The recent intensification of China-US strategic competition has led to a restructuring of regional order. The United States， Japan， Australia， India and even the United Kingdom， France and the European Union have each launched their Indo-Pacific strategies， in which they all reiterate their support for the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations （ASEAN） and recognize its role in the Indo-Pacific region as a well-functioning and solution-oriented regional framework. However， the recognition of ASEAN centrality has not reduced ASEAN’s uneasiness， but instead has significantly increased its anxiety about the strategic implications. Some ASEAN member states expressed concerns that competition between major powers has become dominant in the current regional architecture and threatened important features of ASEAN centrality， as member states may be forced to take sides. In response， ASEAN launched the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific （AOIP） in 2019 in an attempt to maintain its unity and centrality in the restructuring of regional order.

Based on a brief historical review of the changes in regional order and the formation of ASEAN centrality， this article analyzes the impact of the US IndoPacific strategy and China-US strategic competition on ASEAN centrality. It also examines ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts to rebuild ASEAN centrality and its achievements， which would provide a reference for China’s improvement of its regional policies for cooperation with ASEAN in various fields.

China-US Strategic Competition Promotes Profound Changes in Regional Order

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of US-Soviet bipolar structure in the Asia-Pacific region， China-US relations entered a stage of relative détente when both countries sought to cooperate. The US alliance system assumed a dominant role in the Asia-Pacific security order， with the US-Japan alliance as the core， upon which the United States consolidated its alliances with South Korea， Australia， and other countries. In Southeast Asia， the resolution of the Cambodian issue reinvigorated the “ASEAN consciousness”and paved the way for the realization of “greater ASEAN.” In 1999， ASEAN became a regional organization including ten Southeast Asian countries. With the subsequent establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum （ARF）， the East Asia Summit （EAS） and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus， “ASEAN norms” were gradually accepted by major countries inside and outside the region， and ASEAN centrality in the regional cooperation framework was established. During this period， the US-led military alliance was conducive to peace in the Asia-Pacific region. As the US had no intention to establish an Asia-Pacific NATO， the regional security cooperation framework led by ASEAN played a constructive role in the formation of regional security norms and mechanisms.

The US-led alliance system and the ASEAN-led framework were complementary， without plunging into a struggle for dominance. At the same time， the political and economic diversity in the Asia-Pacific became more prominent， especially when China， Japan， South Korea and Southeast Asian countries witnessed a rapid economic upswing in the 1990s. In response to the waves of economic globalization， regional cooperation was stepped up by creating multi-level regional economic organizations， particularly the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation （APEC）， “ASEAN+1” and “ASEAN+3.”

Meanwhile， major changes took place in China’s dealings with neighboring regions， as it began to study and practice the norms of regional multilateralism based on consultation and cooperation. As a result， the ChinaASEAN dialogue relations were established in 1991， and China joined the ARF in 1994. Since then， China has gradually become a major participant and facilitator of East Asian regional cooperation.

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century， the Asia-Pacific had developed a diversified and multi-level economic and political order， whose regional security was guaranteed by the US military alliance system. As a result of long-term peace and rapid economic development， the Asia-Pacific quickly evolved into a model for regional cooperation.

Since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century， significant shifts have occurred in the configuration of the Asia-Pacific. Around 2010， China overtook Japan to become the largest economy in Asia and the second largest in the world， which caused fundamental changes in the balance of power between regional major countries. This historic reversal of the power balance between China and Japan， and the narrowing gap between China and the United States， prompted the US to adopt a new Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy and begin negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement（TPP）. America’s “return” to the Asia-Pacific region was aimed to preserve its regional dominance and push back any “expansion” of China’s regional influence.

Over this period， China began to put together many elements for regional order， even if it did not have a ready-made plan at its disposal for easy implementation. Instead， it was an ongoing process of proposing new ideas and initiatives according to China’s composite strength and changes in the regional environment， and then gaining experience through application. In 2013， at a diplomatic working session concerning China’s neighboring countries， President Xi Jinping stressed that China would pursue friendship and partnership with its neighbors， and seek to create an amicable， secure and prosperous neighborhood. He also pointed out that the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation needs to be brought in line with the neighboring people’s vision for a better life and regional countries’ development prospects， as part of the overall strategic goal of building a community with a shared future with its neighbors.1 On the practical level， China has launched the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI） and has determined Southeast Asia to be one of its priority areas. China and ASEAN countries have also initiated the consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea， integrating it into the regional security architecture.

Despite the US Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy to contain China， competition and cooperation still coexisted in China-US relations during this period. Consequently， ASEAN centrality remained not only largely intact， but as both sides attached even more importance to participation in regional multilateral dialogues， ASEAN became noticeably more active in regional affairs.

In the later period of the Obama administration， there was a marked rise of disappointment and frustration about China among US diplomatic and strategic analysts. Most of them regarded China’s foreign policy as increasingly“intimidating” and advocated a tougher stance on China， especially because the US Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy failed to hold back the rise of China effectively. After a brief period of “dormancy” at the beginning of the Trump administration， the United States launched the Indo-Pacific strategy，2 fueled by domestic forces and supported by Japan， Australia and other allies. This strategy represents a geopolitical design to establish new economic and security rules in the Indo-Pacific， and to create a new type of US-led regional architecture based on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue （Quad） between the United States， Japan， India and Australia. In the economic field， the strategy emphasizes “to spur greater private investment in infrastructure across the region，” and a “bold pursuit of trade that [...] ‘is free， fair， and reciprocal’ while continuing “to work toward forging renewed relationships for trade and economic exchange on the basis of those principles.”3 This differs from the Obama administration’s efforts to promote regional trade arrangements such as the TPP， and instead emphasizes to provide transparent and alternative investments in infrastructure， with an intention to offset the BRI.

The core of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy is comprised of a security agenda to strengthen the rules-based and multi-level security network with the United States at its center. The US is convinced that China and Russia are weakening its military advantages and are undermining prosperity and stability in the Indo-Pacific. To safeguard its national interests and achieve its strategic defense objectives， the United States has vowed to take various measures to establish a networked security architecture and maintain the rules-based international order.4 At the operational level， apart from changing the name of the US Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command， the Indo-Pacific strategy carries on much of the practice of the US Asia-Pacific strategy， comparable with a version 2.0 of the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy.

By the end of 2019， a general security agenda for the Indo-Pacific strategy had been consolidated and implemented in a whole-of-government fashion at various multilateral institutions. However， the realization of the economic agenda lagged behind， with no large-scale infrastructure investment projects in place. After the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020， the Trump administration blamed the pandemic on China and deepened strategic competition against China on economic， technological， geopolitical and ideological fronts. By adopting an increasingly confrontational policy， especially in the economic field， the Trump administration made strong efforts to de-couple from China in global supply and industrial chains， and build international economic and trading blocs with the exclusion of China， such as the Economic Prosperity Network.5

The Biden administration has by and large inherited the Indo-Pacific strategy from the previous government. One hundred days after the new president took office， competition remains the core concept of the Biden administration’s policy on China， determining its organizational principle and tone in dealing with US-China relations. However， in terms of methods， the Biden administration gives more weight to enhancing US competitiveness and strengthening multilateralism by paying more attention to the interests of allies， consulting with them， and seeking their cooperation and support for issues such as economic and trade rules， technology regulation， investment restrictions， democratic values， and security. On March 12， 2021， the United States， Japan， India and Australia held their first Quad summit online， which had been actively promoted by Biden after he entered office. It appears that the US has temporarily put on hold the motion to turn the Quad into an IndoPacific version of NATO， but will nevertheless step up its participation and leadership for more joint influence on regional affairs.6 It should be noted that the multilateralism practiced by the Biden administration is selective in nature， which excludes China and intends to impose greater international pressure on China7 and those countries that are not willing to take sides.

The increasing strategic competition the United States imposes upon China has undermined the existing foundation of the original regional order， as the explicit goal of the Indo-Pacific strategy is to replace the existing order with a new US-led regional order. The attitudes and policies of small- and medium-sized states and regional organizations are decisive to any regional restructuring， because their strategic autonomy may represent severe obstacles for the development of the new regional order. There is also ample room for Chinese diplomacy to strengthen its response to US competition and promote the establishment of a new regional order that is more favorable for the common development of regional countries.

ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook： Rebuilding Centrality amid Changing Regional Order

Not only the United States， Japan， India and Australia， but also the United Kingdom， France， the European Union and other countries or regional organizations have announced their version of an Indo-Pacific program. All of them reiterate their support for ASEAN centrality and its continuous leading role in regional affairs， since ASEAN is the most influential and successful regional organization in the Asia-Pacific. However， ASEAN has recently become more anxious and worried about how strategic competition between China and the US will impact its unity and centrality. Moreover， the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 and the escalating political situation in Myanmar in early 2021 are posing great challenges to ASEAN.

The formation of ASEAN centrality

ASEAN centrality is a unique achievement of the Asia-Pacific region. As more and more countries joined， ASEAN has attached greater importance to ensuring its centrality through a special institutional design. In the “ASEAN Regional Forum： A Concept Paper，” adopted by the second ARF meeting in August 1995， it is stated that ASEAN plays a central role in the ARF. According to that document， applications to join the ARF shall be submitted to the Chair of the ARF who will then consult other ARF members. There shall also be an annual ARF ministerial meeting， held in an ASEAN member state capital after the ASEAN meeting of foreign ministers and other ministerial meetings， and chaired by the host country.8 These rules were drawn up to guarantee ASEAN centrality， and to ensure that ASEAN member states can determine the development direction， process and agenda of the ARF. Surin Pitsuwan，former Deputy Foreign Minister of Thailand， described ASEAN’s position as “the driver.”9 “ASEAN+3” and the East Asia Summit （EAS） followed the same philosophy. In 2005， the first EAS was held， at which ASEAN proposed three qualifications for participants： being a comprehensive dialogue partner of ASEAN， a member of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia（TAC）， and having substantial political and economic ties with ASEAN. The TAC not only provides legal guarantee for the relationship between ASEAN and its partners， but also calls on them to recognize ASEAN centrality and accept “ASEAN norms” as the basic principles governing regional cooperation.

The Obama administration took its relations with ASEAN a step further when it signed the TAC in July 2009 and organized the first USASEAN summit in November of the same year to declare the US “return to Asia.” In 2015， ASEAN and the United States officially established a strategic partnership and issued a joint statement， which stresses that “we are dedicated to ASEAN centrality in the evolving rules-based regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific. [...] We will continue to cooperate through important ASEANled mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit， ASEAN Regional Forum， and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus.”10 Despite his lack of interest in East Asian cooperation， President Donald Trump also repeatedly affirmed his administration’s recognition of ASEAN centrality in a series of official documents and public speeches in preparation for launching his Indo-Pacific strategy， and acknowledged ASEAN as an indispensable and irreplaceable strategic partner of the United States in the region.11 In 2020， on the 5th anniversary of US-ASEAN Strategic Partnership， the United States made a further move by expressing that “this partnership is built on our shared principles， as outlined in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific， including ASEAN centrality， respect for sovereignty and rule of law， good governance， transparency， inclusivity， rules-based frameworks， and openness.”12

The European Union has been the first partner from outside the region to recognize ASEAN centrality. In a 2001 document the EU recognized ASEAN as its main economic and political partner， and confirmed the central role of ASEAN in a July 2003 communication by the EU Commission， called “New Partnership with Southeast Asia.” In April 2021， the EU Council concluded the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to promote effective rulesbased multilateralism， reassure support for ASEAN centrality， and pursue EUASEAN strategic partnership through the EU-ASEAN summit and the AsiaEurope Meeting （ASEM）.13 The United Kingdom’s “Global Britain” agenda， which was launched immediately after the 2016 Brexit referendum to maintain its global influence， also set the focus on Indo-Pacific affairs. Britain took quick follow-up steps by sending diplomatic missions to ASEAN to facilitate the establishment of a dialogue partnership.14

Japan， Australia and India have also launched their respective Indo-Pacific strategies， all recognizing ASEAN centrality.15 They have also reaffirmed this position time and again under the Quad framework， where they， together with the United States， voiced support for ASEAN’s unity and central role as well as the AOIP. The four countries also announced a combined effort to provide countries in the Indo-Pacific region， including ASEAN member states， with one billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022.16

Impact of changing regional order on ASEAN centrality

ASEAN centrality is the outcome of the joint efforts of ASEAN member states and other participants beyond the region. A combination of factors is contributing to sustaining ASEAN centrality： the willingness to cooperate prevails over competition between major powers； ASEAN manages to maintain a balance between major powers； and major extra-regional powers recognize ASEAN’s status.17 Although support for ASEAN centrality has been expressed by the United States， Japan， India and Australia， ASEAN’s anxiety does not go away easily， as the implementation of the US Indo-Pacific strategy and the resulting intensification of US-China strategic competition in the region brings many new challenges. It complicates ASEAN’s intention of maintaining a balance between major powers and preserving unity among its member states.

Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong published two articles in 2019 and 2020 to express his concerns about the impact of China-US strategic competition on the direction of the regional order. He wrote that for long Asian countries had viewed the United States and other developed countries as their main economic partners. After the beginning of reform and openingup in China， they increasingly seized the opportunities created by China’s rapid development. At that time， China was not in a position to challenge US predominance and did not attempt to do so. Southeast Asian countries thus enjoyed the best of both worlds， building economic relationships with China while still maintaining strong ties with the United States and other developed countries. Today， the strained US-China relationship raises profound questions about Asia’s future and the shape of the emerging international order. Southeast Asian countries， including Singapore， are especially affected， as they live at the intersection of the interests of various major powers and must be careful not to get caught in the middle or being forced to make unfavorable decisions.18

The intense competition between big powers has turned regional dialogue platforms more and more into a “microphone” for the US to amplify diplomatic pressure on China， which weakens ASEAN’s privilege for agendasetting and its say in the mechanisms. In September 2020， Michael Pompeo， then US Secretary of State， attacked China in the online US-ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting， and Stephen E. Biegun， Deputy Secretary of State， did the same during the online meeting of ARF foreign ministers. Both officials targeted China in their speeches with accusations concerning the South China Sea， Hong Kong， infrastructure construction， and Mekong water resources， demanding that China halt its alleged “aggressive and destabilizing policies.”19 The United States is not only pressing ASEAN to respond to these issues， but also playing up other topics of particular interest to ASEAN， such as COVID-19 preparedness and response， post-pandemic economic recovery， and non-traditional security threats， always with a view to winning ASEAN over to support its containment efforts against China. If the US persists with these efforts， ASEAN will eventually be forced to take sides， running the risk of becoming marginalized or divided.

Unity is the cornerstone of ASEAN centrality and simultaneously the paramount internal challenge ASEAN faces when coping with changes in the regional order. Given their different historical ties with Southeast Asian countries， which date to periods ranging from colonial times to the Cold War era， the United States， Japan， India， Australia， as well as Britain and France have all adopted a “+ASEAN” approach to their Indo-Pacific strategies in one way or another. To give an example， the United Kingdom emphasizes its ties with Malaysia and Singapore， while the United States in particular pledges to strengthen its military alliances with the Philippines and Thailand.20 Southeast Asian countries may take different positions on the “return” of extraterritorial countries depending on their national interests， and some come into greater conflict with China over the South China Sea issue under the influence of external forces. Due to the “ASEAN norms，” ASEAN does not fully control the behavior of its member states， nor can it restrict their freedom to express their views. These factors may further divide ASEAN in the future.

The AOIP aims to rebuild ASEAN centrality

To safeguard ASEAN’s unity and centrality， the AOIP was adopted at the 34th ASEAN summit in September 2019 under Indonesia’s push. As the ASEAN version of Indo-Pacific program， the AOIP expresses ASEAN’s position on the US-pioneered Indo-Pacific initiative.21 In contrast with the US Indo-Pacific strategy， ASEAN’s standpoint regarding the Indo-Pacific emphasizes inclusiveness， openness and cooperation and reflects its strategic independence and flexibility.

The AOIP offers ASEAN’s own conceptual vision for its central role in the transformation from the “Asia-Pacific” to the “Indo-Pacific.” In terms of geopolitics， the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions have been among the most dynamic in the world for decades， and Southeast Asia has not only been at the center of these dynamics， but also the main passage and gateway to the Indo-Pacific. In terms of geo-economics， the Indo-Pacific region has been the focal point of world economic growth. Within the evolving regional architecture， ASEAN expects itself to further exert its collective leadership and continue to be “an honest broker” for the various competing stakeholders， through various ASEAN-led mechanisms including the EAS， the ARF， the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus （ADMM-Plus）， the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum （EAMF）， and others such as the relevant “ASEAN+1”mechanisms.

The AOIP is conceived to strengthen and give new impetus to all ASEAN-led mechanisms， but it also adds certain changes in the interpretation of ASEAN centrality by stating that ASEAN should continue to be an “honest broker” within the environment of competing strategic interests. “Broker” is related to but different from the previously used terms of “driver” or “l(fā)eader，”focusing more on inclusive connectivity. Connectivity in this sense is meant to synergize various cooperative mechanisms and regional schemes， including more cooperation between ASEAN-led mechanisms and those in other regions and sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific， as well as collaboration with the BRI， the US Indo-Pacific strategy and comparable plans. This is how ASEAN perceives and re-interprets its centrality against the backdrop of intensified rivalry between major powers.

The AOIP reflects ASEAN’s character as an agent for inclusivity， by envisioning the Indo-Pacific “as a closely integrated and interconnected region，” fostering “dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry，” and standing up for “development and prosperity for all.”22 In stark contrast to the US IndoPacific strategy which aims to contain China， the AOIP provides China with diplomatic space to respond positively.

New challenges of ASEAN centrality

Since the publication of AOIP， the Asia-Pacific region has been undergoing significant changes， in particular the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and the sudden change in the political situation of Myanmar in February 2021， which has imposed severe challenges to ASEAN unity. East Asia has been quite successful in controlling the spread of the coronavirus， keeping the region at a low mortality rate and making it one of the first in the world to recover economically. However， mutual assistance and cooperation between ASEAN members is less effective as compared with the close cooperation between China， Japan and South Korea， which raises doubts about the viability of ASEAN integration. In February 2021， after the dramatic turn in Myanmar’s political situation， Indonesia， Thailand， Brunei and other countries participated actively in mediation efforts. On April 24， the ASEAN Leaders’Meeting was convened and reached a five-point consensus on Myanmar， but the implementation remains to be seen.23 As for the situation in Myanmar，countries such as China， the United States and others， as well as international organizations such as the United Nations， are all in favor of ASEAN playing a central and constructive role in dealing with internal affairs of the region. However， as ASEAN upholds the principle of non-interference in internal affairs， the Myanmar issue is still in a deadlock， which raises questions about“the ASEAN way.” As pointed out by some Southeast Asian scholars， the principle of non-interference and consensus-building has prevented ASEAN from coordinating the situation effectively， whereas smaller multilateral groups to deal with controversial issues may preserve ASEAN centrality.

The ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting also instructed ASEAN foreign ministers to hold meetings with their Chinese and US counterparts as soon as possible， prior to the 54th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. The statement underscored the importance of further strengthening ASEAN centrality and unity in building mutual trust with its external partners， particularly in handling its relationships with China and the US.24 ASEAN’s growing anxiety about increased China-US competition was further fueled by the Biden administration’s attempt to force ASEAN to take sides in the US rivalry against China. In April 2021， the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations passed the Strategic Competition Act of 2021， which would require the government to leverage all strategic， economic and diplomatic tools available to prevent China from becoming “hegemonic” in the Indo-Pacific and further a “l(fā)eading world power.” The large section of the bill dealing with the Indo-Pacific recommends that the US government under the guiding framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy fulfill its pledges to key allies and bilateral and regional partners， and advance cooperation in various fields to counter economic， security and diplomatic “coercions” from China. The bill suggests continuous US support for ASEAN community and centrality， and proposes strengthened cooperation in public health， economy， security and other fields. It is worth noting that the bill recommends closer US-ASEAN cooperation in investment and export of strategic technologies and key infrastructure projects， cyber security and artificial intelligence， while suggesting sanctions on China where necessary.25 Once the bill was passed， ASEAN and its member states would be forced to choose one or the other partner for cooperation in many fields and on many issues， which is a fundamental rejection of the spirit of inclusiveness in the AOIP.

With the implementation of the US Indo-Pacific strategy， the Quad has been reactivated to become the central regional mechanism of the strategy. The upgrading and expansion of the Quad pose additional challenges to ASEAN centrality and unity. In the early phase of the Quad， meetings at the directorgeneral level were mainly held on the sidelines of ASEAN meetings， and it was not until 2020 that a special Quad meeting was convened. The Quad summit held in March 2021 marked the completion of the upgrading. Besides， the Quad aims to include Vietnam and South Korea as its partners. In May 2020， Vietnam joined the dialogue under the “Quad+” format， hoping that engagement in other multilateral institutions beyond the ASEAN framework could lead to a balancing of interests.26 However， scholars in US think tanks have pointed out that the rapid expansion of the Quad has stirred up fears that it would replace ASEAN centrality.27 Of course， it remains to be observed to what extent the Quad will impact ASEAN centrality， and the interaction between the Quad and ASEAN is also a significant variable in the equation.

To sum up， the type of ASEAN centrality as recognized by other parties differs from ASEAN’s own perception. ASEAN builds on the concept and functions of its centrality in a dynamic and flexible fashion. When the relationship between major powers is relatively calm， ASEAN prioritizes its agenda to advance regional economic， political and security development.When competition between major powers is on the rise in the regional environment， ASEAN assumes its role as an impartial arbitrator， striving to synergize diverging strategies for the region， and providing a platform for political communication and even crisis management. This， though in a different way， illustrates ASEAN’s irreplaceable role and centrality. The United States and other countries emphasize ASEAN centrality with the motive of using it for their own purposes of building a networked security architecture and maintaining US dominance through ASEAN-led regional mechanisms， such as the EAS， the ARF and the ADMM-Plus.28 This way ASEAN is misinterpreted as a mere provider of dialogue platforms rather than a driver that decides the direction of its activities. Therefore， this kind of recognition cannot pacify ASEAN. To preserve its centrality and unity to the greatest extent， ASEAN must put forward its own vision of regional framework.

Support for ASEAN Centrality and Development Prospects for China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations

The year 2021 marks the 30th anniversary of dialogue relations between China and ASEAN. In the past 30 years， China has been number one on many fronts among ASEAN’s dialogue partners. It was the first to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia， the first to forge strategic partnership with ASEAN， the first to start FTA negotiations with ASEAN， and the first to give unequivocal support for ASEAN centrality in East Asian regional cooperation.29

China always regards ASEAN as a priority partner in its neighborhood diplomacy. China firmly supports the building of an ASEAN community， and strives for a mutually beneficial China-ASEAN relationship. Since 1991， China has participated in and helped push forward all East Asian multilateral processes with ASEAN at the center， including the ARF， ASEAN’s cooperation with China， Japan and South Korea， the EAS and the ADMM-Plus. Since the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative was proposed in Indonesia in 2013， a considerable number of BRI demonstration projects have been launched in Southeast Asian countries. In 2020， China and ASEAN joined hands in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and showed the flexibility and effectiveness of regional governance， opening up new options for global governance reform and transformation. In the same year， ASEAN and China set a historical record by becoming each other’s largest trading partner. In November 2020， 15 countries including China and ASEAN countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement （RCEP）， the most significant outcome of East Asian economic integration in nearly two decades.30 During the same period， at the 23rd China-ASEAN summit， leaders announced the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ChinaASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity （2021-2025）. It lists a comprehensive program of China-ASEAN cooperation in ten areas， and covers a diverse cooperation agenda in multi-level mechanisms.31 It is based on a long-term incremental increase of cooperation as well as on the confidence in continuous and broader cooperation in the future. Past experiences have shown that Southeast Asia is the most stable regional partner for China， where collaboration efforts have borne the most fruit.

Support for ASEAN centrality has positive implications for China. By participating in various ASEAN-led regional cooperation mechanisms， China has established platforms for consultation and cooperation with the Southeast Asian region as a whole， which has contributed to substantially stabilizing its relations with the region and easing land and maritime territorial disputes with some of ASEAN member states.32 To give an example， ASEAN has in recent years generally stayed away from the “two red lines” concerning the South China Sea issue， by not publicly pointing the finger at China or including the award of the South China Sea arbitration between China and the Philippines in official joint statements. This has played a positive role in reducing international pressure on China and stabilizing the regional situation. Of course， there are a few Southeast Asian countries trying to increase their stakes at the ASEAN platform to bargain with China， but overall， based on the idea of “dual tracks，” China and ASEAN countries have kept the situation in the South China Sea under control. The progress cannot do without the valuable role that ASEAN has played， especially given the efforts by the US and its allies to internationalize and weaponize the issue by submitting the disputes to judicial adjudication.

In a broader sense， through involvement in the ASEAN-led regional cooperation mechanisms， China’s foreign policy has witnessed a major shift from cautious participation to active promotion. China-ASEAN cooperation has thus created a model for China to establish a new type of relations with other small- and medium-sized countries， convincing them of China’s firm position in favor of multilateralism and against seeking dominance in regional cooperation.33

In the coming years， China needs to strengthen cooperation with smalland medium-size countries in the region to forge a new regional order featuring openness， inclusiveness， equality and cooperation. For this purpose， China needs to clarify its vision， strategic intention and objectives for the shaping of regional order. By so doing， it would not only reduce misperceptions about China by the United States and its allies， but also remove doubts of ASEAN and other neighboring countries. The Chinese vision for regional order needs to be guided by the idea of building a community of shared future with itsx neighbors， and pursue friendships and partnerships under the principle of amity， sincerity， mutual benefit and inclusiveness. In the economic domain， the principle of extensive consultation， joint contribution and shared benefits needs to be followed in the implementation of the BRI. In the security field， under the new security concept， breakthroughs may be achieved in handling maritime disputes. In general， China needs to build stable and balanced relationships with other major powers and further deepen its relations with neighboring countries.

In particular， China’s vision for regional order needs to be aligned with the AOIP， in terms of philosophy， rules and cooperation agenda. China has officially affirmed its support for “ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture and all ASEAN-led mechanisms and fora，”34 and believes that the regional cooperation framework centered on ASEAN has become mature and consolidated， complying with the tradition and real needs of East Asian cooperation. China will work together with ASEAN countries and “hold on to the original aspiration of focusing cooperation on East Asia， promote multilateralism with East Asian characteristics， contribute the East Asian experience to global governance， and inject lasting impetus for regional development.”35

At the same time， China emphasizes that it is inappropriate to throw overboard established ideas and introduce new concepts in a hasty fashion to the regional architecture. This concerns the notion of “Indo-Pacific.” It remains largely unresolved whether China would accept the concept. Those who oppose it argue that the Indo-Pacific is indeed a geopolitical idea， and that the US Indo-Pacific strategy was launched to amplify competition with China and maintain US dominance in the region. However， more and more experts suggest that the concept should be understood from historical and realistic perspectives. Studies have pointed out that when the concept of the Indo-Pacific was first put forward by German scholars it was first used as a scientific term to describe a geographical region， but became politicized to justify Germany’s competition with the US and the UK who had cultivated Southeast Asia long before. Therefore， from early on the term “Indo-Pacific”has been a geopolitical concept.36 Australia， Japan and the United States have adopted the concept in recent years to serve their regional strategic ambitions.

In comparison， ASEAN pursues a dual approach in adopting the IndoPacific concept. On the one hand， this concept perceives the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean as one integrated and interconnected region， constituting a single geostrategic theater with Southeast Asia at its core. Full acceptance of the concept would thus help to highlight the strategic value of ASEAN. On the other hand， ASEAN member states are well aware that China regards the concept as a US conspiracy to reduce Chinese influence in Asia. Given this， Indonesia has explained that ASEAN accepted the term “Indo-Pacific” in the sense that cooperation in the Indian Ocean Rim is to be connected to the more experienced forms of collaboration in the Asia-Pacific. In contrast to the US， ASEAN has no intention of reducing Chinese influence or containing China.

Thus， rooted in the historical context， the Indo-Pacific is a dynamic concept， evolving to become a political vision for various countries through innovation， rather than a fixed concept established by formal consensus. In this regard， China may have its own interpretation and definition， because realistically the Indo-Pacific as a geographical concept is not necessarily harmful to China. From the Asia-Pacific to the Indian Ocean， the IndoPacific is a vast region where projects of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road can be implemented. China also has a wide range of political， economic and security interests in the region， which it needs to safeguard by establishing rules， mechanisms and frameworks. Moreover， the Indo-Pacific concept has been accepted and used by many countries in the region and beyond， and may be applied more regularly to name regional organizations in the future. To synergize ASEAN’s development with other major countries in the region and beyond， ASEAN is making every effort to persuade them to accept the AOIP and recognize ASEAN centrality.

Apart from the joint understanding of concepts， China and ASEAN need to synergize their approaches and rules. During the past 30 years of dialogue relations between China and ASEAN， the two sides have reached many consensuses， including upholding the purposes and principles of the TAC， promoting regional peace and prosperity， supporting multilateralism and globalization， etc. To improve its capability in the making of international rules and regulations， China may begin at the regional governance level， especially through cooperation with ASEAN. Past experiences have shown that many of the ideas become more acceptable to all parties when they are proposed by ASEAN. In the opinion of Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng， authors of The ASEAN Miracle， “The reason ASEAN has emerged as the indispensable platform for great power engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is that it is too weak to be a threat to anyone. So all the great powers instinctively trust it.”37

Simultaneously， China needs to have an objective understanding of the role of ASEAN centrality. In the current situation， the surging China-US strategic competition will largely shift the direction of regional order restructuring， and ASEAN centrality will most likely work on certain specific areas and issues. First， ASEAN plays an irreplaceable role in the domestic affairs of Southeast Asian nations. To take the issue of Myanmar as an example， ASEAN knows better than any other countries and regional organizations the special situation of Myanmar， and is better positioned to participate in its problem-solving in a constructive way. The role ASEAN plays in this aspect may be conducive to fending off external interference.38 Second， regional economic cooperation， including the implementation of the RCEP and promoting third-party market cooperation， may underscore the significance of ASEAN centrality. Finally， non-traditional security issues， such as public health governance including the fight against COVID-19， anti-terrorism operations and marine disaster prevention and mitigation， are not only primary security concerns of Southeast Asian countries， but also areas in which China， the United States and other countries outside the region are willing to strengthen cooperation. China should provide support for ASEAN to set agendas， build consensus for partial strategic cooperation between different parties， enhance political mutual trust， reduce strategic misjudgment and strengthen crisis management.

Conclusion

Despite some initial difficulties in the early phase of their relationship， China and ASEAN have successfully managed and maintained their dialogue relations for the past 30 years， resulting in win-win cooperation under a model with regional characteristics that is beneficial for both sides. As Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out， China-ASEAN partnership is founded on their common understanding of a shared future and aims for win-win cooperation， and is never targeted against any third party.39 Based on past experiences and successes， China and ASEAN will continue their cooperation through mutual consultation to jointly cope with the anti-globalization trend and the challenge brought by the US intention to reshape regional order. In the coming years， the Asia-Pacific will increasingly be faced with a choice to either go for win-win cooperation or get caught in zero-sum game， to go for unification or run into division. Although the influence of US strategies still weighs heavily， the future depends more on the choices made by China， ASEAN and other regional forces. If countries adhere to the principle of working together in the same direction， and make flexible and pragmatic strategic adjustments respectively， a new regional order that is open， cooperative， inclusive and fair can be expected in the Asia-Pacific region.

1 “Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at the Meeting of Diplomatic Work Concerning China’s Neighboring Countries，” Xinhua， October 25， 2013. http：//www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_ 117878897.htm.

2 The Trump administration， shortly after coming to power， announced a complete withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy as well as the TPP negotiations， indifferent to the East Asia Summit and other regional cooperation mechanisms. Consequently， Japan and Australia， while redefining their regional strategies， restarted the Quad between the United States， Japan， India and Australia， trying to keep the US in the dialogue and win over India to respond to the rise of China. See Zhang Jie， “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Reconstruction of Asia-Pacific Order，” China International Studies， Issue 1， 2019.

3 “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the 6th U.S.-ASEAN Summit，” US Mission to ASEAN， November 16， 2018， https：//asean.usmission.gov/remarks-by-vice-president-pence-at-the-6th-u-s-asean-summit.

4 US Department of Defense， “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report： Preparedness， Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region，” June 1， 2019， https：//media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/ DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.

5 Zhao Minghao， “The Coronavirus and China-U.S. Strategic Competition，” Journal of American Studies， No.4， 2020， p.20.

6 Zhang Jie， “Quad Summit Intensifies Competition in Regional Order，” World Affairs， No. 7， 2021， p.24， https：//new.qq.com/omn/20210422/20210422A0FA9F00.html.

7 Yan Xuetong， “Biden Exerts Greater Pressure on China than Trump，” April 22， 2021， https：//new. qq.com/omn/20210422/20210422A0FA9F00.html.

8 “The ASEAN Regional Forum： A Concept Paper，” https：//2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/12052.htm.

9 Zheng Xianwu， Security， Cooperation and Community： Theory and Practice of Southeast Asian Security Regionalism. Nanjing University Press， 2009， p.320.

10 “Joint Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership，” The White House， November 21， 2015， https：//obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/21/joint-statement-asean-us-strategicpartnership.

11 “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the 6th U.S.-ASEAN Summit”； US Department of Defense，“Indo-Pacific Strategy Report： Preparedness， Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region.”

12 “United States-ASEAN Strategic Partnership，” September 9， 2020， https：//asean.usmission.gov/factsheet-united-states-asean-strategic-partnership.

13 Council of the European Union， “Council on Conclusions on an EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific，” April 16， 2021， https：//data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7914-2021-INIT/en/pdf.

14 ASEAN Secretariat， “Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting，” April 24， 2021， https：// asean.org/storage/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf.

15 Zhang Jie， “The ASEAN Indo-Pacific Vision： Understanding Changing Regional Order and Strategic Choices，” The Pacific Journal， No.6， 2019， pp.15-16.

16 “QUAD Leaders’ Joint Statement： The Spirit of the QUAD，” March 13， 2021， https：//www.pm.gov.au/ media/quad-leaders-joint-statement-spirit-quad.

17 Wei Zongyou， “ASEAN Centrality from the Indo-Pacific Perspective and Challenges of US-ASEAN Relations，” Journal of Southeast Asian Affairs， No.3， 2019， p.8.

18 Lee Hsien Loong， “Keynote Address by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 18th IISS ShangriLa Dialogue，” IISS， May 31， 2019， https：//www.iiss.org/-/media/files/shangri-la-dialogue/2019/speeches/ keynote-address-lee-hsien-loong-transcript.ashx； Lee Hsien Loong， “The Endangered Asian Century： America， China， and the Perils of Confrontation，” Foreign Affairs， July/ August 2020.

19 “Secretary Pompeo’s Participation in ASEAN-United States Foreign Ministers’ Meeting，” September 9， 2020， https：//asean.usmission.gov/secretary-pompeos-participation-in-asean-united-states-foreignministers-meeting； “Deputy Secretary Biegun’s Participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum Virtual Foreign Ministers’ Meeting，” September 12， 2020， https：//asean.usmission.gov/deputy-secretary-biegunsparticipation-in-the-asean-regional-forum-virtual-foreign-ministers-meeting.

20 US Senate， “Strategic Competition Act of 2021，” https：//www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senatebill/1169/text.

21 “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific，” https：//asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-theIndo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf.

22 “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”

23 “Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting，” April 24， 2021， https：//asean.org/storage/ Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf.

24 “Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting，” April 24， 2021.

25 US Senate， “Strategic Competition Act of 2021.”

26 Vietnam also takes a positive attitude towards the Indo-Pacific concept. In the Vietnam-India Joint Vision Statement for Peace， Prosperity and People， concluded at the Vietnam-India virtual summit in December 2020， Vietnam for the first time used the term “Indo-Pacific” in a high-level joint statement. See“Vietnam-India Joint Vision Statement for Peace， Prosperity and People，” Online News of the Government of Vietnam， December 21， 2020， http：//news.chinhphu.vn/Home/Full-Viet-NamIndia-Joint-VisionStatement-for-Peace-Prosperity-and-People/202012/42482.vgp.

27 Stephen Tankel et al.， “Positive Visions， Powerful Partnerships： the Keys to Competing with China in a Post-Pandemic Indo-Pacific，” CNAS， March 2021， https：//www.cnas.org/publications/reports/positivevisions-powerful-partnerships.

28 Wei Zongyou， “ASEAN Centrality from the Indo-Pacific Perspective and Challenges of US-ASEAN Relations，” p.1.

29 “Speech by Premier Li Keqiang at 23rd China-ASEAN Summit，” November 12， 2020， http：//english. www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/202011/13/content_WS5fade6dbc6d0f7257693f972.html.

30 Yang Jiechi， “Firmly Uphold and Practice Multilateralism and Build a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind，” February 21， 2021， https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1855530.shtml.

31 The ten areas are political and security cooperation， economic cooperation， social and cultural cooperation， connectivity cooperation， smart city cooperation， sustainable development cooperation， initiative for ASEAN integration and narrowing development gap， East Asia cooperation， sub-regional cooperation， and inter-regional cooperation and cooperation in the UN. See “Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity （2021–2025），” https：//asean.org/ storage/2012/05/ASEAN-China-POA-2021-2025.pdf.

32 Zhang Yunling， Between Ideal and Reality： My Research， Participation and Thoughts of East Asian Cooperation， China Social Sciences Press， 2015， p.231.

33 Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng， The ASEAN Miracle： A Catalyst for Peace， NUS University Press， 2017.

34 “Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity （2021–2025）.”

35 “Wang Yi Gives an Interview after Meeting Foreign Ministers from Five Neighboring Countries，”April 5， 2021， https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1866842.shtml.

36 Li Hansong， “The Concept of the Indo-Pacific： Sources and International Reception in the Global Context，” Zhejiang Academic Journal， No.2， 2021， pp.61-62.

37 Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng， The ASEAN Miracle.

38 “Wang Yi： China Expects the Special Meeting of ASEAN Leaders to be Conducive in Three Aspects，”April 22， 2021， https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1871058.shtml.

39 “Wang Yi Attends the United Nations Security Council High-level Open Debate Enhancing Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations，” April 19， 2021， https：//www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1870100.shtml.