韓雨瀟

南海仲裁案中菲律賓主張“單島定性”問題探析

韓雨瀟*

在南海島礁爭端中，菲律賓是侵占中國南海島礁較多的國家，其一直聲稱對(duì)中國南海的部分島礁擁有主權(quán)，菲律賓為了謀求本國在南海的利益，一方面就南海部分島礁單方面提起仲裁，主張中國的“斷續(xù)線”違反《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》，要求就其海洋權(quán)利做出裁定，把中國南海諸島的主權(quán)和海洋權(quán)利割裂開來；另一方面，菲律賓企圖將中國南海的部分島礁進(jìn)行“單島定性”，尤其是對(duì)處于中國實(shí)際控制的島礁進(jìn)行定性，通過“矮化”中國相關(guān)島嶼的性質(zhì)，以達(dá)到損害中國海洋權(quán)益的目的。針對(duì)菲律賓將中國南海諸島進(jìn)行碎片化處理的惡意企圖，中國應(yīng)盡快在南海地區(qū)構(gòu)建遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度，從而更好地維護(hù)中國的島嶼主權(quán)與海洋權(quán)益。

南海仲裁案 領(lǐng)土爭端 遠(yuǎn)洋群島 《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》

在中國對(duì)南海諸島及其附近海域進(jìn)行開發(fā)利用的歷史過程中，從沒有任何一個(gè)國家對(duì)中國南海諸島的主權(quán)、管轄權(quán)提出過挑戰(zhàn)，無論從歷史上還是從法理上來說，中國對(duì)南海諸島及其附近海域均具有不可爭辯的主權(quán)。菲律賓雖宣稱對(duì)中國南海諸島的部分島嶼擁有主權(quán)及主權(quán)權(quán)利，但是20世紀(jì)中期以前，沒有任何法律文件或者官方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人講話表明菲律賓的領(lǐng)土范圍包括中國的南海諸島。20世紀(jì)中期開始，隨著南海豐富的油氣資源、生物資源、空間資源、旅游資源等被不斷發(fā)現(xiàn)，極大提升了南海的戰(zhàn)略與軍事價(jià)值，加之《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》（以下簡稱“《公約》”）在1994年的生效、亞太格局的變化，促使菲律賓對(duì)南沙群島產(chǎn)生了濃厚的興趣。自20世紀(jì)70年代以來，菲律賓陸續(xù)派兵對(duì)南沙群島進(jìn)行武力侵占，先后非法占據(jù)了中國南沙群島的9個(gè)島礁（見表1）。

2013年1月22日，菲律賓不顧中方的強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)，就中菲南海爭端單方面提起強(qiáng)制仲裁程序，質(zhì)疑中國在南海海域所主張的權(quán)利的正當(dāng)性。菲律賓在南海仲裁案中對(duì)南海部分島礁提出“單島定性”的主張，其根本目的就是企圖將南海諸島肢解開來，使中國無法從整體上維護(hù)南海地區(qū)的領(lǐng)土主權(quán)和海洋權(quán)益。2016年7月12日，仲裁庭對(duì)南海仲裁案做出“最終裁決”，否定了中國在“斷續(xù)線”內(nèi)南海海域的主權(quán)權(quán)利、管轄權(quán)及歷史性權(quán)利。仲裁庭在審議島礁的地位時(shí)，認(rèn)定《公約》并未規(guī)定如南沙群島的一系列島嶼可以作為一個(gè)整體共同產(chǎn)生海洋區(qū)域。①Eleventh Press Release, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), p. 10, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf, 21 March 2017.面對(duì)菲律賓咄咄逼人的進(jìn)攻態(tài)勢，中國有必要從法理的角度對(duì)南沙群島的群島地位進(jìn)行探討并構(gòu)建群島制度，從而有力地回?fù)舴坡少e碎片化南沙群島的惡意企圖。

表1 菲律賓非法侵占的中國南沙島礁

一、駁斥菲律賓在南海仲裁案中對(duì)南海部分島礁“切割”的主張

（一）菲律賓企圖以《公約》為法律依據(jù)，割裂南沙島礁主權(quán)與海洋權(quán)利之間的關(guān)系，進(jìn)而全盤否定中國在南海的主權(quán)

2016年7月12日仲裁庭發(fā)布了南海仲裁案的仲裁裁決。菲律賓在仲裁過程中一共提出了15項(xiàng)訴求，其中第2項(xiàng)訴求是針對(duì)中國南海的“斷續(xù)線”，菲律賓認(rèn)為中國以南海“斷續(xù)線”為依據(jù)主張海洋權(quán)利，這種做法不符合《公約》的規(guī)定，仲裁庭應(yīng)認(rèn)定是無效的，試圖從根本上否定中國在南海地區(qū)的所有權(quán)利。菲律賓這種訴求十分荒謬，因?yàn)槠渖暾堉俨玫膶?shí)體問題不屬于《公約》規(guī)制的范圍，因此《公約》并不能作為處理中菲南海爭端的法律依據(jù)。①Eleventh Press Release, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), p. 6, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf, 21 March 2017.《公約》序言指出：“在妥為顧及所有國家主權(quán)的情形下，為海洋建立一種法律秩序……本公約未予規(guī)定的事項(xiàng)，應(yīng)繼續(xù)以一般國際法的規(guī)則和原則為準(zhǔn)據(jù)。”也就是說，由于《公約》并沒有對(duì)領(lǐng)土主權(quán)爭端進(jìn)行規(guī)定，所以島嶼爭端的解決應(yīng)適用一般國際法的規(guī)則?！秺W本海國際法》認(rèn)為：“習(xí)慣是國際法以及一般法律的最古老和原始的淵源”，而“法律不溯及既往”早已成為習(xí)慣法并獲得國際社會(huì)公認(rèn)。根據(jù)一般國際法，當(dāng)《公約》與習(xí)慣法發(fā)生抵觸時(shí)，習(xí)慣法將優(yōu)于《公約》。②鄭海麟：《南海仲裁案的國際法分析》，載于《太平洋學(xué)報(bào)》2016年第8期，第4頁。依據(jù)“法律不溯及既往”，中國“斷續(xù)線”的劃定比《公約》生效要早47年，不能用現(xiàn)行法律去約束和指導(dǎo)過去的行為，而中國對(duì)于南沙群島的主權(quán)及其附近水域的歷史性權(quán)利是有著充分的歷史和法理依據(jù)來佐證的，并且也得到了國際社會(huì)的廣泛承認(rèn)，同時(shí)，“斷續(xù)線”的劃定并不屬于《公約》的管轄范圍，其本身是歷史問題，所以菲律賓認(rèn)為中國的“斷續(xù)線”違反《公約》的訴求并不成立。

菲律賓2013年1月22日向中國發(fā)出了《關(guān)于西菲律賓海的通知和主張聲明》（以下簡稱“《聲明》”），其中第五部分闡述了菲律賓請求仲裁庭予以裁決的13項(xiàng)訴求，其中第10～13項(xiàng)訴求是針對(duì)南海海域權(quán)利的，請求仲裁庭認(rèn)定菲律賓在南海相關(guān)海域享有專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架的權(quán)利。③Notif i cation and Statement of Claim on West Philippine Sea, pp. 17～19, at http://www.dfa. gov.ph/images/UNCLOS/Notification%20and%20Statement%20of%20Claim%20on%20 West%20Philippine%20Sea.pdf, 22 March 2017.南海相關(guān)海域的專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架權(quán)利是從領(lǐng)土主權(quán)派生而來的，菲律賓這種割裂南沙群島主權(quán)與海洋權(quán)利之間的關(guān)系，直接要求仲裁庭對(duì)海洋權(quán)益進(jìn)行仲裁的訴求也是不符合國際法中“陸地支配海洋”的原則。國際法院早在1969年北海大陸架案的判決中就明確指出，“陸地支配海洋”是國際法的一項(xiàng)基本原則，陸地是一個(gè)國家對(duì)其領(lǐng)土向海洋延伸的部分行使權(quán)力的法律淵源，也就是說擁有島嶼或者陸地主權(quán)才是一個(gè)國家擁有該陸地或島嶼附近海域主權(quán)權(quán)利和海洋權(quán)益的基礎(chǔ)。④國家海洋局政策研究室編：《國際海域劃界條約集》，北京：海洋出版社1989年，第79頁。按照傳統(tǒng)國際法對(duì)國家領(lǐng)土取得方式的認(rèn)定，只有先占、割讓、征服及添附這幾種方式，⑤杜蘅之：《國際法大綱（上冊）》，臺(tái)北：臺(tái)灣商務(wù)印書館1971年版，第216～217頁。并沒有通過取得大陸架或?qū)俳?jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)來確定島嶼歸屬的方式。所以，菲律賓沒有擁有南沙群島的主權(quán)卻要求仲裁庭對(duì)南海相關(guān)海域的權(quán)利進(jìn)行仲裁的訴求是十分荒謬的。

（二）菲律賓主張只有群島國才可適用“群島原則”，以割裂式的思維認(rèn)定南海部分島礁屬于不符合《公約》島嶼定義的巖礁、礁石，不可擁有專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)、毗連區(qū)甚至是領(lǐng)海

根據(jù)《公約》第四部分對(duì)群島國制度的規(guī)定，群島原則即群島國可以依據(jù)其在群島中確定的領(lǐng)海基點(diǎn)劃定直線群島基線，其領(lǐng)海、毗連區(qū)、專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)、大陸架的寬度應(yīng)從群島基線量起，群島基線所包圍的水域?yàn)槿簫u水域，群島國主權(quán)及于群島水域,但是其他國家在尊重群島國主權(quán)的前提下,在該水域也享有無害通過權(quán)、傳統(tǒng)捕魚權(quán)等權(quán)利。①《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》，下載于http://www.un.org/zh/law/sea/los/index.shtml，2017年3月22日。菲律賓屬于以群島為基本領(lǐng)土的國家，海洋資源的開發(fā)和利用決定了其國家未來的發(fā)展，出于其本國利益考量，菲律賓曾經(jīng)聯(lián)合印度尼西亞在1958年前后就主張建立一個(gè)專門適用于群島國家的組合制度。隨后菲律賓于1961年6月17日頒布《關(guān)于確定菲律賓領(lǐng)?；€的法案》，聲稱菲律賓群島周圍、各島之間和連接各島的全部水域，不論其寬度和面積如何，始終被視為菲律賓陸地領(lǐng)土的附屬物，構(gòu)成菲律賓內(nèi)陸和內(nèi)水水域的一部分。②海洋國際問題研究會(huì)編：《中國海洋鄰國海洋法規(guī)和協(xié)定選編》，北京：海洋出版社1984年，第60頁。也就是說菲律賓是以群島為中心劃定其領(lǐng)海，并用80段直線基線劃定了菲律賓的領(lǐng)?；€。所以說，菲律賓是在國際海洋法實(shí)踐中第一個(gè)提出群島理論概念的國家，而當(dāng)時(shí)的群島原則還沒有得到國際法和國際社會(huì)的承認(rèn)。在1973年第三次聯(lián)合國海洋法會(huì)議籌備委員會(huì)會(huì)議上，菲律賓、斐濟(jì)、印度尼西亞、毛里求斯四國首次聯(lián)合提出群島原則，但是它們反對(duì)將群島制度擴(kuò)大適用于大陸國家的遠(yuǎn)洋群島，并在隨后提出的《群島條文草案》第1條聲稱：“該群島條文草案只適用于群島國?！雹跲ffice for Ocean Af f airs and the Law of the Sea, Archipelagic States – Legislative History of Part IV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, New York: U.N. Publications, 1990, pp. 7～9.菲律賓等群島國認(rèn)為群島國設(shè)立群島制度可以更好地保護(hù)國家安全和經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，所以只有群島國在劃定領(lǐng)?；?qū)俳?jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)時(shí)才有適用群島制度的客觀需要。1982年出臺(tái)的《公約》對(duì)群島國的群島制度做了專門的規(guī)定，但是《公約》并沒有明確大陸國家的遠(yuǎn)洋群島問題，菲律賓想以《公約》作為大陸國家不適用群島制度的法律依據(jù)，這顯然是不合理的，因?yàn)榇箨憞业倪h(yuǎn)洋群島問題屬于《公約》中的法律空白，而法律未規(guī)定事項(xiàng)并不能當(dāng)然認(rèn)為是法律禁止事項(xiàng)，大陸國家適用群島原則也不當(dāng)然構(gòu)成違背《公約》義務(wù)或者濫用權(quán)利，更不是違反一般國際法規(guī)則或者原則，所以群島國基于政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)安全等理由主張群島原則，大陸國家遠(yuǎn)洋群島和群島國的群島在地理上并無差別，大陸國家也可以基于政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、安全等理由對(duì)其遠(yuǎn)洋群島適用群島原則。

由于南海地區(qū)地形復(fù)雜，大量巖礁難以定性為《公約》范疇內(nèi)的島嶼，而根據(jù)《公約》第121條第3款的規(guī)定，不符合《公約》島嶼定義的巖礁是不能依據(jù)其主張專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架的，但在群島制度體系之下，可以將群島內(nèi)的各個(gè)巖礁、島嶼作為一個(gè)整體，以群島整體為依據(jù)主張主權(quán)權(quán)利，作為一個(gè)整體的群島是由島嶼及其周圍的巖礁共同組成，同時(shí)，在群島制度下群島基線的運(yùn)用也將更多的水域劃入群島水域。菲律賓在仲裁申請中對(duì)南海部分島礁的法律性質(zhì)及法律地位進(jìn)行分別認(rèn)定，反對(duì)大陸國家適用群島制度，其根本目的就是想從島礁的性質(zhì)入手，割裂一個(gè)完整的南沙群島，企圖在南海地區(qū)人為地制造一些主權(quán)真空地帶，損害中國領(lǐng)土主權(quán)的完整性。其實(shí)菲律賓早已經(jīng)把南海地區(qū)的島礁視為群島，其在1978年6月11日發(fā)布的第1596號(hào)總統(tǒng)令和7月15日頒布的第1599號(hào)總統(tǒng)令中，將南沙群島的33個(gè)島礁、沙洲宣布為菲律賓領(lǐng)土，非法劃歸巴拉望省的一個(gè)獨(dú)立自治區(qū)，把這個(gè)范圍內(nèi)的島群命名為“卡拉延群島”，2009年3月10日，菲律賓又通過了“第9522號(hào)共和國法案”即“領(lǐng)海基線法”，為所謂的“卡拉延群島”與其他島嶼劃定了領(lǐng)海基線。①郭淵：《地緣政治與南海爭端》，北京：中國社會(huì)科學(xué)出版社2011年，第273～281頁。同時(shí)，針對(duì)菲律賓的訴求，仲裁庭其實(shí)也注意到菲律賓選取中國南沙部分島礁定性的行為是不合理的：“由于菲律賓的主張建立在中菲之間不存在專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)或大陸架的海洋權(quán)利的重疊上，仲裁庭認(rèn)為應(yīng)分析中國所主張的所有南海島礁的海洋權(quán)益，不管這些島礁是否目前由中國占領(lǐng)?！雹赥he Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, Award, 12 July 2016, para. 154, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf, 24 March 2017.

（三）菲律賓通過對(duì)南海島礁性質(zhì)進(jìn)行分別認(rèn)定來主張其所謂的“南海權(quán)益”，實(shí)際上想避開中菲雙方關(guān)于《公約》排除聲明的適用

2006年8月25日，中國根據(jù)《公約》第298條的規(guī)定向聯(lián)合國秘書長提交聲明，排除強(qiáng)制仲裁程序適用于海洋劃界、歷史性權(quán)利等海洋爭端。③中國根據(jù)《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》第298條提交排除性聲明，下載于http://wcm.fmprc. gov.cn/pub/chn/gxh/zlb/tyfg/t270754.htm，2017年3月24日。菲律賓不顧中國政府對(duì)于《公約》的排除性聲明申請強(qiáng)制仲裁。根據(jù)南海仲裁案的裁決書，菲律賓的第1～2項(xiàng)仲裁請求是訴請仲裁庭裁定中國的“斷續(xù)線”因違背《公約》的規(guī)定而不具備法律效力，從而否定中國在南海的主權(quán)及相關(guān)權(quán)利；第3～7項(xiàng)請求涉及黃巖島、美濟(jì)礁、仁愛礁、渚碧礁、西門礁、南薰礁等島礁的法律地位認(rèn)定問題，①The South China Sea Arbitration, p. 5, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf, 21 March 2017.這些仲裁請求表面上是菲律賓主張對(duì)其所謂“南海權(quán)利”的維護(hù)，實(shí)際上是針對(duì)海域劃界和島礁歸屬的問題。菲律賓也曾經(jīng)針對(duì)《公約》提出過排除性聲明，其于1982年12月10日公布的《菲律賓對(duì)于簽署1982年〈聯(lián)合國海洋法公約〉的宣言》第4條聲明：“該種簽署不應(yīng)該侵害或損害菲律賓運(yùn)用其主權(quán)權(quán)力于其領(lǐng)土之主權(quán)，例如卡拉延群島及其附屬之海域?！雹趨鞘看嬷骶帲骸赌虾栴}文獻(xiàn)匯編》，?？冢汉Ｄ铣霭嫔?001年，第234頁。顯然，菲律賓想要以“通過對(duì)南海部分島礁的性質(zhì)認(rèn)定來維護(hù)其在南海的合法權(quán)利”為幌子，證明其提起仲裁只是為了解決與中國在南海問題上的糾紛，不屬于超越仲裁庭審理范圍的領(lǐng)土主權(quán)爭端，這不僅是為了避開中國提出的排除性聲明，也是為了繞過菲律賓曾經(jīng)針對(duì)《公約》提出的排除性聲明。

二、中國態(tài)度：中國南沙群島是不可分割的群島

（一）仲裁庭對(duì)相關(guān)島礁的定性不能否定南海諸島的整體性

菲律賓在南海仲裁案中提出了對(duì)黃巖島、美濟(jì)礁、仁愛礁、渚碧礁、南薰礁、西門礁、赤瓜礁、華陽礁分別進(jìn)行定性的訴求，根據(jù)其訴求可以看出菲律賓對(duì)相關(guān)島礁性質(zhì)所持的態(tài)度（見表2）。菲律賓認(rèn)為判定屬于“低潮高地”的島礁不可以享有領(lǐng)海、專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架，并且不能通過占領(lǐng)或者其他方式取得主權(quán)，屬于“巖礁”的島礁不可以享有專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架，菲律賓企圖用化整為零的方式來否定南海諸島的整體性，從而否定中國在南海諸島及其附近海域的主權(quán)與管轄權(quán)。根據(jù)《公約》第13條的規(guī)定，因低潮高地在漲潮期間會(huì)淹沒在水中，不能與島嶼一樣擁有領(lǐng)海、專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)以及大陸架，也就是說，《公約》既沒有條文明確規(guī)定低潮高地不是領(lǐng)土，也沒有規(guī)定不能通過先占取得低潮高地的主權(quán)，只是規(guī)定低潮高地本身所能產(chǎn)生的海洋權(quán)利與島嶼有所區(qū)別，所以即使相關(guān)島礁被判定為“低潮高地”，也不意味著中國喪失了該島礁的領(lǐng)土主權(quán)。就巖礁而言，根據(jù)《公約》第121條第3款規(guī)定，巖礁應(yīng)該屬于一種特殊的島嶼，由于其不能維持人類居住或其本身的經(jīng)濟(jì)生活，所以不能享有專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架，但是卻可以享有領(lǐng)海。③《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》，下載于http://www.un.org/zh/law/sea/los/index.shtml，2017年3月22日?？梢?，《公約》并沒有給“巖礁”下具體定義，有關(guān)“維持人類居住或其本身的經(jīng)濟(jì)生活”的條件也沒有明確的規(guī)定，所以菲律賓訴求中的赤瓜礁、華陽礁的性質(zhì)無法依據(jù)《公約》納入“巖礁”。

《公約》第46條規(guī)定了對(duì)群島的要求，即在本質(zhì)上構(gòu)成一個(gè)地理、經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治的實(shí)體，或在歷史上已經(jīng)被視為這種實(shí)體。從歷史角度看，早在東漢時(shí)期楊孚《異物志》中記載的“漲海”就是中國古代對(duì)包括南海諸島在內(nèi)的南中國海的稱謂；到了宋代，對(duì)南沙群島、西沙群島采用了更加形象的稱呼，“長沙”、“千里長沙”、“萬里長沙”一般指的是西沙群島，“石塘”、“千里石塘”、“萬里石塘”一般指的是南沙群島。其后中國的歷代文獻(xiàn)及官方資料對(duì)西沙群島、南沙群島也均有記載，如明清廣東的地方志把“千里長沙”、“萬里石塘”列在疆域范圍之內(nèi)。①袁古潔：《國際海洋劃界的理論與實(shí)踐》，北京：法律出版社2001年，第224～225頁。從中國古代文獻(xiàn)記載中不難發(fā)現(xiàn)，中國歷史上一直把南海諸島視為一個(gè)整體，所以給南海諸島如西沙群島、南沙群島等整體命名。

從地理、政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)角度上看，南海是一個(gè)半封閉型的邊緣海，海內(nèi)分布著200多個(gè)島礁，根據(jù)它們與海平面的高度差可分為島嶼、沙洲、礁、暗沙和暗灘5種類型，其中露出海面的很少，大部分都是淹沒在水下，南海諸島就是這些島、洲、沙、灘、礁的總稱。南海海底為中國盆地，盆地的邊緣與四周陸地間，才有狹寬不一的大陸礁層，也就是說，南海諸島為一個(gè)獨(dú)立的地理單元，西沙、中沙、南沙和東沙群島各自又構(gòu)成了一個(gè)獨(dú)立的區(qū)域，形成了各自的大陸架區(qū)，所以菲律賓訴求中主要涉及的南沙群島可以說在地理上是自成一體的。②郭淵：《地緣政治與南海爭端》，北京：中國社會(huì)科學(xué)出版社2011年，第301～302頁。中國最早開發(fā)和經(jīng)營了南海諸島，早在明代時(shí)，就有中國漁民到南海諸島去捕撈和開發(fā)，漁民祖輩相傳留下的航海指南《更路簿》更是具體記載了中國漁民前往西沙和南沙群島的航程、航向等，證明了中國自明清以來就開發(fā)了南海諸島。20世紀(jì)70年代，廈門大學(xué)南洋研究所調(diào)查組經(jīng)過實(shí)地考察，在南沙群島的太平、中業(yè)、南威等島嶼上發(fā)現(xiàn)了明清時(shí)代漁民建立的水井、茅屋、石碑等。③韓振華主編：《我國南海諸島史料匯編》，上海：東方出版社1988年，第519頁。中國歷代政府從未停止過對(duì)南海諸島行使主權(quán)及行政管理，將南海諸島的長沙、石塘列入中國疆域管轄范圍之內(nèi)，新中國成立之后出版的地圖也都標(biāo)明南海諸島屬于中國，中國政府也多次發(fā)表聲明，重申中國對(duì)南沙群島、西沙群島的主權(quán)。1959年中國廣東省海南行政區(qū)公署在西沙群島的永興島設(shè)立西沙、南沙、中沙群島辦事處，履行中國對(duì)南海諸島的行政管轄權(quán)，1988年海南省將西沙群島、南沙群島、中沙群島的島礁及附近海域納入管轄范圍，2012年6月21日，經(jīng)中國國務(wù)院正式批準(zhǔn)，撤銷三沙辦事處，建立地級(jí)三沙市，政府駐西沙永興島?？梢?，南海諸島無論從自然地形上還是從歷史上看，都在本質(zhì)上構(gòu)成了一個(gè)地理、經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治的實(shí)體。

表2 菲律賓仲裁請求涉及的南海島礁

（二）國際法依據(jù)

1.大陸國家遠(yuǎn)洋群島可適用直線基線及歷史性權(quán)利的法律依據(jù)

1935年7月12日挪威發(fā)布國王赦令，宣布北緯66°28′48″以北的4海里海域?yàn)榕餐贊O區(qū)，根據(jù)該赦令，在挪威沿岸以及其外緣確定48個(gè)領(lǐng)?；c(diǎn)，并把這些基點(diǎn)用直線連接起來劃出挪威的領(lǐng)?；€。英國認(rèn)為挪威采取的直線基線劃法違背了國際法，并且此類基線的劃定會(huì)使一部分公海變?yōu)榕餐膶贊O區(qū)，雖然英挪兩國就此進(jìn)行多次談判但均未成功，因此英國于1949年向國際法院提起了訴訟。1951年12月18日，國際法院對(duì)“英挪漁業(yè)案”作出判決：挪威北部海岸地帶具有獨(dú)特的結(jié)構(gòu)且極為曲折，群山環(huán)抱中的峽灣和海灣的存在造成海岸線的斷續(xù)相間，沿岸還包含無數(shù)的島嶼、小島和干礁，形成了一個(gè)小島群（挪威稱之為“石壘”），也就說挪威海岸的陸地和海洋之間并沒有清晰的分界線，“石壘”的外界構(gòu)成了其海洋的邊界。國際法院認(rèn)為，領(lǐng)海帶必須沿著海岸的一般走向劃定，為了測算領(lǐng)海的寬度，國家實(shí)踐一般采用低潮線，因?yàn)檫@一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)對(duì)沿海國最為有利，并且清晰地體現(xiàn)了領(lǐng)海附屬于陸地領(lǐng)土的特點(diǎn)。但低潮線不是一成不變的，海岸輪廓的不規(guī)則加大了確定適用低潮線的復(fù)雜性，所以在海岸線極為曲折的地方，或者近鄰海岸有一系列島嶼，在劃定包括領(lǐng)海在內(nèi)的管轄海域時(shí)，可適用更實(shí)際的方法使領(lǐng)海帶的形狀更為簡明，即采用連結(jié)各適當(dāng)點(diǎn)的直線基線法，所以國際法院認(rèn)為挪威劃定的基線不違反國際法。①Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), pp. 127～130, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ fi les/5/1809.pdf, 28 March 2017.

“英挪漁業(yè)案”對(duì)厘清現(xiàn)有基線劃定方法的國際法規(guī)則起到了重要作用，案件結(jié)束后，挪威這種有別于傳統(tǒng)基線劃法卻又基于特殊地理情形的直線基線法也被各國廣泛采納。第三次聯(lián)合國海洋法會(huì)議的主席阿米拉辛格指出：“在英挪漁業(yè)案中國際法院考慮的是直線基線適用于海岸線極為曲折和海岸旁存在群島的情況，但同時(shí)國際法院也指出了領(lǐng)海法的一般原則，即領(lǐng)海帶必需沿著海岸線畫出，而這對(duì)遠(yuǎn)洋群島問題的解決能發(fā)揮一定的作用?！雹贑. F. Amerasinghe, The Problem of Archipelagoes in the International Law of the Sea, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 1974, p. 544.1958年第一次聯(lián)合國海洋法會(huì)議通過的四公約之一《領(lǐng)海及毗連區(qū)公約》第4條明確規(guī)定了接近海岸的一系列島嶼劃定直線基線的方法，“英挪漁業(yè)案”的判決可以說是《領(lǐng)海及毗連區(qū)公約》確定直線基線法的基礎(chǔ)?！坝⑴矟O業(yè)案”中國際法院也考量了挪威在該海域的歷史性權(quán)利問題，認(rèn)為挪威當(dāng)?shù)鼐用癜倌陙硗耆蕾嚧说貪O業(yè)生活形成了歷史性權(quán)益，挪威的劃界方式符合國際法的規(guī)定。應(yīng)當(dāng)說，該案也可以為中國主張南海斷續(xù)線內(nèi)歷史性權(quán)利提供國際法層面的支持。格林·菲爾德認(rèn)為，中國破碎的海岸以及眾多島嶼的地理特征說明中國有資格適用直線基線，而這似乎也符合“英挪漁業(yè)案”所體現(xiàn)的原則。③Jeanette Green Field, China’s Practice in the Law of the Sea, Gloucestershire: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 72.所以，從法律角度來看，雖然《公約》只規(guī)定了“群島國的群島制度”，并未規(guī)定大陸國家的群島制度構(gòu)建，但是國際法院關(guān)于“英挪漁業(yè)案”的判決及《領(lǐng)海與毗連區(qū)公約》第4條為大陸國家遠(yuǎn)洋群島采用直線基線提供了法律依據(jù)。

2.大陸國家遠(yuǎn)洋群島適用直線基線的他國實(shí)踐

布朗利對(duì)國家實(shí)踐的種類作出了如下列舉：外交文書、政策聲明、新聞發(fā)布、國家立法、國際和國內(nèi)司法判例、條約和其他國際文件的內(nèi)容、聯(lián)合國大會(huì)有關(guān)

法律問題的決議等。①賈兵兵：《國際公法：和平時(shí)期的解釋與適用》，北京：清華大學(xué)出版社2015年，第32～33頁。通過對(duì)一些典型國家關(guān)于遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度方面資料的整理（見表3），發(fā)現(xiàn)很多大陸國家在其遠(yuǎn)洋群島采用的直線基線在《公約》生效之前就已經(jīng)存在，還有一部分國家是采用混合基線制度，在《公約》生效之后，仍然維持原有立法或依據(jù)《公約》采用新的立法形式確定在遠(yuǎn)洋群島適用直線基線，這證明了大陸國家在遠(yuǎn)洋群島采用直線基線是穩(wěn)定的國家實(shí)踐行為。

表3 典型國家建立群島制度的實(shí)踐

混合基線法（羅丹群麥島）就基劃線定與法正羅常群基島線的相領(lǐng)結(jié)海合基的線劃選界定方了法10基，用海了里直。線，領(lǐng)個(gè)海點(diǎn)寬度采121.1959年年年44月月20030162724日日第第令第第130號(hào)號(hào)法法令令2.1963 156 3.1999第45號(hào)法4.2002 年年月月日日240號(hào)號(hào)法法令令5.2002 306亞（速葡爾萄群牙島）亞速部速爾分爾群單群島獨(dú)島分作的為為基三一線個(gè)個(gè)是部完由分整正，的常一整基共體線設(shè)分和定別直了適線29基個(gè)線領(lǐng)劃海定基的點(diǎn)，，將每亞個(gè)用直線基線。1985年11月29日495/85號(hào)法令

很多國家不僅在國內(nèi)法上明確表示在遠(yuǎn)洋群島上適用直線基線，還向聯(lián)合國秘書長遞交了照會(huì)。2011年3月9日，厄瓜多爾政府向聯(lián)合國秘書長遞交照會(huì)，要求記錄和宣傳其2010年8月2日頒布的第450號(hào)執(zhí)行法令，該法令附有2010年7月12日部長級(jí)協(xié)議0081和清楚地顯示厄瓜多爾加拉帕戈斯洋中群島直線基線的海圖IOA42。②洪農(nóng)、李建偉、陳平平：《群島國概念和南（中國）?！绰?lián)合國海洋法公約〉、國家實(shí)踐及其啟示》，載于《中國海洋法學(xué)評(píng)論》2013年第1期，第193頁。葡萄牙2011年5月向大陸架界限委員會(huì)提交了外大陸架提案，其提交的附圖明確顯示了其實(shí)踐中混合使用了直線基線和正?；€。印度政府2009年5月11日的政府第736號(hào)公報(bào)闡述了在拉克沙群島適用直線基線，同時(shí)印度于2010年1月29日向聯(lián)合國秘書長交存該群島的領(lǐng)?；c(diǎn)坐標(biāo)和海圖。③M.Z.N.76.2010.LOS of 17 February 2010, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/mzn_s/mzn76ef.pdf, 29 April 2017.

3.中國的國內(nèi)法規(guī)定及在西沙群島的國家實(shí)踐

中國在西沙群島的實(shí)踐也早于《公約》的存在，所以中國的國家實(shí)踐并非是援引《公約》第7條作為國際法依據(jù)。新中國成立之后，中國政府于1958年公布了《關(guān)于領(lǐng)海的聲明》，確定中國的領(lǐng)海寬度為12海里，采用直線基線法劃定領(lǐng)海，并說明了領(lǐng)海制度適用于臺(tái)灣及南海諸島，用政府聲明的形式確認(rèn)了南海諸島及其水域自古以來就是中國的海洋國土。1973年中國代表團(tuán)向聯(lián)合國海底委員會(huì)提出的《關(guān)于國家管轄范圍內(nèi)海域的工作文件》指出：“島嶼相互距離較近的群島或列島，可視為一個(gè)整體，劃定領(lǐng)海的范圍?！雹苴w理海：《關(guān)于南海諸島的若干法律問題》，載于《法制與社會(huì)發(fā)展》1995年第4期，第56～57頁。1992年中國政府制訂了《領(lǐng)海及毗連區(qū)法》，在第2條具體列舉屬于中國的群島和島嶼，以立法的形式再次重申和確認(rèn)了南海諸島為中國的固有領(lǐng)土，為南沙群島領(lǐng)?；€的確定做了法律上的充分準(zhǔn)備。1996年5月15日中國頒布《中國政府關(guān)于領(lǐng)?；€的聲明》，宣布中國大陸領(lǐng)海的部分基線和西沙群島的領(lǐng)海基線，在第二部分中標(biāo)明了西沙群島的28個(gè)領(lǐng)?；c(diǎn)，也就是說，中國將西沙群島視為統(tǒng)一的整體，用直線基線將西沙群島的領(lǐng)?；c(diǎn)連接起來，構(gòu)成西沙群島的領(lǐng)?；€。

三、在南海地區(qū)構(gòu)建遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度的意義

（一）從群島的整體性角度劃界，明晰中國在南海的主權(quán)

南海諸島數(shù)量龐大。以存在爭議最多的南沙群島為例，雖然其島嶼眾多，但平時(shí)露出水面的僅有36個(gè)，高潮時(shí)露出水面的也只有25個(gè)，如果對(duì)南沙群島的單個(gè)島礁進(jìn)行界定，很難符合《公約》第121條島嶼的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，還會(huì)導(dǎo)致國際社會(huì)對(duì)該島礁的法律地位產(chǎn)生質(zhì)疑，從而使中國在南海的管轄水域受到限縮，也就是說，該島礁將很難獲取專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)、大陸架甚至是領(lǐng)海。為南海諸島中的每個(gè)島礁單獨(dú)劃基線只會(huì)使中國在南海地區(qū)的領(lǐng)海范圍被分割，領(lǐng)海與公?？v橫交錯(cuò)在一起，中國在南海地區(qū)的主權(quán)范圍就更加模糊。在南海地區(qū)構(gòu)建遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度，就可以從群島的整體性角度進(jìn)行劃界，把南海地區(qū)的島礁視為若干獨(dú)立的群島并確定群島基點(diǎn)及劃定領(lǐng)海基線，不僅可以緩解島礁性質(zhì)在主權(quán)爭議中的尷尬地位，還可以明晰中國在南海的主權(quán)范圍，其影響和意義極為重大。

（二）有效解決中菲南海爭端

中菲南海爭端主要就是針對(duì)島礁主權(quán)歸屬及海域劃界的爭端。菲律賓的領(lǐng)?；€是依據(jù)群島原則劃定的，以群島為中心，把位于群島外緣島嶼之外，但是在條約界線之內(nèi)的全部水域稱作菲律賓的領(lǐng)海，而所謂的“條約邊界線”是指1989年《美西巴黎條約》、1900年《美西華盛頓條約》以及1930年《英美條約》中所提到的全部水域所構(gòu)成的菲律賓領(lǐng)海的外部界限。菲律賓這種領(lǐng)?；€的劃法等于把群島中各島嶼之間的大片公海海域變成了本國的管轄水域，并把基線內(nèi)的整個(gè)海域變?yōu)閮?nèi)水。菲律賓還將群島基線立法，并從群島基線劃出專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架，不僅將中國在南沙群島的33個(gè)島礁、沙洲、沙灘劃為菲屬島嶼，其專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)的外部界線還侵入了中國的傳統(tǒng)疆界線。為了維護(hù)菲律賓所謂的“南海主權(quán)”，菲律賓一方面反對(duì)中國這樣的大陸國家在其遠(yuǎn)洋群島上構(gòu)建群島制度，其理由是只有由島嶼組成的國家才能適用群島制度，并且《公約》沒有規(guī)定大陸國家可以適用群島制度。另一方面，菲律賓提出對(duì)南海部分島礁分別進(jìn)行定性，那么如果南沙群島中的一些島礁被界定為巖礁或低潮高地，將會(huì)對(duì)中菲的海洋劃界產(chǎn)生重要影響，中國將無法依據(jù)這些島礁在南海主張專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架，菲律賓的目的就在于通過否定南海諸島的整體性，限縮中國在南海的主權(quán)范圍從而給菲律賓非法占領(lǐng)南海島礁披上“合法”的外衣。雖然《公約》沒有明確規(guī)定大陸國家可以劃定群島基線，但是《公約》也沒有否定大陸國家可以為其遠(yuǎn)洋群島構(gòu)建群島制度，大陸國家可以為其遠(yuǎn)離大陸的群島劃定直線基線，基線內(nèi)的水域是內(nèi)水或者是領(lǐng)海，而不是群島水域。中國也可以采用直線基線的方法圍繞南海中的島群劃定群島基線，在群島制度之下的巖礁、礁石等與島嶼共同組成了一個(gè)群島，海洋劃界時(shí)應(yīng)作為一個(gè)整體來看。所以中國可以通過構(gòu)建遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度對(duì)南海島礁行使絕對(duì)主權(quán)，從而粉碎菲律賓企圖侵占中國南海島礁的陰謀。

（三）沖破美國的島鏈封鎖

南海的地理位置極端重要，不僅是溝通印度洋和太平洋的重要海上通道，還是連通大洋洲和亞洲大陸的交通要沖。美國制訂的“島鏈戰(zhàn)略”是其亞太戰(zhàn)略的重要組成部分，依照亞太地區(qū)海上地形特點(diǎn)，又分為第一島鏈和第二島鏈，目的是為了封鎖中俄等國家的海上之路。南海是美國第一島鏈的一個(gè)重要支點(diǎn)，其與朝鮮半島相呼應(yīng)，構(gòu)成所謂的“新月防線”，從海上構(gòu)成對(duì)中國的圍堵封鎖，所以南海在美國的“島鏈戰(zhàn)略”中具有極為重要的位置。南海只要不在中國控制之下，美國就可以依據(jù)第一島鏈全面封鎖中國；反之，“新月防線”將不復(fù)存在，美國制訂的“島鏈戰(zhàn)略”將被打破，美國在亞太地區(qū)的防線只能被迫退回第二島鏈。菲律賓因其綜合國力孱弱，為了維護(hù)其在南海的所謂“主權(quán)”，實(shí)現(xiàn)其在南海的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)，千方百計(jì)的拉攏域外大國介入南海爭端。美國則支持菲律賓侵占中國的島礁，希望通過菲律賓牽制中國，否定中國在南海地區(qū)擁有的主權(quán)，從而維護(hù)其“島鏈戰(zhàn)略”。此外，亞太地區(qū)提供的大部分原料的進(jìn)口都要通過南海航線進(jìn)入美國，如果南海的海上貿(mào)易通道受到破壞，會(huì)使美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展受到影響，同時(shí)還將阻斷日本大部分的石油和天然氣進(jìn)口。所以美國多次聲稱，其在南海地區(qū)的利益訴求主要是保持南海國際航道的暢通，而中國政府也在各種場合多次明確表示，中國維護(hù)南沙群島的主權(quán)和海洋權(quán)益并不會(huì)影響外國船舶和飛機(jī)根據(jù)國際法所享有的航行自由和飛越自由。

在南海構(gòu)建遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度，中國在劃定領(lǐng)海基線并主張相應(yīng)的海域權(quán)利時(shí)可將群島作為整體來看待，從而有力回?fù)裘婪评谩豆s》的空白否定與質(zhì)疑中國在南海的主權(quán)。同時(shí)，中國還可以借鑒《公約》的規(guī)定，在相關(guān)水域設(shè)定無害通過權(quán)及群島海道通過權(quán)，中國劃分出來以供外國船舶自由通行的航運(yùn)水道必然是由主權(quán)國多方綜合考量，且能夠安全航行的水道，中國對(duì)這些水道的管理和維護(hù)，也會(huì)有利于國際航運(yùn)的安全，這樣既保證了中國在該區(qū)域的絕對(duì)主權(quán)，又可以保障他國船只在該區(qū)域的自由航行和安全。可以說，在南海地區(qū)構(gòu)建遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度不僅可以維護(hù)中國在南海的主權(quán)，還可以突破美國對(duì)中國的島鏈封鎖。

（四）推動(dòng)現(xiàn)行海洋法規(guī)則的發(fā)展

自1982年《公約》誕生已經(jīng)走過了30多年，雖然其確立了人類利用和管理內(nèi)水、領(lǐng)海、毗連區(qū)、大陸架、專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)等海洋區(qū)域的基本法律框架，但是在群島制度方面的規(guī)定卻存在諸多缺陷，《公約》規(guī)定的群島制度是妥協(xié)的產(chǎn)物，由于一些國家的反對(duì)，《公約》在起草過程中擱置了關(guān)于大陸國家遠(yuǎn)洋群島的爭議，許多國際法學(xué)者都坦誠指出，《公約》回避大陸國家遠(yuǎn)洋群島能否適用群島制度問題是政治和外交因素影響的結(jié)果。①卜凌嘉、黃靖文：《大陸國家在其遠(yuǎn)洋群島適用直線基線問題》，載于《中山大學(xué)法律評(píng)論》2013年第2輯，第110頁。隨著越來越多的國家已經(jīng)將直線基線運(yùn)用于本國的遠(yuǎn)洋群島海域劃定，《公約》還停留在1982年的共識(shí)之上，未能根據(jù)國家實(shí)踐及國際慣例的變化及時(shí)調(diào)整。菲律賓出于本國的利益，背離《公約》原則與精神，對(duì)《公約》進(jìn)行惡意解釋，抓住并利用《公約》的妥協(xié)性和滯后性為自己的侵占事實(shí)尋找所謂的“國際法依據(jù)”，更加激化了南海地區(qū)的爭端。法律常常以既往的傳統(tǒng)為基礎(chǔ)逐漸地發(fā)生變化，而不是發(fā)生根本性的變化。一些價(jià)值觀念最初也是通過不具有約束力的“軟法”得到表達(dá)，轉(zhuǎn)而影響公共輿論、政治議程以及填補(bǔ)條約法中的空白。各國顯然不會(huì)就所有新的海洋問題展開正式談判，這樣《公約》所帶有的精心設(shè)計(jì)的修正②《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》第155條和第312～314條，下載于http://www.un.org/zh/law/sea/ los/index.shtml，2017年3月22日。機(jī)制就很難得到運(yùn)用，在這種情況下，通過處理具體海洋問題的全新區(qū)域性或全球性條約、國家實(shí)踐、政府間組織的實(shí)踐則會(huì)推動(dòng)海洋法新規(guī)則的建立。中國把從《公約》群島國制度引申出來的大陸國家遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度用于南海島礁，并非只關(guān)注本國在南海地區(qū)的主權(quán)和主權(quán)權(quán)利，而是努力探尋各國在南海地區(qū)存在激烈爭端的根源，以此為基礎(chǔ)提出切實(shí)可行的解決方案。中國在遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度框架下，在南海地區(qū)尋求與各相關(guān)國家和平解決爭端，合作共贏，積極探索，為推動(dòng)國際海洋規(guī)則的發(fā)展作出貢獻(xiàn)。

四、針對(duì)中菲南海仲裁所涉南沙群島的群島制度構(gòu)建建議

（一）南沙群島的基線劃定

中國在南沙群島劃定基線應(yīng)該依據(jù)大量國家實(shí)踐的慣常做法，即以直線基線的方法來劃定。南沙群島也滿足適用直線基線的條件，原因包括三點(diǎn)：第一，從地理上看，根據(jù)國際法院對(duì)于“英挪漁業(yè)案”的判決，劃定直線基線的地理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)為“海岸極為曲折”或者“海岸臨近一個(gè)群島”，眾多島礁構(gòu)成的南沙群島其輪廓極為曲折，符合國際法院 “海岸極為曲折”的條件；第二，國際法院認(rèn)為，領(lǐng)海帶必須沿著海岸的一般走向劃定，由于基線內(nèi)的海域必須充分接近陸地領(lǐng)土，使其受內(nèi)水制度支配，中國選擇在南沙群島適用直線基線就是為了尊重海岸、島嶼的自然輪廓，充分考慮南沙群島的自然地理走向；第三，南海仲裁案中菲律賓提出的“單島定性”，實(shí)際上忽略了我國南沙群島的整體性，從地理、經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治的角度來看，組成南沙群島的島、礁、沙、灘以及相連的水域已經(jīng)在本質(zhì)上構(gòu)成一個(gè)實(shí)體，或在歷史上已被視為這種實(shí)體。①鄭雨晨：《大陸國家的洋中群島制度的演變及其對(duì)我國南海諸島的影響》（碩士論文），北京：外交學(xué)院2016年版，第34頁。南沙群島已被視為一個(gè)整體且已經(jīng)得到了國際法學(xué)界和國際社會(huì)的認(rèn)可。目前已公布的遠(yuǎn)洋群島的基線劃定均遵循了整體性原則，對(duì)于這一問題，中國也以立法的形式在《關(guān)于國家管轄范圍內(nèi)海域的工作文件》②《關(guān)于國家管轄范圍內(nèi)海域的工作文件》第1條第6款：“島嶼相互距離較近的群島或列島，可視為一個(gè)整體，劃定領(lǐng)海范圍。”中對(duì)群島的整體性做出了確認(rèn)，1992年2月25日通過的《中華人民共和國領(lǐng)海及毗連區(qū)法》也再次確認(rèn)采用直線基線法劃定南海各群島的領(lǐng)海基線。

針對(duì)直線基線的合理適用問題，若以南沙群島為整體并連接外緣島礁適當(dāng)?shù)幕c(diǎn)來劃定直線領(lǐng)?；€容易導(dǎo)致基線內(nèi)海域過大，對(duì)周邊國家包括航行自由、海洋資源開采等多方面海洋利益產(chǎn)生影響，從而招致他國的非議。由于南沙島礁眾多且情況復(fù)雜，雖然將其視為一個(gè)整體，但在劃定基線時(shí)可對(duì)整個(gè)群島進(jìn)行分割，以多個(gè)群礁的方式劃定基線，并且不將基線內(nèi)的全部水域都定性成“內(nèi)水”。

（二）充分做好構(gòu)建群島制度的法律準(zhǔn)備，順應(yīng)海洋權(quán)益法制化的潮流

海洋法是平衡各國海洋權(quán)益的基礎(chǔ)，《公約》規(guī)定了各國管理和利用海洋的法律框架。在當(dāng)前的形勢下，各國海洋權(quán)益的維護(hù)日趨法制化，國家間海洋爭端的解決都離不開完備的海洋法制。此外，《公約》也不是一個(gè)靜態(tài)不變的法律體系，需要在實(shí)踐中不斷完善。我國也必須順應(yīng)這一潮流，充分利用法律武器來維護(hù)自身的海洋權(quán)益。《公約》作為一部通過各國協(xié)商一致達(dá)成的“海洋憲章”，難免有妥協(xié)和折中的內(nèi)容，為了照顧各方面的利益，《公約》中的一些條文規(guī)定模棱兩可，處于不同立場或利益的國家可以從不同角度進(jìn)行解釋。因此，中國需要加強(qiáng)對(duì)《公約》的研究與應(yīng)用，力求在實(shí)施過程中用好用足其法律制度，如對(duì)南海斷續(xù)線法律地位的研究及明確中國的歷史性所有權(quán)，在法理上找到有力根據(jù)，以求和平解決問題。雖然中國的海洋法律體系已經(jīng)初步建立，但還存在很多問題和不足。比如中國1996年頒布的《中華人民共和國政府關(guān)于中華人民共和國領(lǐng)海基線的聲明》雖然宣布了大陸領(lǐng)海的部分基線和西沙群島的領(lǐng)?；€，并提出了中國政府將會(huì)再行宣布中華人民共和國其余的領(lǐng)?；€，但是迄今二十年過去了，海陽島到成山頭的基線以及南海其他群島的基線仍未公布，而很多擁有遠(yuǎn)洋群島的大陸國家早在《公約》出臺(tái)之前就已經(jīng)頒布實(shí)施了相關(guān)法律。不難發(fā)現(xiàn)，中國的海洋立法存在明顯滯后性，而《公約》的貫徹和執(zhí)行必須依賴國內(nèi)法制建設(shè)，可以說，《公約》的成敗與否很大程度上取決于一國的法制建設(shè)水平。近年來，無論國內(nèi)還是國際層面，海洋格局和權(quán)益都發(fā)生了巨大變化，所以應(yīng)該針對(duì)新情況、新問題，通過國內(nèi)立法完善和細(xì)化《公約》中不明確、不具體、甚至不完善的條款（正如大陸國家的遠(yuǎn)洋群島制度），真正建立起完善的海洋法律體系，在開發(fā)海洋、利用海洋、維護(hù)中國海洋權(quán)益方面做到有法可依，才能最大限度地維護(hù)中國對(duì)南海諸島的主權(quán)。此外，中國還應(yīng)該積極參與聯(lián)合國關(guān)于海洋方面的國際法規(guī)討論和制定，積極參加國際學(xué)術(shù)會(huì)議，讓世界了解中國的立場和觀點(diǎn)，讓國際海洋法規(guī)能夠反映中國合理的權(quán)益訴求。

（三）新形勢下中國對(duì)于中菲南海爭端的策略思考

菲律賓與中國的南海主權(quán)爭端一直都比較激烈，近年來在域外大國的支持下，菲律賓在南海問題上不斷挑戰(zhàn)中國。隨著2016年6月30日，杜特爾特當(dāng)選新一任的菲律賓總統(tǒng)，就任后打破阿基諾三世時(shí)期推行的親美政策，推行“不依賴美國”的獨(dú)立外交政策，雖然其依然承認(rèn)南海仲裁的結(jié)果，但對(duì)通過國際仲裁解決南海問題不抱希望，多次強(qiáng)調(diào)不會(huì)與中國發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭，愿意與中國通過合資的方式共同開發(fā)南海油氣資源，并歡迎中國幫助菲律賓改善基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。①Duterte Favors Making Deal with China over Dispute, at http://globalnation.inquirer. net/138487/duterte-favors-making-deal-china-dispute, 31 March 2017.杜特爾特政府雖然不大可能距離美國遠(yuǎn)一點(diǎn)，但是不難發(fā)現(xiàn)其策略轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槿绾卧诓坏米锩绹耐瑫r(shí)與中國修好，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)兩頭通吃，既享受美國提供的安全保障，又搭上中國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的快車。②張潔：《南海博弈：美菲軍事同盟與中菲關(guān)系的調(diào)整》，載于《太平洋學(xué)報(bào)》2016年第7期，第33頁。去年10月杜特爾特總統(tǒng)訪問中國期間，中菲兩國元首達(dá)成了妥善處理南海問題的重要共識(shí)，雙方重回對(duì)話協(xié)商妥善處理南海問題的正確軌道。③2017年3月30日外交部發(fā)言人陸慷主持例行記者會(huì)，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ fyrbt_673021/t1450196.shtml，2017年3月30日。《中菲雙方聯(lián)合聲明》專門就南海問題進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)闡述，并在第40條④《中華人民共和國與菲律賓共和國聯(lián)合聲明》第40條：“雙方就涉及南海的問題交換了看法。雙方重申?duì)幾h問題不是中菲雙邊關(guān)系的全部。雙方就以適當(dāng)方式處理南海爭議的重要性交換了意見。雙方重申維護(hù)及促進(jìn)和平穩(wěn)定、在南海的航行和飛越自由的重要性，根據(jù)包括《聯(lián)合國憲章》和1982年《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》在內(nèi)公認(rèn)的國際法原則，不訴諸武力或以武力相威脅，由直接有關(guān)的主權(quán)國家通過友好磋商和談判，以和平方式解決領(lǐng)土和管轄權(quán)爭議?！敝忻鞔_提出“由直接有關(guān)的主權(quán)國家通過友好磋商和談判，以和平方式解決領(lǐng)土和管轄權(quán)爭議”，這就等于以政府文件的形式進(jìn)一步固化了雙方的官方立場，可以說，中菲關(guān)系目前出現(xiàn)了歷史性的轉(zhuǎn)圜。但就目前形勢來說，由于主權(quán)問題中菲分歧較大，短時(shí)間內(nèi)中菲恐怕很難達(dá)成協(xié)議，但如果要等到爭議解決之后才能進(jìn)行合作，那么合作就永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)存在，相對(duì)而言，“擱置爭議，共同開發(fā)”作為中菲南海爭端的臨時(shí)解決方法是較為現(xiàn)實(shí)可行的，中國也應(yīng)針對(duì)新情況對(duì)“擱置爭議，共同開發(fā)”戰(zhàn)略進(jìn)行新思考。

首先，促進(jìn)“擱置爭議，共同開發(fā)”原則的具體化?！赌虾８鞣叫袆?dòng)宣言》在某種意義上可以說是“擱置爭議，共同開發(fā)”的體現(xiàn)，但是并不具有法律約束力，缺乏可供操作的具體內(nèi)容，這樣各國就會(huì)根據(jù)本國的利益需求，產(chǎn)生不同的理解或主張。2016年《中菲雙方聯(lián)合聲明》第41條表明：“雙方承諾全面、有效落實(shí)《南海各方行動(dòng)宣言》，愿共同努力在協(xié)商一致基礎(chǔ)上早日達(dá)成‘南海各方行為準(zhǔn)則’。”①《中華人民共和國與菲律賓共和國聯(lián)合聲明》第41條：“雙方回顧了2002年《南海各方行為宣言》和2016年7月25日于老撾萬象通過的中國－東盟外長關(guān)于全面有效落實(shí)《宣言》的聲明。雙方承諾全面、有效落實(shí)《宣言》，愿共同努力在協(xié)商一致基礎(chǔ)上早日達(dá)成‘南海行為準(zhǔn)則’?！薄赌虾８鞣叫袨闇?zhǔn)則》是對(duì)《南海各方行動(dòng)宣言》的具體落實(shí)，《中菲雙方聯(lián)合聲明》充分表明了中菲兩國就南海問題坦誠交換意見，并贊同以和平友好協(xié)商的方式尋求問題的妥善解決。具體到南沙群島問題，在擱置島礁主權(quán)爭議的前提下，共同開發(fā)是在實(shí)行劃界前的過渡期內(nèi)，在不損害雙方主權(quán)立場、法律立場的情況下進(jìn)行的合作。中菲兩國需要以協(xié)議的方式共同勘探和開采主權(quán)爭議區(qū)域內(nèi)的礦產(chǎn)資源，共享開發(fā)收益，而在南沙海域沒有爭議的油氣富集地區(qū)，中國應(yīng)當(dāng)盡快展開勘探開發(fā)，建立起鉆井平臺(tái)和采油平臺(tái)，顯示存在，為后續(xù)的相關(guān)國家實(shí)踐奠定基礎(chǔ)。②薛桂芳：《藍(lán)色的較量——維護(hù)我國海洋權(quán)益的大博弈》，北京：中國政法大學(xué)出版社2015年版，第265頁。中國仍然堅(jiān)持南海諸島的主權(quán)，時(shí)刻保持對(duì)南海問題的關(guān)注和研究，以期在穩(wěn)定、和諧、互信的良好氛圍中，早日和平解決中菲南海爭端。

其次，應(yīng)該努力消除實(shí)現(xiàn)“擱置爭議，共同開發(fā)”的障礙。中菲在南海問題上的信息不對(duì)稱是實(shí)現(xiàn)“擱置爭議，共同開發(fā)”的最大障礙，彼此互相防范導(dǎo)致在對(duì)抗中不斷加碼，因此雙方未能擱置爭議，反而爭議不斷，各自開發(fā)。中菲南海爭端的解決，需要雙方建立和保持暢通的溝通渠道，使各方在南海問題上的信息透明。根據(jù)2016年《中菲兩國的聯(lián)合聲明》第42條③《中華人民共和國與菲律賓共和國聯(lián)合聲明》第42條：“雙方同意繼續(xù)商談建立信心措施，提升互信和信心，并承諾在南海采取行動(dòng)方面保持自我克制，以免使?fàn)幾h復(fù)雜化、擴(kuò)大化和影響和平與穩(wěn)定。鑒此，在作為其他機(jī)制的補(bǔ)充，不損及其他機(jī)制基礎(chǔ)上，建立一個(gè)雙邊磋商機(jī)制是有益的，雙方可就涉及南海的各自當(dāng)前及其他關(guān)切進(jìn)行定期磋商。雙方同意探討在其他領(lǐng)域開展合作?！钡囊?guī)定，中菲之間將建立一個(gè)專門針對(duì)南海問題定期舉行會(huì)晤的雙邊磋商談判機(jī)制，并且雙方同意探討在其他領(lǐng)域開展合作。中菲定期磋商機(jī)制的建立，將會(huì)增進(jìn)雙方了解相互之間有關(guān)南海問題的立場、觀點(diǎn)，形成雙方積極互動(dòng)的局面，通過對(duì)話縮小分歧，從而減少雙方的戰(zhàn)略誤判。總之，通過對(duì)話協(xié)商來解決爭端，中菲兩國的國家利益必定會(huì)得到最大限度的實(shí)現(xiàn)。

五、結(jié) 論

自2012年4月“黃巖島”事件以來，菲律賓便揚(yáng)言要將“黃巖島”事件提交國際海洋法法庭，目的是想使南海爭端國際化，借此贏得國際輿論的支持。同時(shí)，菲律賓還企圖對(duì)中國南沙部分島礁進(jìn)行“單島定性”，使中國在南海地區(qū)的四大群島被完全肢解開來，從而否定中國在南海地區(qū)的主權(quán)與管轄權(quán)。由于大陸國家構(gòu)建遠(yuǎn)洋群島法律制度在先例、國家實(shí)踐、法理基礎(chǔ)等方面均有著充分的依據(jù)，所以中國應(yīng)當(dāng)盡快在南海地區(qū)構(gòu)建遠(yuǎn)洋群島法律制度，從而更好地維護(hù)中國的海洋權(quán)益。

During China’s historically development and exploitation of the islands in the South China Sea (SCS), no States had ever raised any challenges to China’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over these islands. China has, both historically and jurisprudentially, indisputable sovereignty over the SCS Islands and their adjacent sea areas. The Philippines alleged that it had sovereignty and sovereign rights over some islands in the SCS; however, prior to the mid-20th century, no legal instruments or speeches of government leaders contain words telling that the territory of the Philippines includes the SCS Islands of China. The strategic and military significances of the SCS was hugely raised by the gradual discovery of rich oil, gas, living, space, and tourism resources in the SCS since the mid-20th century. Additionally to that, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the “UNCLOS” or the “Convention”) entered into force in 1994, and the political landscapes of the Asian Pacif i c Region were altered. All these intrigued the Philippines to cast its covetous eyes on the Nansha Islands. Since 1970s, the Philippines successively sent troops to encroach upon the Nansha Islands by force, and illegally occupied nine features of China’s Nansha Islands (see Table 1).

On 22 January 2013, the Philippines, disregarding the strong protests from China, unilaterally initiated a compulsory arbitral procedure against China, which challenged the legitimacy of China’s claims to rights in the SCS waters. In this arbitration, the Philippines requested to def i ne the nature of some islands in the SCS individually, attempting to disintegrate the SCS Islands, and further make China unable to protect its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the SCS region as a whole. On 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted for the arbitration (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal”) released the fi nal award, denying China’s sovereign rights, jurisdiction and historic rights within the “dashed-line”in the SCS. When reviewing the status of some islands or rocks, the Tribunal held that the UNCLOS did not provide for a group of islands such as the Nansha Islands to generate maritime zones collectively as a unit.①Eleventh Press Release, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), p. 10, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf, 21 March 2017.Facing the Philippines’aggressive attacks, it is necessary for China to discuss, jurisprudentially, the status of the Nansha Islands as a group of islands (archipelago), and establish a regime of archipelago, so as to expose and criticize the Philippines’ malicious intent tofragmentize the Nansha Islands.

Table 1 Features of the Nansha Islands Illegally Occupied by the Philippines

I. Refutation Against the Philippines’ Proposal to“Fragmentize” Some Islands in the SCS Arbitration

A. The Philippines Intended to Cut of f, Using the UNCLOS as a Tool, the Link between the Sovereignty and Maritime Rights of the Nansha Islands, and Further to Totally Vitiate China’s Sovereignty in the SCS

On 12 July 2016, the Tribunal released the fi nal award for the SCS Arbitration. The Philippines raised 15 Submissions in the arbitral procedure. Among them, Submission No. 2 concerns China’s “dashed-line” in the SCS. The Philippines alleged that China’s claims to rights with respect to the maritime areas of the SCS encompassed by the “dashed line” were contrary to the UNCLOS, and therefore requested the Tribunal to decide that such claims were without lawful effect. In doing so, the Philippines attempted to fundamentally deny all of China’s rights in the SCS. This submission is rather absurd, because the essence of the subjectmatter of the arbitration was beyond the scope of the UNCLOS, which cannot beinvoked as the legal basis to settle the disputes between the Philippines and China.①Eleventh Press Release, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), p. 6, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf, 21 March 2017.The Preamble of the UNCLOS states: “establish through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans …matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.” That is to say, since the UNCLOS contains no provisions concerning the dispute over territorial sovereignty, the settlement of disputes over islands should be governed by the rules of general international law. Oppenheim’s International Law notes, “Custom is the oldest and the original source of international law as well as of law in general.” And “l(fā)ex prospicit non respicit”has become a rule of customary law for a long time, and was widely acknowledged in the international community. In accordance with general international law, the customary law will have a supremacy over the UNCLOS, if the two are in conf l ict.②ZHENG Hailin, International Law Analysis of the South China Sea Arbitration Case, Pacif i c Journal, Vol. 24, No. 8, 2016, p. 4. (in Chinese)The “dashed-line” was drawn 47 years earlier than the entry into force of UNCLOS. In line with the rule “l(fā)ex prospicit non respicit”, current laws cannot be applied to govern and regulate previous conducts. China’s sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and historic rights to their adjacent waters are based on sufficient historical and jurisprudential evidences, which have also been widely recognized by the international community. Apart from that, the drawing of the “dashed-line”is not governed by the UNCLOS; it is a historical issue. Therefore, the Philippines’claim that China’s “dashed line” was contrary to the Convention is not founded in law and fact.

Part V of the Notification and Statement of Claim of the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as “Statement of Claim”) issued by the Philippines to China on 22 January 2013, articulated 13 Submissions that the Philippines requested the Tribunal to adjudicate. Submissions No. 10～13 concern the rights to the SCS waters, requesting the Tribunal to determine the Philippines’entitlements to exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf in the relevant waters of the SCS.③Notif i cation and Statement of Claim on West Philippine Sea, pp. 17～19, at http://www.dfa. gov.ph/images/UNCLOS/Notification%20and%20Statement%20of%20Claim%20on%20 West%20Philippine%20Sea.pdf, 22 March 2017.The entitlements to EEZ and continental shelf in the relevant waters of the SCS are derived from territorial sovereignty. However, thePhilippines, through cutting off the link between the sovereignty and maritime rights of the Nansha Islands, directly asked the Tribunal to rule on its maritime entitlements. This request is inconsistent with the rule of “the land dominates the sea” on international law. In the judgment of the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explicitly pointed out that, “the land dominates the sea” was a basic rule of international law, and the land was the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward. In other words, the sovereignty over an island or land is the basis for a State to enjoy the sovereign rights and maritime entitlements to waters at the vicinity of the island or land.①Policy Research Office of State Oceanic Administration, Collection of International Maritime Delimitation Treaties, Beijing: China Ocean Press, 1989, p. 79. (in Chinese)Traditional international law asserts several modes of acquiring territory as, occupation, cession, conquest, and accretion.②DU Hengzhi, An Outline of International Law (I), Taipei: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1971, pp. 216～217. (in Chinese)However, the ownership of an island cannot be obtained by acquisition of continental shelf or EEZ. Therefore, the request of the Philippines, which lacked the sovereignty over the Nansha Islands, to Tribunal to adjudicate on its rights to the relevant waters of SCS is ridiculous.

B. The Philippines Alleged That the Archipelagic Doctrine Was Merely Applicable to Archipelagic States, and That Some Islands in the SCS Were Not Qualif i ed as Islands under the UNCLOS, but “Rocks”or “Reefs” That Did Not Generate EEZ, Contiguous Zone, or Even Territorial Sea

In accordance with the UNCLOS Part IV (Archipelagic States), an archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines based on the territorial sea base points of the archipelago. The breadth of its territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, described as archipelagic waters, where other States enjoy, among others, right of innocent passage and traditional fishing rights, upon the precondition that the sovereignty of the archipelagic State is respected.③UNCLOS, at http://www.un.org/zh/law/sea/los/index.shtml, 22 March 2017.The Philippines is a country whose territory mainly consists of islands. The exploration and exploitationof marine resources is critical to the future development of the whole country. Considering its own state interests, the Philippines, together with Indonesia, proposed around 1958 to establish a combined regime specially for archipelagic States. It promulgated An Act to Def i ne the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines (1961 Republic Act No. 3046) on 17 June 1961, which states that all the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippine archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines.①Institute of International Oceanic Studies, Selection of Marine Laws, Regulations and Agreements of China’s Marine Neighbors, Beijing: China Ocean Press, 1984, p. 60. (in Chinese)That is to say, the Philippines delineated its territorial sea by using the Philippine archipelago as the center, and used 80 sections of straight baselines to draw the baseline from which the Philippine territorial sea was measured. In this sense, the Philippines is the fi rst State which raised the theoretical concept of archipelago. At that time, the archipelagic doctrine has not been acknowledged by the international law or community. At one session of the Preparatory Committee for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973), four States – the Philippines, Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius – jointly put forward the archipelagic doctrine, but they all objected to extending the application of the archipelago regime to the mid-ocean archipelagoes of continental States. Article 1 of the Draft Articles on Archipelago, which was proposed by them later, also stated that this Draft only applied to archipelagic States.②Office for Ocean Af f airs and the Law of the Sea, Archipelagic States – Legislative History of Part IV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, New York: U.N. Publications, 1990, pp. 7～9.The Philippines and other archipelagic States held that the establishment of a regime for archipelagos would better protect their national security and economic interests, therefore, only archipelagic States have the objective need to apply the archipelago regime when drawing their territorial sea or EEZ. The UNCLOS of 1982 contains special provisions regarding the archipelago regime of archipelagic States, however, it did not expressly address the issue concerning the mid-ocean archipelagoes of continental States. It is, obviously, unreasonable for the Philippines to invoke the UNCLOS as the legal basis to support its claim that the archipelago regime did not apply to continental States. The reasons are listed as follows: fi rstly, the issue concerning the mid-ocean archipelagoes of continental States is a legal vacuum leftby the UNCLOS, and the matters uncovered in the law should not be considered as the matters prohibited by law; secondly, a continental State’s application of the archipelagic doctrine does not necessarily amount to a breach of the obligations or an abuse of rights under the UNCLOS, not to say a violation of the rules or principles of general international law. Since, geographically, the mid-ocean islands of continental States are no different from the islands of archipelagic States, the continental States may also, for political, economic and security concerns, require to apply the archipelagic doctrine to its mid-ocean islands, just like the archipelagic States.

Due to the complex topography of the SCS region, a great number of rocks are difficult to be defined as islands under the UNCLOS. As per Article 121(3), rocks disqualif i ed as islands under UNCLOS are not entitled to EEZ or continental shelf. However, under the archipelago regime, a State may claim its sovereign rights based on a group of islands in its entirety, which consists of islands and their surrounding rocks. Additionally, under the archipelago regime, more waters, when applying archipelagic baselines, would be enclosed into archipelagic waters. In its Memorial, the Philippines defined the legal nature and status of each and every feature in the relevant waters of the SCS, and opposed continental States’application of archipelago regime, with a view to fragmentizing the whole Nansha Islands, from the perspective of analyzing the nature of some features. By doing so, it attempted to create a sovereignty vacuum in the SCS region, and undermine the integrity of China’s territorial sovereignty. As a matter of fact, the Philippines had already treated the islands in the SCS as groups of islands. For example, in its Presidential Decrees No. 1596 (released on 11 June 1978) and No. 1599 (released on 15 July 1978), the Philippines declared a cluster of 33 islands, islets and cays as its territory, and stated that such area constituted as a distinct and separate municipality of the Province of Palawan and shall be known as “Kalayaan Island Group”. On 10 March 2009, the Philippines adopted the Republic Act No. 9522 (i.e., An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Def i ne the Archipelagic Baseline of the Philippines and for Other Purposes), which def i ned the baseline of territorial sea for “Kalayaan Island Group” and other islands.①GUO Yuan, Geopolitics and South China Sea Disputes, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2011, pp. 273～281. (in Chinese)When examining the Philippines’ Submissions, the Tribunal was also aware of the unreasonableness in the Philippines’ def i nitionof the nature of some features of the Nansha Islands. “To the extent that a claim by the Philippines is premised on the absence of any overlapping entitlements of China to an exclusive economic zone or to a continental shelf, the Tribunal considers it necessary to consider the maritime zones generated by any feature in the South China Sea claimed by China, whether or not such feature is presently occupied by China.”①The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, Award, 12 July 2016, para. 154, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf, 24 March 2017.

C. The Philippines Claimed Its “Rights and Interests in the SCS” by Def i ning the Nature of Some Features Individually, with an Actual Purpose to Avoid the Application of the Declaration Excluding Compulsory Procedures under the UNCLOS to the Dispute between China and the Philippines

On 25 August 2006, China, in line with Article 298 of UNCLOS, delivered a declaration to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, excluding maritime disputes, such as those concerning sea boundary delimitations and historic rights, from compulsory arbitral procedures.②China Delivered a Declaration Excluding Compulsory Procedures under Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, at http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/pub/chn/gxh/ zlb/tyfg/t270754.htm, 24 March 2017. (in Chinese)However, the Philippines, disregarding China’s declaration above, unilaterally fi led a compulsory arbitration against China. As per the award of the SCS Arbitration, the Philippines requested, in Submissions No. 1～2, the Tribunal to decide that China’s “dashed line” was contrary to the UNCLOS and without lawful ef f ect, and to further deny China’s sovereignty and relevant rights in the SCS; Submissions No. 3～7 relate to the determination of the legal status of Huangyan Island, Meiji Reef, Ren’ai Reef, Zhubi Reef, Ximen Reef, Nanxun Reef and other features.③The South China Sea Arbitration, p. 5, at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/ sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf, 21 March 2017.These Submissions, prima facie, asked for protection of the rights and interests that the Philippines claimed in the SCS, but actually concerned the issue of maritime delimitation and the ownership of some features. The Philippines also made declarations under the UNCLOS. Article 4 of the Understanding Made upon Signature (10 December 1982) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of the Philippines stated: “Suchsigning shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines over any territory over which it exercises sovereign authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters appurtenant thereto.”①WU Shicun ed., Compilation of Documents on South China Sea Issues, Haikou: Hainan Press, 2001, p. 234. (in Chinese)Apparently, the Philippines attempted, using the pretext to protect its legal rights in the SCS through defining the nature of some features in the SCS, to demonstrate that its initiation of the arbitration was for the purpose of settling its dispute with China concerning the SCS, which was not a territorial sovereignty dispute beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. By doing so, the Philippines aimed to avoid both China’s and the Philippines’ declarations described above.

II. China’s Position: the Nansha Islands Constitutes an Integral Archipelago

A. The Tribunal Cannot Deny the Integrity of the SCS Islands Based on Its Determination of Some Relevant Islands

In the SCS Arbitration, the Philippines requested the Tribunal to determine the nature of Huangyan Island, Meiji Reef, Ren’ai Reef, Zhubi Reef, Nanxun Reef, Ximen Reef, Chigua Reef and Huayang Reef, respectively. The Submissions show the Philippines’ position towards the nature of some relevant features (see Table 2). The Philippines contended that the features which were decided as “l(fā)owtide elevations” could neither generate territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf, nor acquire sovereignty through occupation or other means, and those decided as “rocks” could not generate EEZ or continental shelf. The Philippines intended to deny the integrity of the SCS Islands by breaking up the whole into parts, and further to deny China’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over the SCS Islands and the adjacent sea areas. In accordance with Article 13 of the UNCLOS, since low-tide elevations may be submerged at high tide, they cannot have territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf as islands. That is to say, the UNCLOS neither specif i ed that low-tide elevations were not territory, nor provided that the sovereignty over lowtide elevations cannot be acquired through occupation. It merely provided that the maritime entitlements of low-tide elevations were dif f erent from those of islands. In this case, even if a feature is def i ned as a low-tide elevation, it does not mean thatChina lost the territorial sovereignty over the feature. As far as “rocks” concern, a rock, under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, is a special kind of islands. Since it cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its own, a rock cannot generate EEZ or continental shelf, but it is entitled to territorial sea.①UNCLOS, at http://www.un.org/zh/law/sea/los/index.shtml, 22 March 2017.The UNCLOS failed to precisely define the rock and the condition of “sustaining human habitation or economic life of its own”, therefore, Chigua Reef and Huayang Reef cannot be def i ned as “rocks” in line with UNCLOS.

As per Article 46 of UNCLOS, archipelago should be natural features which form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such. Historically speaking, “Zhanghai” recorded in the Yiwu Zhi (Record of Foreign Matters), written by Eastern Han Yang Fu, refers to today’s SCS, which included the SCS Islands. In the Song Dynasty, Nansha and Xisha Islands got more vivid names: “Changsha”, “Qianli Changsha” and “Wanli Changsha” generally refer to Xisha Islands, and “Shitang”, “Qianli Shitang”and “Wanli Shitang” generally refer to Nansha Islands. Literatures and official documents thereafter also contain records about Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands. For example, in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, local chronicles of Guangdong Province enclosed “Qianli Changsha” and “Wanli Shitang” into the territory of the province.②YUAN Gujie, The Theory and Practice of the International Maritime Delimitation, Beijing: Law Press China, 2001, pp. 224～225. (in Chinese)It is not difficult to find from ancient Chinese documents that, China has, historically, always treated the SCS Islands as a whole, and named Xisha, Nansha, and other groups of islands in the SCS in their entirety.

Geographically, politically and economically, the SCS is a semi-enclosed marginal sea. The sea has over 200 features. According to their height dif f erence with the sea level, these features can be divided into fi ve categories: islands, cays, reefs, shoals and banks. Most of these features are submerged under water, with a few above the water. These islands, cays, reefs, shoals and banks are collectively called the “SCS Islands”. The seabed of the SCS is the basin of China. Continental shelves can only be found between the margin of the basin and its surrounding land. That is to say, the SCS Islands constitutes an independent geographical unit; Xisha, Zhongsha, Nansha and Dongsha Islands form, respectively, independent regions of their own, and have their own continental shelves. In this connection, the Nansha Islands mentioned in the Philippines’ Submissions, geographically, is a separate

unit.①GUO Yuan, Geopolitics and South China Sea Disputes, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2011, pp. 301～302. (in Chinese)China fi rst developed and managed the SCS Islands. Chinese fi shermen had, as early as the Ming Dynasty, fi shed around and developed the SCS Islands. Geng Lu Bu (Manual of Sea Routes), a navigation guide which has been handed down by Hainan fi shermen from generation to generation, records, among others, voyages and sailing directions from Hainan Island to Xisha and Nansha Islands. This book also demonstrates that China has developed the SCS Islands since the Ming and Qing Dynasties. In the 1970s, an investigation team of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University, found wells, huts, stone tablets and other things on Taiping Island, Zhongye Island, Nanwei Island and other features of the Nansha Islands, which were built by fishermen in the Ming and Qing Dynasties.②HAN Zhenhua ed., Collection of the Historical Materials of the SCS Islands, Shanghai: Orient Publishing Center, 1988, p. 519. (in Chinese)The governments of past dynasties have never stopped exercising sovereignty over and administrating the SCS Islands, and including Changsha and Shitang of the SCS Islands into the territory of China. Maps published after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China also indicate that the SCS Islands belongs to China. Chinese government also made statements on numerous occasions, reiterating China’s sovereignty over Nansha and Xisha Islands. In 1959, the Government of Hainan Administrative District of Guangdong Province, set up an administration office of Xisha, Nansha and Zhongsha Islands on Yongxing Island, responsible for exercising administrative jurisdiction over the SCS Islands. In 1988, Hainan Province included Xisha, Nansha and Zhongsha Islands as well as their adjacent waters into its jurisdiction. On 21 June 2012, upon the official approval of China State Council, the Sansha Office of Administration was replaced by prefecturelevel Sansha City. The government office was located on Yongxing Island of Xisha Islands. It follows that the SCS Islands, both geographically and historically, constitutes, in essence, a geographical, economic and political entity.

Table 2 The SCS Islands Involved in the Philippines’ Submissions

Source: Baidu encyclopedia, Wikipedia, Google map and the Philippines’ Memorial

B. Basis of International Law

1. The Legal Basis Supporting That Straight Baselines and Historic Rights Are Applicable to Continental States

The Government of Norway issued a royal decree on 12 July 1935, declaring that the waters four nautical miles northward of 66°28.8′ N should be the Norwegian fi sheries zone. In accordance with the decree, Norway drew its straight baselines joining 48 outermost points of its coasts and outermost land. The U.K. asserted that the method of straight baseline adopted by Norway was against the international law, and the drawing of such baselines would turn a part of the high seas into Norwegian fi sheries zone. Both States had negotiated over the issue for several times, but such negotiations failed. Under this circumstance, the U.K. fi led, in 1949, an application instituting proceedings before the ICJ against Norway. On 18 December 1951, the ICJ issued the judgment of the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), stating that the northern coastal zone of Norway was of a very distinctive configuration; the coast line was broken by large and deeply indented fjords and bays; the coastal zone concerned included numerous islands, islets, and reefs, forming a group of islands known by the name of the “skj?rgaard”in Norway; there was no clear dividing line between land and sea of Norwegian coast; what really constituted the Norwegian coast line was the outer line of the“skj?rgaard”. The ICJ held that the belt of territorial waters must follow the general direction of the coast; for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, the low-water mark was generally adopted in the practice of States, since this criterion was the most favourable to the coastal State and clearly showed the character of territorial waters as appurtenant to the land territory. However, the lowwater mark was not permanent. The sinuosities of coasts added to the complexity of the application of the low-water mark rule. Where a coast was deeply indented and cut into, or where it was bordered by a series of islands, a more practical method should be applied in delimiting the waters, including territorial sea, which gave a simpler form to the belt of territorial waters. This method consisted of selecting appropriate points on the low-water mark and drawing straight lines between them. Therefore, the ICJ found that the baselines drawn by Norway were not contrary to the international law.①Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), pp. 127～130, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ fi les/5/1809.pdf, 28 March 2017.

The Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) played an essential role in clarifying rules of international law regarding the existing methods to draw baselines. After the end of the Fisheries Case, the method of straight baselines adopted by Norway, which took into account special geographical conditions, but was different from conventional method of baselines, has been widely adopted by other States. C. F. Amerasinghe, the president of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, noted, “Although in the Norwegian Fisheries Case the Court was specif i cally considering only the questions of straight baselines for the purpose of measuring the territorial sea of f a deeply indented coast and of f a coast with archipelagoes, there were some general principles on the law of the territorial sea which it stated and which might prove of some assistance in regard to the problem of mid-ocean archipelagoes … [the belt of territorial waters must follow] the general direction of the coast.”①C. F. Amerasinghe, The Problem of Archipelagoes in the International Law of the Sea, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 1974, p. 544.The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, one of the four conventions adopted in the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, clearly provides for, in Article 4, the method of drawing straight baselines for a fringe of islands along the coast. The judgment of the Fisheries Case could be said to serve as the basis for the method of straight baselines established in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. In the Fisheries Case, the ICJ also considered Norway’s historic rights in the waters under question, contending that local populations of Norway had made a living upon fishing in this area for hundreds of years. Therefore, the delimitation method adopted by Norway was consistent with the international law. This case can provide, on the international level, support to China’s claim to historic rights within the “dashed-line” in the SCS. The fact that China’s coast lines are broken and bordered by numerous islands, in the words of Jeanette Green Field, indicates that China can apply straight baselines, which seems to comply with the principle reflected in the Fisheries Case.②Jeanette Green Field, China’s Practice in the Law of the Sea, Gloucestershire: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 72.From the legal perspective, the UNCLOS merely provides for the archipelago regime for archipelagic States, without explicit provisions regarding the construction of the same regime for continental States. However, the ICJ judgment of the Fisheries Case and Article 4 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone provide the legal basis for continental States to adopt straight baselines toencircle their mid-ocean archipelagoes.

2. Practices Relating to Straight Baselines Adopted by Other Continental States to Encircle Their Mid-Ocean Archipelagoes

Brownlee classified state practices into several categories, which include, among others, diplomatic instruments, policy statements, press releases, national legislation, international and domestic judicial precedents, treaties and other international instruments, as well as the resolutions of UN General Assembly concerning legal issues.①JIA Bingbing, Public International Law: Its Interpretation and Application in Time of Peace, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2015, pp. 32～33. (in Chinese)A collation of the documents in association with the midocean archipelagic regime of some representative States (see Table 3) reveals: a) a great number of continental States had used straight baselines to encircle their midocean archipelagoes before the entry into force of the UNCLOS, and some adopted the regime of mixed baselines; b) after the entry into force of the UNCLOS, these States kept their original legislation, or adopted new legislation, in accordance with the UNCLOS, to apply straight baselines to encircle their mid-ocean archipelagoes. All these demonstrate that continental States’ adoption of straight baselines with respect to their mid-ocean archipelagoes has become stable state practices.

A number of States not only articulated in their national laws that they adopted straight baselines with respect to their mid-ocean archipelagoes, but also delivered notes to UN Secretary-General to ask for the same. On 9 March 2011 Ecuador sent a note to the UN Secretary-General asking to record and disseminate its Executive Decree No. 450 of 2 August 2010, which approved and ordered publication of Ministerial Agreement 0081 of 12 July 2010 and Nautical Chart IOA42. The attached map clearly showed Ecuador’s straight baselines around its oceanic Galápagos Islands.②HONG Nong, LI Jianwei and CHEN Pingping, The Concept of Archipelagic State and the South China Sea: UNLCOS, State Practice and Implication, China Oceans Law Review, No. 1, 2013, p. 223.The maps attached in the Submission made by Portugal, in May 2011, on the outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) clearly show that Portugal used both straight baselines and normal baselines in practice. The Gazetteer of India dated 11 May 2009 (No. 736) stated that straight baselines were applicable to Lakshadweep. On 29 January 2010, India deposited with the UN Secretary-General a list of geographical coordinates of points def i ning

the baselines of Lakshadweep as well as its nautical chart.①M(fèi).Z.N.76.2010.LOS of 17 February 2010, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/mzn_s/mzn76ef.pdf, 29 April 2017.

Table 3 Practices of Representative States Relating to the Establishment of Archipelago Regime

Kerguelen Islands (France)31sectionsofstraightbaselinesconnecting32basepointsselectedwere drawnfortheKerguelenIslands.Thelongestsegmentwasupto19.7nautical miles.DecreeNo.78-112of1978 Lakshadweep(India) Whendrawingthebaselineoftheterritorialseaofanarchipelagoand makingtherelevantmaritimeclaims,oneshouldtreatthearchipelagoasawhole,ratherthandisintegrateitintopieces.13basepointswereselectedfort measuringtheterritorialseaoftheLakshadweepArchipelago.Thestraighbaselinesconnectingthesepointswerearound560nauticalmilesintotal. 1.DecreeNo.80of28May19762.GazetteerofIndiadated11 May2009(No.736) Mixed baselines Faroes Island(Denmark) 10basepointswereselectedformeasuringtheterritorialseaoftheFormal aroeIslands.Themethodofusingstraightbaselinestogetherwithnbaselineswasadoptedtodelineate12nauticalmilesofterritorialseaoftheFaroeIslands. 1.DecreeNo.130of27April19592.DecreeNo.156of24April19633.ActNo.200of7April1999 4.DecreeNo.240of30April20025.ExecutiveOrderNo.306of 16May2002 Azores(Portugal)Thebaselineof Azoreswascomposedofnormalbaselinesandstraight baselines.TheAzoresIslandswasdividedintothreeparts,and29basepoints wereselectedformeasuringitsterritorialsea.Straightbaselineswereappliedtothethreepartsrespectively.Decree-LawNo.495/85of29 November1985

3. Relevant Provisions of China’s Domestic Law and State Practices with Respect to the Xisha Islands

The activities of the Chinese people on the Xisha Islands took place earlier than the adoption of the UNCLOS. China did not, in this connection, invoke UNCLOS Article 7 as the international legal basis. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese government promulgated in 1958 the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea. The Declaration states that the breadth of the territorial sea of China shall be 12 nautical miles drawn by the method of straight baselines. This regime of territorial sea applies to Taiwan and SCS Islands. It conf i rmed, through government statements, that China had owned the SCS Islands and its adjacent waters since ancient times. In 1973, Chinese delegation sent the Working Paper on Sea Area within National Jurisdiction to the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee, which stated that “a group or a fringe of islands that are relatively close to each other may be considered as a single entity when drawing territorial seas.”②ZHAO Lihai, On Some Legal Issues Relating to the SCS Islands, Law and Social Development, No. 4, 1995, pp. 56～57. (in Chinese)In 1992, Chinese government formulated the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Article 2 of the Law enumerates the archipelagoes and islands belonging to China. It reiterates and conf i rms, through legislation, that the SCS Islands forms an inherent part of Chinese territory. Further, it paved the way legally for the drawing of the baselines of the territorial sea surrounding the Nansha Islands. On 15 May 1996, China promulgated the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea, announcing the baselines of part of its territorial sea adjacent to the mainland and those of the territorial sea adjacent to its Xisha Islands. Part 2 of the Declaration marked 28 base points of the territorial sea around the Xiasha Islands. That is to say, China treats the Xisha Islands as an integrated whole. The baseline of the territorial sea adjacent to the Xisha Islands is composed of straight baselines connecting the base points selected for this group of islands.

III. Signif i cances of Establishing a Mid-Ocean Archipelagic Regime in the SCS

A. To Delineate the Maritime Zones of a Group of Islands in Its Entirety, Making China’s Sovereignty Clear in the SCS

The islands and reefs scattered in the SCS are great in number. Take the most controversial Nansha Islands for example. Although the features in the Nansha Islands are large in number, only 36 of them are above water at ordinary times, and merely 25 are above water at high tide. A feature of the Nansha Islands, if def i ned individually, will be difficult to meet the standard of “island” under Article 121 of the UNCLOS. It would further lead the international community to challenge the legal status of the feature, and reduce the jurisdictional waters of China in the SCS. In other words, it would be difficult for the feature to have its own EEZ, continental shelf, and even territorial sea. If baselines are drawn separately for each and every feature in the SCS, the territorial sea of China in the SCS would be carved up. In that case, territorial sea would overlap with the high seas, and the scope of China’s sovereignty in the SCS would further be blurred. Therefore, to establish a regime of mid-ocean archipelago in the SCS has far-reaching impacts and signif i cances. Specifically, China should treat the SCS Islands as several separate groups of islands, and then draw the baseline of the territorial sea for each group of islands in its entirety by connecting the base points selected. By doing so, China may change the embarrassing position of a feature in a sovereignty dispute, but also clarify the scope of China’s sovereignty in the SCS.

B. To Ef f ectively Settle the Dispute Between the Philippines and China in the SCS

The Sino-Philippine dispute in the SCS mainly concerns the sovereignty of some features and maritime delimitation. The baselines of the Philippine territorial sea were drawn in accordance with the archipelagic doctrine. All the waters centering the Philippine archipelago, which lie beyond the outermost islands of the Philippine archipelago but within the treaty boundary, are called the Philippine territorial sea. The “treaty boundary” means the outer limits of the Philippine territorial sea consisting of all the waters mentioned in the Treaty of Paris of 1898 between Spain and the United States, the Treaty of Washington (1900) betweenSpain and the United States, and the Convention between the United States and Great Britain (1930). The method that the Philippines employed to draw the baselines of its territorial sea would turn a large area of the high seas lying between the islands of the Philippine Archipelago into its jurisdictional waters, and turn the waters enclosed by the baselines into its internal waters. Additionally, the Philippines passed legislation regarding the archipelagic baselines, and drew its EEZ and continental shelf from the baselines. By doing so, the Philippines included 33 of Chinese islands, reefs, shoals and banks in the Nansha Islands into its insular territory, which, in turn, made the outer limits of its EEZ intrude into the traditional boundary line of China. In order to protect its alleged “sovereignty in the SCS”, the Philippines, on the one hand, opposed the establishment of an archipelagic regime by continental States, like China, for their mid-ocean archipelagoes, on the pretext that the archipelagic regime applied only to archipelagic States and the UNCLOS failed to provide that this regime was applicable to continental States. On the other hand, the Philippines proposed to determine the nature of some features in the SCS individually. If some of these features are def i ned as rocks or low-tide elevations, it would have great impacts on the maritime delimitation between China and the Philippines. Specif i cally, China may not claim EEZ and continental shelf for these features, if they are def i ned as rocks or low-tide elevations. The Philippines attempted to, through denying the entirety of the SCS Islands, limit or reduce the scope of China’s sovereignty in the SCS, and “l(fā)egitimize” its illegal occupation of some features in the SCS. Although the UNCLOS did not express that continental States may draw archipelagic baselines, it did not also deny the continental States of their right to construct an archipelagic regime for their mid-ocean archipelagoes. That is to say, continental States may possibly draw straight baselines for their distant archipelagoes. The waters enclosed by the baselines should be internal waters or territorial sea, rather than archipelagic waters. China may also use the method of straight baselines to draw the archipelagic baselines with respect to its groups of islands in the SCS. Under the archipelagic regime, a string of rocks, reefs, islands, and other features forms an archipelago, which should be treated as a whole in maritime delimitation. Therefore, by establishing a mid-ocean archipelagic regime, China may exercise absolute sovereignty over the SCS Islands, and further foil the Philippines’ plot to occupy the SCS Islands of China.

C. To Break Through the Island Chain Blockade Set by the United States

The geographical location of the SCS is of great importance. It is not only a key sea passage connecting Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, but also a vital transportation hub connecting Oceania with the continent of Asia. The “island chain strategy” prepared by the United States constitutes an essential part of its Asia-Pacific strategy. The island chain, in line with the marine topographic features of the Asia-Pacif i c region, is divided into fi rst and second island chains. The “island chain strategy” is designed to block the sea passage of China, Russia and other States. The SCS, a vital pivot on the first island chain, together with the Korea Peninsula, forms the so-called “crescent defensive line”, which was devised to obstruct China at the sea. Consequently, the SCS holds a very important position in the “island chain strategy” of the United States. If the SCS is not under the control of China, the United States may completely contain China within the fi rst island chain; otherwise, the “crescent defensive line” would be no longer in existence, the “island chain strategy” made by the United States would fail, and the United States would be compelled to retreat to the second island chain with respect to its defence in the Asia-Pacif i c region. The Philippines, as a State with weak comprehensive national power, tried every means to persuade great powers outside the region to intervene in the SCS disputes, with a view to protecting its alleged “sovereignty” in the SCS, and achieving its strategic goal in the region. The United States supported the Philippines’ occupation of China’s islands and reefs in the SCS, with the purpose to contain China through the hands of the Philippines, to deny China’s sovereignty in the SCS region, and further to safeguard its “island chain strategy”. Additionally, the majority of the raw materials imported from the Asian-Pacif i c region are shipped to the United States through the sea routes in the SCS. The destruction of these routes would affect the economic development of the United States, and hinder the import of most oil and gas to Japan. Therefore, the United States repeatedly claimed that its main concern in the SCS region was to keep the international waterway in the region unobstructed. In response to that, the Chinese government had, on many occasions, expressed that China’s protection of its sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and the relevant maritime entitlements would not prejudice the freedom of navigation and overf l ight enjoyed by foreign ships or aircraft under international law.

If a mid-ocean archipelagic regime is constructed in the SCS, China may,when drawing the baselines of territorial sea and claiming the relevant maritime entitlements, treat each of certain groups of islands in the SCS as a whole. By doing so, China could effectively refute the Philippines and the United States, which denied and challenged China’s sovereignty in the SCS by taking advantage of the vacuum left by the UNCLOS. In the meantime, China may, by reference to the provisions of the UNCLOS, design right of innocent passage and right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in relevant waters. The sea lanes designated by China for the free passage of foreign ships are, certainly, lanes suitable for safe navigation, which are decided by the sovereign State after comprehensive considerations. China’s management and maintenance of these lanes would help ensure the safety of international navigation. In other words, it would guarantee China’s absolute sovereignty in the region, and also ensure the free passage and safety of foreign ships in the region. In a word, to establish a mid-ocean archipelagic regime in the SCS would not only protect China’s sovereignty in the SCS region, but also break the island chain blockage set up by the United States.

D. To Advance the Development of the Current Rules of the Law of the Sea

More than three decades have passed since the adoption of the UNCLOS in 1982. The UNCLOS established the basic legal framework for the exploitation and management of internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, EEZ and other marine areas. However, its provisions concerning the archipelagic regime are suffered from defects, since this regime is a result of compromises. Due to the objections from some States, the controversies over the mid-ocean archipelagoes of continental States were put of f during the draft of the text of the Convention. As many publicists honestly noted, that the UNCLOS avoided to addressing the question whether the archipelagic regime should be applicable to the mid-ocean archipelagoes of continental States was decided by the inf l uences of political and diplomatic factors.①BU Lingjia and HUANG Jingwen, The Issue Concerning the Continental States’ Application of Straight Baselines to Their Distant Archipelagoes, Sun Yat-sen University Law Review, No. 2, 2013, p. 110. (in Chinese)An increasing number of States have applied the straight baselines to draw the waters of their mid-ocean archipelagoes. Nevertheless, the UNCLOS still inf l exibly sticks to the consensus reached in 1982, and failedto, in line with state practices and the change of international customs, timely adjust itself. For the sake of its national interests, the Philippines construed the UNCLOS in bad faith, derogating from the principles and spirit of the Convention. Making use of the compromises found in and the lagging nature of the UNCLOS, the Philippines sought the legal basis from international law (the UNCLOS) to support its occupation of China’s islands in the SCS, which further escalated the disputes in the SCS. Laws, under most cases, may gradually (but not fundamentally) change on the basis of existing conventions. Some values and concepts, which were originally expressed by soft laws without binding force, may later affect public opinions, political agendas and fi ll up the gap of treaty law. Apparently, States are not able to negotiate formally over all emerging issues relating to the oceans and seas, as such, the amendment mechanism well designed under the UNCLOS①UNCLOS, Articles 155, 312～314, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ texts/unclos/closindx.htm, 22 March 2017.will be difficult to be put into use. In this case, the adoption of new regional or global treaties addressing such issues, as well as state and intergovernmental practices with respect to such issues, would push the creation of new rules of the law of the sea. China should apply the mid-ocean archipelagic regime of continental States, which was derived from the regime of archipelagic State, to its SCS Islands. In doing so, China does not merely focus on its sovereignty and sovereign rights in the SCS area; instead, it endeavors to fi nd the root causing the fi erce conf l icts in the SCS, and then explore practicable solutions based on it. China should, under the legal framework of mid-ocean archipelagoes, work on its initiative to cooperate with the States concerned to peacefully settle their disputes in the SCS, and further to contribute to the development of the rules of the law of the sea.

IV. Suggestions on the Construction of an Archipelagic Regime for the Nansha Islands Involved in the Sino-Philippine Arbitration

A. Drawing of the Baselines of the Nansha Islands

The baselines of the Nansha Islands should be drawn by using the method of straight baselines, which is generally adopted in the practice of States. The Nansha Islands is eligible for applying the straight baselines on the followinggrounds. Firstly, geographically speaking, in accordance with the ICJ judgment of Norwegian Fisheries Case, the method of straight baselines is applied where a coast was deeply indented and cut into, or where it was bordered by a fringe of islands; the Nansha Islands consisting of many features is sinuous in conf i guration, therefore it meets the condition “where a coast was deeply indented and cut into”. Secondly, the ICJ asserted that the belt of territorial waters must follow the general direction of the coast. The sea areas lying within the baselines should be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. In this connection, China’s application of the straight baselines to the Nansha Islands shows, precisely, its respect to the natural conf i guration of the coasts and features of the Nansha Islands, as well as the full consideration to the geographic direction of the Nansha Islands. Thirdly, the Philippines’ request to def i ne the nature of each and every feature in the Nansha Islands individually in the SCS Arbitration, as a matter of fact, ignored the integrity of the Nansha Islands. The islands, reefs, shoals and banks constituting the Nansha Islands, as well as the adjacent waters, have formed an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or historically have been regarded as such.①ZHENG Yuchen, The Evolution of the Regime of Mid-Ocean Archipelago of Continental States and Its Implication for China’s South China Sea Islands (Master Dissertation), Beijing: China Foreign Af f airs University, 2016, p. 34. (in Chinese)The Nansha Islands has been considered as a single entity, which has also been acknowledged by the academia of international law and the international community. Currently, the baselines of mid-ocean archipelagoes that have been published were drawn following the principle of integrity. In this regard, China also conf i rmed, through legislation, the integrity of a group of islands in the Working Paper on Sea Area within National Jurisdiction.②Article 1(6) of the Working Paper on Sea Area within National Jurisdiction states: “a group or a fringe of islands that are relatively close to each other may be considered as a single entity when drawing territorial seas.”The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, adopted on 25 February 1992, reconfirmed that the method of straight baselines was applied to draw the baselines of the groups of islands in the SCS.

With regards to the reasonable application of the straight baselines, if the Nansha Islands is treated as a whole, and its baselines are drawn by the method of straight baselines joining the appropriate points around the outermost features of the Nansha Islands, the sea areas enclosed by the baselines may possibly become too large. This would affect the maritime interests of other States bordering theSCS, such as the freedom of navigation and the exploitation of marine resources, and then invite their criticism. Although the Nansha Islands should be treated as a single entity, due to the large number of features in this group of islands and its complex situation, this group of islands should be subdivided into smaller groups when drawing baselines; additionally, not all the waters enclosed by the baselines should be def i ned as “internal waters”.

B. To Fully Prepare Legally for the Establishment of an Archipelagic Regime, and to Follow the Trend of Protecting Maritime Rights and Interests Through Laws

The law of the sea serves as the basis for balancing the maritime rights and interests among different States. The UNCLOS set out the legal framework for the management and exploitation of the oceans and seas. Under the current circumstance where an increasing number of States tend to protect their maritime rights and interests through laws, the marine disputes between States can hardly be settled without a complete legal system of the sea. Apart from that, the UNCLOS is not a static legal system; instead, it needs to be improved in practice. China must follow the trend to protect its own maritime rights and interests through laws. Since the UNCLOS is the “constitution of the oceans” agreed by States upon negotiations, it inevitably contains provisions resulting from compromises. Taking into account the interests of all the parties concerned, the UNCLOS laid out some ambiguous provisions, which could be interpreted by States from different standpoints for their own interests. Hence, China needs to put more efforts into the research and application of the UNCLOS, striving to make full use of the legal regimes under the UNCLOS in practice. For example, China should do further research into the legal status of the “dashed line” in the SCS, and ascertain China’s historic title in the relevant waters. It should fi nd convincing grounds from jurisprudence, seeking to pacif i cally settle its disputes with other States. China’s legal system with respect of the seas and oceans, although established preliminarily, is problematic and deficient. For example, the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea, 1996, announced the baselines of part of its territorial sea adjacent to the mainland and those of the territorial sea adjacent to its Xisha Islands, and stated that the Chinese government would announce the remaining baselines of China. Nonetheless, after two decades, China still has not declared the baselines of its territorial seafrom Haiyang Island to Chengshantou Cape, nor the baselines encircling other groups of islands in the SCS. In contrast, many continental States with mid-ocean archipelagoes had enacted the relevant laws before the adoption of the UNCLOS. Therefore, the lagging of China’s marine legislation is quite obvious. However, the implementation and performance of the UNCLOS depends on the construction of the pertinent national legal system. In other words, the success of the UNCLOS depends, to a great extent, on the level of legal construction of States. In recent years, the marine landscape and interests, both on the national and international level, changed immensely. Facing new situation and new problems, China should adopt national laws to improve and clarify the equivocal, vague or even defective provisions of the UNCLOS, such as the mid-ocean archipelagic regime for continental States. China should set up such a complete legal system of the sea that it may have laws to follow in the exploration and exploitation of the seas and the protection of its marine rights and interests, and that it may maximally protect its sovereignty over the SCS Islands. Aside from that, China should also actively participate in the discussion on and formulation of the international regulations concerning the oceans and the seas organized by the United Nations. It should take the initiative to attend international academic symposiums, with the aim to make its standpoints understood, and make such international regulations ref l ect China’s reasonable claims of rights.

C. The Strategy That China Should Adopt in Its Dispute with the Philippines in the SCS under New Circumstances

The Philippines has always had severe dispute with China over the sovereignty of some features in the SCS. In recent years, the Philippines, supported by exterritorial powers, challenged China continuously on the SCS issue. On 30 June 2016, Duterte was elected as the new president of the Philippines. After taking office, Duterte, reversing the pro-American policies pursued by the Aquino III administration, pursued a foreign policy independent of the United States. He harbored no hope of solving the SCS dispute through international arbitration, although he also acknowledged the result of the SCS Arbitration. Duterte repeatedly stressed that the Philippines would not open fire with China, and it was willing to jointly explore the oil and gas resources in the SCS with China through joint ventures. He also expressed its welcome for China to assistthe Philippines in improving its infrastructures.①Duterte Favors Making Deal with China over Dispute, at http://globalnation.inquirer. net/138487/duterte-favors-making-deal-china-dispute, 31 March 2017.Although it is not possible for the Duterte administration to distance itself from the United States, it changed its strategy, aiming to restore its relationship with China without offending the United States. That is to say, it endeavors to obtain the benef i ts from both sides: to get the security guarantee provided by the United States on the one hand, and to take a free ride in the express train of China in economic development on the other hand.②ZHANG Jie, The South China Sea Game: U.S. – Philippines Military Alliance and Sino-Philippine Relations Adjustment, Pacif i c Journal, No. 7, 2016, p. 33. (in Chinese)During President Duterte’s visit to China last October, the two heads of State reached the important consensus to properly handle the SCS issue, taking the two sides back to the right track of properly handling the SCS issue through dialogue and consultation.③Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on 30 March 2017, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1450255. shtml, 30 May 2017.The Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines specially discussed the SCS issue. Its Article 40④Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, Article 40, “Both sides exchange views on issues regarding the South China Sea. Both sides affirm that contentious issues are not the sum total of the China-Philippines bilateral relationship. Both sides exchange views on the importance of handling the disputes in the South China Sea in an appropriate manner. Both sides also reaffirm the importance of maintaining and promoting peace and stability, freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea, addressing their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and the 1982 UNCLOS.”articulates that the territorial and jurisdictional disputes should be addressed by sovereign States directly concerned by peaceful means through friendly consultations and negotiations. It amounts to a further consolidation of the official positions of both States through government documents. It implies that, currently, there is room for change in the Sino-Philippine relations. However, under current circumstance, it is still difficult for the two States to reach an agreement within a short period, due to their great dif f erences over sovereignty issues. And cooperation between the two would never take place if cooperation can only be carried out after the resolution of their dispute. Comparatively speaking, “shelving dif f erences and seeking joint development” can be used as a feasible solution to their dispute in the SCS for the time being. China should reconsider this strategy in the new situation.

First, China should facilitate the concretizing of the principle of “shelving differences and seeking joint development”. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), in a sense, embodies this principle. However, this declaration is not legally binding, and lacks concrete and implementable provisions. In this case, States would, in line with the requirements of their national interests, construe the DOC differently or raise varying claims based on it. Article 41 of the Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, 2016, states, “Both sides commit to the full and effective implementation of DOC in its entirety, and work substantively toward the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) based on consensus.”①Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, Article 41, “ Both sides recall the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China on the Full and Ef f ective Implementation of the DOC adopted in Vientiane on 25 July 2016. Both sides commit to the full and ef f ective implementation of DOC in its entirety, and work substantively toward the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) based on consensus.”The COC is a framework used to implement the DOC. The Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines fully shows that the two States sincerely exchanged views on issues regarding the SCS, and agreed to appropriately handle these issues through peaceful and friendly negotiations. With respect to the issue of the Nansha Islands, joint development, on the condition that the dispute over the sovereignty of some features is shelved, is a kind of cooperation conducted in the interim period prior to the completion of maritime delimitation between the two States, without prejudice to the positions of both sides on sovereignty and legal issues. China and the Philippines need to conclude agreements to jointly explore and exploit the mineral resources in the areas riddled with sovereignty disputes and share the incomes incurred therefrom. In the waters around the Nansha Islands which are rich in oil and gas but free from disputes, China should, with the least delay, embark on exploration and exploitation work, and build oil drilling and production platforms, so as to showcase its presence in the area and pave the way for subsequent state practice.②XUE Guifang, Blue Game: A Great Game with Respect to the Protection of China’s Maritime Rights and Interests, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2015, p. 265. (in Chinese)China still insists on its sovereignty over the SCS Islands, and always keeps an eye and studying on the SCS issues, seeking to peacefully settle its dispute with the Philippines in the SCS at an early date, in a stable, harmonious and pleasant atmosphere where both Statestrust each other.

Second, China should make great ef f orts to eliminate the barriers preventing the principle of “shelving differences and seeking joint development” from implementing. On the SCS issues between China and the Philippines, information asymmetry constitutes the biggest obstacle preventing the principle from implementing. Both parties are on guard against each other, leading to fiercer conf l icts and confrontations. In that case, both parties failed to shelve their dispute, but even created more disputes. They exploited the resources in the area separately. The resolution of the Sino-Philippine dispute in the SCS needs the establishment and maintenance of a smooth communication channel. In accordance with Article 42 of the Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, 2016,①Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, Article 42, “Both sides agree to continue discussions on confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and confidence and to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities in the South China Sea that would complicate or escalate disputes and af f ect peace and stability. In this regard, in addition to and without prejudice to other mechanisms, a bilateral consultation mechanism can be useful, which will meet regularly on current and other issues of concern to either side on the South China Sea. Both sides also agree to explore other areas of cooperation.”the two States would create a bilateral consultation mechanism, where the two would meet regularly on issues concerning the SCS, and they also agreed to explore other areas of cooperation. The establishment of such a consultation mechanism would help the two sides better understand each other’s position and views towards the SCS issues, and actively interact with each other. They would narrow their dif f erences through dialogues, and further reduce the risk of strategic miscalculation. In a word, the national interests of the States would be maximally reached if their dispute can be settled through negotiations.

V. Conclusions

Since the occurrence of the Huangyan Island Event in April 2012, the Philippine government spread the word that it would submit the event to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for adjudication, with a view to internationalizing the SCS dispute, and winning the support of international public opinion. In the meantime, the Philippines, by def i ning the nature of some features in the Nansha Islands individually, attempted to fragmentize China’s four groups of islands in the SCS, and further to deny China’s sovereignty and jurisdiction inthe SCS region. As described above, it is well founded, both seen from precedents, state practice, and jurisprudence, that a continental State may establish a legal regime for its mid-ocean archipelagoes. Therefore, China should, with the least delay, create a legal regime for its mid-ocean archipelagoes in the SCS, so as to better protect its maritime rights and interests.

Translator: XIE Hongyue

An Analysis on the Determination of the Nature of Some Islands Individually as Requested by the Philippines in the South China Sea Arbitration

HAN Yuxiao*

In the disputes over the islands and reefs in the South China Sea (SCS), the Philippines is a State having occupied many features in the SCS. It alleged that it had sovereignty over some features of China’s SCS Islands. In order to seek its interests in the SCS, the Philippines, on the one hand, unilaterally initiated an arbitration against China with respect to some features, contending that the “dashed line” of China was contrary to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and therefore requested the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate on its maritime entitlements. By doing so, it attempted to cut of f the natural link between the sovereignty and maritime entitlements of China’s SCS Islands. On the other hand, the Philippines attempted to def i ne the nature of some islands in the SCS individually, especially those controlled actually by China. The Philippines, through degrading some of China’s islands into rocks or low-tide elevations, aimed to undermine China’s maritime entitlements in the SCS. With respect to the Philippines’ malicious intent to fragmentize China’s SCS Islands, China should, with the least possible delay, establish a mid-ocean archipelago regime in the SCS region, so as to better protect China’s sovereignty over its islands and the pertinent maritime rights and interests.

South China Sea Arbitration; Territorial disputes; Mid-ocean archipelago; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

* 韓雨瀟，武漢大學(xué)國際問題研究院、國家領(lǐng)土主權(quán)與海洋權(quán)益協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中心2015級(jí)國際法學(xué)博士生。電子郵箱：hyx312@qq.com。

? THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

* HAN Yuxiao, Ph. D candidate of international law enrolled in 2015 of Wuhan University Institute of International Studies and Collaborative Innovation Center for Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights. E-mail: hyx312@qq.com.

? THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW