From the Belt and Road Initiative to Afghanistans present security situation， China has been instrumental in having cordial and close relations with regional countries. During the Cold War， China never supported the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union and even condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Also， China has never sought direct engagement with Afghan Mujahedeen； instead， it prefers an indirect approach either through Pakistan or the US for peace in Afghanistan. Chinas policy of non-interference in Afghanistans foreign policy continued till the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. China has been cautious about its participation in the Afghan peace process， and always puts peace as the topmost priority. An explanation for such a cautious approach with Afghanistan may be the existence of a terrorist network between ISIS in Khurasan， the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan （IMU）， the East Turkistan Islamic Movement， the Haqqani Network， al-Qaeda， and ISIS， which secretly supports Islamic militancy in the Uighur population.

In addition to economic development and political stability， China is also working on a long-term regional politico-strategic dimension. Thus， the region may not be marred by the menace of terrorism in the future. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor （CPEC） under the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI） is such a step in the right direction. A mega project between Pakistan and China， the CPEC is crucial for regional countries， especially Afghanistan， while a safe and secure Afghanistan is indispensable to the success of the CPEC. Despite chronic conflicts in the country， peace in Afghanistan is still possible， but not without a regional initiative that finds a solution acceptable to all the stakeholders. As such an initiative， the CPEC will contribute to Afghanistans economic development and help bring longawaited peace and prosperity to the war-torn state.

Evolution of China-Afghanistan Relations

Afghanistan and the Peoples Republic of China border each other through the Wakhan Corridor. In November 1893， the Durand mission to Kabul agreed to extend the Afghan border through a narrow strip eastward， called the Wakhan Corridor， to separate British India from Russia， out of geopolitical motive instead of demographic logic. All the states concerned except China recognized the Corridor in the 1895 Anglo-Russian Pamirs Agreement， although China now has a border with Afghanistan.1

The history of China-Afghanistan relations can be traced back to the 7th century， when Chinese monks traveled to Afghanistan along the Silk Road and visited Buddha statues in the Bamyan Province of Afghanistan.2 Along with Buddhist pilgrims， China also sent other envoys to travel along the Silk Road for geographical， commercial and political exploration.3 As part of the Islamic Empire， the Afghan area sent as many as thirty-five official missions to China annually between 713 and 755. The Tang Dynasty sent an army of about 100，000 men， which marched up the Pamirs from Kashgar across the Xinjiang-Wakhan-Kashmir mountain ranges to set up a military garrison in the Hunza valley， thereby establishing a long tradition of Chinese authority over neighboring areas up to the time of the 1911 Revolution.4

There was no specific evidence of China-Afghanistan exchanges in the early 20th century. While historical trade routes passed either north or south of the Wakhan Corridor， little but opium， horses or a few farm products crossed the China-Afghanistan border. In the 1920s， an abortive Afghan attempt to exert influence in Xinjiang was in part a Soviet effort to dislodge British and Chinese power.5 Since its independence at the end of WWI， Afghanistan has been involved in the diplomatic maneuvering in the Middle East.6 As the eastern anchor of the WWII grand alliance， China was prompted by the United States to mobilize Afghanistan， among all countries in the Middle East， to join the allied front. With the help of the United Kingdom， a treaty of amity was concluded between China and Afghanistan in 1944 by their envoys to Turkey.7 Afghanistan was one of the first non-communist countries to extend its official recognition to the Peoples Republic of China in 1949. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai paid a visit to Afghanistan in 1956.8

During the Cold War in the 1960s， Afghanistan was pressured to stand on the Soviet side. Even though Moscow could not make Kabul accept its security strategy against China， Beijing could not have been pleased with its increasingly unfriendly neighbor in the Pamirs.9 In 1960， China and Afghanistan signed a Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression Agreement. Also， China was not in favor of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There was factional fighting after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan， and then the Taliban took control.

China is always cautious in dealing with Muslim countries. Some Uighur Muslims fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Though there was no official support for these fighters， Beijings silence still indicated that the authorities knew but did nothing to stop.10 Instead of directly engaging with the Afghan mujahedeen， China chose to work with the US and Pakistan.11 After the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan was over， the East Turkistan Islamic Movement （ETIM） surfaced， which， according to China， had the Talibans support. Since the 1990s， China has publicly linked ETIM to al-Qaeda and the Taliban.12 Thus， China did not restore its relations with Afghanistan， which was suspended during the Soviet invasion， until the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001.13

In the post-Taliban era， China， for the first time， engaged with Afghanistan over development projects and construction assistance. ZTE and Huawei， two Chinese companies， worked together to improve Afghanistans telecommunication network which was comprised of two million lines. It is the first project that China was involved after the September 11 attacks.14 The European Union also hired several Chinese companies for reconstructing roads and hospitals in Kandahar and Kabul， and China contributed to the Parwan irrigation project and the construction of a dam in this region.15 From 2002 to 2010， Chinese aid to Afghanistan reached $1 billion.16 The China Metallurgical Group bid $3.5 billion for a 30-year lease to extract 11 million tons of copper in Afghanistan， outbidding American， Russian， Kazakh， and Canadian firms by $1 billion.17

After 2014， China adjusted its policy towards Afghanistan. Since China and Afghanistan are close neighbors， any significant change in Afghanistan would ultimately affect China. Given the China-US rivalry， US presence in Afghanistan is also important to Chinese foreign policy. Therefore， China is taking a more active role in Afghanistan， especially in the Afghan peace process. When then US President Donald Trump suspended negotiations with the Taliban in September 2019， a Taliban delegation visited China to discuss the stalemate， reaffirming Chinese involvement in Afghanistan.

Rapid Development of China-Afghanistan Relations

Following the horrific September 11 attacks， the United States invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Afghan Taliban. After a new government was established in Kabul， China extended its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in 2001 and was one of the first countries to establish official relations with then Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan Transitional Administration. Soon after its reopening in February 2002， the Chinese embassy in Kabul offered $5 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.18 China was mainly involved in reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan. The two countries signed bilateral agreements to advance overall relations and facilitate closer and deeper economic and technical cooperation.19 At the same time， China was very cautious about its military involvement. Neither did it dispatch troops to join the International Security Assistance Force （ISAF）， nor did it respond to American demarche to open the Wakhan Corridor as a transit route for supplying NATO troops in Afghanistan.20

Beijings investment-based approach allowed it to make friends and pre-empt enemies， promote peace while keeping distance from the troubled ISAF， and enhance its position with the Karzai regime and its possible successors.21 In this way， China ensured that its involvement in Afghanistan would not be portrayed as hijacking the United States efforts in the country. A stable and neutral Afghanistan is in Chinas national interests， A stable and neutral Afghanistan is in Chinas national interests， as stability and security in Afghanistan would guard against the spillover of extremism， while remaining neutral would forestall Kabul from being instrumental in a potential greatpower competition against China in one way or another.22

The long-term US presence in Afghanistan does not bode well for Chinas economic and strategic interests in this area.23 An objective of American grand strategy is to counter the growing influence of China in South Asia and to gain access to West Asia.24 In comparison， the main objective of Chinas foreign policy is to create a sound surrounding environment.25

With more economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan， Chinese policymakers have changed their stance on Afghanistan—from deeply-rooted disinterest to growing involvement.26 As the US prepared to scale back its military presence in Afghanistan in 2020， China had begun to contemplate a geopolitical “march westwards.”27 Beijing is concerned about the instability in South Asia and its possible effects on western China. Moreover， the success of the Central Asian element of the Belt and Road Initiative requires a level of stability and security in Afghanistan.28 The quest for having friendly neighbors in Afghanistan persuaded China to engage the Taliban. It has taken an active part in summits， in particular the Istanbul summit， and convened several bilateral or trilateral meetings with Pakistan， Afghanistan， Russia， and even India.29

In recent years China has been a prominent stakeholder in Afghan affairs， especially as the US proceeds to withdraw from the country. China has also facilitated the Afghan peace process. Even after the peace process was suspended， a delegation of Taliban leaders visited China to discuss the stalled talks with the US.

At the same time， there remain several complications which might make issues in the region for Chinese foreign policy towards Afghanistan.

Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions

Pakistan and Afghanistan have been hostile to each other in the postTaliban era. There is mistrust and a display of the prisoners dilemma in their relations. Despite Pakistans efforts to be a good neighbor， it is blamed for the chaos in Afghanistan， providing safe havens for miscreants in Pakistans Federally Administered Tribal Area （FATA）， and sponsoring terrorism and suicide bombing.30 Although Pakistan was an important US ally in the War on Terror， it still fails to have friendly relations with the new Afghan government backed by the US and other Western powers. One possible reason could be that Pakistan was forced to fight against its former friends and rulers of Afghan Taliban which did not turn out to be a good venture on the part of Pakistan. Therefore， Pakistan is accused of playing a double game—secretly supporting the Afghan Taliban while being a US ally. Many fighters fled the porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to take refuge in Pakistan. The Afghan government has repeatedly accused Islamabad of not only sheltering the Taliban but also helping them in order to make its presence and indispensability felt.31 On June 22， 2006， President Karzai even asked the international community to disarm the terrorists by cutting their sources of funding and attacking their training camps， implicitly pointing to Pakistan.32 This double game and the US-backed Afghan governments tilt towards Pakistans arch-rival India， along with the Durand Line question， all contributed to antagonistic relations between the two countries.

Pakistan and China share common interests in the geopolitical dynamism of South Asia as a whole and in Afghanistan， which is strategically important for them. Historically， China did not have much significant influence in Afghanistan， but Pakistan did. Pakistans decreasing influence and Indias increasing influence in Afghanistan are not beneficial for China， especially given the China-India competition and Indias attempt to counter Chinese influence in the region.

India-Afghan friendship

Since its independence， India has maintained good relations with Afghanitan. India was among the first non-communist states to recognize the government installed by the Soviet Union after its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. New Delhi supported successive governments in Kabul until the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s.33 After the US invasion of Afghanistan， India extended its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan by supporting the US-backed government and providing economic assistance to Kabul， presenting its influence and soft power in Afghanistan. India has helped Afghanistan with the communications infrastructure， educational institutions， health services， transport services， and the personnel training of the Afghan military and intelligence agency.34 India provides more foreign aid to Afghanistan than to any other country.35 Since 2001， India has offered more than $1.2 billion for Afghanistans reconstruction， making it the largest regional donor to Afghanistan.36 India enjoys a positive image in Afghanistan on both national and local levels.

After all the years of considerable engagement in Afghanistan， India， now a stakeholder in Afghan politics， is now heading towards a new crisis with the emergence of the Taliban. With Iran， Russia， China， and the United States directly engaging with the Taliban， and the credibility of the Kabul government at an all-time low， New Delhi is gearing up for a new set of equations in Afghanistan.37 It will have to work closely not only with the United States to ensure that Pakistan doesnt get a free hand in managing the Afghan political transition， but also with other regional stakeholders， such as China， Russia and Iran， to ensure a balance in Afghanistans polity.38

Threat of terrorism

Chinas focus in Afghanistan is moving from development projects to the containment of perceived security threats.39 Instability in Afghanistan has provided an enabling environment for terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda， ISISKhorasan， ETIM， Lashkar-e-Taiba， the Haqqani Network， and IMU to launch attacks across the region.40 China has additional security concerns related to Islamic militancy among the Uighur population in Xinjiang， an autonomous region in its far-western territories. Uighur militants have found shelter beyond Chinas borders in the past， and in recent years， aided by ISIS， Uighur militancy has re-emerged in Afghanistan， where the Islamic State of Khorasan Province（ISKP） has called for jihad against China， vowing to “shed blood like rivers.”41 Over the past decade， operation centers of extremist groups in Xinjiang， most notably ETIM， moved into Afghanistan， Kazakhstan， Tajikistan and Uzbekistan due to the NATO war in Afghanistan and effective measures by the Chinese government.42 They are hence developing ties with jihadist factions there affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

However， long-term conflicts and chronic corruption problems in Afghanistan have failed many stabilization and development initiatives in the past two decades. Having seen the failure of these Western-led projects， Beijing now views Afghanistan as increasingly important， if not yet a strategic priority， due to both the security threats emanating from Afghanistan and its proximity to Xinjiang.43 The Chinese government perceives terrorist groups– especially ETIM， which seeks independence for Xinjiang – as the most significant threat to its national security.

Possible Extension of CPEC to Afghanistan： National and Regional Implications

There will be local and regional implications for Afghanistan as the CPEC steadily advances. The CPEC may impact the role of extraterritorial countries in the region as well as Afghan national security. While the US involvement in Afghanistan to curb terrorist elements is to reduce threat to itself， Pakistans proximity with Afghanistan has opened more vistas of connection and understanding， primarily via the CPEC. In the light of both， national and regional implications of the CPEC for Afghanistan are discussed as follows.

US war fatigue and exit strategy

The United States waged war on Afghanistan soon after the September 11 attacks， which the Bush administration named the Global War on Terror（GWOT）， but the enthusiasm for GWOT slowed down in a short time. Policymakers and academia started talking about the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan within five years. According to Graham E. Fuller， a former vice-chair of the US National Intelligence Council， America wanted to show its military power in a unipolar world， and with that ambition， the Bush administration launched a war in Afghanistan. This ambition， however， generated “strategic fatigue” in America.44

At first， the US focused on counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance， without sufficient dedication to Afghan nation-building. Though a Marshall Plan was promised for Afghanistan， very little from that aid was utilized on development projects. Different scholars have identified numerous administrative failures including “an unfulfilled promise，” a shift of resources to Iraq， a piecemeal operation， inability to work with then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf against the Taliban insurgents who were given a sanctuary in FATA， the strategic division between the Afghan administration and the NATO countries， and the failure to build domestic consensus.45

Administrative moves and strategies with regard to Afghanistan were different during the Obama administration. The Obama administration and the NATO leadership believed that military combat against the Taliban was not the solution to the ongoing Afghan conflict， though they professed to the Taliban and to the Karzai government that Taliban must refrain from violence， accept the constitution of Afghanistan， and pledge to protect human rights as a precondition to peace talks. Before receiving any clear commitments from the Taliban on these matters， the Obama administration allowed the Karzai government to start talks with Taliban leaders by assisting their travel to Kabul， even without the knowledge of their chief Mohammed Omar. However， Pakistans military intelligence agency， the Inter-Services Intelligence （ISI）， disapproved of the talks without its participation.46 At that time， ISI had arrested almost 23 Taliban leaders， including Ghani Bardar， second in rank in the Taliban.47

The Obama administration wanted to end the war in Afghanistan， which is the longest war that the US ever fought. Reasons for the prolonged war include a belief in “the white mans burden” （the alleged moral obligation of the US to make a humanitarian gesture against the Talibans brutalities）， the need to acquire support from coalition partners in support of GWOT， and the expectations of support from neighboring countries like Pakistan and Central Asian countries. The growing war fatigue was most prominent because of heavy causalities for the US military and a loss of $100 billion per year with no end in sight until January 2011.48 However， the US failed to rebuild Afghanistan or cut off the Talibans funding. And the Afghan army was neither powerful nor motivated due to the uncertain commitment from across the border to fight against insurgency.49

The succeeding President Donald Trump did not follow the path of his predecessor in dealing with Afghanistan as he first ordered an increase of American troops in Afghanistan. But with the passage of time， a shift has been observed that the United States sought to finalize a deal with the Taliban. There was a political consensus of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan even before Trump broadcast his desire for it. Though “there is no such thing as a failed intervention capped by a successful exit strategy，”50 the US is more determined to extinguish al-Qaeda than to destroy the Taliban.

That US troops would not stay in Afghanistan forever doesnt mean that they are cavalier about how it leaves. The US government should have negotiated with the Taliban at the height of its leverage， when it had 100，000 troops in Afghanistan. It should have forestalled the insurgencys rise in the first place by encouraging the Talibans political integration at their weakest， in the first few years after the September 11 attacks. But the US did neither. “With the US forces reduced to some 14，000 now， after a dip to around 8，000 two years ago， the US leverage has been wasting away year on year.”51 Now it is to be observed how tactfully the US exits from Afghanistan without letting Afghanistan descend into civil war and disrupt the prospects of stability not only in Afghanistan but in the entire region.

Chinas major interests in Afghan security

As the worlds second-largest economy， China contributes 30 percent of global economic growth. It understands its international duties and keeps a good balance in geopolitics while actively endorsing projects related to global peace， stability， and development.52 China has the potential to perform a vital role in Afghanistan.

The security interest is a priority for China since Afghanistan borders the Xinjiang region of China. China is concerned about the threat of Islamic jihadists and the spillover of extremism. China hopes to have a stable government not controlled by the Taliban， although it does not mind if there is a reintegration with the Taliban. Therefore， China has a stake in the stability of Afghanistan. Economic interest is also prominent， since China is a nation with increasing needs for energy and Afghanistan has almost unexploited oil and gas reserves. Moreover， Afghanistan is of geopolitical importance for China. US military engagement aims at containing China and obtaining hydrocarbon resources of Central Asian countries instead of advancing Afghanistans security. With Beijings and Washingtons presence， Afghanistan is seen as another ground for regional and global maneuvering. And by backing up Pakistans position in Afghanistan， China is an increasingly important stakeholder in the country.

Chinas economic and political influence has been constantly growing in Afghanistan. It has become involved in Kabuls political stability and its potential reconciliation with the Taliban. It has recently exhibited ingenuity in getting involved in the Afghan peace and reconciliation process. China is part of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group， a multilateral mechanism on Afghan peace and reconciliation process that comprises Afghanistan， China， Pakistan and the United States， and once allegedly hosted a Taliban delegation for talks. It has also participated in a trilateral discussion with Pakistan and Russia.

To achieve its economic and political aspirations， China is working on infrastructure development projects in Afghanistan. In recent years， it has granted Islamabad $19 billion in loans and direct foreign investment to build transportation networks， power plants， and ports such as Gwadar. The time has come for the extension of the CPEC to western Pakistan and Afghanistan， a landlocked country. In 2018， then Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Yao Jing said， “We should make the CPEC project another platform for closer regional cooperation and bilateral connectivity， which benefits both the national and regional economies.”53 According to Pakistan Today， diplomats confirmed that in the second phase of CPEC， China， Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to work on a road from Peshawar to Kabul， a significant development in the mega project that would connect the region.54

But it is of vital importance that peace should prevail in conflict-ridden and unstable Afghanistan. China wants the peaceful development of all its neighbors and would take all necessary measures to achieve peaceful results in Afghanistan under the Belt and Road Initiative. A Joint Declaration was issued after the third China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral dialogue. “The three sides reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening their relations， exploring new ways of deepening cooperation， including advancing connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative， the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan （RECCA） and other regional economic initiatives.”55 Chinas move shows its willingness to be an active regional power， and also the dire need of the war-torn Kabul administration for sustainability.

Peace in Afghanistan can only bring prosperity for the CPEC. For four decades， Afghanistan has been a prey to war waged by superpowers， which has ravaged the entire nation economically and politically. The nominal GDP in this resource-rich country is only $22 billion and the per capita income is only $600.56 Afghanistans location makes it a critical country in South Asian and Central Asian regions. It connects with Central Asia， Iran， China and even leads to the Indian Ocean via Pakistan. It is of regional interest to have long-lasting peace in Afghanistan.57

The CPEC is a leading project of the BRI， the worlds largest development plan launched by China. The CPEC involves the investment of billions of dollars in infrastructure and energy sectors in Pakistan. It connects Gwadar to Kashghar and provides China with an alternative route to access oil and energy supplies.58 Chinas oil import is mainly from the Middle East via the route of the Strait of Malacca in the South China Sea， where the constant presence of US fleets sets off alarm bells in China.59 The US and its allies may block the Strait of Malacca to paralyze the Chinese economy completely.60

Without a peaceful Afghanistan， peace in Pakistan is impossible and the CPEC can never achieve its best results.61 Both Pakistan and China are firmly in favor of the CPEC in Afghanistan to change its fate after four decades of war. A regional initiative is needed to find a solution acceptable to all regional stakeholders. It could end the suffering of the Afghan people and bring a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. Pakistan can play a vital role in this process， while China can guarantee the enactment of any agreement undertaken by its two neighboring nations.

Future trajectory

The world today is feeling the devastating effects of conflicts around the globe. In this era， the world has become so interconnected that it has become difficult to guard against the adversity of other states. Therefore， peace at the regional level has become very important for peace at the international level. Also， economic prosperity and development is highly related to peace and stability. The changing times have brought new powers into the limelight. As a strong candidate for reshaping the world order， China needs to consider how to deal with regional interests and conflicts.

The success of the CPEC is closely related to the Afghan peace process， and Afghanistan plays an indispensable role for regional peace. The success of the process and establishment of a government in Afghanistan has vital significance for China， and the type of the Afghan government will decide its future cooperation with China， Pakistan and India. The circumstances now are very complex. The hiatus in the peace process and uncertainties about its outcome is causing constraints in Chinas future strategy. On the other hand， the importance of the CPEC and the objective of its success has urged China to participate in the Afghan peace talks. That is why China is willing to host an intra-Afghan dialogue in Beijing where China hopes to involve Afghan government agents， opposition leaders， and the Taliban.62

In its new security concept， China asserts that economic development is only possible if there is a peaceful environment.63 It reaffirms that Chinas foreign policy benefits regional development because China believes peace and economic growth are related. Hence， in order to develop the region economically， it is likely that China will go to some lengths to influence the stalled Afghan peace process. Given Chinas growing interest in developing peace in the region， it will be able to influence the Afghan peace process which will in turn transform this region into a region of peace.

The eagerness of China to influence the Afghan peace process in order to secure its economic interests in the region will no doubt face challenges as well. The primary challenge is to sustain the Afghan government. China needs to consider the complicated realities in Afghanistan and devise a wise approach to sustain the government. In the current scenario， China has chosen to achieve the objective by promoting its model of economic development. At the same time， China， together with Pakistan， Russia and the US， have also called on the Afghan government and the Taliban to exchange a considerable number of prisoners at the beginning of the internal negotiations of the Afghans. The four countries stressed that any peace agreement should include the protection of the rights of women， adults， children， and ethnic minorities， and should respond to the strong aspirations of the Afghan people in economic， social， political， development and legislative spheres.64

Conclusion

The advent of a modern-day “Great Game，”65 in which all the regional powers with divergent interests are taking part， makes South Asia and Afghanistan even more critical. Moreover， a global economic recession has triggered a competition for Afghan and Central Asian resources. For that， peace in Afghanistan means peace for the whole region. Prosperity in Afghanistan is prosperity for the entire area.

A stable Afghanistan benefits all regional countries and serves as a boost for the BRI and especially the CPEC， allowing the recently developed infrastructure in Pakistan to be best utilized and to deliver a faster return on investment. It will be a win-win situation not only for Afghanistan but for the entire region.66 As for China， a peaceful Afghanistan facilitates its longterm strategic goals as well as political and security plans， and is a win-win outcome for all regional partners.

1 Gerald Segal， “China and Afghanistan，” Asian Survey， Vol. 21， No.11， 1981， p.73.

2 Raja Muhammad Khan， “Chinas Economic and Strategic Interests in Afghanistan，” FWU Journal of Social Sciences， Vol.1， No.1， 2015， p.21.

3 Shen-Yu Dai， “China and Afghanistan，” The China Quarterly， No. 25， 1966， p.38.

4 Ibid.

5 Gerald Segal， “China and Afghanistan，” p.75.

6 Shen-Yu Dai， “China and Afghanistan，” p.39.

7 Ibid.

8 Sawran Singh， “Chinas Afghan Policy： Limitations Versus Leverages，” in K. Warikoo （ed.）， The Afghan Crisis： Issues and Perspectives， Bhavana Books & Prints， 2002， p.407.

9 Gerald Segal， “China and Afghanistan，” p.75.

10 Sreedhar， “Taliban and External Powers，” in The Afghan Crisis： Issues and Perspectives， p.282.

11？Zhao？Hong，？“Chinas？Afghan？Policy：？The？Forming？of？the？‘March？West？Strategy，”？The Journal of East Asian Affairs， Vol.27， No.2， 2013， p.47.

12 Beina Xu， Holly Fletcher， and Jayshree Bajoria， “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement （ETIM），”Council on Foreign Relations， September 4， 2014， https：//www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamicmovement-etim.

13 Raja Muhammad Khan， “Chinas Economic and Strategic Interests in Afghanistan，” p.23.

14 Muhammad Daim Fazil， “China in Afghanistan： Contemporary Engagements and Challenges Ahead，”IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science， Vol.19， No.8， 2014， p.63.

15 Ibid.

16 Kenneth Katzman. “Afghanistan： Post-Taliban Governance， Security， and U.S. Policy，” Congressional Research Service， 2010， p.257.

17 Elizabeth Wishnick， “There Goes the Neighborhood： Afghanistans Challenges to Chinas Regional Security Goals，” The Brown Journal of World Affairs， Vol.19， No.1， 2012， p.84.

18 Tiffany P. Ng， “Chinas Role in Shaping the Future of Afghanistan，” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace， 2010， p.5， https：//carnegieendowment.org/files/china_role_afghanistan.pdf.

19 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal， “Af-Pak and Regional Peace in Chinas Perspective： A Critical Appraisal，”Pakistan Horizon， Vol.64， No.4， 2011， p.74.

20？Zhao？Hong，？“Chinas？Afghan？Policy：？The？Forming？of？the？‘March？West？Strategy，”？p.49.

21 Tiffany P. Ng， “Chinas Role in Shaping the Future of Afghanistan，” p.7.

22 Zeng Xiangyu， “Afghanistan and Regional Security： Implications for China，” Policy Perspectives， Vol.8， No.2， 2011， p.83.

23 Nabiha Gul， “Post-9/11 Afghanistan and the Regional Security Scenario，” Pakistan Horizon， Vol.59， No.1， 2006， p.64.

24 Ibid.

25 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal， “Af-Pak and Regional Peace in Chinas Perspective： A Critical Appraisal，” p.76. 26？Zhao？Hong，？“Chinas？Afghan？Policy：？The？Forming？of？the？‘March？West？Strategy，”？p.53.

27 Muhammad Daim Fazil， “China in Afghanistan： Contemporary Engagements and Challenges Ahead，”p.32.

28 David Rank， “Leveraging US-China Cooperation to Build a Regional Consensus on Afghanistan，”March 12， 2018， https：//www.usip.org/publications/2018/03/leveraging-us-china-cooperation-buildregional-consensus-afghanistan.

29 Andrew Small， The China-Pakistan Axis： Asias New Geopolitics， New York： Oxford University Press， 2015， p.322.

30 Tehseena Usman and Minhas Majeed Khan， “Pak-Afghan Relations （2001-2017）： a prisoners dilemma analysis，” Strategic Studies， Vol.37， No.1， 2017， p.55.

31 Frédéric Grare， “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era，” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 72， 2006， p.13， https：//carnegieendowment.org/files/cp72_grare_fiaccenal.pdf.

32 Ibid.

33 Jayshree Bajoria， “India-Afghanistan Relations，” Council on Foreign Relations， July 22， 2009， https：// www.cfr.org/backgrounder/india-afghanistan-relations.

34 Raja Muhammad Khan， “Chinas Economic and Strategic Interests in Afghanistan，” p.49.

35 Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk， “India，” in Indias and Pakistans Strategies in Afghanistan， RAND： 2012， p.55， https：//www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP387.pdf.

36 Jayshree Bajoria， “India-Afghanistan Relations.”

37 Harsh V. Pant and Avinash Paliwal， “Indias Afghan Dilemma Is Tougher Than Ever，” Foreign Policy， February 02， 2019， https：//foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/19/indias-afghan-dilemma-is-tougher-than-ever.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Vinay Kaura， “A New Approach in Afghanistan： China and India Take Steps Toward Cooperation，”Middle East Institute， November 14， 2018， https：//www.mei.edu/publications/new-approach-afghanistanchina-and-india-take-steps-toward-cooperation.

41 Ibid.

42 Phillip B. K. Potter， “Terrorism in China： Growing Threats with Global Implications，” Strategic Studies Quarterly， No.4， 2013， p.85.

43 Angela Stanzel， “Fear and loathing on the New Silk Road： Chinese Security in Afghanistan and Beyond.”

44 Graham E. Fuller， “Strategic Fatigue，” The National Interest， No.84， 2006， pp.37-42.

45 Rathnam Indurthy， “The Obama Administrations Strategy in Afghanistan，” International Journal on World Peace， Vol.28， No.3， 2011， pp.7-52.

46 Rani Mullen， “Afghanistan in 2009，” Asian Survey， Vol.50， No.1， 2009， pp. 128-133.

47 Rathnam Indurthy， “The Obama Administrations Strategy in Afghanistan，” pp. 7-52.

48 Anthony H. Cordesman， “Cost in Military Operating Expenditures and Aid and Prospects for‘Transition，”？Center？for？Strategic？and？International？Studies，？May？2012，？https：//www.csis.org/analysis/uscost-afghan-war-fy2002-fy2013.

49 Rathnam Indurthy， “The Obama Administrations Strategy in Afghanistan.”

50 David M. Edelstein， “Exit Lessons，” The Wilson Quarterly， Vol.33， No.4， Autumn 2009， pp.34-39.

51 Laurel Miller， “The U.S Shouldnt Stumble Out of Afghanistan，” Foreign Policy， August 16， 2019， https：//foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/16/the-u-s-shouldnt-stumble-out-of-afghanistan-taliban-doha-talkstrump-withdrawal.

52 Ahmed Shah Angas， “China in South Asia： Key Player in Afghanistan，” South Asian Voices， October 6， 2017， https：//southasianvoices.org/china-in-south-asia-key-player-in-afghanistan.

53 Ayaz Gul， “China， Pakistan Seeking CPEC Extension to Afghanistan，” VOA News， November 1， 2018， https：//www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/china-pakistan-seeking-cpec-extension-afghanistan.

54 Mian Abrar， “Peshawar-Kabul Motorway Paves Way for Afghanistans Entry to CPEC，” Pakistan Today， September 8， 2019， https：//www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/09/08/peshawar-kabul-motorway-hintsat-elevation-of-warn-torn-afghanistan.

55 Mian Abrar， “Peshawar-Kabul Motorway Paves Way for Afghanistans Entry to CPEC.”

56 Zameer Ahmed Awan， “Peace in Afghanistan Means Prosperity for CPEC，” China Daily， December 24， 2018， http：//global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/24/WS5c20405ba3107d4c3a002663.html.

57 Ibid.

58 Sadaf Mustafa， Ahmed Zafar， “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor： Importance and Challenges for Pakistan and China，” International Journal of Social Sciences and Economics， Vol.2， No.11， 2017， pp.5059-5068.

59 Muhammad Shoaib Malik and Hafeez Ullah Khan， “Regional Security Threat to Pakistan： A Critical Review，” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture， Vol.XXXIX， No.2， 2018， pp.160-175.

60 Sadaf Mustafa and Ahmed Zafar， “China Pakistan Economic Corridor： Importance and Challenges for Pakistan and China.”

61 Anurag Ram Chandram， “Why Afghanistan Should Join CPEC： Trilateral Cooperation Between Afghanistan， China， and Pakistan on the Belt and Road Would Benefit All Three States，” The Diplomat， May 5， 2017， https：//thediplomat.com/2017/05/why-afghanistan-should-join-cpec.

62 “China， Russia， U.S.， Pakistan Hold Talks on Afghan Peace Process，” Xinhua， October 26， 2019， http：// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/26/c_138504646.htm.

63 Narkaz Opacin， Chinas Role in Afghanistan： A Capitalist Peace Approach， Hamburg： Anchor Academic Publishing， 2015， p.18.

64 “China， Russia， U.S.， Pakistan Hold Talks on Afghan Peace Process.”

65 Peter Hopkirk， The Great Game， London： John Murray， 2006.

66 Zameer Ahmed Awan， “Peace in Afghanistan Means Prosperity for CPEC.”