李璟 賀鶯

As the effects of the Spanish ?u2 waned in 1919， Seattles workers agitated. Many were fed up with long hours and poor pay， especially at a time of high inflation. Shipyard workers went on strike， leading others to down their tools in solidarity. Newspapers were filled with stories of machinists， firefighters and painters quitting their jobs. Events in Seattle3 sparked labour unrest across the rest of America and even much of the rich world. Bosses worried that the lower classes had become work-shy anti-capitalists.

Seattle once again seems like ground zero4 for a big shift in labour relations. In October the local carpenters union finished a weeks-long strike over pay and conditions. Hotels and shops remain understaffed. Local tech firms， worried about losing staff， have raised average salaries by nearly 5% since 2020. Microsoft， one of them， claimed earlier this year that 46% of the global workforce was planning to make “a major pivot or career transition”.

Seattle seems like an example of what Anthony Klotz of Texas A&M University5 has called the “great resignation”. That memorable term has quickly become a corporate buzzword， spouted6 on companies earnings calls7 and at cocktail receptions. It has also made waves online. An “anti?work” message board on Reddit， a social-media site， is filled with screeds8 against the demands of greedy bosses. The forum now generates more user comments a day than the “WallStreetBets9” subreddit， which moved stockmarkets earlier this year.

The term is elastic， but in essence it makes the proposition that the pandemic has provoked a cultural shift in which workers reassess their priorities. People in low-status jobs will no longer put up with bad pay or poor conditions， while white-collar types scoff10 at the idea of working long hours. Some people have become lazier or feel more entitled; others want to try something new， or desire money less because they have come to appreciate the joys of a simpler life. This is， supposedly， leading to a tsunami of resignations and dropouts. There is just one catch11： the theory has little hard evidence to support it.

The great-resignation thesis seems strongest in America and Britain. In October 4.2m Americans quit their jobs， equivalent to nearly 3% of total employment， close to the record. In the third quarter of the year nearly 400，000 Britons moved from one job to another after handing in their notice， the highest-ever level. Employers may be responding to the threat of further departures， too. A tracker compiled by Goldman Sachs， a bank， suggests that wage growth in both countries is unusually strong. A weak jobs report for America， released on December 3rd， seemed to con?rm how hard it has become to hire staff even as vacancies remain sky-high. The worlds largest economy added just 210，000 jobs in November， below economists expectations of 550，000.

In other parts of the rich world， however， a great resignation is harder to spot. It is certainly true that millions have dropped out of work. Our best guess is that the labour force in the rich world is 3% smaller than it would have been without covid-19， a deficit of 20m people. Yet outside America and Britain there is little sign that this reflects more people quitting.

In November 107，000 Canadians who had left their jobs within the past year did so because they were “dissatisfied”， down from 132，000 on the eve of the pandemic. In Japan the number of unemployed people who had quit their previous job is near an all-time low. There are hints of a small rise in resignations in Italy， but across the EU as a whole the ?ow of people from work into leisure is lower than before the pandemic.

Data from New Zealand on labour?market ?ows look entirely unremarkable. And in many places there is little sign that workers are getting antsy12， which you might think could presage a rise in resignations. The number of industrial disputes in Australia continues to trend downwards. Collective disputes are “facing extinction”， according to a recent issue of Japan Labour Issues， a journal. If the pandemic has changed workers outlook on the world， they are hiding it pretty well.

Other factors， then， probably help explain the decline in the labour force. Many people still say they are fearful of catching covid-19 and may therefore be avoiding public spaces， for instance. Immigrants have returned to their home countries.

Even if a wave of resignations is largely an Anglo-American phenomenon， is there any evidence that the people who are quitting are doing so because they have become work?shy？ Reddit posts aside， this does not seem to be the case. In Britain a tenth of workers say they would like a job with fewer hours and less pay—but that is in line with the long?run average. A recent study by Gallup， in America， suggests that “employee engagement”， a rough proxy13 for job satisfaction， is near its all?time high： hard to square with14 the notion that lots more people are desperate for a way out.

That suggests two more prosaic explanations for soaring quit rates. One relates to vacancies. When there are lots of open positions， people feel more confident about handing in their notice， even if they rather like their job. They may also be poached. Vacancies are high right now partly because the pandemic has led to surging demand in new sectors （say， warehouses for online retail）. Analysis of America by Jason Furman of Harvard University and of Britain by Pawel Adrjan of Indeed， a job?search site， suggests that job quits are at the level you would expect them to be， given the number of vacancies.

Messrs Furman and Adrjans analysis may nonetheless underestimate how unremarkable the surge in quits truly is. In both countries resignations sank during the worst of the pandemic in mid-2020. Many people who would like to have left a position last year may only now have plucked up the courage to do so. Account for these “pent-up” resignations， and the recent pickup looks even less unusual.

Could a truly “great resignation” ever emerge？ It would probably require more radical cultural changes. Households would need to decide， en masse15， that their future consumption needs， and the income needed to fulfil them， were substantially lower. That would mean no more foreign holidays， less dining out and fewer household appliances. It would also mean fewer Christmas presents. Anyone who visited a Black Friday sale， in Seattle or elsewhere， would be quickly disabused of the notion that such a dramatic shift was on the cards16.

1919年，隨著“西班牙流感”的影響逐漸減弱，美國西雅圖的工人們開始躁動不安。不少人受夠了時間長、收入低的工作，尤其是在這個物價飛漲的時代。船塢工人發(fā)動罷工，其他行業(yè)的工人也放下工具以示支持。報紙充斥著機械師、消防員、油漆工罷工的報道。西雅圖總罷工事件引發(fā)全美工人動亂，甚至波及全球不少富裕地區(qū)。老板們擔(dān)心下層階級已成為不愿工作的反資本主義者。

西雅圖似乎再次成為勞資關(guān)系重大轉(zhuǎn)變的起爆點。2021年10月，當(dāng)?shù)啬窘彻樘岣咝劫Y、改善工作條件舉行了為期數(shù)周的罷工。酒店和商店一直人手不足。當(dāng)?shù)乜萍计髽I(yè)由于擔(dān)心員工流失，2020年以來將平均薪資提高了近5%。微軟也在其中，該公司于2021年早些時候宣布，其46%的全球員工正在計劃“換工作或轉(zhuǎn)行”。

西雅圖似乎正是德州農(nóng)工大學(xué)安東尼·克洛茨所說“大辭職潮”的典型代表。這一說法令人過目難忘，很快成為企業(yè)流行語，在公司財報電話會和接待酒會上為人們津津樂道，在網(wǎng)上也引發(fā)了轟動。社交媒體紅迪網(wǎng)的“反工作”留言板上充斥著抨擊老板貪得無厭的長篇大論。該論壇現(xiàn)在每日新增用戶評論數(shù)超過了“華爾街賭注”這個紅迪子論壇，后者在2021年較早時候曾一度撼動了美國股市。

“大辭職潮”這個說法可以有多種解釋，從本質(zhì)上講，它提出了這樣一個命題：疫情引發(fā)了文化轉(zhuǎn)向，工薪階層開始重新評價人生的優(yōu)先級。從事底層工作的民眾將不再容忍低薪或惡劣的工作條件，而白領(lǐng)階層則對長時間工作這種想法嗤之以鼻。有些人變得游手好閑或自以為是;有些人則想嘗試新事物，或降低對金錢的欲望，因為他們已開始享受樸素生活的樂趣。據(jù)信，正是這些原因?qū)е铝宿o職離工的大潮。這其中唯一的坑是：這說法缺乏確鑿的證據(jù)支持。

大辭職潮論似乎在英美兩國表現(xiàn)最為強勁。2021年10月，420萬美國人辭去工作，幾乎相當(dāng)于就業(yè)總?cè)藬?shù)的3%，接近歷史紀(jì)錄。2021年第三季度，近40萬英國人遞交辭呈另謀出路，創(chuàng)下歷史新高。雇主們或許也正對更多員工離職的風(fēng)險做出回應(yīng)。國際投行高盛集團編制的一份追蹤報告顯示，英美兩國的薪資增長均異常強勁。12月3日發(fā)布的一份報告顯示美國就業(yè)疲軟，似乎印證了在崗位空缺居高不下時招聘員工有多么艱難。11月，這一全球最大經(jīng)濟體就業(yè)人數(shù)僅增長了21萬，低于經(jīng)濟學(xué)家所預(yù)期的55萬。

然而，在世界其他富裕地區(qū)，大辭職潮并未顯現(xiàn)。確實有數(shù)百萬人辭去工作，但充其量只能說，相比無新冠肺炎影響的正常情況，全球富裕地區(qū)勞動力減少了3%，缺口為2000萬人。但除英美兩國外，幾乎無跡象表明會有更多的人離職。

截至2021年11月，加拿大因?qū)ぷ鳌安粷M意”而在過去一年內(nèi)離職的人數(shù)為10.7萬人，低于疫情暴發(fā)前夕的13.2萬。在日本，辭職待業(yè)人數(shù)接近歷史最低水平。在意大利，有跡象表明辭職人數(shù)略有上升，但就整個歐盟而言，離職待業(yè)人數(shù)比疫情前還要少。

新西蘭的勞動力市場流動數(shù)據(jù)也平平無奇。在許多地方，幾乎沒什么跡象表明員工蠢蠢欲動從而預(yù)示辭職率上升。澳大利亞的勞資糾紛總數(shù)持續(xù)呈下降趨勢。最近一期《日本勞工問題》稱，集體糾紛正“瀕臨消亡”。如果說新冠疫情改變了勞動者們的世界觀，那他們把這一點隱藏得相當(dāng)好。

那么，其他因素也許有助于解釋勞動力減少的情況。比如，不少人依然表示由于害怕感染新冠肺炎可能會避免前往公共場所。許多移民都已返回自己的祖國。

即便辭職潮在很大程度上是一種英美現(xiàn)象，但究竟有沒有證據(jù)表明人們辭職是因為不愿工作？拋開紅迪的帖子不談，事實似乎并非如此。在英國，有1/10的勞動者表示自己想要一份工時更短、薪資更低的工作——但這與長期以來的平均水平是一致的。蓋洛普最近在美國進行的一項研究表明，“員工敬業(yè)度”（衡量工作滿意度的粗略指標(biāo)）已接近歷史最高水平：這與越來越多的人急于另謀出路的說法背道而馳。

這表明，對于不斷飆升的離職率，還有兩種更為平淡無奇的解釋。其中一種與職位空缺有關(guān)。當(dāng)有崗位大量空缺時，人們即使很喜歡現(xiàn)在的工作，也會更有信心地遞交辭呈。他們還有可能是被挖走的。而目前崗位空缺率居高不下，部分原因是疫情導(dǎo)致新興行業(yè)（如網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售倉儲業(yè)）人力需求激增。哈佛大學(xué)杰森·弗曼對美國的分析和Indeed求職網(wǎng)帕維爾·阿德里安對英國的分析均表明，考慮到崗位空缺的數(shù)量，目前的離職率符合預(yù)期水平。

盡管如此，弗曼和阿德里安先生的分析可能還是低估了這一事實：離職率激增實際上并不值得大驚小怪。在2020年年中疫情最嚴(yán)重的時候，英美兩國辭職人數(shù)均有所下降。許多在2020年就想離職的人，可能直到現(xiàn)在才鼓起勇氣這么做。考慮到這些“被壓抑”的辭職，最近的增長也就更不足為奇了。

真正的“大辭職潮”會出現(xiàn)嗎？這可能需要更激進的文化變革。家家戶戶都需要共同做出決定，大幅減少未來消費需求以及滿足需求所需的收入。這意味著不再出國度假，減少外出就餐，減少購買家電。這還意味著要減少圣誕禮物。但是看看西雅圖或是其他地方舉行的“黑色星期五”大促銷，人們就會立刻打消如此巨變已露端倪的念頭。

（譯者單位：寧波大學(xué)）

1 be all mouth and no trousers〈習(xí)語〉意思是“光說不練”，標(biāo)題使用該詞指大辭職潮的提法炒作得很厲害，但實際并沒有流行起來。譯文為保留修辭效果，根據(jù)文意翻譯為“雷聲大雨點小”。? 2 1918年到1920年，一場名為“西班牙流感”的疫情橫掃全球，造成約5億人感染，4000萬到1億人死亡，而當(dāng)時世界總?cè)丝趦H有17億?！拔靼嘌懒鞲小睂嶋H上并非源自西班牙，世衛(wèi)組織現(xiàn)已將之更名為“1918年大流感”。? 3 1919年美國西雅圖總罷工，當(dāng)時工人發(fā)動罷工并接管了整座城市5天。革命席卷了墨西哥和俄羅斯，德國爆發(fā)了工人起義，匈牙利革命政府上臺，意大利和荷蘭工人掌控了工廠，加拿大溫尼伯也發(fā)生了大罷工。故而文中有波及其他富裕地區(qū)的說法。? 4 ground zero原指（核彈的）爆心投影點，引申為“起點”之義。

5得克薩斯州農(nóng)工大學(xué)建立于1876年，世界著名綜合性研究型公立大學(xué)。安東尼·克洛茨為該校梅斯商學(xué)院組織心理學(xué)教授，2021年5月接受彭博社采訪時創(chuàng)造了great resignation這個短語，用以描述新冠疫情引發(fā)的離職潮。? 6 spout喋喋不休地說，滔滔不絕地說。? 7 earnings call財報電話會議，是上市公司、分析師、投資者和媒體進行的電話會議，討論公司在給定報告期內(nèi)的財務(wù)結(jié)果。? 8 screed冗長的文章。? 9“華爾街賭注”論壇（WSB）是美國最大的散戶論壇。2021年年初，大量WSB散戶通過加倉抱團拉升股價，創(chuàng)造了反殺華爾街空頭的金融界奇觀。該論壇從此聲名大噪，用戶數(shù)量從170萬暴漲到300多萬。? 10 scoff嘲笑，譏笑。

11 catch隱藏的問題;暗藏的不利因素。

12 antsy煩躁的;坐立不安的。

13 proxy代表。? 14 square with與……相符合。

15 en masse〈法語〉全體地;一同地。? 16 on the cards〈習(xí)語〉有跡象預(yù)示可能會發(fā)生。