By Bertrand Russell

The life of man may be viewed in many different ways. He may be viewed as one species of mammal and considered in a purely biological light. From this point of view his success has been overwhelming. He can live in all climates and in every part of the world where there is water. His numbers have increased and are increasing still faster. He owes his success to certain things which distinguish him from other animals： speech， fire， agriculture， writing， tools， and large-scale co-operation.

It is in the matter of co-operation that he fails of complete success. Man， like other animals， is filled with impulses and passions which， on the whole， ministered to1 survival while man was emerging. But his intelligence has shown him that passions are often self-defeating， and that his desires could be more satisfied， and his happiness more complete， if certain of his passions were given less scope and other more. Man has not viewed himself more at most times and in most places as a species competing with other species. He has been interested，not in man， but in men； and men have been sharply divided into friends and enemies. At times this division has been useful to those who emerged victoriously： for example， in the conflict between white men and red Indians. But as intelligence and invention increase the complexity of social organizations， there is a continual growth in the benefits of co-operation， and a continual diminution2 of the benefits of competition. Ethics and moral codes are necessary to man because of the conflict between intelligence and impulse. Given intelligence only， or impulse only， there would be no place for ethics.

Men are passionate， headstrong， and rather mad. By their madness they inflict upon themselves， and upon others， disasters which may be of immense magnitude. But， although the life of impulse is dangerous， it must be preserved if human existence is not to lose its savour. Between the two poles of impulse and control， an ethic by which men can live happily must find a middle point. It is through this conflict in the innermost nature of men that the need for ethics arises.

Men is more complex in his impulses and desires than any other animals， and from this complexity his difficulties spring. He is neither completely gregarious3， like ants and bees， nor completely solitary， like lions and tigers. He is a semigregarious animal. Some of his impulses and desires are social，some are solitary. The social part of his nature appears in the fact that solitary confinement is a very severe form of punishment； the other part appears in love of privacy and unwillingness to speak to strangers. Graham Wallas， in his excellent book Hunan Nature in Politics， points out that men who live in a crowded area such as London develop a defence mechanism of social behavior designed to protect them from an unwelcome excess of human contacts.4 People sitting next to each other in a bus or a suburban train usually do not speak to each other， but if something alarming occurs， such as an air raid or even an unusually thick fog， the strangers at once begin to feel each other to be friends and converse without restraint. This sort of behavior illustrates the oscillation5 between the private and social parts of human nature. It is because we are not completely social that we have need of ethics to suggest purposes， and of moral codes to inculcate6 rules of action. Ants， it seems， have no such need： they behave always as the interests of their community dictate7.

But man， even if he could bring himself to be submissive to public interest as the ant， would not feel complete satisfaction， and would be aware that a part of his nature which seems to him important was being starved. It cannot be said that the solitary part of human nature is less to be valued than the social part. In religious phraseology， the two appear separately in the two commandments of the Gospels to love God and to love our neighbour. For those who no longer believe in God or traditional theology， a certain change of phraseology may be necessary， but not a fundamental change as to ethical values. The mystic， the poet， the artist， and the scientific discoverer are in their inmost being solitary. What they do may be useful to others， and its usefulness may be an encouragement to them， but， in the moments when they are most alive and most completely fulfilling what they feel to be their function， they are not thinking of the rest of mankind but are pursuing a vision.

We must therefore admit two distinct elements in human excellence， one social， the other solitary. An ethic which takes account only of the one， or only of the other， will be incomplete and unsatisfying.

The need of ethics in human affairs arises not only from mans incomplete gregariousness or from his failure to live up to an inner vision； it arises also from another difference between man and other animals. The actions of human beings do not all spring from direct impulse， but are capable of being controlled and directed by conscious purpose. To some slight extent higher animals possess this faculty. A dog will allow his master to hurt him in pulling a thorn out of his foot. K？hlers8 apes did various uninstinctive things in the endeavor to reach bananas. Nevertheless， it remains true even with the higher animals that most of their acts are inspired by direct impulse. This is not true of civilized men. From the moment when he gets out bed in spite of a passionate desire to remain lying down， to the moment when he finds himself alone in the evening， he has few opportunities of acting on impulse except by finding fault with underlings and choosing the least disagreeable of the foods offered for his midday meal. In all other respects he is guided， not by impulse， but by deliberate purpose. What he does， he does， not because the act is pleasant， but because he hopes that it will bring him money or some other reward. It is because of this power of acting with a view to a desired end that ethics and moral rules are effective， since they suggest， on the other hand， a distinction between good and bad purposes， and on the other hand， a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate means of achieving purposes. But it is easy in dealing with civilized men to lay too much stress on conscious purpose and too little on the importance of spontaneous impulse. The moralist is tempted to ignore the claims of human nature， and if he does so， it is likely that nature will ignore the claims of the moralist.

Ethics， though primarily individual even when it deals with duty with others， is faced with its most difficult problems when it comes to consider social groups. Wisdom as regards the action of social groups requires a scientific study of human nature in society， if we are to be able to judge what is possible and what impossible. The first thing is to be clear as to the important motives the behavior of individuals and groups. Of these the most imperative are those concerned with survival， such as food and shelter and clothing and reproduction.9 But， when these are secure， other motives become immensely strong. Of these， acquisitiveness10， rivalry， vanity， and love of power are the most important. Most of the political actions of groups and their leaders can be traced to these four motives， together with what is necessary for survival.

Every human being， after the first few days of his lives， is the product of two factors： on the one hand， there is his congenial endowment；11 on the other hand， there is the effect of environment， including education. There have been endless controversies as to the relative importance of these two factors. Pre-Darwin reformers， in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries， attributed almost everything to education； but， since Darwin， there has been a tendency to lay stress on heredity12 as opposed to environment. The controversy， of course， can be only as to the degree of importance of the two factors. Everyone must admit that each plays its part. Without attempting to reach any decision as to the matters in debate， we may assert pretty confidently that the impulses and desires which determine the behavior of an adult depend to an enormous extent upon his education and his opportunities. The importance of this arises through the fact that some impulses， when they exist in two human beings or in two groups of human beings， are such as essentially involve strife， since the satisfaction of the one is incompatible with the satisfaction of the other； while there are other impulses and desires which are such that the satisfaction of one individual or group is a help， or at least not a hindrance， to the satisfaction of the other. The same distinction applies， though in a lesser degree， in an individual life. I may desire to get drunk tonight and to have my faculties at their very best tomorrow morning. These desires get in each others way. Borrowing a term from Leibnizs account of possible worlds，13 we may call two desires or impulses “compossible” when both can be satisfied， and“conflicting” when the satisfaction of the one is incompatible with that of the other. If two men are both candidates for the Presidency of the United States， one of them must be disappointed. But if both men wish to become rich， the one by growing cotton and the other by manufacturing cotton cloth， there is no reason why both should not succeed. It is obvious that a world in which the aims of different individuals or groups are compossible is likely to be happier than one in which they are conflicting. It follows that it should be part of a wise social system to encourage compossible purposes， and discourage conflicting ones， by means of education and social systems designed to this end.

The central group of facts of which a political theory must take account is concerned with the character of social groups. There are various ways in which groups may differ. Among these， the most important are： cause of cohesion， purpose， size， intensity of the control of the group over the individual， and form of government. This leads to the question of power and its concentration or diffusion， which is perhaps the most important in the whole theory of politics. The difficulty of the question arises from the fact that there are technical reasons for concentrating power， but that those who have power are almost secure to abuse it. Democracy is an attempt to solve this problem， but is not always a successful attempt.

A number of problems of great complexity arise from the impact of new techniques upon a society whose organization and habits of thought are adapted to an older system. There have been two great revolutions in human history which came about this way. The first was the introduction of agriculture； the second， that of scientific industrialism. In each case the technical advance was a cause of vast human misery. Agriculture introduced serfdom， human sacrifice， and subjection of women， and the despotic empires which succeeded each other from the first Egyptian dynasty to the fall of Rome.14 The evils resulting from the intrusion of scientific technique are， it is to be feared， only just beginning. The greatest of them is the intensification of war， but there are many others. Exhaustion of natural resources， destruction of individual initiative by governments， control over mens minds by central organs of education and propaganda， are some of the major evils which appear to be on the increase as a result of the impact of science upon minds suited by tradition to an earlier kind of world. Modern science and technique have enhanced the powers of rulers， and have made it possible， as never before， to create whole societies on a plan conceived in some mans head. This possibility has led to an intoxication15 with love of system， and in this intoxication， the elementary claims of the individual are forgotten. To find a way of doing justice to these claims is one of the major problems of our time.

The world in which we found ourselves is one where great hopes and appalling fears are equally justified by the possibilities. The fears are very generally felt， and are tending to produce a world of listless gloom.16 The hopes， since they involve imagination and courage， are less vivid in most mens minds. It is only because they are not vivid that they seem utopian. Only a kind of mental laziness stands in the way. If this can be overcome， mankind has a new happiness within its grasp.

觀察人類的生命可以有多種不同的方式?？梢园讶祟愐暈椴溉閯游锏囊粋€物種，純粹從生物學角度加以研究。從這種視點出發(fā)，他的成功是無與倫比的。他可以生活在任何氣候下，生活在世界上任何一個有水源的地區(qū)。他的數(shù)量一直在增長，現(xiàn)在則增長得更快了。他的成功得益于把他和其他動物區(qū)別開來的一些事物：說話，火，農(nóng)業(yè)，書寫，工具，還有大規(guī)模的合作。

正是在合作這一點上，他沒有能夠取得十全十美的成功。人類和其他動物一樣，充滿了各種沖動和激情，總體來說，這些有助于人類在演化的過程中生存下去。可是，人類的智慧也使其明白，激情經(jīng)常會造成事與愿違，如果收斂自己的某些激情而發(fā)展另一些激情，那么他的欲望可以得到更大的滿足，他的幸?？梢愿油隄M。在大部分時間和大部分地點，人類并沒有把自己視為一個和其他物種互相競爭的物種。他感興趣的，不是單個的人，而是人群；人群又被劃分為涇渭分明的敵友陣營。有時候，這種劃分對于競爭的勝利者很有用，比如白人和紅種印第安人之間的沖突?？墒?，隨著智慧和發(fā)明增加了社會組織的復雜性，合作的益處持續(xù)增大，競爭的益處持續(xù)減小。因為智慧和沖動互相沖突，所以倫理學和道德規(guī)范對人類而言不可或缺。如果只有智慧，或者只有沖動，那就不會有倫理學存在的空間。

人們?yōu)榧で樗?，任性妄為，且相當瘋狂。借著那股瘋狂勁兒，他們把?zāi)難強加到自己和他人身上，這些災(zāi)難可能規(guī)模巨大?？墒牵M管容易沖動的生活是危險的，如果人類不想活得沒滋沒味，就必須保留沖動的本能。在沖動和控制的兩極之間，倫理學必須找到一個平衡點，才能使人們過上幸福生活。正是這種源于人性最深處的沖突，催生了對于倫理學的需求。

就沖動和欲望而言，人類比其他任何動物都要復雜，這種復雜性給人帶來了各種煩難。他既不像螞蟻和蜜蜂那樣完全群居，也不像獅子和老虎一樣完全獨來獨往，而是一種半群居動物。他的有些沖動和欲望是社會性的，另一些則是個體性的。單獨禁閉是一種非常嚴厲的懲罰形式，證明了人類的天性中有著社會性的一面；而人類天性的另外一面，則體現(xiàn)在看重個人隱私，不愿意跟陌生人說話。格雷厄姆·華萊斯在其杰作《政治中的人性》里指出，生活在倫敦之類人口稠密地區(qū)的人們發(fā)展出一種社會行為的防御機制，使自己避開不勝其擾的人際交往。在公共汽車或者城郊列車里，人們通常挨坐在一起，互不搭話，可是一旦有某種緊急情況發(fā)生，比如空襲，甚至是罕見的濃霧，這些陌生人馬上就會開始視彼此為朋友，放下矜持交談起來。這種行為表明，人性在個體性和社會性的兩面之間來回擺動。正因為我們不是完全社會性的，所以需要倫理學來告訴我們行為的目的何在，需要道德規(guī)范來反復灌輸各種行動規(guī)則。螞蟻看來就沒有這種需要：支配它們行為的總是群體的利益。

然而人類不一樣，即使他能夠讓自己像螞蟻一樣屈從于公共利益，也不會就此完全滿足，還會意識到自己天性中的一部分仍然處于極度饑餓之中，而這個部分看來對他自己非常重要。不可以說，人性的個體性的一面不如社會性的一面有價值。用宗教術(shù)語來表述的話，這兩面分別對應(yīng)《福音書》里的兩條教義：愛上帝，愛我們的鄰居。對于那些不再信仰上帝或者傳統(tǒng)神學的人而言，可能有必要對表述方式做些調(diào)整，可是其中體現(xiàn)的倫理觀卻并沒有根本性差別。神秘主義者、詩人、藝術(shù)家和科學發(fā)現(xiàn)者，究其本質(zhì)，無不是獨行客。他們所從事的工作可能讓他人受益，這對他們可能是種鼓勵，可是，他們在心目中為自己設(shè)定好了某種職責，在他們最活躍、最完滿地踐行這種職責的時刻，并沒有為他人著想，而是在追求自己的理想境界。

因此，我們必須承認，人類的卓越品質(zhì)包含了兩個截然不同的要素，一個是社會性，另一個是個體性。任何一種倫理學，如果僅僅考慮其中之一而不及其余，都將是不完整和不盡如人意的。

人類事務(wù)對于倫理學的需求，不僅起因于人類的半群居性，或者起因于他無法實現(xiàn)內(nèi)心的理想境界，還起因于人類和其他動物的另一個區(qū)別。人類的行動并非全部起源于直接的沖動，而是能夠被有意識的目的所控制和引導。在某種輕微的程度上，高等動物也具備這種能力。狗會允許主人在把它腳掌的刺拔出來的過程中弄痛它自己。克勒的類人猿做出各種各樣非本能的動作來努力夠到香蕉。盡管如此，有一點始終是千真萬確的：即便是高等動物，它們的絕大多數(shù)行動仍然是由直接的沖動所激發(fā)。文明人卻不是這樣。一個人，從極力壓制繼續(xù)賴床的強烈欲望、從床上爬起來的那一刻起，到發(fā)現(xiàn)自己要獨自度過漫漫長夜之時，他很少有機會沖動行事，除非找下屬的茬兒，或者對供應(yīng)給自己的午餐挑挑揀揀。在其他任何方面，指導他的都不是沖動，而是經(jīng)過慎重思考后決定的目的。他之所以做他所做的事，不是因為這個行動帶給他愉悅，而是希望能從中賺到錢，或者得到其他回報。正是因為這種著眼于一個渴望達到的目的而行動的力量，倫理學和道德規(guī)范才會起作用，因為它們一方面表明了善的目的與惡的目的之間存在區(qū)別，另一方面也表明了為達目的所采取的正當手段和不正當手段截然不同?？墒?，與文明人打交道很容易過度強調(diào)有意識的目的，而漠視心血來潮的沖動的重要性。道德家忍不住忽略人性的各種訴求；如果他這么做，那么人性很可能也會忽略道德家的種種主張。

即使是涉及相對他人的義務(wù)，倫理學也主要是針對個人的。盡管如此，當它開始研究社會集團的時候，就會面對最為棘手的問題。關(guān)于社會集團的行動明智與否，需要對社會中的人性進行科學的研究，前提是我們能夠判斷什么是可能的，什么是不可能的。首先要明確支配個人和集團行為的重要動機，其中最為迫切的是那些與生存息息相關(guān)的，比如食物、住所、衣服和生育?？墒?，一旦這些穩(wěn)穩(wěn)到手，另一些動機就會變得極其強大，貪欲、好勝、虛榮和權(quán)欲就是其中最重要的。各個集團及其領(lǐng)袖的大部分政治行動歸根結(jié)底就是基于這四種動機，加上對于生存不可或缺的那些動機。

每個人在出生幾天以后，都會成為兩個因素的產(chǎn)物：一個是自身合宜的先天稟賦，另一個是包括教育在內(nèi)的環(huán)境的影響。這兩個因素究竟孰重孰輕，一直爭議不斷。18世紀和19世紀早期，達爾文之前的改良者幾乎把一切都歸結(jié)為教育；可是，自達爾文伊始，出現(xiàn)了一種趨勢，重視遺傳性而非環(huán)境。當然，這種爭議的焦點只是這兩個因素究竟哪個更重要一些。無可否認，兩者都在發(fā)揮作用。盡管我們無意就爭論中的各個問題得出任何結(jié)論，仍然可以相當有信心地斷言，導致一個成人做出某種行為的各種沖動和欲望，在極大程度上取決于他所受到的教育和獲得的機遇。這一點的重要性可從以下事實窺見一斑：當有些沖動存在于兩個個體或者兩個集團當中的時候，基本上處于對立狀態(tài)，因為滿足一個和滿足另一個不相容；與此同時也存在其他沖動和欲望，其性質(zhì)使得滿足一個個體或者集團有助于滿足其他個體或者集團，或者至少不妨礙后者獲得滿足。同樣的區(qū)別也適用于個人生活，只不過程度較輕。我既想今晚大醉一場，又想明早仍舊精神抖擻。這些欲望彼此妨礙。借用萊布尼茲描述“可能世界”的一個術(shù)語，當兩個欲望或者沖動都可以被滿足的時候，我們可以稱它們“共同可能”；當滿足一個和滿足另一個不相容的時候，我們可以稱它們“互相沖突”。如果兩個人都參加美國總統(tǒng)競選，那么其中一人必然落選?？墒?，如果兩個人都想致富，一個靠種棉花，另一個生產(chǎn)棉布，那么完全有可能二人都得償所愿。顯然，不同個體或集團有著共同可能的目標的世界，很可能要比他們的目標互相沖突的世界更加幸福。由此可以推斷，明智的社會制度應(yīng)該鼓勵共同可能的目的，阻止互相沖突的目的，而要做到這一點，就必須針對這個目標設(shè)計教育和社會體制。

政治學理論必須考慮的那些重要事實關(guān)注社會集團的性質(zhì)。集團可能各不相同，其中最重要的區(qū)別在于凝聚的原因、目的、規(guī)模、集團對個體控制的強度，以及政府的形式。這些會引出權(quán)力以及集權(quán)或者分權(quán)的問題，而這或許就是整個政治學理論中最重要的部分。這個問題很難求解，因為權(quán)力集中有技術(shù)方面的原因，可是那些擁有權(quán)力的人幾乎都會濫用權(quán)力。民主制度嘗試解決這個問題，可是實情往往并不盡如人意。

新技術(shù)對社會產(chǎn)生影響，引發(fā)大量極其復雜的問題，尤其是當這個社會的組織方式和思想習慣還在按照舊體制的那套運行。人類歷史上有兩次大變革便是如此，第一次是農(nóng)業(yè)的誕生，第二次是科學工業(yè)主義的誕生。每一次變革，技術(shù)進步都給人類帶來了巨大的不幸。農(nóng)業(yè)引進了農(nóng)奴制、活人祭、男尊女卑，還有從第一個古埃及王朝開始到羅馬帝國滅亡期間此起彼伏的專制帝國?？茖W技術(shù)入侵所造成的種種惡果，恐怕才剛剛拉開序幕。其中最大的惡果就是導致戰(zhàn)爭升級，可是還有很多其他的惡果，主要包括對自然資源的竭澤而漁，政府對個人自主權(quán)的毀滅，通過教育和宣傳等核心部門控制人的思想。由于科學對因循守舊的人類思維施加影響，這些惡果看起來不斷擴大?，F(xiàn)代科技讓統(tǒng)治者擁有了更多的權(quán)力，使得根據(jù)某人頭腦里的構(gòu)想來創(chuàng)造整體社會成為可能。這種可能性導致人們沉迷于體制而不能自拔，忘卻了個體的基本訴求。尋找一種公正的方式處理這些訴求，是我們這個時代的主要問題之一。

在我們身處的這個世界，巨大的希望或可怕的恐懼有著同樣的可能性?？謶謺谌巳寒斨新樱苋菀鬃屖澜缱兊贸翋炾幱?。而希望呢，因為需要想象力和勇氣，所以在大多數(shù)人的頭腦中并沒有那么生動，就是因為不夠生動，所以看起來好像是烏托邦。某種思想的懶惰成為唯一的攔路虎。如果可以克服這一點，一種嶄新的幸福對人類而言將是觸手可及的。

1. minister to： 給予援助。

2. diminution： 減少，縮小。

3. gregarious：（動物）群居的，（人）愛社交的。

4. Graham Wallas： 格雷厄姆·華萊斯（1858—1932），英國教育家和政治學家，倡導用實驗的方法研究人的行為；defence mechanism： 防御機制，指人類自我用來對抗其所察覺到的危險并保護自身的心理過程，也指在這一過程中所運用的技巧。這個過程通常是無意識的。

5. oscillation： 擺動。

6. inculcate： 反復灌輸。

7. dictate： 命令，規(guī)定。

8. K？hler： 克勒（1887—1967），德國心理學家、格式塔心理學派創(chuàng)始人之一，通過實驗發(fā)現(xiàn)黑猩猩具有設(shè)計和應(yīng)用簡單工具、建立簡單結(jié)構(gòu)的能力，著有《類人猿的智力》等。

9. imperative： 極為重要的，緊急的；reproduction：生育，繁衍。

10. acquisitiveness： 貪婪攫取。

11. congenial： 合意的，相宜的；endowment： 天資，天賦。

12. heredity： 遺傳（性）。

13. Leibniz： 萊布尼茲（1646—1716），德國自然科學家、哲學家、數(shù)學家；possible world：可能世界，運用此概念的理論家認為，實際世界是很多可能世界中的一個。

14. serfdom： 農(nóng)奴制；subjection：征服，強行統(tǒng)治；despotic： 專制的，暴虐的。

15. intoxication： 陶醉，極度興奮。

16. listless： 倦怠的，無精打采的；gloom：憂郁，陰暗。