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Upgrading the China-ASEAN Partnership:ASEAN’s Concerns,China’s Responsibility and Regional Order

2022-05-01 16:37:52WeiLing
China International Studies 2022年1期

Wei Ling

In November 2021, when China and ASEAN celebrated the 30th anniversary of the establishment of their dialogue relations, the two sides announced an upgrade of their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership. ASEAN is the priority of Chinas neighborhood diplomacy, and it is also becoming a target of charm offensives by some extraterritorial powers. At the historic moment when the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and profound changes in the world unseen in a century are intertwined and reinforcing each other, how China and ASEAN countries get along will not only affect the sustainable development and security of both sides but also have a profound impact on the evolving regional order and world landscape.

Achievements and Lessons from China-ASEAN Relations

Since the end of World War II, there have been three periods of long peace in East Asia. First is the process of building an ASEAN security community. Southeast Asia was once called the “Balkans of the Orient,” but since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, there has been no large-scale conflict among its member countries. Second is East Asias development and peace process since the 1980s. The emergence of developmental states in East Asia, the priority they gave to economics in national development, and the adoption of export-oriented economic growth strategy by these states helped bring about East Asias economic miracle and political stability.1 In this way, development and security achieved a virtuous cycle. Third is the socialization of great powers and the regional peace process since the end of the Cold War.2 Marked by the establishment of a dialogue relationship between China as the regions largest country and ASEAN as the regions primary inter-state organization, there has been a change in the relations between China and Southeast Asian countries. Their relations have become a significant force to promote the East Asian culture from the hostile confrontation of the Cold War to the development of peace in the post-Cold War era.3

Two intertwined processes have influenced the evolution of the East Asian order: one is the interaction between major powers, and the other is the ASEAN-led regional institutional cooperation, in which ASEAN takes the initiative to mobilize, balance, and coordinate major powers. The strategic partnership between China and ASEAN has promoted the sound development of both processes. Chinas active involvement in ASEAN has fostered benign competition among regional countries to invest in ASEAN, accelerated the integration process in the East Asian region and benefited regional strategic stability and peace.4 The establishment of the “ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea” (10+3) cooperation mechanism, the signing of several “10+1” free trade agreements, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP) Agreement are examples of how China-ASEAN cooperation has promoted East Asias critical regional cooperation framework and integration process. China-ASEAN relations are the core of East Asian regionalism,5 and “are among the most dynamic, substantive, and mutually beneficial partnerships between ASEAN and its dialogue partners, which has become a good example of regional cooperation.”6B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

In the past 30 years, China-ASEAN relations have achieved leapfrog development, and cooperation between the two sides has enabled East Asia to cast away the shadow of the Cold War and embark on a dynamic path of economic integration.7 How have such achievements been accomplished? The main lessons probably include the following three points: creating strategic opportunities, building developmental peace, and insisting on ASEAN centrality.

Creating strategic opportunities

The process of continuously upgrading China-ASEAN dialogue relations has been one of creating, maintaining, and seizing strategic opportunities. Creating strategic opportunities has been why ChinaASEAN cooperation was started and sustained. Treating each other as essential opportunities is the driving force for developing China-ASEAN relations. Strategic opportunity refers to the systematic conditions that can have a decisive influence on actors and promote their long-term interests. For international actors, strategic opportunity is the factor that can help sustain their security and development.8 After the Cold War, China and ASEAN made the strategic decision to approach each other based on their judgment of the international and regional situation and their respective interests in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar system. For China, the top priority at that time was to explore a favorable international environment under the new situation, promote the construction of nonconfrontational partnership, break the containment and sanctions imposed on China by the US and other countries, and create a good environment for opening up and development. For ASEAN, the top priority was to achieve stability in Southeast Asia in the “post-conflict period”9 and bring China into the dialogue of “ASEAN+.” This can relieve ASEANs anxiety caused by the regional power vacuum after the Cold War and counteract the impact of changing power configuration on the regional order. In addition, ASEAN countries can take advantage of Chinas development opportunities to realize their own economic and social development and build a regional economic community in the process of rapid globalization. China and ASEAN share similar views on strategic opportunities: seizing the strategic opportunity of peace to develop themselves, and actively creating strategic opportunities to seek sustainable development under challenging situations. Thanks to this consensus, China-ASEAN relations have consistently gained momentum.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

At the beginning of the 21st century, China carried out intensive diplomacy toward ASEAN and implemented a series of innovative measures known as the first move of its neighborhood diplomacy. Thus, China greatly enhanced the strategic mutual trust and created conditions for the all-round development of East Asian cooperation, for strengthening the political and rules foundation of regional process, and for improving the regional strategic culture. In 2002, China submitted a position paper on the new security concept to the ASEAN Regional Forum and signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between China and ASEAN, and the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues. In 2003, China became the first nonASEAN country to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and was the first among ASEAN dialogue partners to upgrade the dialogue relations to a strategic partnership. China also became the first nuclear state to express the willingness to join the Treaty of Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Through the above actions, China has gradually established a responsible, constructive, and predictable international image. Most Asian countries see China as “a good neighbor, a constructive partner… and a non-threatening regional power.”10 These actions have created the subsequent “golden decade” of the China-ASEAN strategic partnership and made outstanding contributions to the regional process with the long-term goal of building an East Asian community.

Building developmental peace

Prioritizing economic development is the consensus of China and ASEAN, and it is also the most crucial reason for rapid deepening of their relations. Chinas understanding of “developmental security” has its origin in its own experience of reform and opening-up. In time of peace, maintaining political and social stability has created necessary conditions for economic development. The export-oriented strategy, high-level investment, mutual adaptation and constant adjustment between the institution and the market have made the miracle of large-scale poverty alleviation and economic growth. The Chinese catchphrase “development is the hard truth” illustrates the fundamental significance of economic development for national security. In fact, Chinas grand strategy of developmental security is to set phased development goals for per capita GDP and pursue the convergence of security and development interests.11 In foreign exchanges, priority is also given to economic development cooperation, which not only aims to achieve sustainable development, but also helps maintain a stable and friendly external environment and realize the benign interaction between development and security. In most ASEAN countries, the government plays a vital role in economy-oriented regional cooperation. Furthermore, political legitimacy depends on stable economic growth, gradual elimination of poverty, and continuous improvement of peoples livelihood. Countries in the region not only promote economic growth through manufacturing, trade and outbound direct investment, but also strive to reduce poverty and narrow the development gap at domestic and regional levels. Development is the top priority and the most fundamental challenge for ASEAN countries. Therefore, as their most significant common interest, inclusive growth and sustainable development have propelled the cooperation between China and ASEAN.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

Since 2005, by following the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, China and ASEAN have conducted comprehensive cooperation. So far, three five-year plans have been completed, and the plan of action for 2021-2025 is being implemented. In the latest action plan, economic cooperation takes up the largest part, with 14 areas including trade, finance, agriculture, health, maritime cooperation, communications, scientific and technological innovation, transportation, tourism, energy, production capacity, trade facilitation, intellectual property rights, and enterprise cooperation. The plan lists connectivity and sustainable development separately to highlight their importance in China-ASEAN development cooperation. The plan is also a guiding document for both sides to coordinate their positions on ASEAN integration, East Asian cooperation, and sub-regional cooperation.12

The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area has been the most prominent example of China-ASEAN cooperation. In 2000, at the China-ASEAN summit, then Premier of China Zhu Rongji put forward the idea of building the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, which was formally presented as Chinas initiative at the 2001 meeting. In 2002, the two sides signed the Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which explicitly stated the goal of completing a free trade zone in 2010. The strategic significance of the free trade zone initiative is that among the large countries outside ASEAN, China was the first to propose the goal and action plan of building a free trade zone with ASEAN, earlier than Western market economy countries. This free trade zone was the first free trade zone China promoted internationally after joining the WTO. It is also the largest free trade zone among developing countries to promote regional stability and development.13 This free trade zone has enhanced China-ASEAN economic ties. In 2020, China and ASEAN became each others largest trading partners for the first time, and their bilateral trade volume expanded 85 times in 30 years. From January to October 2021, the trade volume between China and ASEAN reached US$703.3 billion, up 30 percent year-on-year, and would set a record high again for the whole year.14 China and ASEAN have built a rules-based and open economic development zone.15

When a country takes economic development as its priority, its foreign policy also shows a typical pattern: it strives to maintain external and internal stability, adopts pragmatic strategies, and tends to seek solutions to problems step by step through dialogue and consultation and tackle security challenges in a way which best promotes regional and domestic economic development. If negotiation is complex, the country tends to shelve disputes and maintain basic stability, avoid direct confrontation or resorting to force, avoid causing substantial harm to the overall situation of economic development cooperation, and avoid settling disputes at the expense of development. Therefore, the more importance a country attaches to economic development, the more likely it can alleviate or resolve security challenges and conflicts and maintain peace and cooperation.16 This is the deep logic for China and ASEAN to pursue developmental security. It is also the basic behavior norm for both sides to focus on shared interests, resolve differences through dialogue, and build regionalism and peace in East Asia.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

Insisting on ASEAN centrality

One of the fundamental reasons why the China-ASEAN partnership has become a regional cooperation model is that China has insisted on ASEAN centrality in participating in regional cooperation. Insisting on ASEAN centrality has several meanings: following the “ASEAN way” of regional cooperation, maintaining the ASEAN-centered regional institutional framework, respecting ASEANs role as a regional agenda-setter, and following the decision-making procedure in which ASEAN reaches internal consensus before conducting consultation with dialogue partners. But more importantly, ASEANs concerns should be fully considered in bilateral and multilateral interactions.

Sovereign equality is the basic principle of the Westphalian System. However, when there is a significant power gap between countries, there are usually different understandings of equality. The small country is more susceptible to the influence of the interactive relationship, is more concerned about gains and losses of the relationship, and is more vulnerable when dealing with changes in relations. Therefore, when interacting with the big country, the small country more urgently needs to obtain an explicit guarantee that the big country respects its living space, identity, and interests.17 David Kang has argued that the East Asian hegemony system established by the US after World War II was equal in name but unequal in reality.18 According to Zhang Yunling, China and ASEAN respect each other, have dialogues on an equal basis, and conduct mutually beneficial cooperation. This culture is “fundamentally different from the condescending ‘lectures by some countries.”19 China, whose comprehensive strength is growing fast, fully considers the interests and concerns of ASEAN countries, and that is why their relations can achieve equality and mutual respect.

China fully considers ASEANs concerns, as reflected, first of all, in Chinas efforts to strengthen the rule basis of its relations with ASEAN. Different from the propaganda of some Western countries, the ChinaASEAN partnership has almost the most substantial rule basis among all ASEAN dialogue partnerships. When the “10+3” mechanism was launched in 1997, China, Japan, and South Korea issued joint statements with ASEAN respectively, but only the joint statement between China and ASEAN incorporated the norms recognized by both sides. China and ASEAN affirmed that the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and universally recognized international law should serve as basic norms governing their relations. They also reaffirmed in particular“their respect for each others independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.”20 In contrast, the joint statements that Japan and South Korea signed with ASEAN on the same day only focused on specific cooperation fields but didnt involve the above norms and principles.21 Therefore, it can be said that from the very beginning, the dialogue relationship between China and ASEAN has been based on stronger norms than other dialogue relations. In 2003, among the dialogue partnerships of ASEAN, China-ASEAN relations were the first to be upgraded to a strategic partnership. China was also the first non-ASEAN country to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, strengthening the cooperation norms and strategic mutual trust between the two sides.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

In addition, China respects ASEAN countries concerns about their interests. In the Asian financial crisis of 1997, China was determined not to devalue the renminbi, which helped maintain regional financial stability and created conditions for the economic recovery of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. When China subsequently started negotiating a free trade area agreement with ASEAN, there was no precedent for negotiation with ASEAN as a whole. In addition, there were significant internal differences among the ten ASEAN countries, and their interest demands and market opening capabilities were diverse. Comprehensively considering their various concerns, interests, and market capabilities was a practical problem. At that time, ASEAN had just experienced a financial crisis, and the economies of its member countries were still recovering. Some countries were worried that opening their markets to China would make capital flow to China, and less developed member countries were concerned that Chinese goods would occupy and monopolize the local markets. Under this circumstance, China proposed that the construction of the free trade area should start with an “early harvest plan”: opening up in advance the agricultural products market, which would benefit the less developed ASEAN countries most; supporting ASEAN members efforts to expand their exports to China; paying particular attention to the less developed ASEAN members in the market opening arrangement, giving them a more extended grace period; negotiating step by step (“easy things first”); signing comprehensive economic cooperation agreements, and supporting ASEANs economic development. Because it earnestly respects the interests of ASEAN countries, China became the first country to sign a free trade area agreement with ASEAN as a whole.22

It was quite a challenge for China to unilaterally surrender part of its profits and take the lead in opening its markets, including in agriculture. Still, it was a significant strategic opportunity for ASEAN countries. Chinas actions expanded its economic ties with ASEAN, enhanced ASEANs position globally, and made other major powers pay more attention to ASEAN.23 In addition, China supports ASEANs central role in the regional institutional framework and ASEANs leading role in regional affairs. The examples of the “10+3” Summit, the East Asia Summit, and RCEP indicate that without Chinas support, the “ASEAN+” regional cooperation system framework and vibrant regional cooperation would have hardly materialized.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

ASEANs Interests and Concerns amid Asymmetric Power and Great-Power Competition

In the 30 years since China established dialogue relations with ASEAN, China has grown from a regional power to a global major country. To maintain a safe neighborly environment and to effectively build a comprehensive strategic partnership with ASEAN, China needs to learn from lessons that global powers experienced in regional strategy, grasp the defining factors of regional landscape, and when formulating plans and policies, fully consider the fundamental interests and main concerns of regional countries.

After World War II, the US became the most potent country globally, but the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which the US played a central role in creating, failed at last. The main reason was that the US misjudged the fundamental interests and greatest concerns of Southeast Asian countries. The US took it for granted that liberal hegemony was welcomed worldwide, while the Asian countries that had just become independent from Western colonial rule generally regarded American hegemony as another form of Western imperialism. They believed that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was a tool of Western rule and threatened their sovereignty and independence, so they strongly resisted it. In the end, the Organizations membership was limited, its intervention in Indochina was hindered, and the US strategy of establishing a pro-US bloc in Asia failed.24

After the Cold War, the US became the sole hegemon of the unipolar world. However, when the US returned to Asia, its Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy encountered another failure due to its repeated misjudgment of interests and major concerns of regional countries. Given the military and strategic intentions behind the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy, regional countries believed that its core was to strengthen US military presence in the region and curb Chinas rise. As a result of this strategy, the initial steps of economic integration in East Asia were disrupted, disputes concerning the South China Sea and other issues heated up, confrontation among major powers intensified, and the regional situation became tense. After 2016, with the easing of South China Sea tensions and the negotiation and signing of RCEP, it is generally believed that the rebalancing strategy has failed.25 In 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of the US surveyed the five founding members of ASEAN and strategic elites in the Pacific region to find out their views on the trends of regional power, norms, and institutions, and concluded that “It is clear that US priorities in engaging Southeast Asia, principally traditional security matters related to China, do not always match the priorities of the region. Based on the survey results, the United States and regional partners should engage Southeast Asian countries on what matters most to them, including pandemic preparedness, climate change, economic security and stability, and other non-traditional challenges.”26B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

Two important external factors have influenced the evolution of regional order in Southeast Asia and the shaping of regional landscape. First, China continues to rise, and the gap between the strengths of regional countries and China further widens. Second, the US puts its global strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific region with Southeast Asia as the core,27 and enhances the competitiveness in China-US relations. From 2020, the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) launched a poll on the topic of China-ASEAN relations. The final report, named “ASEAN-China Relations after 30 Years,” polled the governments, industries, scholars, media, and the general public in the 10 ASEAN countries. More than 1,000 questionnaires were collected, with survey questions covering geopolitics, economy, political security, and people-to-people exchanges. Regarding the survey questions like“Will centrifugal forces of great-power politics prevail over the centripetal forces of cooperation?” and “Will the cooperation between ASEAN and China get stronger, or the opposite?”28 ASEAN countries believe that these questions will affect regional stability and prosperity and have a far-reaching impact on the world pattern and order.

ASEANs concerns are mainly reflected in three areas: first, the perception of Chinas power and regional role; second, the view of Sino-US competition; and third, the consideration of ASEANs interests and regional priority agenda. Regarding ASEANs perceptions and concerns, there have been three poll reports published over the recent two years and a research project. The three poll reports include “Powers, Norms, and Institutions: The Future of the Indo-Pacific from a Southeast Asia Perspective,” which CSIS released in June 2020; “The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report,”which was released by the ASEAN Center at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute(ISEAS) in February 2021; and “China-ASEAN Relations after 30 Years: Changing Perceptions, Remaining Anxieties, and New Opportunities,”which was released by FPCI in October 2021. The research project was“Southeast Asia Views America: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects,”organized by the US National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in 2021, whose initial results have been published in Asia Policy.29

Chinas power and its regional role

In the past 30 years, ASEAN countries perceptions of Chinas power and regional role have changed significantly. First of all, ASEAN countries believe that Chinas political and economic strength and influence in Southeast Asia have already surpassed that of the US, and its lead over the US will be further widened in the next decade. According to the ISEAS survey, 76.3 percent of the respondents believed China is undoubtedly the most economically influential country in the region; 49.1 percent thought that China is the most politically and strategically influential power.According to the CSIS survey, ASEAN countries believed that China has more significant advantages in economic strength and influence and has dramatically surpassed the US; in the next decade, the gap between China and the US in terms of regional influence will continue to widen and develop in a direction favorable to China.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

Secondly, ASEAN countries regard China as an essential dialogue partner and hope that China can play a more active and constructive role in the region. As indicated by the FPCI report, if 30 years ago Southeast Asian countries mainly looked at China with the Cold War mentality, then most respondents now regard China as an essential dialogue partner and hope that China can play a more active and constructive role in the region. More than half of the respondents were optimistic about Chinas role in the region in the CSIS poll. In the FPCI poll, nearly half of respondents believed China is a reliable development partner and a provider of development assistance. They also thought that China should play a more critical role in regional affairs, take on as a problem solver and help ASEAN cope with multiple challenges. In addition to pandemic control and economic recovery, this poll report highlights the Myanmar issue. In fact, in the NBR roundtable discussion, Southeast Asia scholars also urged the US to fulfill similar responsibilities.

Finally, ASEAN countries express doubts and worries about Chinas growing strength and prefer a more diversified distribution of regional power. On the one hand, the FPCI report welcomes Chinas more active and constructive actions in Southeast Asia; on the other hand, it calls on China to abide by regional norms, adhere to the ASEAN centrality, regard Southeast Asian countries as equal partners, and respect their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. FPCI believes that the concerns of ASEAN countries may be mainly caused by the continuing tensions in the South China Sea and the slow progress in the negotiation on a code of conduct in the South China Sea. The ISEAS report indicates that about half of the respondents are anxious or even worried about Chinas growing regional economic influence and strategic capabilities; and compared with Japan, the EU and the US, there is a significantly lower trust in China. In the NBR roundtable discussion,Southeast Asian scholars called on China and the US to accommodate and coordinate with each other to facilitate a new normal of competition and cooperation in the region. The CSIS report indicates that power dynamics in the Southeast Asian region involve more than China and the US; Japan, India, and Indonesia are also significant regional powers.

China-US competition and ASEAN centrality

Southeast Asian countries are generally apprehensive about the strategic competition between China and the US, which is the top geopolitical challenge facing the region. According to the CSIS poll, China-US strategic competition is the number one concern of all Southeast Asian countries except the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The Philippines and Vietnam regard the South China Sea issue as a more serious challenge, while Indonesia is more worried about Chinas economic influence. Southeast Asian countries feel that the geostrategic competition of major powers increasingly dominates the regional process. They risk being passively involved in the competition of major powers and being forced to take sides. According to the ISEAS poll in 2019, when asked if they had to choose between China and the US, about half of the respondents chose China, and the other half chose the US, with the US having a slight advantage at 53.6 percent. But in 2020, the US advantage expanded significantly to 61.5 percent. This change could be due to two reasons: first, the people had expectations about the Biden administration; the other reason might be the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the FPCI poll, 37.98 percent of the respondents believed that China and the US had entered strategic confrontation in all fields, and 54.66 percent believed that Sino-US interaction is characterized by both strategic confrontation and strategic competition; most respondents thought that the quadrilateral security dialogue (Quad) of the US, Japan, Australia and India had intensified the regions geopolitical situation.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

With the intensified competition among major powers, ASEAN countries feel that the ASEAN centrality in regional cooperation has been challenged and that ASEANs unity has also been undermined.30 According to the FPCI poll, most respondents believed that ASEAN and its member countries should not be passively involved in the competition among major powers but should strive to maintain balance and good cooperative relations with all major powers. According to the ISEAS poll, 69.1 percent of the respondents believed that ASEAN is becoming a stage for competition among major powers and that ASEAN member countries may become agents of major powers; 22.1 percent of the respondents were worried that ASEAN might become insignificant in the new world order; more than half of the respondents believed that the best way to deal with SinoUS competition and pressure from major powers is to strengthen ASEANs unity and resilience. As indicated by the CSIS poll, the respondents believed that the main challenge facing ASEAN comes from the pressure of external powers and that this pressure is undermining ASEANs unity. Regarding the most important regional institutions or regional initiatives, respondents from all countries except Thailand and Vietnam held positive views of ASEAN. When asked which ASEAN-led regional framework is most suitable for tackling various regional challenges, the respondents expressed a clear preference for ASEAN over the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, or the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus.

Given the complicated and profound changes in the regional situation, ASEAN countries have significantly different positions on politicalsecurity issues, which has hampered ASEANs community building and the capability for collective action. The FPCI poll report highlights the noticeable differences across countries on some issues, indicating that ASEAN countries will face significant challenges when taking collective action, especially in sensitive strategic and security areas. In economic, social and cultural fields, respondents from ASEAN countries look at China positively whether at regional or national levels. However, in political-security areas, there were apparent differences between the positions of different sides. The Philippines and Malaysia had largely negative views, especially on unresolved territorial disputes with China and Chinas intention to participate in regional affairs; Laos and Cambodia expressed the most optimistic views about China and its regional influence. In the CSIS poll, the Philippines and Vietnam had the most negative perception of Chinas role in the region due to the South China Sea issue; and Thailand and Vietnam notably differed from other countries in their identity with ASEAN. In Thailand, half of the respondents supported ASEAN, and half supported Chinas Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In Vietnam, the Quad was regarded as the most crucial regional mechanism.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

Non-traditional security challenges and economic sustainability

The most important agenda for ASEAN countries is to address nontraditional security challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change and promote post-pandemic economic recovery with sustainable regional growth. The CSIS survey, which was conducted in 2019, shows that for Southeast Asian countries, climate change and other non-traditional security threats were of greater concern than traditional military issues. Climate change was perceived as the biggest threat to national security, with economic and financial crises coming second, well ahead of traditional security concerns. The survey also points out that had the survey been conducted in 2020, public health and pandemics would likely have also been a top concern. The ISEAS survey shows that Southeast Asia is preoccupied with the COVID-19 pandemic and economic recovery, with the pandemic (76.0 percent), unemployment and economic recession (63.0 percent), and socio-economic gaps and income disparity (40.7 percent) being the most pressing concerns.

The FPCI survey suggests that the pandemic also opens a new opportunity for deeper cooperation between ASEAN and China. 67.12 percent of the respondents agreed that ASEAN cooperation with China helps alleviate the pandemic, and 58.48 percent of the respondents said Chinas COVID-19 vaccine support is well-intentioned. Also, 73.5 percent of the respondents believed that economic cooperation with China becomes more critical in the pandemic. No wonder China-ASEAN cooperation for post-pandemic economic recovery and COVID-19 vaccine cooperation are topping the list of collaboration with the most potential to be further developed. In the longer term, cooperation in the economic sector and science and technology are prioritized by the respondents.

The BRI and the RCEP are viewed as new opportunities to achieve sustainable regional development and further deepen China-ASEAN cooperation. However, respondents in the FPCI survey indicated they have yet to see the optimum results of those initiatives. Ensuring that the benefits of the BRI and the RCEP can be felt by the people of ASEAN is still an important task for China and ASEAN to deepen their strategic partnership.

In addition, the FPCI survey also illustrates that the areas of ChinaASEAN cooperation are increasingly differentiated. The people of ASEAN tend to see China-ASEAN relations as consisting of different and compartmentalized dimensions, instead of an “undivided package”simply through a geopolitical lens. While connections between different dimensions are acknowledged, there is a strong tendency to evaluate and develop cooperation in a compartmentalized manner. When assessing the collaboration in economic or socio-cultural fields, for example, the people of ASEAN tend not to put it in the same framework. This explains the divergence in the perceptions of socio-cultural and economic cooperation and of political-security issues. The FPCI survey suggests that acknowledging and maintaining this compartmentalization, or avoiding the simplification of China-ASEAN relations through a single lens, is crucial to enrich the partnership and develop more effective collaboration for the future.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

Thoughts on Developing the China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

How should China develop and deepen cooperation with ASEAN under the framework of comprehensive strategic partnership? As a guiding and actionable document with great political significance and rich content, the Joint Statement of the China-ASEAN Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations, which is subtitled“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Sustainable Development,” fully considers ASEANs concerns and positively responds to issues of regional interest.31 The Joint Statement emphasizes the basic principles of China-ASEAN comprehensive strategic partnership, namely being rules-based, promoting mutual benefit, and advocating consensus. To implement these principles in the future cooperation between China and ASEAN, there are three things to do: first, regulating and constraining the great powers in asymmetric relations; second, aligning cooperation initiatives with ASEANs development needs and plans so that ASEAN can gain tangible benefits and protect its fundamental interests, namely enhancing sustainable development and ASEANs community building process; third, further building consensus through consultation, and jointly creating a consultative regional order as consultative strategic partners.

Regulating the major powers

Nowadays, the situation facing the Southeast Asian countries is complicated. First, Southeast Asia has become the core area for the United States to compete with China, as it defines the Indo-Pacific as the most consequential region for Americas future.32 Second, Southeast Asian countries believe that Chinas political and economic power and its influence in the region have surpassed that of the US, and this trend may last for some time. Third, Southeast Asian countries have been worried about regional stability and security, ASEAN centrality, and ASEANs fundamental interests in the region. They are facing stronger pressure to choose sides, and their distrust towards major powers is rising. They also feel that the uncertainty of regional cooperation and the risk of conflict is increasing. Under this circumstance, to develop the China-ASEAN comprehensive strategic partnership, it becomes necessary to regulate the major powers and ensure ASEANs strategic autonomy and centrality in the regional institutional framework.

The asymmetric relationship between China and ASEAN requires both sides to strengthen the rules-based order and consciously restrict the use of power. Asymmetry in international relations means that the weaker side cannot threaten the stronger side, while the stronger side cannot impose its preferences on the weaker side either, as such coercive behavior will cause severe systematic consequences to the stronger party. In international relations, if a country wants to stay powerful, it must handle asymmetric relations successfully. The weaker side is more sensitive and vulnerable to possible changes in the relationship, as these changes may significantly affect its interests. Thats why the strategic autonomy of the weaker party needs to be respected and guaranteed. Even in a normal situation without threats, the weaker side would also pay more attention to the rules and try to gain relative advantages and more control over the system by fully utilizing the rules.33 China-ASEAN relation is a typical asymmetric relationship, and the asymmetry will continue to expand for a long time in the future.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

Therefore, in building the China-ASEAN comprehensive strategic partnership, it is necessary to strengthen the role of rules in all documents and keep committed to the rules in daily interactions. This would help ASEAN countries feel dignified, respected and strategically independent, and increase their trust and confidence in bilateral strategic relations. Both the concepts of international rules system and institutionalized international cooperation proposed by mainstream Western international relations theories are based on the assumption of contractual relations, without full regard to trust and other social factors.34 In an asymmetric relationship, strategic autonomy is not only a physical space that needs to be safeguarded by specific rules, but also a subjective feeling that could be strengthened by constant interactions among social actors. Therefore, though China has made high-level commitments to rules in various documents, including the Joint Statement,35 surveys still show that Southeast Asians have little confidence in an equal relationship and rules-based cooperation.

To solve this problem, China must focus on ASEANs specific concerns, strengthen rules in the cooperation, and give ASEAN full respect. The South China Sea issue can be seen as a touchstone for Chinas commitment to supporting ASEAN unity and maintaining regional strategic security with ASEAN. It also tests Chinas ability to formulate international rules and build regional order. In the Joint Statement, China and ASEAN countries reaffirm their commitment to “exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities” and look forward to the early conclusion of a practical and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) that is “following international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS).” Based on this active response to ASEANs concerns, China needs to speed up the COC negotiation process and react promptly in the future. In this way, China could improve its image as a major responsible country that respects ASEAN and actively promotes rules-based management of the South China Sea issue. Another primary concern for ASEAN is the strategic competition among great powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The Joint Statement reaffirms the principles expressed in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) while recognizing that “it is ASEANs independent initiative, being open and inclusive, is intended to enhance ASEANs Community building process, and is not aimed at creating new mechanisms or replacing existing ones.” Chinese President Xi Jinping also stated that China sought cooperation between the BRI and the AOIP. These statements reflect Chinas openness to the AOIP and support for ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional order.36 As the Indo-Pacific order has now become an unavoidable topic, China should take more proactive measures and strengthen consultations with ASEAN on this issue, while supporting ASEANs leading role in regional institutional cooperation. This is in the interests of both China and ASEAN, as by so doing the trust between the two sides could be strengthened, and the United States attempt to launch all-round competition against China by building a regional alliance may be foiled to a certain extent.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

Shouldering the due responsibilities of a major country

Building a comprehensive strategic partnership requires China to actively shoulder the responsibilities of a major country, namely providing public goods to promote sustainable political and economic development in Southeast Asia and ensuring that ASEAN people have a real sense of gain. From the surveys mentioned above, we can see that ASEANs demand for China is based on its perception of Chinas power and influence. Since China has become the most influential country in Southeast Asia both economically and strategically, its natural for China to take greater responsibilities and provide public goods for regional security and development.

According to the FPCI survey, 43.67 percent of the respondents think that China acts as a responsible partner in defusing the Myanmar crisis. However, when asked how China should play its role, 43.96 percent of the respondents say China should follow and support ASEANs response mechanism and process. This reflects the subtleties of Chinas responsible role in Myanmar. On the one hand, ASEAN expects China to play a constructive role. On the other hand, it emphasizes the ASEAN Community and insists that ASEAN take the lead in tackling the Myanmar crisis. Currently, regional countries have generally appreciated Chinas position and efforts on the Myanmar issue. China has expressed its support for ASEANs role in Myanmar on many occasions, as Myanmar is an essential member of the big ASEAN family. China supports ASEAN to uphold the ASEAN way and play a unique role following its five-point consensus on Myanmar to help different parties in Myanmar find a political solution within the constitutional framework through dialogue. In addition, China has provided constant anti-pandemic assistance to Myanmar and calls on all parties to prioritize helping Myanmar fight against the pandemic.37 Despite Myanmars absence from the special summit to commemorate the 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations, Chinas positive attitude towards Myanmars participation was appreciated by ASEAN countries.38

For ASEAN countries, fighting against the COVID-19 pandemic and realizing post-pandemic economic recovery are the top concerns now, which are also the most expected areas of cooperation with China. The pandemic poses a severe threat to public health and peoples lives and causes significant impacts on the economies of ASEAN countries. According to the FPCI survey, ASEAN people appreciate the current China-ASEAN cooperation in fighting the pandemic and pursuing post-pandemic recovery. The ISEAS report also shows that most respondents (44.2 percent) believed that China provides the most COVID-19-related assistance to the region, followed by Japan (18.2 percent) and the EU (10.3 percent). Besides strengthening cooperation in vaccine production and distribution, ASEAN countries also expect to work with China to build a stronger and more resilient regional public health system and improve the regions ability to respond to epidemics and public health crises. President Xi Jinping announced at the summit that China would donate an additional 150 million doses of COVID vaccines to ASEAN countries, contribute an additional US$5 million to the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund, and provide ASEAN with another US$1.5 billion of development assistance in the next three years to support ASEAN countries fight against COVID-19 and economic recovery.39 These measures, which actively respond to ASEANs greatest concerns in a timely manner, clearly reflect Chinas sense of responsibility.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

ASEAN pays great attention to the BRI and the RCEP with high expectations in economic cooperation. President Xis suggestion is to“begin work toward a new round of upgrade of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area at an early date and enhance the level of trade and investment liberalization,”40 which fully goes along with ASEANs needs and demonstrates Chinas active and responsible attitude in promoting regional economic integration. However, theres a certain amount of ambivalence among ASEAN countries about the Belt and Road cooperation. On the one hand, the demand for infrastructure development in Southeast Asia is high. ASEAN is also trying to narrow the development gap and promote regional integration by enhancing connectivity. On the other hand, Southeast Asian countries worry about becoming more vulnerable in an asymmetric relationship with China as the BRI would deepen their dependence on China. They are concerned that China might be too influential in the region, as the BRI is shaping not only a physical connectivity network but also an institutional structure in the region.41 These deep-seated concerns have led to different responses of ASEAN countries on the BRI in different periods and on various issues, such as rules, environmental protection, corporate social responsibility, and local employment. In addition to highquality cooperation, it is also necessary to coordinate multiple actors and stakeholders to fully achieve “extensive consultation” and “shared benefits.”Furthermore, infrastructure construction generally takes a longer time. Completing some high-quality BRI projects would also have a positive demonstration effect. For example, the exemple set by the China-Laos Railway will encourage more countries in Southeast Asia to join the TransAsian Railway cooperation.42

Building a consultative regional order

China and ASEAN need to reach consensus on the vision of the regional order when building a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Joint Statement, which “reaffirms the commitment to multilateralism, maintain an open and inclusive regional cooperation framework, support ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture,” indicates the consensus between China and ASEAN on regional order in three areas, namely ASEAN centrality, multilateralism, and open regionalism.

ASEAN centrality in regional institutional cooperation, as a historical and realistic choice, has become the fundamental and dominant norm in East Asia. Regarding the approach to strengthening ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional order, Southeast Asian elites have generally agreed on two points: first, enhancing ASEANs capabilities and strengthening ASEANs unity, especially taking meaningful and collective actions on regional hotspots and hard issues such as the South China Sea and Myanmar; second, maintaining a positive and stable balance among major powers, and avoiding being dragged into the growing geopolitical competition. Facing the current tendency to define the direction of regional order with the Cold War mentality, Southeast Asian countries believe that it is necessary to resist this mindset and emphasize the multi-layered, diverse and balanced nature of ASEANs relations with its dialogue partners. President Xi Jinping expressed his support for ASEAN by using the word “unswervingly” four times in his speech at the special summit, namely “China will unswervingly take ASEAN as a high priority in its neighborhood diplomacy, unswervingly support ASEAN unity and ASEAN Community building, unswervingly support ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture, and unswervingly support ASEAN in playing a bigger role in regional and international affairs.”43 This is a clear response to ASEANs concerns and a promise from China. With a closer strategic relationship between the two sides, China should support ASEAN centrality and help ASEAN build capacity and maintain unity. It is proven that ASEANs leading role in regional issues could help guide healthy competition among major powers and strengthen development cooperation in the region.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

Multilateralism is a strong consensus between China and ASEAN. However, simply emphasizing its “rules-based” aspect is not enough. The consensus-based approach as reflected in the ASEAN way is indispensable. In an asymmetric relationship, whether bilateral or multilateral, the weaker side often feels threatened by the binding force of rigid rules, which greatly squeezes their space of strategic autonomy. With the vast gap among ASEAN member states, the consensus-based ASEAN way has become the fundamental norm for regional cooperation. The strategic autonomy of smaller or weaker countries could only be protected by adopting a consensusbased decision-making process in informal agreements, which makes it possible for all parties to focus on shared interests and promote cooperation. In essence, the ASEAN-led regional cooperation in East Asia is a kind of consultative multilateralism, in which trust is built through consultation. In the future, such consensus-based consultative multilateralism should continue to be the foundation for regional order.

Open regionalism is an essential feature of East Asian cooperation, as seen in its multi-actor, multi-issue and multi-layered features. This also explains the enduring vitality of East Asian regional process. Based on the“ASEAN+” regional structure, ASEAN expects to bring more dialogue partners and cooperation partners, actively develop relations with its every single partner, and maintain the balance of various powers amid competition and cooperation in the region. Currently, there are two kinds of differentiation in the China-ASEAN partnership, across countries and across issues, which sometimes become intertwined. This requires China to formulate more specific cooperation strategies for different issues and different countries and try different combinations to improve the effectiveness of cooperation. Regional countries need to maintain an open attitude towards the institutional framework, membership and agenda of regional cooperation, and participate in a more flexible and pragmatic spirit. In the past two years, due to internal pressure and the COVID-19 pandemic, the positions and attitudes of different countries on some issues have become differentiated as they face various difficulties. Even one country may not make the same choice in different periods and on different issues. Given this, China and ASEAN need to adhere to open regionalism, strive for more cooperation opportunities and partners, and handle major-power competition through multiple, diverse and multi-layered cooperation to avoid significant interruptions in the cooperation process.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

In a nutshell, when developing a comprehensive strategic partnership, China and ASEAN should jointly promote a consensus-based consultative regional order. This order stresses that rules shall be based on equal consultation and consensus of all stakeholders to promote inclusive and open cooperation rather than exclude others. A consultative regional order characterized by ASEAN centrality, multilateralism, and open regionalism is not only realistic and feasible, but will also be well recognized by all regional stakeholders.

Conclusion

Cooperation between China and ASEAN emerged when the international system shifted from the bipolar system of the Cold War to a unipolar system dominated by the United States. With joint effort, China and ASEAN have not only maintained regional stability in turbulent times but also formed a consultative and cooperative culture in the past 30 years and extensively promoted economic integration in East Asia. It sets a good model for mutually beneficial cooperation among developing countries. In contrast to the forecast of Western international relations theories that the rise of emerging powers will inevitably cause instability, China has become an engine of regional economic growth that promotes mutually beneficial cooperation and joint development with Southeast Asian countries. Such achievement is made possible by Chinas focus on economic development and its active response to ASEANs concerns. As the stronger side in the asymmetric relationship, China has been following the principle of “giving more and taking less” and emphasizing “amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness” in its interactions with ASEAN. The power asymmetry between the two sides may further expand in the future, and the concerns and misgivings of Southeast Asians reflected in opinion polls are typical for the weaker side in an asymmetric relationship. To manage the relationship well, the stronger side needs to restrain its power, actively accommodate the weaker sides concerns, respect its strategic autonomy, and facilitate an order based on dialogue and consultation.

Whether in China-ASEAN relations or in the broader East Asian regional order, an excessive emphasis on structural contradictions and an ignorance of individual initiative will prevent us from dispelling such myths as global polarization, another Cold War or falling into the same traps in history, and possibly lead to serious consequences such as regional conflicts and systemic turmoil. A true strategy is one that “thinks the unthinkable”and puts forward innovative ideas and action plans.44 It is expected that China and ASEAN could find such innovative ideas and strategies in the building of their comprehensive strategic partnership, and make significant contributions to the sustainable peace and prosperity in East Asia and the world.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

1 Stein T?nnesson, “Explaining East Asias Developmental Peace: The Dividends of Economic Growth,”Global Asia, Vol.10, No.4, 2015, pp.10-13.

2 The “socialization of major countries” here mainly means that China and other major East Asian countries not only participate in the process of regional cooperation with ASEAN as the institutional center, but also have accepted and internalized the norms of regional cooperation such as the “ASEAN way” and ASEAN centrality, and become an important part of East Asian regionalism. See Qin Yaqing and Wei Ling,“Structures, Processes, and the Socialization of Power: China and Regional Cooperation in East Asia,”World Economics and Politics, No.3, 2007, pp.7-14.

3 On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the dialogue relations between China and ASEAN, the China-ASEAN Eminent Persons Group comprehensively evaluated the relationship between the two sides. According to the report of the China-ASEAN Eminent Persons Group, the development of ChinaASEAN relations has been a process from suspicion and confrontation during the Cold War to dialogue and cooperation after the Cold War. The two sides have established a strategic partnership based on equality, mutual trust, good neighborliness and friendship. Their relations have been “a force for peace and stability in East Asia,” and “contributed substantially to world peace and prosperity.” See “Report of the ASEANChina Eminent Persons Group,” ASEAN Secretariat, November 2005, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/ images/archive/ASEAN-China-EPG.pdf.

4 Zhai Kun, “Comment on Chinas Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia,”Contemporary International Relations, No.11, 2003, pp.36-37. See also Takashi Terada, “Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan-China Power Struggles,” Japanese Studies, Vol.26, No.1, 2006, pp.5-17.

5 Nicholas Thomas, “China-ASEAN Relations: The Core of Asian Regionalism,” in Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, London and New York: Routledge, 2012, p.138.

6 “Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Sustainable Development,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, November 22, 2021, https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202111/t20211122_10451478.html.

7 Xi Jinping, “For a Shared Future and Our Common Home—Speech at the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, November 22, 2021, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202111/t20211122_10451280.html.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

8 Wei Ling, “Creating Strategic Opportunities: The Concept and Practice of China-ASEAN Security Cooperation,” Social Sciences in China, Vol.42, No.3, 2021, pp.188-208.

9 Zhang Yunling, “China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations for 30 Years: Join Hands to Create Cooperative Civilization,” China International Studies, No.3, 2021, p.108.

10 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security, Vol.29, No.3, 2004/2005, pp.64-99.

11 Zhong Feiteng, “Developmental Security: One of Chinas Grand Strategies,” Foreign Affairs Review, No.6, 2013, p.16.

12 “Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2021-2025),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, November 12, 2020, http://new.fmprc. gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1831837.shtml.

13 Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng, The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace, Singapore: Ridge Books, 2017, pp.99-100.

14 “Overview of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations,” October 6, 2021, http://asean.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/Overiew-of-ASEAN-China-Relations-6-Oct-2021.pdf; “China-ASEAN Trade Achieved Leapfrog Development,” Ministry of Commerce of China, November 22, 2021, http://asean.mofcom.gov. cn/article/jmxw/202111/20211103220051.shtml.

15 Zhang Yunling, “China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations for 30 Years: Join Hands to Create Cooperative Civilization,” p.113.

16 Wei Ling, “Local Practice and Regional Order: ASEAN, China, and the Indo-Pacific Construct,”Southeast Asian Affairs, No.2, 2020, pp.9-10.

17 Brantly Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp.11-13.

18 David Kang, “Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia,” Security Studies, Vol.19, No.4, 2010, pp.591-622.

19 Zhang Yunling, “China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations for 30 Years: Join Hands to Create Cooperative Civilization,” p.111.

20 “Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the President of the Peoples Republic of China,” December 16, 1997, https://asean.org/joint-statementof-the-meeting-of-heads-of-state-government-of-the-member-states-of-asean-and-the-president-of-thepeoples-republic-of-china-kuala-lumpur-malaysia-16-december-1997/.

21 “Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the Prime Minister of Japan,” December 16, 1997, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9712/ statement_1.html; “Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea,” December 16, 1997, https://asean.org/jointstatement-of-the-meeting-of-heads-of-state-government-of-the-member-states-of-asean-and-the-primeminister-of-the-republic-of-korea-kuala-lumpur-malaysia-16-december-1997/.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

22 Zhang Yunling, “China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations for 30 Years: Join Hands to Create Cooperative Civilization,” p.112.

23 Luo Jie, “Building Partnership with Neighboring Countries: Interview with Fu Ying, Director General of Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding 10+1 and 10+3 Summits,” World Affairs, No.23, 2002, p.10.

24 Ji-Young Lee, “Contested American Hegemony and Regional Order in Postwar Asia: The Case of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.19, No.2, 2019, pp.237–267.

25 John Ford, “The Pivot to Asia Was Obamas Biggest Mistake,” The Diplomat, January 21, 2017, https:// thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-pivot-to-asia-was-obamas-biggest-mistake/; Uriel N. Galace, “In Retrospect: Assessing Obamas Asia Rebalancing Strategy,” CIRSS Commentaries, Vol.III, No.16, 2016, https://www. fsi.gov.ph/in-retrospect-assessing-obamas-asia-rebalancing-strategy/.

26 “Powers, Norms, and Institutions: The Future of the Indo-Pacific from a Southeast Asia Perspective. Results of a CSIS Survey of Strategic Elites,” Center for Strategic & International Studies(CSIS), 2020, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/20624_Green_ PowersNormsandInstitutions_WEB%20FINAL%20UPDATED.pdf.

27 Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order: A Strategy for Restoring Balance and Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs, January 12, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america-can-shore-asian-order?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_ source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20211125.

28 “ASEAN-China Relations after 30 Years: Changing Perceptions, Remaining Anxieties, and New Opportunities,” Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), 2021, https://72083642-3236-47db-91f5-36b59e075581.filesusr.com/ugd/09e67b_e0595f1f9cd14f31a0acefd31b2bf83c.pdf.

29 “Powers, Norms, and Institutions: The Future of the Indo-Pacific from a Southeast Asia Perspective. Results of a CSIS Survey of Strategic Elites”; “The State of the Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report,”ASEAN Center at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS), February 10, 2021, https://www.iseas.edu. sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-State-of-SEA-2021-v2.pdf.; “ASEAN-China Relations after 30 Years: Changing Perceptions, Remaining Anxieties, and New Opportunities”; Ann Marie Murphy, et al.,“Roundtable: Can America Come Back? Prospects for U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations under the Biden Administration,” Asia Policy, Vol.16, No.4, 2021, pp.65-142. In the following sections, the four reports will not be listed in the references again.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

30 Catharin Dalpino, “ASEAN Centrality under Siege,” Comparative Connections, Vol.21, No.2, 2019, p.47; Lukas Maximilian Mueller, “ASEAN Centrality under Threat--the Cases of RCEP and Connectivity,”Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, Vol.8, No.2, 2019, pp.177-198.

31 “Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Sustainable Development.”.

32 Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” March 2021, https://www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf; Joseph Aguilino, “INDOPACOM Change of Command Ceremony,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, April 30, 2021, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/ Speeches-Testimony/Article/2587015/indopacom-change-of-command-ceremony.

33 Brantly Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships, p.1.

34 Robert O.Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

35 Wei Ling, “China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Anchor for Regional Peace and Prosperity,” Guangming Daily, November 26, 2021, p.12.

36 Xi Jinping, “For a Shared Future and Our Common Home—Speech at the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations.”

37 “Wang Yi Speaks with Special Envoy of ASEAN to Myanmar and Bruneian Second Minister of Foreign Affairs Erywan bin Pehin Yusof on the Phone,” August 18, 2021, http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2021-08/18/ content_5631958.htm.

38 Yang Danxu, “ASEAN-China Relations Stay Robust despite Myanmars Absence from Virtual Summit,” Think China, November 23, 2021, https://www.thinkchina.sg/asean-china-relations-stay-robustdespite-myanmars-absence-virtual-summit.

39 Xi Jinping, “For a Shared Future and Our Common Home—Speech at the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations.”

40 Ibid.

41 “ASEAN-China Relations after 30 Years: Changing Perceptions, Remaining Anxieties, and New Opportunities”; Vannarith Chheang, “BRI Projects in Cambodia and Laos Roll on despite Covid-19,”ISEAS Perspective, No.99, 2021, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ISEAS_ Perspective_2021_99.pdf; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Irresistible Inducement? Assessing Chinas Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ kuik_irresistible-inducement-assessing-bri-in-southeast-asia_June-2021.pdf.

42 “US Scholar: China-Laos Railway Plays an Exemplary Role,” China Daily, November 30, 2021, https://china.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202111/30/WS61a58524a3107be4979fa8ab.html.

43 Xi Jinping, “For a Shared Future and Our Common Home—Speech at the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations.”

44 Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy, New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2020.B910D915-912D-4F52-A5DE-B1ECC45FAF0F

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