羅 薩

善意原則視角下的中菲南海仲裁案

羅 薩*

文章以善意原則這一抽象的國際法基本原則為視角，分析南海仲裁案中菲律賓和仲裁庭之行為。第一部分研究善意原則在海洋劃界背景下所具有的內(nèi)涵。一方面，海洋劃界爭端的當(dāng)事國受到善意原則的規(guī)制，特別以善意協(xié)商為代表，包括積極開展協(xié)商、充分進(jìn)行協(xié)商和持續(xù)歡迎協(xié)商等；另一方面，善意原則也指引著爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)作出真正合法合理的裁決。具體到仲裁案中，第二部分將菲律賓在仲裁過程中的行動(dòng)與善意原則蘊(yùn)含的主要要求相對應(yīng)，指出菲方在種種方面對善意原則的違背。第三部分闡述仲裁庭作為爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)，在審理過程中展示的做法，表明其判決也絕非善意之裁決。最后，文章以菲律賓和仲裁庭反以善意原則評判中國的行為，總結(jié)兩者誠信的缺失，是對這一國際法一般原則的根本破壞。

善意原則 中國 菲律賓 仲裁庭 南海仲裁案

一、前 言

善意原則是國際法的基本原則之一，規(guī)制著國際法主體行使其權(quán)利的方式、履行其義務(wù)的態(tài)度，在國際法實(shí)踐中發(fā)揮著極為重要的作用。隨著《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》（以下簡稱“《公約》”）等海洋法公約逐步界定了專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架的概念，國家對這些海域的主張也引發(fā)了新的分歧與沖突，海洋劃界爭端不斷引發(fā)世界關(guān)注。而善意原則也指引著海洋劃界行動(dòng)，對于沿海國之間爭端的解決具有重大的實(shí)踐意義。

2013年1月22日，菲律賓依據(jù)《公約》第十五部分及附件七，單方面就與中國的南海爭端啟動(dòng)仲裁程序。2015年10月29日，仲裁庭公布《關(guān)于管轄權(quán)和可受理性問題的裁決》。仲裁庭宣布其對菲律賓提交的15項(xiàng)訴求中的7項(xiàng)具有管轄權(quán)，并保留對其他8項(xiàng)訴求的管轄權(quán)問題的審議至實(shí)體問題階段；也即菲律賓提交的所有15項(xiàng)訴求，被全部送入第二階段庭審。2016年7月12日，仲裁庭發(fā)布了最終裁決，對中國南海斷續(xù)線等一系列權(quán)利主張作出否定。至此，無論是爭端當(dāng)事方菲律賓，還是第三方司法機(jī)構(gòu)仲裁庭，其種種做法都有違善意原則這一國際法基本原則的精神。

中菲南海仲裁案自啟動(dòng)以來，已經(jīng)引發(fā)了學(xué)界極大的關(guān)注；但相關(guān)研究主要側(cè)重于對菲律賓各項(xiàng)訴求，以及對仲裁庭之裁決特別是建立管轄權(quán)之初步裁決的深入剖析，即集中于法律依據(jù)和法理論證的角度。本文并未就仲裁相關(guān)法理依據(jù)作深入分析，而是站在善意原則的角度，更多地關(guān)注由法律原則產(chǎn)生的、更為抽象的義務(wù)，這是文章創(chuàng)新之處；由此，也希望能夠?qū)χ袊鴳?yīng)對中菲南海爭端作出淺薄的貢獻(xiàn)。

二、善意原則與海洋劃界

（一）善意原則概述

善意原則作為國際法的一項(xiàng)基本原則，在法律的所有領(lǐng)域和體制中都扮演著重要并且是基礎(chǔ)性的角色。首先，自20世紀(jì)以來，眾多國際性的多邊公約都以明示或默示的方式，將善意原則納入其內(nèi)涵。例如《聯(lián)合國憲章》（以下簡稱“《憲章》”）第2條規(guī)定的7項(xiàng)基本原則中，第2項(xiàng)原則即會員國應(yīng)善意地履行憲章義務(wù)；①《聯(lián)合國憲章》，1945年，第2條第2款。又如，《維也納條約法公約》（以下簡稱“VCLT”）序言即規(guī)定，善意原則為舉世所承認(rèn)，并在約文中數(shù)次明確提到“善意”一詞。②《維也納條約法公約》，1969年，序言；第26條；第31條第1款；第46條第2款；第69條第2款（b）項(xiàng)。另外，涉及國際法不同領(lǐng)域的司法判例，也通過其裁決肯定了善意原則的地位，如國際法院在1974年“核試驗(yàn)案”中指出，善意原則是監(jiān)督國家履行其法律義務(wù)的基本原則之一；③Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46.在國際貿(mào)易領(lǐng)域，世界貿(mào)易組織（以下簡稱“WTO”）的爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)也在其眾多裁決中運(yùn)用了善意原則。最后，該原則是國際法一般原則，也是習(xí)慣國際法的要求，這一點(diǎn)也早已為學(xué)界所公認(rèn)。④J. F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991, p. 124; Reviews of Books, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1957, p. 106; Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 73.可見，善意原則的地位和影響力已得到普遍的肯定；國際法的最基本規(guī)范，正是善意之原則。⑤Thomas Cottier、Krista N. Schefer：《WTO中的善意及合法期望之保護(hù)》（韓秀麗譯、高波校），載于《國際經(jīng)濟(jì)法學(xué)刊》2005年第3期，第181頁。

同樣為人們所公認(rèn)的是，善意原則的具體含義難以進(jìn)行明確的定義。起源于羅馬民法的善意原則，體現(xiàn)了對誠信契約和誠信訴訟的要求。誠信契約意即，契約雙方在履行合約時(shí)應(yīng)本著善意的初衷，承擔(dān)因誠信要求而衍生的補(bǔ)充義務(wù)；誠信訴訟則要求，當(dāng)事方在訴訟中善意行使訴訟權(quán)利，同時(shí)法官在解釋和理解當(dāng)事人約定和行使自由裁量權(quán)時(shí)，應(yīng)本著善意，公平公正地做出裁判。伴隨歷史的進(jìn)程，善意原則也普遍融入西方各國的法律制度，并隨著國際交往的不斷發(fā)展而走上國際法的舞臺。國際法意義上的善意原則，最先來源于約定必須遵守；①Thomas Cottier、Krista N.Schefer：《WTO中的善意及合法期望之保護(hù)》（韓秀麗譯、高波校），載于《國際經(jīng)濟(jì)法學(xué)刊》2005年第3期，第181頁。WTO甚至把二者視作同義，并在相當(dāng)數(shù)量的貿(mào)易爭端中，結(jié)合具體案件對善意原則的內(nèi)涵作出各有側(cè)重的闡述。的確，作為基本法律原則，善意原則關(guān)注的不僅僅是行動(dòng)過程中的某一或某些環(huán)節(jié)，而是對一切行動(dòng)的整體規(guī)制，因此這一原則的含義是多面的，也是開放而包容的?！恫既R克法律辭典》將“善意”一詞定義為包含如下幾種思想狀態(tài)：信念或目的的誠實(shí)，忠誠于其義務(wù)，在貿(mào)易或商業(yè)中遵守公平交易的合理商業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，沒有欺詐或謀求不合理利益的意圖。②Bryan A. Garner ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, Eagan: West Group, 2004, p. 2038.“善意”要求行為主體的合情合理、誠實(shí)守信，它難以被賦予客觀的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，而更傾向于主觀上的定義。

值得特別注意的是，在國際法實(shí)踐之中，善意原則不可憑空存在。國際法院指出，善意原則本身并不能單獨(dú)構(gòu)成法律義務(wù)的來源。③Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46.對善意原則的違反不是抽象的、憑空的，這種違反可能建立在對條約的違反之上，或與對另一方利益造成損害相關(guān)，或是以違背某項(xiàng)義務(wù)為基礎(chǔ)。例如，在“核試驗(yàn)案”中，法國曾聲明停止在南太平洋的核試驗(yàn)，盡管聲明是單方面自愿的，國際法院認(rèn)為善意原則要求法國必須遵守其聲明。④Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, paras. 46～51.在“關(guān)于《1995年臨時(shí)協(xié)議》的申請案”中，國際法院需要判斷當(dāng)事國馬其頓是否違反善意協(xié)商的義務(wù)，該義務(wù)基于一份臨時(shí)協(xié)議的規(guī)定。⑤Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 127.正如WTO上訴機(jī)構(gòu)所闡明的，要構(gòu)成違背善意原則，需要滿足兩個(gè)要件，一是存在對某具體法條或義務(wù)的違反，二是不僅僅存在單純的違反。⑥United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Appellate Body Report, 2003, para. 298.

因此，善意原則作為一項(xiàng)缺乏明確行為模式的概念，其含義還需要結(jié)合具體的適用環(huán)境，結(jié)合國際實(shí)踐進(jìn)行探究——正所謂“可以被說明但無法被定義”。⑦Reviews of Books, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1957, p. 106.在海洋劃界這一語境下，善意原則也起到了指引作用。

（二）海洋劃界中的善意原則之于當(dāng)事國

國際法的基本原則作為對國際條約與國際習(xí)慣的補(bǔ)充，對于國際法的各個(gè)領(lǐng)域、各個(gè)方面都具有重要意義，①詹寧斯、瓦茨修訂，王鐵崖等譯：《奧本海國際法》，北京：中國大百科全書出版社1995年版，第23頁。海洋法自然也不例外?！豆s》第300條明文規(guī)定，締約國應(yīng)善意履行根據(jù)公約承擔(dān)的義務(wù)，②《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》，1982年，第300條。從而對各國的海洋劃界行動(dòng)提出了總括性的要求，更有著深厚的內(nèi)涵。當(dāng)然，善意原則本身并不憑空產(chǎn)生新的法律義務(wù)。本文將要探討的種種義務(wù)也都基于實(shí)體法而存在，而善意原則支撐著這些義務(wù)的實(shí)現(xiàn)：它是對履行這些義務(wù)的監(jiān)督，更是對履行義務(wù)之態(tài)度的監(jiān)督。③Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 74.

1.善意展開協(xié)商的義務(wù)

《公約》第74條與第83條，就專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架界限的劃定做出了規(guī)定；此兩條的第1款均指出，海洋邊界應(yīng)由有關(guān)國家協(xié)議劃定，以便得到公平解決。④《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》，第74條第1款，第83條第1款。因此，這一規(guī)定蘊(yùn)含著成員國就海洋劃界展開協(xié)商的義務(wù)；國際法院的多項(xiàng)判例也將該條款下的義務(wù)與善意原則聯(lián)系起來。善意展開協(xié)商的含義可進(jìn)一步具體為以下2點(diǎn)。

第一，善意協(xié)商之義務(wù)意味著，一國單方面進(jìn)行的海洋劃界可能是無效的。誠然，兩國之間可能不會展開正式的協(xié)商談判，而是采取一系列國家行為進(jìn)行互動(dòng)：一國單方面主張，而另一國并未表示反對，以默許的方式最終形成了默示的海域邊界。但由于《公約》明文規(guī)定了海洋邊界的確立方式——協(xié)定優(yōu)先的方式，則一旦其他國家對一國的劃界主張?zhí)岢隹棺h，該國單方面的行為即已經(jīng)構(gòu)成了對《公約》的違反。不得單方面采取可能對其他國家造成影響的行動(dòng)，這是善意履行《公約》義務(wù)的要求，也將在國際法的其他領(lǐng)域找到輔證。

適用于WTO成員國的《關(guān)稅與貿(mào)易總協(xié)定》（以下簡稱“GATT”）是WTO的前身，也是WTO法關(guān)于貨物貿(mào)易最重要的協(xié)定之一；其第20條引言規(guī)定，成員國不應(yīng)采取任意或不合理歧視的手段。⑤《關(guān)稅與貿(mào)易總協(xié)定》，1947年，第20條引言。在“美國龜蝦案”的最終判決中，WTO爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)明確指出GATT第20條引言是善意原則的一種表達(dá)。⑥United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 1998, para. 158.在該案中，美國針對進(jìn)口的蝦產(chǎn)品設(shè)立了一項(xiàng)法規(guī)，但并未事先與所有受到影響的國家就法規(guī)進(jìn)行協(xié)商。WTO上訴機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)為，美國單方面通過和實(shí)施這一法規(guī)的行為是不合理的，并且沒有考慮各國不同的具體情況，是武斷的行為。⑦United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 1998, paras. 172, 177.可見，各國應(yīng)達(dá)成一致，而不是單方面獨(dú)斷地進(jìn)行主張，這一點(diǎn)在國際法各領(lǐng)域都是不爭的事實(shí)，與善意原則這一國際法一般原則相符。

既然如此，善意展開協(xié)商的第二點(diǎn)含義也就自然而然、不言而喻：各國應(yīng)當(dāng)就海洋劃界問題進(jìn)入?yún)f(xié)商，開啟談判，尋求達(dá)成協(xié)議。在“北海大陸架案”中，國際法院認(rèn)為大陸架劃界相關(guān)的具體法規(guī)，以正義和善意的基本原則為基礎(chǔ)，各國有進(jìn)入?yún)f(xié)商的義務(wù)。①North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.“緬因?yàn)嘲浮备鞔_地將協(xié)商的義務(wù)與善意原則聯(lián)系了起來：“海域劃界應(yīng)通過善意協(xié)商，由協(xié)議達(dá)成……”②Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, para. 112(1).2002年，“喀麥隆—尼日利亞案”又一次確認(rèn)了善意協(xié)商的義務(wù)。③Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, para. 244.

總而言之，在海洋劃界中，國家首先應(yīng)善意地開展協(xié)商，尋求與其他相關(guān)國家達(dá)成共同的協(xié)議；而一切單方面行動(dòng)——包括單方面劃界、勘探、開發(fā)等等，都是有違《公約》精神的。

2.善意進(jìn)行協(xié)商以尋求達(dá)成協(xié)議的義務(wù)

相比開啟協(xié)商，在意圖達(dá)成協(xié)議的目標(biāo)下繼續(xù)進(jìn)行協(xié)商，才更是一國善意的試金石。國家應(yīng)就協(xié)商付出多大的努力？怎樣程度的協(xié)商才是“足夠的”？是否協(xié)商過程中出現(xiàn)任何一點(diǎn)的相持不下，都足以令當(dāng)事國轉(zhuǎn)而付諸爭端解決程序？《公約》無法回答這些更具主觀性的問題；但通過這些問題，善意進(jìn)行協(xié)商的重要性已可見一斑。究竟能否和平、友好地完成海洋劃界，很大程度上依賴于各國進(jìn)行協(xié)商的善意。本文希望強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，善意原則下協(xié)商的義務(wù)不僅僅是程序上的，有意義的協(xié)商才是關(guān)鍵，這要求雙方真誠地進(jìn)行協(xié)商，盡一切努力，尋求以協(xié)議方式完成劃界。

首先，各國都有各自更傾向使用的劃界方法，其偏好的方法可能不盡相同，但這并不是當(dāng)事國逃避協(xié)商合作的理由。在第三次聯(lián)合國海洋法會議漫長的談判過程中，眾多國家圍繞大陸架和專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)的劃界規(guī)則展開了激烈爭論，并形成了兩派觀點(diǎn)。巴哈馬等24國組成的一派支持中間線法為首要原則，阿爾及利亞等32國為代表的另一派則認(rèn)為，中間線原則并不優(yōu)先于其他多種劃界原則，海洋劃界應(yīng)將衡平原則放在首位。然而無論支持哪一種劃界方法，兩派的提案都不約而同地承認(rèn)，海域界線應(yīng)由國家間的協(xié)議確立。①Informal Proposal by Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Colombia, Cyrus, Democratic Yemen, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia (later joined by Cape Verde, Chile, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau and Portugal), UN General Assembly Document NG7/2; Informal Proposal by Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Congo, France, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Syria, Somalia, Turkey, Venezuela and Vietnam, UN General Assembly Document NG 7/10.當(dāng)事國海洋劃界主張中的種種分歧，可以采取靈活變通的方式，善意地協(xié)商解決。前國際法院院長布斯塔曼特·伊·里韋羅法官在其關(guān)于“北海大陸架案”的獨(dú)立意見中說，關(guān)于大陸架的協(xié)商需要引入善意和靈活的要素，這些要素可以協(xié)調(diào)保持和平睦鄰關(guān)系的需要與法律的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性。②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Separate Opinion of President J. L. Bustamante Y Rivero, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 58.該案判決更指出，當(dāng)事國有義務(wù)開展有意義的協(xié)商，而不是固執(zhí)己見。③North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.在該案中，當(dāng)事方——丹麥與荷蘭兩國——在判決前一直堅(jiān)持中間線原則，而不愿作任何讓步，這被判定為與有意義的靈活協(xié)商義務(wù)相悖。④North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 87.此處也再次體現(xiàn)了善意原則提倡靈活合理、反對獨(dú)斷僵化的內(nèi)涵，與WTO法對獨(dú)斷和不合理歧視的禁止相互印證，異曲同工。

由此，應(yīng)當(dāng)說各國海洋劃界之主張無論有怎樣的分歧，在協(xié)商解決分歧這一點(diǎn)上都不應(yīng)存在爭議。然而，國家實(shí)踐表明，一些國家更傾向于協(xié)商之外的其他方式；但根據(jù)上文已列出的《公約》規(guī)定，海洋劃界問題又必須首先經(jīng)過協(xié)商尋求解決，未果才可付諸其他程序，主要指《公約》第十五部分的爭端解決程序。國家是否具有協(xié)商的真誠實(shí)意，以及這一真意到底到達(dá)了何種程度，構(gòu)成了善意進(jìn)行協(xié)商所面臨的第2個(gè)問題。

根據(jù)國際法院所述，既然需要進(jìn)行有意義的協(xié)商以尋求取得一致，那么在付諸種種努力進(jìn)行這類協(xié)商之前，爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)避免對實(shí)體問題作出不成熟的裁判。法庭審議的初步事宜應(yīng)為：上訴方是否確實(shí)履行了其協(xié)商的義務(wù)。⑤Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 682.本文認(rèn)為，上訴方對待協(xié)商的態(tài)度，是其是否遵循善意原則要求的一項(xiàng)關(guān)鍵證明，這在中菲南海仲裁案中也具有特別的意義。遺憾的是，判例法對此尚沒有明確的表述，僅能依靠對判決隱含之意以及學(xué)者觀點(diǎn)的解讀，尋找善意協(xié)商的蹤跡。

國際法院曾在判決中闡明，協(xié)商的義務(wù)意味著當(dāng)事方懷著達(dá)成協(xié)議的目標(biāo)參與到談判中，而并非只為完成這一程序上的前提要件，但實(shí)際上卻意在進(jìn)入后續(xù)的其他程序。⑥North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.據(jù)此，在進(jìn)入第三方爭端解決程序之前，國家應(yīng)充分展開真誠的協(xié)商，而非僅僅做“表面功夫”。在國際海洋法法庭審理的“馬來西亞—新加坡圍海造地案”中，一位法官便明確指出了這點(diǎn)：“交換意見之要求并非一項(xiàng)空洞的形式，不可為爭端方隨意舍棄。該義務(wù)必須善意履行。”①Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Separate Opinion of Chandrasekhara Rao, ITLOS Reports 2003, para. 11.正如《布萊克法律辭典》之釋義所說，真誠，是善意協(xié)商最基本的要義。

在“愛琴海大陸架案”中，希臘更傾向于以第三方程序解決與土耳其的劃界爭端，而土耳其則堅(jiān)持協(xié)商優(yōu)先。當(dāng)然，希臘更偏好司法程序的解決方法，這一事實(shí)本身不能說明其在協(xié)商中就不具備真意，并且希臘也確實(shí)同意與土耳其協(xié)商。但希臘在1975年10月2日的外交照會中也明確表示，爭端應(yīng)“首先提交國際法院”，而“不排除隨后繼續(xù)進(jìn)行協(xié)商”。②Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, para. 20.其一系列的聲明和行動(dòng)也都表明，希臘在沒有與土耳其開展充分協(xié)商的情況下，就將爭端提交了國際法院；從法院自身對事實(shí)的陳述也能看出，雙方僅僅進(jìn)行了初步的、程序上的對話，而尚未“充分展開嚴(yán)肅認(rèn)真、靈活適當(dāng)?shù)纳埔鈪f(xié)商”。③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 683.希臘同時(shí)也將該問題提交了聯(lián)合國安理會，安理會在對此作出的決議中“要求”雙方恢復(fù)直接談判，并“呼吁它們竭盡力量，保證談判產(chǎn)生雙方都可接受的解決方法”。④Security Council Resolutions, S/RES/395, 1976.應(yīng)當(dāng)說，安理會也認(rèn)為雙方在此之前進(jìn)行的協(xié)商并不充分，努力達(dá)成特別協(xié)定的解決方式應(yīng)當(dāng)優(yōu)先于司法程序。⑤Leo Gross, The Dispute between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 71, Issue 1, 1977, p. 32.

土耳其在案件審理過程中堅(jiān)持，協(xié)商尚不成熟，雙方應(yīng)當(dāng)回到談判中去；只有那些善意協(xié)商確實(shí)無法解決的問題，并且只有在確實(shí)面臨這類問題的時(shí)刻，才能將其訴諸法庭。⑥Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 21, 28; UN Doc S/PV.1950, United Nations, 13 August 1976.鑒于土耳其的觀點(diǎn)，法庭應(yīng)有義務(wù)檢驗(yàn)雙方在進(jìn)入司法程序之前，是否充分履行了它們協(xié)商的義務(wù)；假如協(xié)商是初步的、表面的，甚至有當(dāng)事方缺乏協(xié)商的真意，只是為了滿足使用其他方法的程序要件，這類行為就不符合善意原則下協(xié)商的要求。

法庭完全有立場裁判爭端是否尚處于協(xié)商的初步階段，可能適用的解決方案還遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)沒有為雙方所探討，也即協(xié)商的義務(wù)是否被“足夠、充分”地履行。⑦Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 686.國際法院并未對此給出明確的觀點(diǎn)；⑧Cottier教授因此也將本案稱為被國際法院“錯(cuò)過的機(jī)會”。但無論是“愛琴海大陸架案”之裁決，還是上文已談到的“北海大陸架案”等，亦或是學(xué)者們的真知灼見，都指向這一完全合理的結(jié)論：當(dāng)事國應(yīng)以達(dá)成一致為目標(biāo)，真誠地參與協(xié)商，這意味著以靈活、合理的態(tài)度，充分考慮各種可能的劃界方法，而不是使協(xié)商淪為一項(xiàng)表面程序。

3.其他爭端解決程序不構(gòu)成對協(xié)商的妨礙

上文提到的“愛琴海大陸架案”同時(shí)證明，即使?fàn)幎朔揭呀?jīng)將爭議付諸司法程序，也并不妨礙協(xié)商在法庭之外繼續(xù)進(jìn)行。實(shí)際上，作為上訴方的希臘也并未排除協(xié)商，而是優(yōu)先選擇第三方程序而已；在案件審理階段，當(dāng)事兩國仍然繼續(xù)進(jìn)行了多次談判，甚至同意大陸架劃界問題應(yīng)努力由協(xié)商解決。①Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 20, 24～26.

協(xié)商作為最有效也是最自然的爭端解決方式，其地位早已為國際社會反復(fù)確認(rèn)。國際法院在1974年“漁業(yè)管轄權(quán)案”中，將協(xié)商稱作“顯然是和平解決爭端的最合適方法。”②Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 73.安理會關(guān)于愛琴海大陸架問題的決議，更進(jìn)一步支持了這一點(diǎn)。僅僅因?yàn)橐粐鴮幎嗽V諸協(xié)商之外的其他程序，并不能斷言其行動(dòng)是惡意的，③Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 52.這也是善意原則對國家行為進(jìn)行善意推定的要求；但另一方面，既然并非惡意，該國也就不應(yīng)放棄協(xié)商的努力，在其他爭端解決程序之外，協(xié)商仍然可以繼續(xù)或重啟，這也是該國的確遵循善意原則的有力證明。

（三）海洋劃界中爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)的善意

《公約》第十五部分建立了綜合的海洋爭端解決機(jī)制，由此，各國可以選擇的第三方爭端解決方法包括調(diào)解、國際海洋法法庭、國際法院、附件七仲裁和附件八特別仲裁。這些方法所指向的第三方爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)，也應(yīng)當(dāng)根據(jù)善意原則行事，探尋能夠?yàn)樗挟?dāng)事國接受的、真正具有意義的結(jié)果。盡管適用于國際司法機(jī)構(gòu)的國際規(guī)約并沒有明文提到善意原則，但國際爭端要真正得以解決，需要爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)與當(dāng)事方共同的努力，這一點(diǎn)是確鑿無疑的。因而爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)不可因其作為“裁判員”，行動(dòng)可能不會招致懲罰，就任意行事；這類做法也的確鮮有發(fā)生，國際司法實(shí)踐一貫體現(xiàn)出對善意裁決的認(rèn)同。

上文已經(jīng)詳細(xì)分析了協(xié)商在海洋劃界中的優(yōu)先地位，這一重要地位正是由國際法院等爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)反復(fù)確認(rèn)的。為了確保協(xié)商發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的作用，不僅當(dāng)事國應(yīng)善意進(jìn)行協(xié)商，爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)也應(yīng)作出相應(yīng)的努力。

首先，在合理地用盡協(xié)商的可能方案之前，也即，未能確定經(jīng)善意協(xié)商后仍存在無法解決的問題時(shí)，爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)不應(yīng)就實(shí)體問題作出裁判。這要求判決機(jī)構(gòu)考量當(dāng)事方是否確實(shí)善意履行了協(xié)商義務(wù)。

第二，第三方機(jī)構(gòu)的善意當(dāng)然并不代表它們永遠(yuǎn)不應(yīng)當(dāng)作出裁判，或是想方設(shè)法逃避裁判。但是，根據(jù)不同案件的具體情形，一項(xiàng)最終確定的、沒有進(jìn)一步協(xié)商余地的判決，可能無法為當(dāng)事一方完全接受。在這種情況下，可能產(chǎn)生2種結(jié)果：輕則判決效力受到減損，重則有適得其反之效——判決有利的一方要求將結(jié)果付諸實(shí)施，不利的一方則拒絕實(shí)施，雙方矛盾加劇，爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)非但未能解決爭端，反而弄巧成拙。另外，國際司法的有效性，尚依賴于國家自愿的服從；①Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 688.故司法機(jī)構(gòu)更有必要堅(jiān)持中立，堅(jiān)持客觀的法律原則作出裁判。鑒于以上原因，第三方機(jī)構(gòu)在面臨上述類似情況時(shí)，應(yīng)作出鼓勵(lì)協(xié)商的裁決，而不是不留余地的、終結(jié)性的決定。

“北海大陸架案”就是這方面的范例，法庭最終的決定是，海洋界線應(yīng)當(dāng)根據(jù)衡平原則，經(jīng)協(xié)議達(dá)成，協(xié)商過程中應(yīng)考慮法庭指出的各項(xiàng)因素。②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 101(C), (D).“漁業(yè)管轄權(quán)案”更明確提出善意協(xié)商，判定當(dāng)事國“有義務(wù)進(jìn)行善意談判以尋求公平解決分歧”，以及“充分考慮對方所享有的權(quán)益”。③Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, paras. 78～79.法庭在最終判決中所提供的也許不是可以直接付諸實(shí)施的方法，不是一目了然的明確結(jié)果，而是一種指引和鼓勵(lì)，引導(dǎo)各國就和平解決其爭端付出更多努力。

將司法解決爭端的方式簡單視為直接友善協(xié)商的替代方法，這一說法已經(jīng)不再準(zhǔn)確了。它更應(yīng)當(dāng)成為一種互動(dòng)的方法，不僅沒有削減爭端解決體制的效力，反而為及時(shí)、有效的協(xié)商助力。④Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 690.以裁決要求各國重回談判桌，從而取得爭端的和平解決，或許這才是爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)所能作出的最有意義之貢獻(xiàn)。爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)，正如其名，應(yīng)當(dāng)為爭端最終獲得解決而考慮，為國際法律規(guī)則和原則得到遵循和守護(hù)而考慮；這是其作為第三方機(jī)構(gòu)對爭端方的善意，更是對國際法之長期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展的善意。

（四）條約必須遵守；不得減損條約的目的及宗旨

條約必須遵守，是國際社會賴以存在和運(yùn)行的一大基石，是國家善意最基本的體現(xiàn)之一；善意原則最初的內(nèi)涵，就在于條約信守。①J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, p. 124; Thomas Cottier、Krista N. Schefer：《WTO中的善意及合法期望之保護(hù)》（韓秀麗譯、高波校），載于《國際經(jīng)濟(jì)法學(xué)刊》2005年第3期，第181頁。VCLT第26條明文要求國家善意履行有效之條約；《憲章》也有類似的規(guī)定。早在百年之前，國際法實(shí)踐也已確認(rèn)了這一點(diǎn)：1910年“北大西洋漁業(yè)案”判決指出，任何國家均有義務(wù)善意履行條約所產(chǎn)生之義務(wù)。②李浩培著：《條約法概論》，北京：法律出版社2003年版，第277頁。

另一方面，VCLT第31條闡述了條約解釋之通則，其第1款規(guī)定，條約應(yīng)依其用語、按其上下文、并參照條約之目的及宗旨所具有之通常意義，進(jìn)行善意解釋。第18條也規(guī)定，只要國家表示接納了條約，則在條約生效之前也不得妨礙其目的及宗旨；該條款也被視為對善意原則的表達(dá)。③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 667, note 53.對條約的遵守，也意味著對其目的與宗旨的認(rèn)同，意味著促進(jìn)而不是破壞條約目的及宗旨的實(shí)現(xiàn)，這也是善意原則的基本要求之一。④Anthony D’Amato, Good Faith, in Rudolf Bernhardt ed., Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 599.條約的目的及宗旨，代表著締約國的共同期望；“期望乃法律之命脈”，⑤Stephen M. Schwebel, The Compliance Process and the Future of International Law, in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1981, p. 182.在善意原則之下，締約國根據(jù)條約產(chǎn)生的合法期望應(yīng)當(dāng)受到保護(hù)。

《公約》序言是對《公約》整體目標(biāo)的表達(dá)，其中明確指出，與海洋法相關(guān)的一切問題都應(yīng)本著互相諒解和合作的精神進(jìn)行解決。由此可見，《公約》基本目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)有賴于國家間的理解與合作，這也再次強(qiáng)調(diào)了上文分析的協(xié)商之重要地位。此外，保持開明、靈活、誠懇的態(tài)度，行動(dòng)透明而不帶有保留或隱藏的目的，等等——凡此種種善意的表現(xiàn)，顯然都是“互相諒解與合作精神”的題中之義。

為了實(shí)現(xiàn)在海洋劃界中達(dá)成最終協(xié)議的目標(biāo)，《公約》還做出了更加具體的規(guī)定。第74條第3款和類似的第83條第3款，敦促各國作出臨時(shí)安排，且臨時(shí)安排不得危害或阻礙最后協(xié)議的達(dá)成?！肮鐏喣恰K里南案”仲裁庭認(rèn)為，以上條款包含2項(xiàng)義務(wù)：一是致力于推進(jìn)臨時(shí)制度和具體措施，從而為爭議地區(qū)的暫時(shí)開發(fā)利用掃除障礙；二是盡一切努力，不危害或阻礙取得最終協(xié)議。⑥Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 2007, paras. 460, 467.這要求善意協(xié)商，且雙方的一些行為，例如蘇里南威脅使用武力的行為，構(gòu)成了對達(dá)成最終協(xié)議的危害。⑦Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 2007, paras. 460, 484.

總之，不得減損條約目的及宗旨很大程度上需要各國努力協(xié)商，并有義務(wù)避免采取阻礙協(xié)商進(jìn)程的行為。各國有義務(wù)信守條約之規(guī)定，善意行使自身權(quán)利，履行自身義務(wù)，促進(jìn)條約目的及宗旨的實(shí)現(xiàn)。

（五）真誠——善意原則之核心

通過以上對善意原則多方面內(nèi)涵的闡述，應(yīng)當(dāng)說，善意原則并不具有清晰、準(zhǔn)確的含義，并沒有一套客觀、嚴(yán)格的檢驗(yàn)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；其一切要求，都與“真誠”這一抽象的品質(zhì)緊密相連。然而，善意原則作為國際法基本原則的意義也正在于此。為了更好地發(fā)揮法律原則的作用，填補(bǔ)國際條約和習(xí)慣尚未覆蓋的空白，善意原則的范疇恰恰應(yīng)當(dāng)是靈活和廣泛的。①R. Summers教授就將善意原則稱為“安全閥”，指出其定義應(yīng)當(dāng)是開放而不是封閉的。See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 54, Issue 2, 1968, p. 266.真心與誠意是善意原則的試金石；②For example, J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991, p. 118; Andrew D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2006, p. 339.以真誠為核心，善意原則總體上要求國家抱著開明的態(tài)度，在爭議中以靈活的方式考慮所有可能方法，致力于協(xié)商合作，并采取誠實(shí)的行動(dòng)。

三、南海仲裁案中菲律賓行為對善意原則之違背

國際法上的善意原則，對海洋劃界爭端中當(dāng)事方和第三方仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)的行動(dòng)，都做出了頗有分量的指導(dǎo)，應(yīng)當(dāng)為各方所重視。中國與菲律賓在南海主張的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架存在重疊，且對南海諸島的主權(quán)歸屬存在爭議，雙方之間的爭端是主權(quán)爭端和海洋劃界爭端。因而爭端當(dāng)事方菲律賓，以及爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)仲裁庭均應(yīng)遵循善意原則。但審視案件全程，菲律賓和仲裁庭的行為已屢屢違背了善意原則之于海洋劃界的指引。

（一）善意協(xié)商的關(guān)鍵地位

爭端方開啟協(xié)商的行動(dòng)本身，就是善意的表示，而本著尋求協(xié)議解決沖突的目標(biāo)將協(xié)商進(jìn)行下去，也是雙方善意的有力體現(xiàn)。在這方面，不得不說菲方的行為已將善意原則破壞殆盡。

1.菲律賓未就仲裁展開協(xié)商

首先，爭端當(dāng)事國不僅應(yīng)啟動(dòng)協(xié)商，還應(yīng)致力于協(xié)商的持續(xù)開展。中菲已經(jīng)進(jìn)行過多次友好協(xié)商，雙方共同作出的一系列雙邊聲明就是協(xié)商成果的代表；這一點(diǎn)也得到了菲律賓的承認(rèn)。在仲裁案訴訟過程中，菲方代表曾總結(jié)道，中菲多年來已就南海爭端各個(gè)議題展開了協(xié)商，包括中國的“歷史性權(quán)利”、黃巖島和南沙群島的海洋權(quán)利、相關(guān)海域的捕魚和航行權(quán)、在相關(guān)海域內(nèi)進(jìn)行島礁建設(shè)等方面。①Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 28～32.

然而，菲方代表在仲裁庭面前隱去的事實(shí)是，兩國有關(guān)南海爭端的協(xié)商進(jìn)程，在2012年黃巖島事件之后幾乎戛然而止。該事件發(fā)生半年后，菲律賓單方面發(fā)起仲裁，在此之前從未就仲裁事項(xiàng)與中國協(xié)商；菲方共提出15項(xiàng)訴求，沒有任何一項(xiàng)曾與中國協(xié)商甚至交換意見。

既然中菲之間已經(jīng)存在協(xié)商的通道，則有任何新的觀點(diǎn)或提議，首先都理應(yīng)繼續(xù)經(jīng)這一通道向?qū)Ψ教岢?，否則兩國多年來對協(xié)商合作的努力經(jīng)營和長期付出就將付諸東流。假如菲律賓有意提交仲裁，或認(rèn)為協(xié)商已入僵局、第三方的介入將幫助取得進(jìn)展，那么應(yīng)直接向中國做出提議，聽取中方對其訴求之意見。但實(shí)際情況卻是，菲方不僅沒有就具體的任何一類訴求與中國商討，甚至，其準(zhǔn)備將整個(gè)中菲爭端提交仲裁的這一意圖都沒有向中國吐露。2012年4月26日，菲律賓在其照會中提出要將黃巖島問題提交第三方司法機(jī)構(gòu)，這也是菲方在發(fā)起仲裁前，就進(jìn)入司法程序一事向中國遞交的唯一表述；而就是這唯一的一份文件，從善意原則的角度審視也是漏洞百出。照會僅提出將黃巖島問題提交司法程序，而沒有提及南沙群島等其他問題；沒有說明第三方司法機(jī)構(gòu)具體指國際法院、國際海洋法法庭還是仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)；沒有表達(dá)任何要與中國談判的意愿，且文件的性質(zhì)——由外交部發(fā)出的普通照會——本身也表明，菲方之意僅限于做一通知。②《中華人民共和國政府關(guān)于菲律賓共和國所提南海仲裁案管轄權(quán)問題的立場文件》（以下簡稱“《立場文件》”），2014年12月7日，第48段。隨后，2013年1月22日，菲即聲明將發(fā)起仲裁。

根據(jù)以上事實(shí)可知，菲律賓的行動(dòng)沒有履行充分協(xié)商的義務(wù)；嚴(yán)格地說，就發(fā)起仲裁一事而言，菲律賓甚至沒有試圖與中國開啟新的協(xié)商。

2.菲律賓之“協(xié)商”缺乏真意

即使真如菲律賓所爭辯的，在發(fā)起仲裁前已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了協(xié)商，其對待協(xié)商的態(tài)度也不堪一擊。本文強(qiáng)調(diào)，上訴方對于協(xié)商是否具有真意，是其是否遵循善意原則要求的關(guān)鍵證明，這一點(diǎn)可從兩個(gè)方面得到檢驗(yàn)：一是，作為上訴方的國家是否確實(shí)進(jìn)行了充分協(xié)商，還是僅僅協(xié)商，以不至于公然違反《公約》規(guī)定的程序要件；二是，司法程序啟動(dòng)后如有可能，上訴方是否仍愿意參與到協(xié)商中去。菲律賓之行為未能經(jīng)住任何一項(xiàng)考驗(yàn)。

案件初步審議過程中，仲裁庭曾提問，“若《公約》第283條確實(shí)要求當(dāng)事方首先就爭端實(shí)體問題進(jìn)行協(xié)商，則這類協(xié)商應(yīng)具體到怎樣的程度，以及菲律賓是否已就其具體的每項(xiàng)訴求與中國充分交換了意見?！雹貴inal Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, p. 32.仲裁庭這一問題問到了點(diǎn)子上。菲方作出了這樣的回答：“就訴求實(shí)質(zhì)進(jìn)行逐項(xiàng)協(xié)商是不必要的；只要從整體上就爭端交換了意見，就滿足了第283條的要求……；就《公約》各項(xiàng)具體條款交換意見也是不必要的?！雹贔inal Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People's Republic of China, PCA, pp. 34～35.菲律賓將協(xié)商貶為浮于表面的程序需要，這一意圖在以上回答中可謂呼之欲出。既然訴求反映了菲國在南海爭端中的主要觀點(diǎn)，其實(shí)質(zhì)自然應(yīng)在協(xié)商中討論，否則協(xié)商意義何在？菲方這一說法已經(jīng)自證，其仲裁開始前進(jìn)行的所謂協(xié)商根本不具誠意。另外，協(xié)商談判與第三方仲裁同為解決爭端的方式，就這一最終目的而言，兩者并無二致。既然菲方認(rèn)為爭端涉及多項(xiàng)議題，故而列出林林總總15項(xiàng)訴求請仲裁庭一一裁決，那么，若真意希望和平解決這種種議題，在協(xié)商中又怎能不逐項(xiàng)逐條地交換意見？試想，假如一場談判中，一方甚至連自己的具體主張都沒有告知對方，也就更談不上“聽取”或“交換”意見，則談判的實(shí)質(zhì)內(nèi)容何在？再者，“只要交換了意見，就滿足了第283條要求”的用語，幾乎是明確地承認(rèn)，協(xié)商對菲方而言只不過是表面程序?？梢姺品揭褯Q心倚仗仲裁，在此基礎(chǔ)上，即使其就仲裁事宜與中國有過對話，這種對話也失去了意義。因?yàn)?，菲方根本不是懷著尋求取得一致的目?biāo)與中國“協(xié)商”（假如還能被稱為協(xié)商的話）的，甚至可能恰恰相反——畢竟失敗的協(xié)商更是進(jìn)入仲裁程序的強(qiáng)大理由。我國不應(yīng)，更不愿對菲律賓作這樣近乎惡意的推定，但菲方對待協(xié)商的態(tài)度著實(shí)難以令人信服。

善意原則之要義，就在于誠意履行條約賦予之義務(wù)，避免使條約在事實(shí)上歸于無效。因此，即使菲方曾經(jīng)有過所謂“協(xié)商”的舉動(dòng)，也仍未善意履行《公約》對于協(xié)商的規(guī)定。

3.仲裁不妨礙協(xié)商的繼續(xù)

最后，作為上訴方的當(dāng)事國仍然愿意甚至歡迎繼續(xù)協(xié)商，這也是其善意履行和平解決爭端之義務(wù)的上佳體現(xiàn)?！皭矍俸４箨懠馨浮钡漠?dāng)事雙方并未因?yàn)闋幎艘呀?jīng)進(jìn)入司法程序，就停止協(xié)商的步伐，而是繼續(xù)進(jìn)行了數(shù)次談判。③Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 24～26.正如該案的一位法官在其獨(dú)立意見中所指明的，由于國家間爭端往往錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜、涉及多個(gè)層面，多種途徑相結(jié)合的方式可能更有助于爭端解決；因此國家可以選擇的解決途徑是互補(bǔ)的，并非互不相容。④Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 52.也許，有些海洋劃界爭端在幾種爭端解決方式同時(shí)適用的情況下，反而更能促進(jìn)爭端的解決；無論如何，可以肯定的是，第三方爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)的介入并不阻礙協(xié)商的進(jìn)行，甚至，這些機(jī)構(gòu)往往都鼓勵(lì)和呼吁繼續(xù)協(xié)商。

不幸的是，南海仲裁案被提交以來數(shù)年，中菲之間協(xié)商的進(jìn)程已陷入停滯。對于中國一再呼吁重啟協(xié)商的意愿，菲國一律一口回絕。2013年1月菲提交仲裁后，中國駐菲大使館隨即請菲方通過雙邊談判解決爭端，而菲律賓總統(tǒng)府發(fā)言人的回應(yīng)是，中國的邀請來得太遲了，“讓我們在法庭見”。①朱曉磊：《中國吁菲律賓就領(lǐng)土爭端談判》，下載于http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/ 2013-01/3577769.html，2017年1月30日。至今，菲律賓在政府新聞發(fā)布會等官方場合已多次作出類似的表態(tài)，認(rèn)為中國的立場要求菲首先承認(rèn)“整個(gè)南中國海屬于中國”，在仲裁結(jié)果出爐之前不會進(jìn)行雙邊磋商。②See Response of the DFA Spokesperson to the Recent Statement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the West Philippine Sea Issue, at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/ newsroom/dfa-releases/332-response-of-the-dfa-spokesperson-to-the-recent-statementof-the-chinese-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-west-philippine-sea-issue, 1 February 2017；朱艷芳：《菲律賓稱2016年前不會和中國重啟南海爭端雙邊談判》，下載于http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141211/42697421_0.shtml，2017年2月1日；Statement before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/ dfa-releases/6795-statement-before-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration, 1 February 2017.

正在進(jìn)行中的司法程序根本不構(gòu)成協(xié)商之阻礙，問題之根本在于，當(dāng)事方究竟是否存有以協(xié)商優(yōu)先解決爭端的善意。這一善意之于菲方是大有疑問的，顯然它根本不愿為雙邊合作作出努力，一再拒絕與中國協(xié)商。自相矛盾的是，菲律賓同時(shí)又宣稱自己遵守爭端解決的相關(guān)法律，甚至呼吁國際社會遵循法律規(guī)定以和平解決爭端。③PHL Stresses Adherence to Rule of Law as Key to Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; Highlights World Development Challenges and Calls on UN Reforms, at http://www.dfa. gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/4202-phl-stresses-adherence-to-rule-of-law-askey-to-peaceful-settlement-of-disputes-highlights-world-development-challenges-and-callson-un-reforms, 1 February 2017.既然如此，菲方就更應(yīng)當(dāng)銘記，無論是《憲章》、《公約》等國際公約，還是國際法一般原則善意原則，都要求爭端當(dāng)事國首先致力于有意義的、充分的協(xié)商。

（二）條約必須遵守、不減損條約目的及宗旨之義務(wù)

1.《公約》的規(guī)定、目的及宗旨

《公約》約文反復(fù)肯定了協(xié)商合作的重要性。第280條聲明，不損害當(dāng)事國任何時(shí)候協(xié)議采用自行選擇的和平方法之權(quán)利；第281條指出，如已協(xié)議用自行選擇的和平方法來謀求解決爭端，則只有在訴諸這種方法而仍未解決時(shí)才適用《公約》規(guī)定的解決程序；第283條，締約國對《公約》的解釋或適用發(fā)生爭端，則應(yīng)迅速就以談判或其他和平方法解決爭端一事交換意見。僅在關(guān)于爭端解決的第十五部分中，明文提到談判等“和平方法”一詞的就有4項(xiàng)條款；④《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》，第279～281、283條。表達(dá)了應(yīng)當(dāng)優(yōu)先協(xié)商之意的，或是指向了要求協(xié)商之條款的文字，更比比皆是。例如第286條，已訴諸該部分第一節(jié)而仍未解決的、關(guān)于《公約》解釋及適用的爭端，才可提交具有約束力的強(qiáng)制裁判程序；而第一節(jié)則強(qiáng)調(diào)將雙邊協(xié)商放在優(yōu)先地位?！豆s》以復(fù)雜的、相互照應(yīng)的條款，構(gòu)建出一套爭端解決機(jī)制，卻又幾乎是小心翼翼地確保雙邊協(xié)商的爭端解決方法不僅不受這一機(jī)制的干擾，更位于這一機(jī)制之上。對《公約》的信守，已然要求各國充分展開協(xié)商，誠意進(jìn)行合作。

而關(guān)于《公約》的目的及宗旨，其序言和第十六部分的一般規(guī)定都作出了指引：與海洋法相關(guān)的一切問題都應(yīng)本著互相諒解和合作的精神進(jìn)行解決；締約國應(yīng)誠意履行其義務(wù)，并以不致構(gòu)成濫用權(quán)利的方式，行使其權(quán)利、管轄權(quán)和自由。如果說《公約》有關(guān)自行協(xié)商的明文規(guī)定，尚能夠經(jīng)任何雙邊對話得到表面上的滿足，而無需關(guān)注談判實(shí)質(zhì)，那么《公約》追求的目的和宗旨，則對成員國的善意提出了更高的要求。

事實(shí)表明，菲律賓在仲裁案醞釀期間、啟動(dòng)之時(shí)以及進(jìn)程之中，均未與中國進(jìn)行協(xié)商，或是確實(shí)旨在尋求共識的真意協(xié)商。因此，首先，假如菲律賓提交仲裁的爭端果真如其所稱，是關(guān)于《公約》的解釋及適用的爭端，則應(yīng)根據(jù)《公約》第283條，與中方就以和平方法解決爭端交換意見。但菲從未就其任何訴求詢問中國意見，故而已經(jīng)違反了《公約》明文條款，違反了條約必須遵守之要求。

退一步講，即使中菲關(guān)于仲裁一事有過交流——如菲方所堅(jiān)稱的——這種交流也毫無誠意。原因在于菲律賓認(rèn)為沒有必要具體商討其訴求，從而使雙方可能開展的任何協(xié)商淪為表面功夫。由此，菲律賓拋棄了協(xié)商的目標(biāo)，忽視了合作的真諦，減損了《公約》的目的及宗旨。

2.中菲之間多項(xiàng)雙邊及多邊協(xié)議的規(guī)定、目的及宗旨

除了《公約》本身，中菲更有一系列《公約》所指的協(xié)定，對兩國爭端的解決方式作了明確要求。中國與菲律賓就以友好協(xié)商解決南海爭端早有共識；自1995年以來，中菲之間多項(xiàng)聯(lián)合聲明等官方文件都明確指出，雙方爭議將通過雙邊友好協(xié)商加以解決。①中國關(guān)于仲裁案的立場文件引用了多份此類聲明，參見《立場文件》，第31～34段。2002年簽署的《南海各方行為宣言》（以下簡稱“《宣言》”）更有如下規(guī)定：各方以《憲章》宗旨和原則等公認(rèn)的國際法原則作為處理國家間關(guān)系的基本準(zhǔn)則；各方承諾根據(jù)公認(rèn)的國際法原則，通過友好磋商和談判，以和平方式解決領(lǐng)土和管轄權(quán)爭議。②《南海各方行為宣言》，2002年，第1、4條。協(xié)商的地位也得到了現(xiàn)任菲律賓政府的確認(rèn)，2011年中菲聯(lián)合聲明重申以和平對話處理爭議，并重申將遵守《宣言》。③《立場文件》，第37段。中國堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，中菲一系列雙邊文件以及包含中菲兩國的多邊文件，都構(gòu)成具有約束力的協(xié)議，也即《公約》第280條和281條所指的協(xié)議，要求兩國承擔(dān)以協(xié)商解決爭端的義務(wù)。以下以《宣言》為例做進(jìn)一步分析。

首先，《宣言》屬于對中菲具有約束力的政治協(xié)議。VCLT第2條第1款規(guī)定：“稱‘條約’者，謂國家間所締結(jié)而以國際法為準(zhǔn)之國際書面協(xié)定，不論其載于一項(xiàng)單獨(dú)文書或兩項(xiàng)以上相互有關(guān)之文書內(nèi)，亦不論其特定名稱如何?！雹佟毒S也納條約法公約》，第2條第1款。一項(xiàng)協(xié)議之所以稱其為協(xié)議，關(guān)鍵在于當(dāng)事方具有創(chuàng)設(shè)國際法上權(quán)利與義務(wù)的意思表達(dá)。②詹寧斯、瓦茨修訂，王鐵崖等譯：《奧本海國際法》，北京：中國大百科全書出版社1995年版，第1203頁。未經(jīng)簽署的文件，例如新聞公報(bào)，也可能成為協(xié)議，③詹寧斯、瓦茨修訂，王鐵崖等譯：《奧本海國際法》，北京：中國大百科全書出版社1995年版，第1209頁。包含有法律義務(wù)的會議記錄等文件，也可能成為協(xié)議。④Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, para. 41(1).因此，當(dāng)事方的意圖和文件使用的文字，才是決定文件是否成為具有約束力之協(xié)議的要素。

《宣言》明文規(guī)定，以《憲章》宗旨和原則以及《公約》等國際法原則，作為處理國家間關(guān)系的基本準(zhǔn)則；各方經(jīng)《宣言》承諾，根據(jù)公認(rèn)的國際法原則，由直接有關(guān)的主權(quán)國家通過友好磋商和談判，以和平方式解決它們的領(lǐng)土和管轄權(quán)爭議。⑤《南海各方行為宣言》，2002年，第1、4條。這說明《宣言》包含了明確的行為規(guī)則。對“承諾”一詞的使用，也彰顯了締約國確立相互之間義務(wù)的意圖。⑥《立場文件》，第38段。另外，《宣言》是由中國外交部副部長和東盟成員國外交部部長或外交大臣所簽署的，也即政府的官方代表。⑦原文為“聲明……經(jīng)由主要官方代表簽署，且此聲明含有包括明確行為規(guī)則這種巳獲同意之結(jié)論的話，此文件就對當(dāng)事國家具有約束力?！闭矊幩埂⑼叽男抻啠蹊F崖等譯：《奧本海國際法》，北京：中國大百科全書出版社1995年版，第1189頁。綜上，《宣言》應(yīng)被視為具有法律約束力的協(xié)議文件。

因此，《宣言》所規(guī)定之“由直接有關(guān)的主權(quán)國家通過友好磋商和談判”解決爭議的方法，才是菲律賓應(yīng)當(dāng)堅(jiān)持的方式。而《宣言》之序言也宣告了其宗旨所在：為和平與永久解決有關(guān)國家間分歧和爭議創(chuàng)造有利條件。菲律賓不僅沒有主動(dòng)履行與中國協(xié)商的義務(wù)，面對中國提出的協(xié)商請求也是一律回絕，這一行為是對《宣言》的違背，同時(shí)也超出了對《宣言》的違背，是對《宣言》目的及宗旨的破壞。

第二，根據(jù)菲律賓在訴訟中的論辯，《宣言》并非有約束力的協(xié)議，只是一份政治性文件。菲方也分析了“承諾”一詞，認(rèn)為這一用語和“同意”的效力是不同的，各國僅是“聲明”它們的“承諾”。⑧Memorial of the Philippines, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, 2014, paras. 7.51. [hereinafter “The Memorial”]但《布萊克法律辭典》對“承諾”的解釋，卻無法支撐菲方觀點(diǎn)；該詞的含義包括承擔(dān)一項(xiàng)義務(wù)，或作出正式的承諾，或以保證的方式行事。①Bryan A. Garner ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, Eagan: West Group, 2004, p. 4741.這些用詞是毫不含糊的，無論哪一項(xiàng)解釋都表明了行為人確定的意圖。菲方扭曲解釋《宣言》用語，這已然有違善意解釋條約的要求；同時(shí)，將《宣言》視作沒有約束力的文件從而任意行事，也漠視了《宣言》所有簽署國當(dāng)時(shí)創(chuàng)設(shè)相關(guān)義務(wù)的意圖。正如前文所述，條約的宗旨反映了所有締約國共同的期望，而不是某一方任意的觀點(diǎn)；對條約目的及宗旨的保護(hù)，也是對各國共同的合法期望之保護(hù)，這是締約國相互之間應(yīng)當(dāng)展現(xiàn)的善意。

第三，菲律賓還提出，中國與東盟成員國在4個(gè)領(lǐng)域多項(xiàng)問題上都無法達(dá)成共識，故《宣言》只是妥協(xié)的產(chǎn)物，這一簽署時(shí)期的情況也表明《宣言》不具有約束力。②The Memorial, para. 7.55.然而，《宣言》的實(shí)施情況只能證明相反的結(jié)論。中國與東盟各國隨后繼續(xù)簽訂了《宣言》后續(xù)行動(dòng)指南，包括與菲律賓發(fā)布聯(lián)合聲明重申遵守《宣言》。③《中華人民共和國和菲律賓共和國聯(lián)合聲明》，2011年9月1日。菲律賓自身持續(xù)參與了《宣言》簽署以來的協(xié)商會議，卻從未在會上表示無法與中國溝通的類似意見。恰恰在菲方提交其訴狀前夕，2014年3月18日，落實(shí)《宣言》的第十次聯(lián)合工作組會議召開，菲律賓與中國代表雙雙參會；會議的目的正是要落實(shí)《宣言》。假如菲國認(rèn)為《宣言》不具有約束力從而根本不打算履行其要求，又何必參與落實(shí)《宣言》的協(xié)商進(jìn)程？或者，在這一進(jìn)程中，菲國又為何不提出其異議？毫無疑問，菲方一邊參與《宣言》的落實(shí)，一邊公然背離《宣言》要求，如此行事自相矛盾，毫無誠意。

最后，即使《宣言》被認(rèn)作不具有約束力的文件——仲裁庭初步裁決也的確如此裁定——如上文所述，當(dāng)事國自行協(xié)商之方式也得到了《公約》的肯定。從而，菲律賓既不主動(dòng)協(xié)商，也不接受中國提議之協(xié)商，更明確表示仲裁期間均不參與協(xié)商的“三不”行為，仍然證明其置《公約》的目的及宗旨于不顧，違背了善意原則。

四、仲裁庭對善意原則之違背

《公約》既然創(chuàng)建了爭端解決機(jī)制，致力于海洋和平的宗旨，也需要爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)的守護(hù)。面對錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜的海洋劃界爭端，要尋求能夠真正為所有當(dāng)事方接受的解決途徑，不僅需要當(dāng)事國自身的努力，也考驗(yàn)著第三方解決機(jī)構(gòu)的智慧。

（一）對當(dāng)事方真意履行協(xié)商義務(wù)之檢驗(yàn)

爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)就實(shí)體問題作出裁判之前，首先應(yīng)當(dāng)判斷的是當(dāng)事方是否已充分合理地進(jìn)行了協(xié)商。這要求判決機(jī)構(gòu)考量，雙方是否確實(shí)善意履行了協(xié)商義務(wù)。根據(jù)上文的論述，該義務(wù)主要分為2步，即雙方是否就提交審議之事項(xiàng)進(jìn)行了協(xié)商，以及雙方在協(xié)商過程中是否付出了真誠的努力。

對第一步的檢驗(yàn)相對而言更易于完成，無需裁判機(jī)構(gòu)深入探究協(xié)商的實(shí)質(zhì)，只需要確定相關(guān)議題是否被擺在了雙方的談判桌上。然而，即便在這一步上，本案仲裁庭的決定也令人不敢茍同。例如，在對《公約》第283條進(jìn)行審議時(shí)，仲裁庭在初步裁決中判定，中菲已經(jīng)就“菲律賓提交仲裁的爭端”交換了意見，從而滿足了第283條的要求。①Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2015, para. 342. [hereinafter “Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility”]作為證據(jù)，仲裁庭引用了2012年1月14日，中菲外交部副部長之間進(jìn)行的一次磋商內(nèi)容。恰恰在仲裁庭引用的文字里，菲國代表對中國代表說道：“您方提倡雙邊討論的方式。而我們已經(jīng)開始使用法律的途徑。”②Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 339.結(jié)合英文版本所使用的時(shí)態(tài)，菲方代表的陳述幾乎明白地承認(rèn)了，甚至早在黃巖島事件發(fā)生之前，菲國就“已經(jīng)”開始著手法律解決。既如此，仲裁庭怎能將這一陳述視為“與中國交換意見”之證據(jù)？第二，菲國在本次磋商中提出的爭端解決方式是多邊談判，而不是司法程序。③Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 339.根據(jù)仲裁庭之判斷，本次磋商是中菲存在交換意見的有效證據(jù)；那么只能說，菲律賓在這一磋商中欺騙了中國。《公約》第283條的要求是就解決爭端的和平方法交換意見，故菲國至少應(yīng)在這場磋商中告知中國，它打算將南海爭端提交仲裁，但在該磋商中它主張的卻是完全不同的另一種解決方法。也就是說，仲裁庭的結(jié)論又指出了菲律賓違反善意原則對誠實(shí)信用之要求的另一處表現(xiàn)。但是，要把菲國代表在這場協(xié)商中所付出的努力歸為欺騙，于情于理都委實(shí)令人難以接受，因而唯有得出結(jié)論：中菲本次協(xié)商并不是有關(guān)仲裁案事宜之協(xié)商，仲裁庭之判斷并不合理。

除此以外，仲裁庭還引用了菲律賓2012年就黃巖島問題向中國發(fā)出的照會作為依據(jù)。然而，該照會僅僅是關(guān)于黃巖島及其專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)的問題，不涉及其他，也沒有提出打算采用哪一種司法程序。④Note Verbale from the Department of Foreign Af f airs of the Philippines to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-1137, 26 April 2012.仲裁庭卻說道，雙方已經(jīng)“清楚明白地”就“菲律賓提交仲裁的爭端”交換了意見。⑤Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 342.種種事實(shí)如此明確和顯而易見，仲裁庭卻能夠得出如此結(jié)論，這已經(jīng)不是單純的觀點(diǎn)判斷問題，而是對善意原則的漠視。

如果說對爭端方是否開展協(xié)商的裁判，仲裁庭尚能自圓其說；在第二步也即協(xié)商是否真誠、充分的檢驗(yàn)上，仲裁庭則幾乎對相關(guān)證據(jù)視而不見，毫無疑問是缺乏善意的裁決。仍然以其對《公約》283條的檢驗(yàn)為例，仲裁庭自己指出，外交上的意見交換往往不會注重區(qū)分程序性問題和實(shí)質(zhì)性問題；在實(shí)踐中，雙方對實(shí)體問題的意見，可能也體現(xiàn)出雙方對如何解決或不解決爭端的意見。①Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 332.既然仲裁庭已經(jīng)如此承認(rèn)，則對雙方協(xié)商的內(nèi)容就更有必要認(rèn)真審議。然而如上文所述，仲裁庭所列舉的2項(xiàng)材料，甚至都無法構(gòu)成菲律賓就仲裁開啟了協(xié)商的證明，更不必說其協(xié)商中的誠意究竟幾何。另外，前文也引述了菲方訴訟代表的發(fā)言，其認(rèn)為，就訴求實(shí)質(zhì)進(jìn)行逐項(xiàng)協(xié)商是不必要的，只要從整體上交換了意見就滿足了第283條的要求。②Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 34～35.這些觀點(diǎn)已經(jīng)表明菲律賓僅視協(xié)商為一項(xiàng)程序，早已無意在雙邊合作之中繼續(xù)投入精力。面對菲國如此明顯的態(tài)度，仲裁庭仍然判定其滿足了協(xié)商之要求，只能說仲裁庭也同樣拋棄了協(xié)商的意義。毫無意義的協(xié)商顯然不符合《公約》，也不符合任何國際性條約對雙邊合作、和平解決爭端的追求，從這一角度，仲裁庭之裁決也減損了《公約》目的及宗旨，再次與善意原則相背離。

（二）仲裁庭對法律與事實(shí)的漠視

仲裁庭對中菲之間這一明顯關(guān)于領(lǐng)土主權(quán)和海洋劃界的爭端宣布具有管轄權(quán)，隨后在最終判決中，否定了中國在南海享有之歷史性權(quán)利，否定了南海U形線之有效性，也否定了南沙群島擁有專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架之可能性。實(shí)體審議時(shí)仲裁庭罔顧法律、歷史與事實(shí)之處幾乎不勝枚舉，在此僅以中國的歷史性權(quán)利問題為例進(jìn)行分析。

中國尚未對南海U形線的性質(zhì)，以及在南海享有的歷史性權(quán)利之內(nèi)容做出過明確的界定。在仲裁庭看來，中國主張的這種權(quán)利具有排他性；仲裁庭進(jìn)而判定，中國主張的U形線及其范圍內(nèi)的歷史性權(quán)利無效。③Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award, 2016, para. 278. [hereinafter “Award”]

從善意原則的視角出發(fā)，這一判決歪曲了事實(shí)，未能誠實(shí)可信地處理證據(jù)。首先，中國的確聲明過，我國在南海U形線內(nèi)享有一系列歷史上形成的權(quán)利；但中國從未表示，不允許其他國家在南海行使其合法權(quán)利。事實(shí)上，仲裁庭也注意到中國反復(fù)聲明，尊重和支持各國依國際法在南海享有的航行自由。④Award, para. 212.結(jié)合南海多年來的實(shí)際航行狀況，事實(shí)已表明中國并未妨礙其他國家在南海，包括在U形線范圍以內(nèi)行使其正當(dāng)權(quán)利。然而判決卻指，歷史性權(quán)利“通常是排他的”，⑤Award, para. 268.并推定中國主張的歷史性權(quán)利也是排他的，從而影響了其他國家的權(quán)利。問題在于，仲裁庭從何處得出了歷史性權(quán)利就是排他的這一結(jié)論？判決本身也承認(rèn)，“歷史性權(quán)利”的概念在國際法中尚未明確；①Award, para. 226, the text reads “Other ‘historic rights’… are nowhere mentioned in the Convention.”具體到中國的聲明和實(shí)踐，則更無法得出這一論斷。顯然，這是仲裁庭對歷史性權(quán)利和中國主張的臆斷。

第二，仲裁庭以中國對油氣資源、漁業(yè)資源等的主張為例，認(rèn)為中國在解釋對這些資源所享有的權(quán)利時(shí)，并沒有提到其權(quán)源是由于相關(guān)區(qū)域位于中國的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架范圍內(nèi)，而是由于中國在歷史上享有的權(quán)利。例如，針對菲律賓在禮樂灘海域GSEC-101區(qū)塊等多個(gè)油氣田的開發(fā)行為，中國表示反對的聲明措辭都是，相關(guān)區(qū)域位于中國享有歷史性權(quán)利和管轄權(quán)的范圍內(nèi)，而沒有言及專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)或大陸架。②Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacif i c Af f airs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2011; Note Verbale from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila to the Department of Foreign Af f airs, Republic of the Philippines, No. (11) PG-202, 6 July 2011; Award, para. 209.仲裁庭由此斷定，中國對這些權(quán)利的主張不是基于《公約》規(guī)定的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架權(quán)利，而是單純基于歷史性權(quán)利。③Award, para. 209.問題是，仲裁庭自己也指出，假如中國就南沙群島主張專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架，則以上區(qū)域均位于中方依據(jù)《公約》主張的范圍內(nèi)。④Award, para. 209.中國在論及其對油氣資源所享有的權(quán)利時(shí)，未從專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架的角度做明言解釋，并不一定就代表在事實(shí)上就不享有由此具備的權(quán)利。

第三，判決認(rèn)為，在U形線范圍內(nèi)、而在中國專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架范圍外的部分，當(dāng)中方的權(quán)利主張與菲方主張的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架范圍重疊時(shí)，便是中國有違《公約》。⑤Award, para. 232.然而，中菲之間存在海洋劃界爭端，其各自主張的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架范圍本來就有爭議；既然如此，仲裁庭又怎么能在這一爭議獲得解決之前，就斷言是中方侵犯了菲方權(quán)利？在此，判決顯然有失公允，也再次違背了善意原則之基本內(nèi)涵。

《公約》沒有明文要求，根據(jù)其附件七成立的仲裁庭應(yīng)遵循善意原則；但前文已經(jīng)指出，仲裁庭等司法機(jī)構(gòu)既旨在解決爭端，維護(hù)國際司法之正義，便理應(yīng)以身作則。應(yīng)當(dāng)說，仲裁庭作出有違善意的裁決，所造成的影響比菲律賓更加嚴(yán)重。因?yàn)榉坡少e僅僅是一項(xiàng)爭端的當(dāng)事方，是國際社會眾多成員中的一份子，它對國際法基本原則的違反可以為司法機(jī)構(gòu)所糾正；然而仲裁庭作為國際司法機(jī)構(gòu)，假如不僅不對這類違反行為進(jìn)行辨別，甚至自己也無視事實(shí)、歪曲證據(jù)，則是對國際法之一般原則的嚴(yán)重?fù)p害。

（三）未能做出真正有利于和平解決爭端之裁決

從初步裁決而言，仲裁庭已在相當(dāng)程度上漠視了善意原則，但這并不代表其不能在實(shí)體裁決中有所補(bǔ)救。無論裁判機(jī)構(gòu)對具體事項(xiàng)怎樣解讀，其最終判決的目的都在于使國際沖突歸于平息，使?fàn)幎穗p方歸于和平，這是作為爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)的最基礎(chǔ)義務(wù)，可以說也是其最根本之善意。然而，2016年7月出爐的最終裁決，不僅未對初步裁決中善意的缺失進(jìn)行彌補(bǔ)，甚至變本加厲，通篇毫無善意。至此，本案仲裁庭的做法對于中菲之間爭端的和平解決而言，不僅毫無增益，甚至可謂適得其反。

國際法作為國際關(guān)系歷史發(fā)展的產(chǎn)物，永遠(yuǎn)不能與國際關(guān)系相互孤立看待。中菲南海爭端，正如所有的國家間爭端，都不僅僅是國際法上的問題，同時(shí)也牽涉復(fù)雜的國際政治考量，牽涉雙方未來關(guān)系的發(fā)展走向。也正是因此，外交途徑才始終是解決任何一項(xiàng)爭端的優(yōu)先方式；在合理的情況下，國際司法機(jī)構(gòu)作出鼓勵(lì)協(xié)商的最終裁決是極為必要的，這不是對其責(zé)任的逃避，而是根據(jù)實(shí)際作出最有利于爭端解決的決定，代表著國際法對國際社會成員的善意。

從這一角度出發(fā)，中菲南海仲裁案，正有必要得到這樣一份鼓勵(lì)性質(zhì)的最終決定。中國已反復(fù)聲明不接受、不參與仲裁案，因而即使仲裁庭作出任何不利于中國的判決，中國也有充分立場不將其裁決付諸執(zhí)行。更何況，鑒于仲裁庭在初步裁決中已然有失善意，其決定早已招致中國乃至外國學(xué)者質(zhì)疑。本案仲裁庭在中國國內(nèi)幾乎已成眾矢之的，不僅中國政府堅(jiān)持仲裁庭沒有管轄權(quán)，①外交部條法司司長徐宏就菲律賓所提南海仲裁案接受中外媒體采訪實(shí)錄，下載于http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebe/chn/zclc/t1362765.htm，2017年1月17日；2015年10月30日外交部發(fā)言人陸慷主持例行記者會，下載于http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1310668.shtml，2017年1月17日。學(xué)界更從種種角度深入剖析了管轄權(quán)判決的荒謬之處。中國既認(rèn)定仲裁庭沒有管轄權(quán)，則其隨后做出的最終裁決也將被視為缺乏法律效力。如此一來的結(jié)果，輕則中菲雙方就裁決結(jié)果僵持不下，最終裁決被束之高閣，毫無意義；重則，中國堅(jiān)持仲裁無效，菲律賓倚仗裁決要求執(zhí)行——雙方有關(guān)南海問題的分歧進(jìn)一步加深，爭端反而加劇，裁決適得其反。前者無疑將減損國際司法之有效性和權(quán)威性，不利于國際法的發(fā)展；后者則進(jìn)一步損害國際關(guān)系友好發(fā)展，威脅國際社會之和平穩(wěn)定。

遺憾的是，本案仲裁庭一意孤行，未能客觀評判中菲南海爭端過程中的事實(shí)。最終裁決發(fā)布之后，不僅中國義正言辭地進(jìn)行批駁，菲律賓在新上任總統(tǒng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，也轉(zhuǎn)向重回協(xié)商，而將裁決束之高閣。仲裁庭的宗旨本應(yīng)是，促成中菲爭端解決，還南中國海以和平安寧；然而其卻在與善意原則相背離的道路上愈行愈遠(yuǎn)，可謂枉費(fèi)了爭端“解決”機(jī)構(gòu)之名。

五、菲律賓與仲裁庭之根本不足

無論是爭端當(dāng)事方善意進(jìn)行協(xié)商的要求、信守條約的要求、促進(jìn)條約宗旨之實(shí)現(xiàn)的要求，還是作為第三方爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)對當(dāng)事方以上義務(wù)進(jìn)行善意檢驗(yàn)的職責(zé)，其根基都在于各方行動(dòng)的誠信。真誠的主觀品質(zhì)，輻射出多方面的要求，涵蓋了一項(xiàng)爭端的方方面面。

例如，真誠行事還可以解釋為，爭端方行為透明，客觀呈現(xiàn)事實(shí)。中菲南海爭端中的任何議題，實(shí)際上都是關(guān)于領(lǐng)土主權(quán)和海洋劃界之爭端；但菲國卻竭力包裝其主張，提出判定海洋地物法律性質(zhì)等表面訴求，①關(guān)于菲方對其訴求的偽裝，羅國強(qiáng)教授詳細(xì)歸納出4種手法，參見羅國強(qiáng)：《南海仲裁案初步裁決評析》，載于《外交評論：外交學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào)》2016年第2期，第26頁。刻意掩藏其背后真實(shí)意圖。這種對事實(shí)的扭曲、對爭端本質(zhì)的掩蓋，自然也違反了透明、客觀和誠信的要求。

又如，菲律賓在其抗議中國對南海主張的照會中，聲明“卡拉延群島”中的海洋地物所產(chǎn)生的領(lǐng)海、專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架，其主權(quán)或主權(quán)權(quán)利屬于菲律賓。②The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations, Note Verbale 000228, United Nations Documents, 2011.菲方主張的“卡拉延群島”完全由南沙群島的一部分島礁組成；因而，菲律賓已經(jīng)承認(rèn)南沙群島中的部分地物能夠產(chǎn)生專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架。那么，中國在比南沙群島某一島礁范圍更大，也在比“卡拉延群島”范圍更大的南沙群島整體的基礎(chǔ)上，主張群島的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)與大陸架，似乎更不應(yīng)產(chǎn)生異議。因此這一證據(jù)根本不足以反映中菲對此存在爭端，但仲裁庭卻得出了相反結(jié)論。③Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 170.這也是仲裁庭未能客觀審查事實(shí)之體現(xiàn)。

最后也是最具諷刺意味的一點(diǎn)在于，菲律賓和仲裁庭在仲裁過程中多次明言提及善意原則，意指中國行動(dòng)有違善意。菲國認(rèn)為，在黃巖島、仁愛礁、美濟(jì)礁等海域，中國違反《公約》規(guī)定的保護(hù)海洋環(huán)境之義務(wù)，島礁建設(shè)損害海洋環(huán)境，且未阻止本國漁民的破壞性行為；據(jù)此，中國未能善意履行《公約》賦予的義務(wù)。④Day 3 – Hearing on the Merits and Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, p. 45.菲國所提第14項(xiàng)訴求又稱，中國在仁愛礁的一系列行動(dòng)令爭端惡化。菲方認(rèn)為，《公約》第300條是對善意和禁止權(quán)力濫用之基本原則的敘述，它要求各國致力于縮小分歧，而不是惡化爭議。

顯然，善意原則要求爭端當(dāng)事國積極以和平方式化解分歧，而不是相互刺激、加劇爭端，這一點(diǎn)毋庸置疑。但問題在于，正是菲律賓自1999年以來，一直以一艘破敗軍艦在仁愛礁坐灘，甚至試圖在此修建固定設(shè)施。菲國指責(zé)中國，在2013年仲裁啟動(dòng)后繼續(xù)在仁愛礁采取行動(dòng)，從而構(gòu)成加劇、惡化爭議的行為，然而，正是菲國于2014年3月公開宣稱，要將其在仁愛礁的軍艦建成為永久設(shè)施。作為南沙群島的一部分，中國絕不會坐視仁愛礁的領(lǐng)土主權(quán)遭此挑釁，因而采取了必要措施。作為挑起爭端一方的菲律賓，又有何立場反指中國是南海和平的破壞者？

可悲的是，仲裁庭眼中只看得到中國一方的行動(dòng)，而對菲國挑釁在先的行為視而不見。仲裁庭認(rèn)定，不僅菲方明確提出的美濟(jì)礁、仁愛礁等地，中國在南海共7處地物上的島礁建設(shè)等行動(dòng)，均為惡化爭端之舉。①Award, para. 1177.仲裁庭奇怪地“忘記”了，正是菲國一方首先挑戰(zhàn)中國主權(quán)主張，而單單關(guān)注中國一方的行動(dòng)。這種對事實(shí)明顯刻意的無視，怎能說是善意的裁決？更進(jìn)一步，仲裁庭還認(rèn)為，中國的舉措對仲裁構(gòu)成了阻礙，令仲裁幫助爭端獲得解決的目的受到損害。但是，真正妨礙爭端獲得解決的，難道不正是這份虛偽不實(shí)的裁決嗎？實(shí)際上，裁決的核心內(nèi)容在于推導(dǎo)出中菲兩國根本不存在海域劃界爭端的結(jié)論，從而南沙所涉地物位于菲律賓大陸架范圍內(nèi)，因此，這些地物自動(dòng)歸菲國所有。這一結(jié)論源于仲裁庭3點(diǎn)關(guān)鍵的認(rèn)定，即：中國“歷史性權(quán)利主張”無效；南沙群島作為整體產(chǎn)生海洋權(quán)利之主張無效；南沙所有地物均不屬于“島嶼”。然而，此3點(diǎn)認(rèn)定無一不是罔顧事實(shí)之語。中國主張的“歷史性權(quán)利”絕非排他的權(quán)利，但仲裁庭妄加判斷；《公約》并未規(guī)定遠(yuǎn)洋群島不可適用群島基線，至少不應(yīng)斷言群島不可作為整體產(chǎn)生自身的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架，但仲裁庭武斷否定；至于“島嶼”的構(gòu)成標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，更是缺乏明確規(guī)定，但仲裁庭卻無視事實(shí)證據(jù)，有故意抬高“島嶼”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)之嫌。事實(shí)上，要充分辨析仲裁在此3項(xiàng)問題中的不實(shí)之處，還需長篇累牘；但就本文的主旨而言則不再展開，僅強(qiáng)調(diào)一點(diǎn)，即仲裁庭認(rèn)為中菲兩國不存在海域重疊，這一結(jié)論虛假不實(shí)，荒謬至極。在此基礎(chǔ)上的所有裁決，都不可能有利于爭端的解決，而只會帶來相反效果。

菲律賓和仲裁庭以種種行為肆意踐踏善意原則，卻還堂皇援引該原則妄議中國行動(dòng)，其在仲裁過程中的言行前后不一、自相矛盾，其對待善意原則的態(tài)度幾可謂“合則用、不合則棄”。由此，菲律賓和仲裁庭對這一國際法基本原則、國際社會基本行事準(zhǔn)則的破壞，不得不說已是登峰造極。

本文所探討的善意原則之內(nèi)涵，還遠(yuǎn)未窮盡，也無法窮盡。以真心與誠意為核心，善意原則自然體現(xiàn)在行為主體的一舉一動(dòng)之中。中菲南海仲裁案在2016年7月終于落下帷幕，不幸的是，所謂的“最終判決”幾乎完全支持了菲方提出的所有訴求。審視菲律賓和仲裁庭行為，其不符善意原則之處早已不勝枚舉，本文僅選取了寥寥幾例；這不可不謂為善意原則之殤。

六、結(jié) 語

國際爭端之解決，及其對世界和平的維護(hù)，特別需要各行為主體遵循善意原則的指引。具體到海洋劃界爭端之中，善意原則衍生出層層內(nèi)涵，主要包括：

1.對于爭端當(dāng)事方，應(yīng)以取得一致為協(xié)商目標(biāo)，善意開展協(xié)商并誠意進(jìn)行協(xié)商；善意履行雙方間條約規(guī)定之義務(wù)，不得減損條約目的及宗旨；此外，其行動(dòng)始終保持著真誠的本質(zhì)。

2.對于參與其中的爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)，應(yīng)充分認(rèn)識到當(dāng)事方在善意原則下所負(fù)有的責(zé)任，并對爭端事實(shí)做善意的客觀檢驗(yàn)；其裁決應(yīng)秉承解決爭端的宗旨，真正推動(dòng)國際社會向和平邁進(jìn)。

中菲南海爭端是領(lǐng)土主權(quán)和海洋劃界爭端。無論當(dāng)事一方菲律賓還是爭端解決機(jī)構(gòu)仲裁庭，其種種行為都有違上述的各項(xiàng)要求，這無疑是對善意原則的極大破壞。

作為國際法一般原則，內(nèi)涵深邃的善意原則是國際社會運(yùn)行的一塊基石；它是國際行動(dòng)的最低準(zhǔn)繩，也是整個(gè)人類社會對美德的崇高追求。善意原則不容漠視與侵犯，而面對中菲南海仲裁案缺乏善意的無效裁決，這一點(diǎn)更應(yīng)為致力于國際法發(fā)展的全體國際社會成員所注意。

I. Introduction

The principle of good faith, a basic principle of international law, governs how the subject of international law exercises its rights and the attitude it has when performing its obligations. This principle plays a significant role in the practice of international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, hereinafter referred to as the “UNCLOS” or the “Convention”, as well as other conventions on the law of the sea def i ned the concepts of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. In this context, many States compete to lay claims to these marine areas, giving rise to new conf l icts and confrontations. Unceasing disputes on maritime delimitation have garnered global attentions. The principle of good faith also gives guidance to maritime delimitation, bearing great signif i cances to the settlement of disputes between coastal States in practice.

On 22 January 2013, the Philippines, in accordance with Part XV and Annex VII of the UNCLOS, initiated an arbitral proceeding against China over the South China Sea (SCS) disputes between the two States. On 29 October 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal released the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility. The Arbitral Tribunal stated that it had jurisdiction to consider seven of the Philippines’ 15 Submissions and reserved consideration of its jurisdiction to rule on the left eight Submissions to the merits phase. In other words, all the 15 Submissions of the Philippines would be considered in the second phase of trial. On 12 July 2016, the Tribunal issued its fi nal award, which denied a series of China’s claims, including the dashed-line in the SCS. In this connection, both the Philippines, a party to the disputes, and the Tribunal, a third-party judicial body, have in practice violated the spirit of the principle of good faith, a basic principle of international law.

The SCS arbitration has garnered great attentions from the academia ever since its initiation. However, previous academic researches primarily focus on the analysis of each Submission of the Philippines, as well as the Tribunal’s award, particularly the preliminary rule on the establishment of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Such researches are conducted mainly from the perspectives of legal basis and legal reasoning. This paper will not give an in-depth exploration of the legal basis relating to the SCS arbitration. Instead, it will, from the perspective of the principle of good faith, focus on some more abstract obligations arising out from the legal principle, which is an innovation of the paper. The author hopes that this paper may contribute to China’s ef f orts to deal with the SCS disputes with the Philippines.

II. The Principle of Good Faith and Maritime Delimitation

A. An Overview of the Principle of Good Faith

The principle of good faith, as a fundamental principle on international law, plays an important and basic role in all the spheres and systems of law. Firstly, since the 20th century, this principle has been, explicitly or implicitly, incorporated into many international or multilateral conventions. For example, the second principle of the seven principles provided for in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter “UN Charter”) states that all Members shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter;①Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Article 2(2).the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states in its preamble that the principle of good faith is universally recognized, and uses the term “good faith”many times in the text.②Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Preface, Articles 26, 31(1), 46(2), 69(2) (b).Additionally, judicial precedents concerning dif f erent fi elds of international law also conf i rmed the status of the principle of good faith in the relevant decisions. For instance, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter“ICJ” or “the Court”) pointed out, in the Nuclear Tests Cases of 1974, the principle of good faith was one of the basic principles governing the performance of legal obligations by States.③Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46.In international trade, the dispute settlement mechanisms of World Trade Organization (WTO) also applied the principle of good faith in many of their decisions. This principle is a general principle of international law and a requirement of customary international law, which is widely recognized in the academia.④J. F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991, p. 124; Reviews of Books, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1957, p. 106; Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 73.It follows that the status and the inf l uence of the principle of good faith has been universally recognized, and the most basic norm of international law is the principle of good faith.⑤Thomas Cottier and Krista N. Schefer, HAN Xiuli trans., GAO Bo proofread, Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations in the WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, No. 3, 2005, p. 181. (in Chinese)

It is also widely recognized that the specific connotations of the principle of good faith are difficult to be def i ned def i nitely. This principle is derived fromRoman civil law, reflecting a requirement on “bona fide contract” and “actio bonae fi dei”. “Bona fi de contract” means that the two parties to a contract, when performing the contract, should undertake any additional obligations incurred by the requirement of honesty, in accordance with their original purpose of goodwill. And the term “actio bonae fidei” requires the parties to an action exercise their litigious rights in good faith during an action, and the judge justly and fairly make his decisions in good faith when interpreting and understanding the agreements reached by the parties, and exercising his discretions. As history progresses, the principle of good faith was widely incorporated into the legal systems of many Western States, and then found its way into international law with the deepening of international exchanges. The principle of good faith in the ambit of international law fi rstly derived from the concept that agreements should be abided by.①Thomas Cottier and Krista N. Schefer, HAN Xiuli trans., GAO Bo proofread, Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations in the WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, No. 3, 2005, p. 181. (in Chinese)WTO uses the two concepts interchangeably. In a considerable number of trade disputes, WTO expounded, on a case-by-case basis, the good faith principle with emphasis upon different aspects of the principle. Virtually, as a basic legal principle, this principle does not only focus on a step or steps of acts, but also regulates all acts. Therefore, it is an open-ended and inclusive principle with multifaceted connotations. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “good faith” is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting (a) honesty of belief or purpose, (b) faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation, (c) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealings in trade or commerce; and (d) freedom from intention to defraud or seek an unconscionable advantage.②Bryan A. Garner ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, Eagan: West Group, 2004, p. 2038.“Good faith” demands an individual to be reasonable, honest and faithful. With no technical assessment criteria, the term tends to be def i ned subjectively.

Notably, in the practice of international law, the principle of good faith cannot exist in vacuo. The ICJ stated that the principle of good faith cannot create any legal obligations by itself.③Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46.A violation of the principle of good faith is not abstract or baseless. Instead, such a violation possibly stems from breaches of treaties, or relates to damages to the interests of another party, or bases on the violation of an obligation. For example, in the Nuclear Tests Cases, the French Government announced its decision to terminate nuclear tests in the South Pacific Ocean.Despite of the unilateral nature of the declaration, the ICJ held that the principle of good faith required that such an declaration be respected.①Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, paras. 46～51.In the Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995, the Court needed to consider whether the Applicant Macedonia had breached its obligation to negotiate in good faith, which was created by an Interim Accord.②Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 127.As stated by the Appellate Body of WTO, to constitute a violation of the principle of good faith, two requirements should be satisfied: the first is that a party should be found to have violated a substantive treaty provision or obligation; the second is that it should be proved to be more than mere violation.③United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Appellate Body Report, 2003, para. 298.

In sum, the principle of good faith is a concept without any def i nite behavior patterns. It should be interpreted under the context where it is used, and explored after considering the relevant international practices. In other words, this principle can be illustrated but not def i ned.④Reviews of Books, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1957, p. 106.It also provides a guiding ef f ect in the fi eld of maritime delimitation.

B. The Principle of Good Faith in Relation to the Parties to a Maritime Delimitation Case

The basic principles of international law, as a supplement to international treaties and customs, play a vital role in every field and aspect of international law,⑤Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., WANG Tieya et al. trans., Oppenheim’s International Law, Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1995, p. 23. (in Chinese)and the law of the sea is no exception in this connection. Article 300 of the UNCLOS explicitly provides that States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under the Convention.⑥United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Article 300. [hereinafter“UNCLOS”]This provision lays out the general requirements on maritime delimitation between States, which contains rich implications. The principle of good faith certainly cannot create new legal obligations in vacuo. Each obligation to be discussed in the following pages exists on the basis of substantive laws, and the principle of good faith supports thefulfillment of such obligations: it supervises on the performance of such obligations, and more on the attitude towards obligation performing.①M(fèi)alcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 74.

1. The Obligation to Negotiate in Good Faith

Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS provide for the delimitation of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves; paragraph 1 of both articles states that the maritime delimitation between States shall be effected by agreement in order to achieve an equitable solution.②UNCLOS, Articles 74(1) and 83(1).Hence, this provision implies an obligation for States Parties to negotiate in respect of maritime delimitation. Many legal precedents of ICJ also link the obligation under this provision with the principle of good faith. The meaning of “to negotiate in good faith” could be further explained in the following two aspects.

First, the obligation to negotiate in good faith means that the maritime boundary delineated by a State unilaterally may be void and null. Admittedly, it is possible that two States may not conduct official negotiations, but may communicate by taking a series of State actions. A State raises a claim unilaterally, which the other State concerned makes no objection to. In this case, a tacit maritime boundary is created ultimately by acquiescence. However, since the UNCLOS has provided for the means to establish maritime boundary (by agreement in priority), the unilateral action of a State, if its maritime claims are opposed by any other States, may breach the UNCLOS. To carry out the obligations under the UNCLOS in good faith requires that a State should not take any actions with possible prejudice to other States. This requirement can also fi nd its supports in other fi elds of international law.

The General Agreement on Tarif f s and Trade (GATT), which is the predecessor of WTO and applicable to WTO Members, is one of the most important agreements concerning goods trades among WTO law. The chapeau of Article XX of GATT provides that Members should not apply such measures in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustif i able discrimination between countries.③General Agreement on Tarif f s and Trade, 1947, Chapeau of Article XX.In the final rulings of the United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the dispute settlement body of WTO articulated that the chapeau of Article XX was one expression of the principle of good faith.④United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 1998, para. 158.In thiscase, the United States enacted a regulation on the import of shrimp products without negotiating with all the countries affected by the regulation in advance. The WTO Appellate Body opined that the United States’ unilateral adoption and implementation of this regulation was unjustifiable, as it failed to take into account the dif f erent circumstances of the countries af f ected and such a regulation constituted arbitrary discrimination between countries.①United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 1998, paras. 172, 177.It follows that all countries concerned should reach an agreement, and no country may claim unilaterally and arbitrarily. This is an undisputable fact in all fields of international law, and compatible with the principle of good faith, a general principle of international law.

Based on the first meaning described above, the second meaning of “to negotiate in good faith” is self-evident. States concerned should enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement on issues concerning maritime delimitation. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ argued that actual rules of law governing the delimitation of continent shelves were established on a foundation of general precepts of justice and good faith, and the States concerned were under an obligation to enter into negotiations.②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area case connected the obligation to negotiate with the principle of good faith in even a clearer way: “Such delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in good faith…”③Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, para. 112(1).In 2002, the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case further conf i rmed the obligation to negotiate in good faith.④Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, para. 244.

In a nutshell, with respect to maritime delimitation, a State should negotiate in good faith with other States concerned with a view to reaching an agreement. All sorts of unilateral actions, including unilateral delimitation, exploration and exploitation, are in contravention with the spirit of the UNCLOS.

2. The Obligation to Negotiate in Good Faith with a View to Reaching an Agreement

Compared to entering into negotiations, to negotiate with a view to reaching an agreement serves as a better touchstone to test a State’s good faith. How mucheffort should a State make during a negotiation? What kind of negotiation is“sufficient”? Whether any stalemate reached during a negotiation is sufficient to enable a party to a dispute to resort to dispute settlement procedures? UNCLOS cannot provide an answer to such subjective questions. However, these questions highlight the importance of negotiating in good faith. Whether the delimitation of maritime boundary can be ef f ected in a peaceful and friendly manner depends, greatly, on the good faith that the States concerned use in negotiations. The paper underlines that the obligation to negotiate in good faith is not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation, but to conduct meaningful negotiations, which is really critical. This requires that the parties concerned negotiate sincerely and honestly with a view to ef f ecting a delimitation by agreement.

First, each State may favor different delimitation methods. However, such differences cannot be used as the grounds to evade negotiation and cooperation. In the lengthy discussions and negotiations conducted during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the rules regarding the delimitation of continental shelves and EEZs were intensely debated, and two distinct views upheld by two groups of interests appeared. The Bahamas Group of 24 favored equidistance as a general principle. On the other hand, the Algerian Group of 32 considered that equidistance should not have an inappropriate privilege on any other multi-method approach. Instead, the latter Group proposed that delimitation of maritime boundary should be ef f ected based on equitable principles. Despite of such dif f erences, the proposals of both groups affirmed that maritime delimitation should be ef f ected by agreement.①Informal Proposal by Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Colombia, Cyrus, Democratic Yemen, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia (later joined by Cape Verde, Chile, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau and Portugal), UN General Assembly Document NG7/2; Informal Proposal by Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Congo, France, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Syria, Somalia, Turkey, Venezuela and Vietnam, UN General Assembly Document NG 7/10.All kinds of conf l icting claims to marine areas could be fl exibly settled by negotiation in good faith. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Former President Bustamante Y Rivero noted, in his Separate Opinion, that factor of good faith and flexibility which reconciled the needs of peaceful neighbourly relations with the rigidity of the law needed to be introduced into the negotiations on the continental shelf.②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Separate Opinion of President J. L. Bustamante Y Rivero, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 58.The Judgment of the case statedthat the parties were under an obligation to conduct meaningful negotiation, which would not be the case when either of them insisted upon its own position.①North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the parties (the Kingdoms of Denmark and the Netherlands) insisted on the equidistance principle and were reluctant to compromise before the day of the judgment. Such actions were found to contradict the obligation to fl exibly conduct meaningful negotiations.②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 87.This case also shows that the principle of good faith calls for fl exibility and reasonableness, and opposes arbitrariness and rigidity, which is consistent with the prohibition of arbitrary and unjustif i able discrimination between countries as provided in WTO law.

It follows that States should have no controversy over the resolution of dispute through agreement, even if they have conf l icting claims in a delimitation case. Nevertheless, state practices reveal that some States prefer other methods to delimitation by agreement. In accordance with the UNCLOS provisions as listed above, the issues concerning maritime delimitation should fi rst be settled through negotiations. Only when such negotiations fail, can the parties concerned resort to other procedures, mainly the dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS Part XV. Does a State enter into negotiations with another State with sincerity and honesty, and what is the extent of their sincerity and honesty? This is the second question in terms of negotiation in good faith.

As noted by the ICJ, since the parties concerned should enter into meaningful negotiations with a view to concluding agreements, a dispute settlement body shall refrain from delivering any immature rulings on the merits of a dispute prior to such negotiations. A preliminary issue that a court should consider is whether the applicant has de facto performed its obligation to negotiate.③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 682.The author asserts that the applicant’s attitude towards negotiations is a critical factor determining whether it has complied with the requirements of the good faith principle. This factor has special significance to the Sino-Philippine SCS Arbitration. Unfortunately, case law contains no explicit provisions in this regard. The obligation to negotiate in good faith is only implied in some judgments or found in the interpretations or understandings of scholars.

The ICJ expressed, in one of its judgments, that the obligation to negotiaterequires that the parties enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition with an actual intention to proceed to other procedures.①North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.In other words, prior to the initiation of any third-party dispute settlement procedure, the States concerned should conduct sincere negotiations, not merely a formal process. In the Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), which was submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), a judge articulated that “The requirement… regarding exchange of views is not an empty formality, to be dispensed with at the whims of a disputant. The obligation in this regard must be discharged in good faith.”②Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Separate Opinion of Chandrasekhara Rao, ITLOS Reports 2003, para. 11.As explained in Black’s Law Dictionary, honesty is the core of negotiation in good faith.

In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey) case, Greece inclined to resolve its delimitation dispute with Turkey through a third-party procedure, while Turkey insisted on resolving their dispute through negotiations first. The fact that Greece favored the method of settling dispute through judicial procedures does not necessarily suggest that Greece lacked good faith during negotiations. Actually, Greece agreed to negotiate with Turkey. Nonetheless, in a Note of 2 October 1975, the Greek Government expressed that their dispute “would fi rst be formally submitted to the Court” and that “talks were not excluded to follow.”③Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, para. 20.A series of declarations made and actions taken by Greece showed that Greece had submitted their dispute to the ICJ before negotiating with Turkey sufficiently. And the facts stated by the ICJ also demonstrated that both parties had only conducted preliminary or procedural talks, but not “sufficiently serious and fl exible negotiations conducted in good faith”.④Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 683.Greece, at the same time, submitted the issue to the UN Security Council. The Security Council called upon, in its resolution on this issue, both parties to resume direct negotiations and “appeals to them to do everything within their power to ensure that these negotiations will result in mutually acceptable solutions.”⑤Security Council Resolutions, S/RES/395, 1976.This could be interpreted as an indicationthat the Council also held that the parties had not conducted sufficient negotiations before submitting the dispute to the Council, and that the dispute should be settled fi rst by means of a special agreement rather than by judicial procedures.①Leo Gross, The Dispute between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 71, Issue 1, 1977, p. 32.

While the case was pending before the Court, Turkey insisted that both parties should resume their talks due to the immaturity of their previous negotiations; only the matters irresolvable through negotiations in good faith may be submitted to the ICJ when such matters arise.②Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 21, 28; UN Doc S/PV.1950, United Nations, 13 August 1976.In the views of Turkey, the ICJ should be obligated to examine whether or not the parties have fully performed their duties to negotiate before entering into any judicial procedures; if the negotiations are prima facie, and a party even lacks the bona fides to negotiate or negotiate only to meet the procedural requirements so as to resort to other means, such negotiations may not comply with requirements of negotiations in good faith.

The ICJ was in a good position to decide whether the negotiations between the parties were at a preliminary phase, or whether the possible solutions were far from being discussed by the parties. In other words, the ICJ may determine whether or not the obligation to negotiate has been discharged sufficiently and fully.③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 686.The ICJ failed to give a conclusive answer in this regards.④Prof. Cottier also argued that this case was an opportunity missed by the ICJ.However, the judgments of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case and North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, as well as the insights of scholars all support a reasonable conclusion: the States concerned should take up negotiations in good faith with a view of reaching agreements, which means that they should take into account, flexibly and reasonably, all possible delimitation methods, rather than making negotiation a prima facie procedure.

3. Other Dispute Settlement Procedures Cannot Constitute an Impediment to Negotiations

The above-mentioned Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case also demonstrates that the submission of a dispute to judicial procedures cannot constitute an impediment to the continuing of negotiations outside the Court. Virtually, the Applicant Greece did not exclude negotiations; it only gave the priority to third-party procedures. While the case was pending before the Court, Greece and Turkey resumed their negotiations, and even agreed that the question of the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf would be resolved through negotiations.①Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 20, 24～26.

Negotiations are, of course, the most cost-efficient and natural avenue to settle disputes. This status of negotiations has been confirmed repeatedly by the international community. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), 1974, the ICJ proposed that “the most appropriate method for the solution of the dispute is clearly that of negotiation.”②Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 73.The Security Council Resolution on the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf further supports this point. We cannot consider a State’s act to be taken in bad faith, only because it resorted to procedures other than negotiations.③Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 52.This is also a requirement imposed by the principle of good faith to deduce a conclusion about any State’s behaviors in good faith. However, on the other hand, since the State chooses other procedures not in bad faith, that State should not stop negotiation endeavors; apart from other dispute settlement procedures, negotiations may still be continued or restarted, which is a convincing evidence proving that the State has indeed complied with the principle of good faith.

C. The Good Faith of Dispute Settlement Body in Maritime Delimitations

UNCLOS Part XV established a comprehensive mechanism of maritime disputes settlement. Under this mechanism, States may select one or more of the following third-party means for settlement of disputes, including conciliation, ITLOS, ICJ, arbitration under Annex VII and special arbitration under Annex VIII. The third-party dispute settlement bodies involved here should also act in line with the principle of good faith, seeking meaningful solutions acceptable to both parties concerned. Although the principle of good faith is not expressly mentioned in the international statutes for international judicial bodies, the actual settlement of disputes between States, undoubtedly, needs the concerted efforts of dispute settlement bodies and the parties involved. In this connection, a dispute settlementbody should not act arbitrarily by virtue of its status as an “umpire”, who may not be punished for his actions. In fact, such arbitrary acts rarely happened, as international judicial practices always show that judgment in good faith is recognized.

The priority of maritime delimitation by negotiations has been elaborated above. Such a priority has been reiterated by dispute settlement bodies like the ICJ. In order to ensure the ef f ect of negotiations, not only the parties concerned should conduct negotiations in good faith, but the dispute settlement bodies should also make corresponding ef f orts.

First, a dispute settlement body is not supposed to deal with the merits before the avenue of negotiations has been reasonably exhausted, or before it is not able to conf i rm that a issue cannot be settled upon good faith negotiations. This needs the settlement body to consider whether or not the parties concerned have discharged their duties to negotiate in good faith.

Second, the good faith of third-party bodies, certainly, does not mean that they should never deliver any judgments, or avoid rendering any judgments by all means. However, considering the circumstances of dif f erent cases, a fi nal judgment without any room for further negotiations may not be fully acceptable to one of the parties concerned. This situation may lead to two consequences: the ef f ect of a judgment would be jeopardized or impaired if the consequence is mild; and it would have an ef f ect exactly opposite of its wish, if it is severe. Specif i cally, the party to which the judgment is favorable would request to implement the judgment, but the other party would refuse to do so. In that way, the conf l icts between the two would be aggravated. The dispute settlement body would fail to resolve the dispute; worse still, it would exacerbate the situation. Additionally, the ef f ect of international judiciary function is dependent on voluntary compliance and acceptance of States.①Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 688.Therefore, it is essential for judicial bodies to contribute an intermediate step towards a more acceptable settlement based on objective legal principles. For these reasons, third-party bodies, when in similar situations, can render judgments encouraging negotiations, rather than trying to bring about fi nal settlement.

The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases is an example in this regard. In the case, the Court found that delimitation should be effected by agreement inaccordance with equitable principles, and in the course of negotiations, the factors indicated by the Court should be taken into account.①North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 101(C), (D).In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the Court expressly proposed for negotiations in good faith, and held that the States concerned “are under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their dif f erences” and “to pay due regard to the interests of other States”.②Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, paras. 78～79.The Court may not provide, in the final judgment, a direct solution or clear-cut settlement, but a guide or encouragement calling upon States to put greater ef f orts in peaceful settlement of their disputes.

It is no longer accurate to say that judicial settlement is simply an alternative to direct and friendly negotiations. It should be seen and perceived as a matter of interaction, which does not impair the ef f ect of dispute settlement mechanism, but instead contributes to timely and effective negotiations.③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 690.To render a judgment, which requires the States involved to resume negotiations pursuing to peacefully settle their disputes, may be the most meaningful contribution that a dispute settlement body can make. The dispute settlement body, as its name suggests, should act in consideration of the fi nal resolution of disputes, and the compliance and observance of international legal rules and principles. This is the good faith that a third-party body should have towards the disputants for the long-term and stable development of international law.

D. Pacta Sunt Servada and Non-impairment of the Objects and Purposes of Treaties

The rule that treaties should be observed is the cornerstone for the existence and functioning of the international community. It is one of the basic manifestations of the good faith of States. The principle of good faith means, originally, pacta sunt servada (agreement should be respected).④J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, p. 124; Thomas Cottier and Krista N. Schefer, HAN Xiuli trans., GAO Bo proofread, Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations in the WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, No. 3, 2005, p. 181. (in Chinese)Article 26 of VCLT requires explicitly that States perform every treaty in force in good faith. The UN Charter containssimilar provisions. Practice of international law confirmed this point as early as more than one hundred years ago: the award of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case of 1910 pointed out that every State must have the duty to perform the obligations arising out of a treaty.①LI Haopei, An Introduction to Treaty Law, Beijing: Law Press China, 2003, p. 277. (in Chinese)

On the other hand, Article 31 of VCLT provides for the general rule of interpretation of treaties, and paragraph 1 of this article states that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. And Article 18 provides that a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty. This article is also an expression of the principle of good faith.②Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 667, note 53.Observing a treaty implies a recognition to the objects and purposes of the treaty, and gives pushes rather than injuries to the achievement of such objects and purposes, which is also a basic requirement of the good faith principle.③Anthony D’Amato, Good Faith, in Rudolf Bernhardt ed., Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 599.The objects and purposes of a treaty represent the common expectations of the States to a treaty. “Expectations are the vitals of the law”.④Stephen M. Schwebel, The Compliance Process and the Future of International Law, in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1981, p. 182.Under the principle of good faith, the legal expectations of States Parties arising from a treaty should be protected.

The UNCLOS articulated its overall object in its Preamble, which explicitly provides that all issues relating to the law of the sea should be settled in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation. This shows that the attainment of the basic object of UNCLOS depends on the mutual understanding and cooperation between States, and also reiterates, as analyzed above, the importance of negotiations. In addition, among others, adopting an open, fl exible and sincere attitude, and taking transparent actions without reserved or hidden purposes, obviously, are inherent in the “spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation”.

In order to obtain the goal of concluding a final agreement on maritime delimitation, the UNCLOS sets out more specific provisions. Articles 74(3)and 83(3), similar in text, urge the States concerned to enter into provisional arrangements, and not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the fi nal agreement. The Arbitral Tribunal of the Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname held that the provisions above include two obligations: The first obligation was designed to promote interim regimes and practical measures that could pave the way for provisional utilization of disputed areas; the second obligation was to try every ef f ort not to hamper or jeopardize the reaching of a fi nal agreement on delimitation.①Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 2007, paras. 460, 467.The obligation imposed on the Parties a duty to negotiate in good faith. And some of the Parties’ conducts, such as Suriname’s threat of force, jeopardized the reaching of a fi nal agreement.②Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 2007, paras. 460, 484.

In short, not to defeat the objects and purposes of a treaty, to a great extent, needs the negotiation ef f orts of the States concerned, which are also obligated to evade actions that may hamper negotiations. Every State has the duty to observe the provisions of a treaty, and perform its rights and obligations in good faith, so as to promote the obtainment of the objects and purposes of the treaty.

E. Honesty – the Core of the Good Faith Principle

The description of the multi-faceted meanings of the good faith principle, as mentioned above, indicates that the principle does not have clear and accurate connotations. We cannot fi nd a set of objective and strict standards to assess the principle. All the requirements of the principle are closely associated with the abstract quality of honesty, which, however, is precisely the meaning of it as a basic principle of international law. In order to better play the function of legal principles, and fi ll up the gaps of international treaties and customs, the scope of the good faith principle should be fl exible and broad.③Professor R. Summers called the principle of good faith a “safety valve” and argued that this principle should be open-ended rather than sealed off in a definition. See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 54, Issue 2, 1968, p. 266.Bona fi des serves as the touchstone of theprinciple.①For example, J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991, p. 118; Andrew D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2006, p. 339.With honesty as its core, the principle generally requires every State to be committed to negotiations and cooperation by taking up honest actions in a dispute, fl exibly taking into account all possible avenues with an open attitude.

III. The Philippines’ Violation of the Good Faith Principle in the SCS Arbitration

Since the principle of good faith under international law gives considerable guidance to the parties to a maritime delimitation dispute and third-party arbitral bodies, it should be paid due attentions. The EEZs and continental shelves claimed by China in the SCS overlap with those claimed by the Philippines. Both States have disputes over the sovereignty of some SCS islands. Such disputes fall into the category of sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes. Consequently, the Philippines, a party to the dispute, and the Arbitral Tribunal, acting as a dispute settlement body, should comply with the principle of good faith. Nevertheless, a review of the whole case reveals that both the Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal have acted, repeatedly, against the guidance of the good faith principle to the delimitation of marine boundary.

A. The Critical Status of Negotiation in Good Faith

The start of negotiations by the disputants is, in itself, a symbol of good faith. And the continuing of such negotiations with a view to reaching a settlement by agreement also fully manifests the good faith of both parties. In this connection, the Philippines has greatly jeopardized the principle of good faith.

1. The Philippines’ Lack of Negotiations with Respect to the Arbitration

First, the parties to a dispute must enter into negotiations, and also try every effort to continue such negotiations. China and the Philippines have conducted friendly negotiations on many occasions, whose results include a series of bilateral declarations jointly made by them. This fact is acknowledged by the Philippines. In the course of the arbitration, a Philippine representative concluded that bothparties have, over many years, negotiated on every issue involved in the SCS disputes between them, including China’s claim of “historic rights”, the maritime entitlements generated by Huangyan Island and the Nansha Islands, fishing and navigation rights in the relevant waters, and the construction of artif i cial islands in the relevant waters, etc..①Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 28～32.

However, the fact that the Philippine representative hid from the public is that after the Huangyan Island Event happened in 2012, negotiations regarding the SCS disputes stopped abruptly. Six months after the event, the Philippines unilaterally initiated an arbitration against China, without any prior negotiations with China over the matters submitted to arbitration. The Philippines has never negotiated or exchanged views with China on any one of its 15 Submissions.

Since there is an avenue for China and the Philippines to negotiate with each other, any new views or proposals are supposed to be mutually exchanged through this avenue. Otherwise, the longstanding and huge ef f orts made by both States on negotiation and cooperation over the years would be wasted. When the Philippines intended to initiate an arbitration against, or believed that their negotiations had reached an impasse whose progress needed the intervention of a third party, it was supposed to propose directly to China and hear China’s views in respect to its Submissions. However, the truth is that the Philippines failed to negotiate with China regarding any sort of its Submissions; further, it even did not express its intention to submit their disputes before an arbitral tribunal. On 26 April 2012, the Philippines delivered a note verbale to China, proposing that the issue of Huangyan Island be referred to a third-party judicial body for resolution. This is the only document that the Philippines, before its initiation of the arbitration against China, delivered to China concerning the start of a judicial procedure. However, from the perspective of good faith principle, this only document is also full of loopholes. The note verbale merely proposed to submit the issue of Huangyan Island to a judicial procedure, without mentioning the Nansha Islands and other issues, or saying that the third-party judicial body refers to the ICJ, ITLOS or an arbitral body, nor indicating any willingness to negotiate with China. The nature of the document, i.e., an ordinary note verbale issued by the Ministry of Foreign Af f airs, shows in itself that this document was intended by the Philippines to be no morethan a notif i cation.①Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, 7 December 2014, para. 48. [hereinafter “Position Paper”]However, the Philippines declared, on 22 January 2013, that it would start an arbitration process against China.

The above facts demonstrate that the Philippines has failed to fulfill its obligation to sufficiently negotiate with China. Technically, it even did not attempt to start negotiations with China regarding its initiation of arbitration.

2. The Absence of Honesty in the Philippines’ Negotiations Even if, quod non, the Philippines, as alleged by itself, has conducted negotiations before the start of the arbitration, its attitude towards negotiations is questionable. The paper contends that the degree of honesty which the applicant has towards negotiations is a critical factor to determine whether it has observed the good faith principle. This point may be assessed in two aspects: fi rst, whether the applicant State has actually conducted sufficient negotiations, rather than mere negotiations aiming not to openly violate the procedural requirements under the UNCLOS; second, whether the applicant remains willing to enter into negotiations, if possible, after the start of an judicial procedure. However, the deeds of the Philippines cannot stand the test in any one of two aspects above.

During the preliminary review of the case, the Tribunal asked: assuming Article 283 requires an negotiation on the substance of the parties’ dispute, at what level of specificity must such a negotiation occur, and whether the Philippines has sufficiently exchanged views with respect to each of its specific, individual submissions”.②Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, p. 32.This question is right to the point, to which the Philippines answered: “it is not necessary to exchange views on the substance of each and every submission per se; as long as there has been an exchange of views on the general subject matter of the dispute, broadly construed, Article 283 is satisf i ed…; there is no need for an exchange of views to touch upon specific articles of the Convention.”③Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 34～35.The Philippines degraded negotiations into a prima facie procedural requirement, which can be seen clearly in its answers presented above. Now that the Submissions reflect the Philippines’ primary arguments in its disputes with China in the SCS, the substance of the disputes must naturally be discussed in their negotiations. Otherwise, such negotiations would lose their meanings. The aboveanswer of the Philippines proves per se that the so-called negotiations conducted prior to the initiation of the arbitration totally lack honesty and sincerity. On the other hand, both negotiations and third-party arbitration are means to settle disputes, which are identical in terms of their fi nal aims. The Philippines alleged that its disputes with China involved a number of issues, and therefore it presented 15 Submissions to the Tribunal for resolution. In that case, if it sincerely hoped to settle such issues, how could it fail to exchange views with China on each and every Submission? Assuming that in a negotiation, if one party fails even to inform the other party of its specif i c claims, then how to mention a “hearing” or “exchange”of views, and what is the substance of such a negotiation? Furthermore, the saying that “Article 283 is satisfied as long as there has been an exchange of views”admitted unequivocally that negotiation is a prima facie procedural requirement to the Philippines. It follows that the Philippines has resolved to submit the dispute before an arbitral body. Given such a resolution, its talk with China on the issue of arbitration, if any, becomes meaningless. That is because the Philippines did not “negotiate”, if it can be called “negotiate”, with China with a view to reaching an agreement, maybe even the opposite. A failed negotiation is, after all, a strong excuse to enter into an arbitral process. China should not and is unwilling to make such a presumption that is nearly malicious; however, the Philippines’ attitude towards negotiations is indeed unconvincing.

The substance of the good faith principle is to perform one’s obligations assumed under a treaty in good faith, so as not to make the treaty de facto null and void. Hence, even if, quod non, the Philippines has conducted the so-called“negotiations”, it has failed to implement the provisions concerning negotiations under UNCLOS.

3. Arbitration Does Not Hamper the Continuing of Negotiations Finally, that the applicant State remains willing to negotiate and even welcomes such negotiations also best demonstrates that it has fulf i lled the obligation to settle disputes in good faith through peaceful means. The parties to Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case did not, as their dispute had been submitted to judicial process, stop their negotiations; instead they continued their negotiations on several occasions.①Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 24～26.Just as a judge of this case noted in his separate opinions, since State to State disputes frequently involve intricate and multi-dimensional issues, itis desirable to apply several methods at the same time or successively; thus the various instruments and fora to which States may resort are not incompatible, for all are mutually complementary.①Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 52.In some maritime delimitation disputes, applying several methods at the same time, if all are applicable, may better contribute to the resolution of such disputes. Anyway, it is certain that the intervention of a third-party dispute settlement body would not hamper the conducting of any negotiations; instead, such bodies often encourage and call for the resumption of negotiations.

Unfortunately, the negotiations between China and Philippines had stagnated during the years after the initiation of the SCS arbitration. The Philippines rejected all of China’s proposals to restart negotiations. Immediately after the Philippines’fi ling of the arbitration in January 2013, the Chinese embassy in Manila invited the Philippines to resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiations. However, the Philippine presidential spokesman said that China’s invitation was too late; “l(fā)et’s meet at the tribunal”.②ZHU Xiaolei, China Calls on the Philippines to Talk on Their Territorial Disputes, at http:// world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-01/3577769.html, 30 January 2017. (in Chinese)To date, the Philippines has made similar declarations at its government press conferences and on other occasions. Asserting that China insisted to demand it to fi rstly recognize that “the SCS in its entirety belongs to China”, the Philippines would not continue bilateral discussions prior to the release of the fi nal award of the arbitration.③See Response of the DFA Spokesperson to the Recent Statement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Af f airs on the West Philippine Sea Issue, at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/ newsroom/dfa-releases/332-response-of-the-dfa-spokesperson-to-the-recent-statementof-the-chinese-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-west-philippine-sea-issue, 1 February 2017; ZHU Yanfang, The Philippines Said that It Would Not Restart Bilateral Talks with China on the South China See Disputes before 2016, at http://news.ifeng.com/ a/20141211/42697421_0.shtml, 1 February 2017 (in Chinese); Statement before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfareleases/6795-statement-before-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration, 1 February 2017.

An ongoing judicial process does not, in the slightest sense, impede the conduction of any negotiations. The fundamental question lies in whether the parties concerned have the good faith to settle their disputes through negotiations fi rst. In this connection, the good faith of the Philippines is greatly questionable; it is, apparently, reluctant to make efforts in bilateral cooperation, since it has repeatedly rejected to talk with China. Paradoxically, the Philippines, at the same time, alleged that it adhered to the laws in relation to settlement of disputes, andeven called upon the international community to peacefully settle disputes by complying with the rules of laws.①PHL Stresses Adherence to Rule of Law as Key to Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; Highlights World Development Challenges and Calls on UN Reforms, at http://www.dfa. gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/4202-phl-stresses-adherence-to-rule-of-law-askey-to-peaceful-settlement-of-disputes-highlights-world-development-challenges-and-callson-un-reforms, 1 February 2017.Such being the case, the Philippines should keep in mind that both the international conventions such as the UN Charter and the UNCLOS, and the principle of good faith (a general principle of international law) require the disputants to fi rst negotiate in a meaningful and sufficient fashion.

B. Pacta Sunt Servada and the Obligation Not to Impair the Objects and Purposes of Treaties

1. The Provisions, Objects and Purposes of UNCLOS

The language of the UNCLOS repeatedly affirmed the importance of negotiation and cooperation. Article 280 states that the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them by any peaceful means of their own choice would not be impaired. Article 281 provides that if the States Parties have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in the UNCLOS apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means. Article 283 stipulates that when a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, the parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means. A mere Part XV (Settlement of Disputes) contains four articles mentioning expressly negotiation or other “peaceful means”.②UNCLOS, Articles 279～281, 283.Words expressing the priority of settlement by negotiation or referring to the articles providing for the settlement by negotiation can be found in numerous provisions of the UNCLOS. For example, Article 286 provides that any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS may, only when no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted to compulsory procedures entailing binding force; while section 1 stresses the priory of bilateral negotiations. The UNCLOS established a dispute settlement mechanism by setting out complex and mutually complementary provisions. It carefully ensures that the settlement of disputes through bilateralnegotiations would not be jeopardized by this mechanism; instead, the former would enjoy a priority over the mechanism. It has already become a fact that the adherence to the UNCLOS requires the States Parties to sufficiently negotiate and sincerely cooperate.

Regarding the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS, its Preamble and the general provisions of Part XVI have laid down the guiding principle: all issues relating to the law of the sea should be settled in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation. States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right. If the express requirement on voluntary negotiation can be said to be prima facie satisf i ed by conducting any bilateral dialogues, without focusing on the substance of such dialogues, then the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS impose higher demands on the States Parties in respect of their good faith.

A number of facts indicate that the Philippines, when preparing to file the arbitration and initiating the arbitration, and during the consideration of the case, had never talked with China, or sincerely negotiated with China with a view to concluding an agreement. In this connection, first, where the disputes submitted by the Philippines really, as it alleged, concern the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, then it shall, in accordance with Article 283, exchange views with China regarding the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means. However, the Philippines, in fact, has never consulted China concerning any one of its Submissions. Consequently, it has breached the express provisions of the UNCLOS, and the rule of Pacta Sunt Servada.

Even if, quod non, the Philippines has, as alleged by itself, talked with China over the arbitration, such talks lack sincerity, to say the least. Since the Philippines asserts that it is not necessary to exchange views to touch upon specif i c contents of its Submissions, any negotiations that may be taken up by the parties become prima facie. In that case, the Philippines has abandoned the object of negotiation, ignored the true meaning of cooperation and impaired the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS.

2. Provisions, Objects and Purposes of Many Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements between China and the Philippines

Aside from the UNCLOS, China and the Philippines have signed a series of agreements referred to in the UNCLOS, which set out the explicit requirements on the means to settle disputes between States. There has been a long-standingagreement between China and the Philippines on resolving their disputes in the SCS through friendly consultations and negotiations. The joint statements between the two States, as well as other official documents issued since 1995, all specif i ed that their disputes should be settled through friendly consultations and negotiations.①China’s Position Paper invoked a number of such statements, see Position Paper, paras. 31～34.The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), signed in 2002, contains the following provisions: The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations which shall serve as the basic norms governing State-to-State relations; the Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means through friendly consultations and negotiations, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law.②Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 2002, Articles 1, 4.The importance of negotiation has also been acknowledged by the current Philippine Government. The 2011 Joint Statement between China and the Philippines reiterated their commitment to addressing their disputes through peaceful dialogue and reaffirmed their commitments to respect and abide by the DOC.③Position Paper, para. 37.China insists that the bilateral instruments and multilateral instruments to which China and the Philippines are parties, constitute agreements with binding force, i.e., the agreements within the meaning of UNCLOS Articles 280 and 281. On that basis, they have undertaken a mutual obligation to settle their disputes through negotiations. The following pages will provide a further analysis taking the DOC as an example.

Firstly, the DOC is a political agreement having binding force upon China and the Philippines. Article 2(1) of the VCLT states: “‘treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”.④Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 2(1).An agreement is called an agreement mainly because the parties to the agreement have expressed to create rights and obligations on international law.⑤Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., WANG Tieya et al. trans., Oppenheim’s International Law, Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1995, p. 1203. (in Chinese)An unsigned instrument, such as a press communiqué, can also constitute an agreement.⑥Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., WANG Tieya et al. trans., Oppenheim’s International Law, Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1995, p. 1209. (in Chinese)Documents, including minutescreating legal obligations for the parties concerned, may also become agreements.①M(fèi)aritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, para. 41(1).Therefore, the intentions of the parties concerned, along with the words used in a document, are the factors determining whether or not the document constitutes an agreement entailing binding force.

The DOC articulates that the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the UNCLOS, and other principles of international law shall serve as the basic norms governing State-to-State relations; that the Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law.②Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 2002, Articles 1, 4.These provisions demonstrate that the DOC contains clear rules of conduct. The employment of the term “undertake” also evinces an intention to establish an obligation between the two States in this regard.③Position Paper, para. 38.Additionally, the DOC was jointly signed by the Vice Foreign Minister of China, and the foreign ministers or secretaries of the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), i.e., government representatives.④A declaration, if signed by the primary government representatives, and including def i nite rules of conduct and other conclusions agreed, this document should be binding upon the States involved. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., WANG Tieya et al. trans., Oppenheim’s International Law, Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1995, p. 1189. (in Chinese)To sum up, the DOC should be considered as an agreement with legal force.

Therefore, the Philippines should insist that the disputes be settled “through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned”, as provided for in the DOC. The Preamble of the DOC also declares its purpose: to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of dif f erences and disputes among countries concerned. The Philippines not only failed to proactively perform its obligation to negotiate with China, but also refused all of China’s requests for talk. In this connection, the Philippines violated the DOC, and beyond that, it impaired the objects and purposes of the DOC.

Secondly, the Philippines argued, in the proceeding, that the DOC was not intended to be a legally binding agreement, but nothing more than a political instrument. It also analyzed the term “undertake”, contending that it was dif f erentfrom the term “agree” in ef f ect in that States solely “state” their “undertakings”.①M(fèi)emorial of the Philippines, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, 2014, paras. 7.51. [hereinafter “The Memorial”]Nevertheless, the explanation given by the Black’s Law Dictionary to the word“undertake” is unable to support the Philippines’ argument; the word “undertake”denotes the assumption of an obligation, the making of a formal promise, or acting in surety.②Bryan A. Garner ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, Eagan: West Group, 2004, p. 4741.The words used in the explanation is unambiguous, whichever indicates the intention of the doer. The Philippines distorted the interpretation of the terms employed in the DOC, which obviously breached the requirement that a treaty be interpreted in good faith. In addition, acting arbitrarily by regarding the DOC as a document without binding force, also overlooked the intention of the signatory States to DOC when creating the relevant obligations. As described previously, the purpose of a treaty mirrors the common aspiration of all States Parties, rather than the viewpoints of a single party. The protection of a treaty’s objects and purposes is also a kind of protection to the legal aspiration of all States Parties, which is the mutual good faith that should be shown by States Parties.

Thirdly, the Philippines argued that the DOC was signed as something of a stop-gap measure in light of the inability of the ASEAN member States and China to achieve consensus on four major areas of disagreement; that the circumstances surrounding the DOC’s adoption indicated that it was not a legally binding instrument.③The Memorial, para. 7.55.However, the implementation of the DOC provides a different story. ASEAN member States and China, subsequently, signed the guidelines for future actions of the DOC. For example, China issued a joint statement with the Philippines, reaffirming their commitments to the DOC.④Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, 1 September 2011.The Philippines has participated in numerous consultations held after the conclusion of the DOC, where it has never expressed the kind of views indicating that it was impossible to negotiate with China. Right before the Philippines’ submission of its memorial, the 10th ASEAN-China Joint Working Group Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC was held on 18 March 2014. Representatives from both the Philippines and China participated in the meeting. The object of the meeting was precisely to implement the DOC. If the Philippines believed that the DOC was not legally binding and thus did not intend to discharge the requirements thereunder, whybother to participate in the consultations concerning the implementation of the DOC? Or, why did the Philippines fail to raise any objections during such consultations? On one hand, the Philippines participated in the implementation of the DOC; on the other hand, it blatantly deviated from the requirements of the DOC. Such self-contradictory actions show, indisputably, the absence of good faith on the Philippines’ side.

Finally, even if, quod non, the DOC was considered a document without binding force, as the Tribunal found in its preliminary decision, the means of settlement by negotiation between the parties is also affirmed by the UNCLOS. However, the Philippines refused to take the initiative to talk with China, rejected China’s proposal for negotiation, and clearly expressed its decision not to enter into negotiations. Such facts provide further evidence that it has disregarded the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS, and further gone against the principle of good faith.

IV. The Tribunal’ Breach of the Good Faith Principle

Given that the dispute settlement mechanism is established, the UNCLOS, which is committed to the peace of the oceans, also needs the protection from dispute settlement bodies. Maritime delimitation disputes are intricate and complex, the seeking of settlement means acceptable to all parties involved, hence, requires the efforts of all parties and the wit and intelligence of third-party settlement bodies.

A. The Examination of the Parties’ Fulf i llment of Their Obligation to Negotiate in Good Faith

Before rendering any judgment on the merits of a dispute, the dispute settlement body should fi rst decide whether the parties concerned have, sufficiently and reasonably, conducted negotiations. It requires the adjudication body to examine whether or not the parties concerned have actually performed their obligation to negotiate in good faith. Based on the statement above, this obligation can be examined through two steps: the first is to examine whether the parties have negotiated over the matters submitted to a third party body; the second is to consider whether the parties have good faith during the course of negotiations.

The fi rst step is easier to complete, since it is not necessary for the adjudication body to explore the substance of negotiations, which only needs to decide whetherthe relevant issues have been put on the negotiation table. However, the decision of the Tribunal of the present case, even in this step, is unconvincing. For instance, when considering Article 283 of UNCLOS, the Tribunal held, in its preliminary award, that China and the Philippines had exchanged views regarding the disputes that “the Philippines has presented in these proceedings”, and thus Article 283 had been satisf i ed.①Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2015, para. 342. [hereinafter “Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility”]The Tribunal quoted as evidence the content of a consultation between the vice foreign ministers of the two States made on 14 January 2012. Nevertheless, exactly in this quotation, the Philippine representative said to the Chinese counterpart: “You are for bilateral discussion. We have embarked on a path that uses the law…”②Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 339.The tense used in this statement of the Philippines suggests that it almost acknowledged unequivocally that the Philippines “had”, even before the occurrence of the Huangyuan Island Event, embarked on a path that uses the law. Under this circumstance, how can the Tribunal employ this statement as an evidence to prove that the Philippines has exchanged views with China? Additionally, the Philippines, in that consultation, proposed to adopt multilateral dialogue, rather than judicial process, to settle its disputes with China.③Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 339.That consultation, as determined by the Tribunal, is an ef f ective evidence proving that the Philippines has exchanged views with China. Then we have to say that the Philippines deceived China in the consultation. UNCLOS Article 283 requires an exchange of views regarding dispute settlement by peaceful means. Consequently, the Philippines should, at least, inform China in that consultation that it intended to submit their disputes in the SCS to arbitration. Nonetheless, it proposed, in that consultation, another dispute settlement means which is totally dif f erent from arbitration. That is to say, the conclusion of the Tribunal reveals another aspect indicating that the Philippines has gone against the requirement on honesty and credibility imposed by the good faith principle. Yet it is still hard to accept the conclusion that the ef f orts made by the Philippines in that consultation are nothing more than a fraud. Therefore, we can only conclude: that consultation was not concerning the issue of arbitration, and thus the decision of the Tribunal in this regard is unreasonable.

Apart from the consultation mentioned above, the Tribunal also invoked the note verbale issued by the Philippines in 2012 to China concerning the issue of Huangyan Island. However, the note verbale involved nothing more than the issues of Huangyan Island and its EEZ, without mentioning other issues or its intention to adopt which judicial proceedings.①Note Verbale from the Department of Foreign Af f airs of the Philippines to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-1137, 26 April 2012.However, the Tribunal stated that the Parties had “unequivocally” exchanged views regarding the disputes that “the Philippines has presented in these proceedings”.②Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 342.The facts are clear and obvious, but the Tribunal still made such an incredible conclusion. This is not purely a question of the Tribunal’s misjudgment on an argument; instead, it is also the Tribunal’s disregard of the good faith principle.

If the Tribunal’s decision on whether the parties have conducted negotiations can still be said to sound plausible, then in the second step where the sincerity and sufficiency of the negotiations are examined, the Tribunal nearly turned a blind eye to all relevant evidences, whose award, therefore, is undoubtedly absent of good faith. Here, we will also take the consideration of UNCLOS Article 283 as an example. The Tribunal pointed out that diplomatic communications and exchanges did not divide neatly between procedural and substantive matters; that in practice, the Parties’ views on the substantive matters between them may shed a great deal of light on their respective views on how the dispute may – or may not –be settled.③Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 332.Now that the Tribunal acknowledged this fact, it is of more necessity to carefully review the contents of negotiations between the Parties. However, the two evidences provided by the Tribunal, as previously mentioned, cannot even prove that the Philippines has started the negotiations with China, not to say how much good faith it has made in such negotiations. Furthermore, the agent of the Philippines, as quoted above, argued that “it is not necessary to exchange views on the substance of each and every submission per se; as long as there has been an exchange of views on the general subject matter of the dispute, broadly construed, Article 283 is satisf i ed.”④Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 34～35.These arguments indicate that the Philippines has perceived negotiation as a mere procedure, with no intention to put more ef f orts in bilateral cooperation for a long time. Seeing such obvious attitudes of thePhilippines, the Tribunal still held that the Philippines satisf i ed the requirement on negotiation. We have no choice but to say that the Tribunal has also ignored the meaning of negotiation. Meaningless negotiation, apparently, is neither consistent with the spirit of the UNCLOS, nor with the goals of any international treaties to seek bilateral cooperation and resolution of disputes through peaceful means. In this connection, the award of the Tribunal impaired the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS, and went against the principle of good faith once again.

B. The Tribunal’s Disregard of Law and Facts

The Tribunal declared that it had jurisdiction over the disputes between China and the Philippines which obviously concerned with the territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation. Subsequently, the Tribunal, in the fi nal award, denied China’s historic rights in the SCS, the validity of the U-shaped line, as well as the possibility that the Nansha Islands may have EEZ and continental shelf. In the merits phase, the Tribunal acted in defiance of laws, history and facts on uncountable occasions. The following pages will provide an analysis taking the issue of China’s historic rights as an example.

China has not clearly def i ned the nature of the U-shaped line and contents of its historic rights in the SCS. In the view of the Tribunal, such rights claimed by China were exceptional, and therefore the U-shaped line and China’s claims to historic rights encompassed by the relevant part of the U-shaped line were without lawful ef f ect.①Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award, 2016, para. 278. [hereinafter “Award”]

From the perspective of good faith, the Tribunal’s decision above distorted the facts, and failed to deal with the evidences honestly. Firstly, it is true that China declared that it had historic rights in the areas enclosed by the U-shaped line. However, it has never said that other States were not allowed to exercise their legal rights in the SCS. In fact, the Tribunal also noted that China had repeatedly stated that it respected and safeguarded the freedom of navigation in the SCS to which all countries were entitled under international law.②Award, para. 212.The actual navigation situations of the SCS for years show that China has not impeded any other States’ exercise of their legal rights in the SCS, including the areas enclosed by the U-shaped line. TheTribunal however asserted, in the award, that historic rights were, in most instances, exceptional rights.①Award, para. 268.It then presumed that the historic rights claimed by China were exceptional, which affected the rights of other States. The problem is that how can the Tribunal conclude that historic rights are exceptional? The Tribunal, in the Award, also admitted that the notion of “historic right” had not been defined on international law.②Award, para. 226, the text reads “Other ‘historic rights’… are nowhere mentioned in the Convention.”Then, after considering China’s specif i c statements and practice, it has less grounds to reach the conclusion above. Such a conclusion is, evidently, the Tribunal’s assumption on historic rights and China’s claims.

Secondly, the Tribunal took China’s claims to petroleum and fi shery resources as an example, holding that China did not mention that its rights with respect these resources were based on the fact that the relevant areas were located within its EEZ and continental shelf, instead, China considered its rights to stem from historic rights. In the view of the Tribunal, China’s objections to the Philippines’ exploration of the Reed Bank/GSEC101 and other petroleum blocks, for instance, were merely based on the claim that these blocks were situated in the waters of which China has historic rights and jurisdiction, without mentioning EEZ or continental shelf.③Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacif i c Af f airs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2011; Note Verbale from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila to the Department of Foreign Af f airs, Republic of the Philippines, No. (11) PG-202, 6 July 2011; Award, para. 209.The Tribunal then concluded that China’s claims to these rights were not based on a theory of entitlement to EEZ and continental shelf rights under the UNCLOS, but on historic rights.④Award, para. 209.However, the question lies in that the Tribunal has also pointed out that the area of the Philippines’ petroleum blocks was covered by entitlements claimed by China under the Convention, if China claimed EEZ and continental shelf from the Nansha Islands.⑤Award, para. 209.The fact that China did not explain its rights to the petroleum resources from the perspective of EEZ and continental shelf does not, necessarily, represent that China does not enjoy the rights derived from its entitlement to EEZ and continental shelf.

Thirdly, the Tribunal argued, in the award, that with respect to the part of area encompassed by the U-shaped line but outside the EEZ and continental shelf of China, when China’s claim for rights extended to areas that would be consideredto form part of the entitlement of the Philippines to an EEZ or continental shelf, China would be at variance with the UNCLOS.①Award, para. 232.Nevertheless, since China and the Philippines have dispute over the delimitation of their marine boundaries, the scope of the EEZ and continental shelf claimed by the two States, respectively, is controversial in itself. In that case, how can the Tribunal, before the settlement of the delimitation dispute, decide that China infringed the rights of the Philippine side? In this regard, the award is apparently unfair to China, which goes against the basic connotation of the good faith principle once again.

The UNCLOS does not specify that the arbitral tribunal constituted under its Annex VII should comply with the principle of good faith. However, as described above, judicial bodies, including arbitral tribunals, which are established to resolve disputes and maintain the fairness of international justice, are supposed to set themselves an example to others. It should be said that the Tribunal may exert more severe impacts than the Philippines, if it renders its award not in good faith. The Philippines is only a party to a dispute and a member of the international community. Its violation of the basic rules of international law can be corrected by the judicial bodies. In contrast, the Tribunal is an international judicial body per se. It will extensively impair the general rules of international law, if it fails to identify such violations and even ignores facts and misinterprets evidences.

C. The Tribunal’s Failure to Issue an Award Really Contributing to the Peaceful Resolution of Disputes

The preliminary award of the Tribunal is indicative of the Tribunal’s def i ance of the good faith principle to a great extent. However, it does not mean that the situation cannot be remedied in the award delivered at the merits phase. No matter how the adjudication body interprets each specif i c issue, its fi nal award is aimed at appeasing international conf l icts, and encouraging the parties to a dispute to make peace, which is the most fundamental obligation of the dispute settlement bodies, and also their basic good faith. However, the final award released in July, 2016, failed to make up the good faith that was absent in the preliminary award. Instead, it even went further, as no good faith can be found in the whole text of the award. To this point, the Tribunal of the present case cannot contribute to the resolution of the disputes between China and the Philippines. The result will even turn out to bejust the opposite of its wish.

The international law, as a result of the historical development of international relations, cannot be treated separating from the latter. The Sino-Philippine disputes in the SCS, like all State-State disputes, are not solely an issue of international law. They also involve complex international political considerations and future development of the relations between the Parties. For these reasons, any disputes should always be addressed by diplomatic means in priority. In a similar vein, under reasonable circumstance, it is extremely necessary for an international judicial body to make a final award encouraging negotiations. By doing so, the judicial body is not evading its responsibilities, but making a decision based on the actual situation that will best contribute to the settlement of disputes. It is a signal of good faith from the international law to the members of the international community.

From the perspective above, the SCS arbitration between China and the Philippines needs nothing more than such a award encouraging negotiations. Given that China has reiterated that it would not accept or participate in the arbitration, it has sufficient grounds not to implement the award, even if the Tribunal delivered any award unfavorable to China. Moreover, due to the lack of good faith in the preliminary award of the Tribunal, its decisions have already invited the question and doubts from academia home and even abroad. The Tribunal of the case has almost become the target of public criticism in China. The Chinese Government insists that the Tribunal lack jurisdiction over the case;①Transcript of the Chinese and Foreign Media’ Interview with XU Hong, the Director-General of Department of Treaty and Law of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regarding the SCS Arbitration Initiated by the Philippines, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ cebe/chn/zclc/t1362765.htm, 17 January 2017(in Chinese); Foreign Ministry Spokesman LU Kang’s Regular Press Conference on 30 October 2015, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1310668.shtml, 17 January 2017. (in Chinese)and scholars explored, from various perspectives, the fallacies of its award on jurisdiction. Since China holds that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, the fi nal award it issued later should also be considered to be without legal ef f ect. In that case, the parties would be locked in a stalemate regarding the final award, which would be eventually laid aside and become meaningless, if the consequence is mild. On the other hand, it would have an ef f ect exactly opposite of its wish, if the consequence is severe enough. Specif i cally, China would insist that the award be null and void, but the Philippines would request to implement the award. In that way, their conflicts and disputesconcerning the issue of SCS would be further aggravated or exacerbated. The former consequence would undoubtedly impair the ef f ect and authoritativeness of international justice, and prejudice the development of international law; the latter would further undermine the friendly development of international relations, and threaten the peace and stability of the international community.

Regretfully, the Tribunal of the present case, acting arbitrarily and willfully, failed to objectively review the facts of the Sino-Philippine disputes. After the release of the fi nal award, China rightly criticized it, and the Philippines, under the leadership of its newly elected president, also determines to renegotiate with China and put the award aside. The purpose of the Tribunal is supposed to contribute to the resolution of the Sino-Philippine disputes, and to restore the peace of SCS. However, the Tribunal went farther and farther on the way deviating from the good faith principle. It is appropriate to say that the Tribunal has abused its name as a dispute settlement body.

V. The Philippines and the Tribunal’s Fundamental Def i ciency

Be it the requirement imposed on the parties to a dispute to negotiate in good faith, the rule of pacta sunt servada, the requirement to contribute to the attainment of a treaty’s purpose, or the duty of a third-party dispute settlement body to review the obligations above in good faith, the very foundation is the honesty of each party when taking actions. The objective quality of bona fi des ref l ects many requirements, covering multiple aspects of a dispute.

For example, acting in good faith can also be interpreted that the disputants act transparently and depict facts objectively. Any issues involved in the Sino-Philippine disputes in the SCS are, in practice, concerning the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation. However, the Philippines spared no effort to package its claims into some prima facie submissions, such as the consideration of the legal nature of certain marine features,①Professor LUO Guoqiang lists four ways that the Philippines employed to disguise its real submissions. See LUO Guoqiang, A Comment on the Preliminary Award on the South China Sea Arbitration, Foreign Af f airs Review, No. 2, 2016, p. 26. (in Chinese)deliberately hiding its true intention behind. Such distortion of facts and hiding of the substance of the disputes, naturally, goes against the requirements on transparency, objectivity andhonesty.

For another example, the Philippines, in its note verbale protesting against China’s claims in the SCS, stated that it enjoyed the sovereignty or sovereign rights to the territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf generated by the marine features of “Kalayaan Island Group”.①The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations, Note Verbale 000228, United Nations Documents, 2011.The “Kalayaan Island Group” claimed by the Philippines is entirely composed by some features of the Nansha Islands. It follows that the Philippines has admitted that some features of the Nansha Islands are entitled to EEZ and continental shelf. In that case, it should not be disputable for China to claim EEZ and continental shelf on the basis of the Nansha Islands in its entirety, which is larger than any one feature of the Nansha Islands, and also bigger than the “Kalayaan Island Group”. Therefore, this evidence is insufficient to prove that China and the Philippines have disputes in this regard. Nevertheless, the Tribunal made an opposite decision.②Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 170.This also demonstrates that the Tribunal failed to examine the facts in an objective way.

The last but the most ironical point is that the Philippines and the Tribunal, during the course of the arbitration, expressly mentioned the good faith principle on several occasions, implying that China had not acted in good faith. In the view of the Philippines, China violated its obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment in the waters surrounding Huangyan Island, Ren’ai Reef, Meiji Reef and other features; China’s land creation and construction work damaged the marine environment; and it made no ef f ort to control the harmful activities of its fi shermen; therefore China has not performed the obligations under the UNCLOS in good faith.③Day 3 – Hearing on the Merits and Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, p. 45.In its Submission No. 14, the Philippines alleged that China had aggravated the dispute by taking a series of actions in the waters at, and adjacent to, Ren’ai Reef. The Philippines argued that UNCLOS Article 300 articulated the basic principle of good faith and the prevention of abuse of rights, which required States to narrow their dif f erences, rather than aggravate their disputes.

The good faith principle, indisputably, calls for the parties to a dispute to actively address their dif f erences through peaceful means, rather than to provoke each other to exacerbate their dispute. However, the problem is that the Philippines illegally ran an old warship aground on the Ren’ai Reef in 1999 and has neveracted to remove the warship from the Chinese reef for the last 18 years, but even attempting to build facilities there. The Philippines accused China of continuing actions on or around the reef after the start of the arbitration in 2013, which aggravated or escalated their disputes. However, the truth is that the Philippines publicly declared, in March, 2014, that it would build the warship aground on the Ren’ai Reef into a permanent facility. In this context, China took necessary measures, since China would never sit by and watch other States challenge its territorial sovereignty over the Ren’ai Reef, which is a part of its Nansha Islands. On what grounds can the Philippines, being the party provoking the dispute, accuse China of destroying the peace in the SCS?

Sadly, the Tribunal only saw the actions on the Chinese side, but turned a blind eye to the prior provocation made by the Philippines. The Tribunal considered that China’s construction of artif i cial islands on seven features in the SCS, in addition to the Meiji Reef, Ren’ai Reef and other features identified by the Philippines, aggravated the disputes between the Parties.①Award, para. 1177.The Tribunal, weirdly, “forgot” the fact that the Philippines fi rst challenged China’s claims of sovereignty, but solely focused on the actions on the Chinese side. In view of such deliberate disregard of facts, how can the award be considered to be made in good faith? Further, the Tribunal held that China’s actions obstructed the progress of arbitration, which impaired its purpose to help the settlement of disputes. However, does not the deceptive award really hamper the resolution of disputes? In fact, the award primarily aims to conclude that China and the Philippines do not have disputes over maritime delimitation, therefore the relevant features of the Nansha Islands are located within the Philippine continental shelf, and these features would belong to the Philippines automatically. This conclusion is based on three critical fi ndings of the Tribunal: China’s claims of historic rights are ineffective; China’s claims of maritime rights generated by the Nansha Islands in its entirety are invalid; no feature of the Nansha Islands qualifies as an “island”. Nonetheless, none of the three fi ndings is well-founded in facts. The “historic rights” claimed by China is by no means exceptional; but the Tribunal arbitrarily decided otherwise. No provisions can be found in the UNCLOS that archipelagic baselines do not apply to mid-ocean archipelagos. A group of islands, at least, cannot be assumed to be not entitled to EEZ and continental shelf in its entirety. However, the Tribunal arbitrarily denied this entitlement. There is no express stipulation on the criteria of “island”, yet theTribunal seems to have elevated the criteria on purpose by disregarding the factual evidences. In fact, a sufficient exploration of the problems lying in the Tribunal’s three fi ndings needs much more pages, which would not be pursued in this paper. For the purpose of the paper, we only underscore the falsehood and absurdity of the Tribunal’s fi nding that there is no overlapping sea areas between China and the Philippines. No decision based on this fi nding can contribute to the settlement of disputes; instead, it will only bring ef f ect opposite to its wish.

The Philippines and the Tribunal recklessly infringed on the principle of good faith, nevertheless they still invoked this principle to falsely discuss China’s actions without respect. In the course of the arbitration, their words and actions were inconsistent and self-contradictory. They employed the principle of good faith when convenient and abandoned it on unfavorable conditions. As such, the damages that they brought to this basic principle of international law and fundamental rule of conduct for the international community have attained a level never known before.

The connotations of the good faith principle under discussion are far from exhaustion and cannot be exhausted. With sincerity and honesty as its core, the principle is, naturally, mirrored in every move and action of the doer. The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on SCS Disputes was closed eventually in July, 2016. Regrettably, the so called “f i nal award” nearly supports all the Submissions raised by the Philippines. An examination of the behaviors of the Philippines and the Tribunal reveals numerous violations of the good faith principle, from which the paper only cited a couple of examples. Such violations will hugely impair the principle.

VI. Conclusions

The settlement of international disputes, and accordingly the maintenance of world peace, needs, especially, each doer to comply with the good faith principle. In the context of maritime delimitation disputes, this principle involves multiple connotations, mainly including:

Firstly, the parties to a dispute should enter into and conduct negotiations in good faith, with a view to arriving at agreements. They should perform their obligations assumed under the treaties between them in good faith, without prejudice to the objects and purposes of such treaties. Furthermore, their actions should always keep the essence of sincerity.

Secondly, the dispute settlement body involved should be fully aware of theduties assumed by the parties under the principle of good faith, and objectively examine the facts associated with the dispute in good faith. Its award or judgment should aim to resolve the dispute, and really advance the peace progress of the international community.

The Sino-Philippine disputes in the SCS concern territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation. Be it the Philippines (a party to the disputes), or the Tribunal (a dispute settlement body), their behaviors failed to meet the requirements above, which, undoubtedly, enormously undermined the principle of good faith.

As a general principle of international law, the good faith principle, which has profound connotations, is a cornerstone supporting the functioning of the international community. It is the minimal criteria for international actions, also the goodness highly pursued by the entire human being. This principle should not be ignored or infringed. In the context of the invalid award of the Sino-Philippine Arbitration on SCS Disputes made not in good faith, this principle should be paid more attention by all the members of the international community which is committed to the development of international law.

Translator: XIE Hongyue

Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: A Perspective from the Principle of Good Faith

LUO Sa*

This paper, from the perspective of the principle of good faith, an abstract and basic principle on international law, examines the deeds of both the Philippines and the Tribunal in the Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes. The fi rst section explores the connotations of the principle in the context of maritime delimitation. On the one hand, the parties to a maritime delimitation dispute are governed by this principle. For example, the parties are obligated to negotiate in good faith, including to actively enter into negotiations, conduct sufficient talks and keep welcoming negotiations. On the other hand, the principle also requires dispute settlement bodies to make their decisions in a legal and reasonable manner. The second section identif i es the Philippines’ violation of the good faith principle in multiple aspects, by checking its actions taken during the course of the proceedings against the primary requirements of the principle. The third section showcases the absence of good faith in the Arbitral Tribunal’s award, by presenting the behaviors of the Tribunal, as a dispute settlement body, during its review of the case. Lastly, the paper mentions that the Philippines and the Tribunal even check China’s behaviors against the principle of good faith. And the paper concludes that the lack of honesty and integrity of both the Philippines and the Tribunal causes fundamental detriment to this general principle of international law.

Principle of good faith; China; The Philippines; Arbitral Tribunal; South China Sea Arbitration

* 羅薩，武漢大學(xué)中國邊界與海洋研究院2015級碩士研究生。電子郵箱：lovirosa@163. com。本文獲《中國海洋法學(xué)評論》批判南海仲裁案征文比賽二等獎(jiǎng)。

? THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

* LUO Sa, master degree candidate enrolled in 2015 of Wuhan University China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies. E-mail: lovirosa@163.com. This paper won the second prize of the COLR Open Submission Contest for Criticizing the SCS Arbitration.

? THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW