文/ Victor Margolin （University of Illinois, Chicago）譯/劉 越 陳祥潔

設計學博士教育中的歷史、理論與批判

文/ Victor Margolin （University of Illinois, Chicago）譯/劉 越 陳祥潔

History, Theory, and Criticism in Doctoral Design Education

DOl編碼：10.3969/J.lSSN.1674-4187.2017.01.012

一

自Herbert Simon三十年前在麻省理工學院的康普頓講座首次提出“設計科學”這一概念，這一目標至今仍未達成。社會各界特別是設計教育工作者一直致力于在主要知識領域的基礎上嚴格規(guī)范設計的定義，并希望這項努力被社會大眾認可。然而，關于這一學科具體包含哪些內容至今沒有達成一致。

Nigel Cross主編的英國雜志Design Studies是支持創(chuàng)立設計學科的力量之一。在1996年的一篇社論中，Cross回應了來自美國的一份報告，報告中表示幾位設計的同事沒有被各自的大學續(xù)聘任期，因為負責審核申請的人認為他們的設計研究缺乏嚴謹性和相關性，Cross在社論中指出：“我們一直認為，設計學科的合理性的認知度和接受度在不斷提高，設計作為一門學科越來越多的為大眾所知。讓人失望的是，設計仍然不能作為一個學術與研究的合理學科被領先的學術機構認可?！?/p>

Cross進一步闡釋了其對當下設計學科被科學或藝術等外來文化淹沒的反對，盡管他意識到了在適當?shù)臅r候借鑒這些文化的價值。合法性是他關注的基本問題?！拔覀儽仨毮軌蜃C明，我們知識文化的嚴謹性和相關性標準至少要與其他知識文化標準相匹配”，他寫道。

在尋求基于其他文化體系標準的合法性的過程中，盡管Cross沒有詳細介紹，但他呼應了Simon觀點，即設計概念化的方式是值得大學研究的內容。事實上，Cross在他的社論中廣泛引用了Simon的《設計科學》。

Cross把Simon的工作作為一個設計科學或學科的先例， 然而Simon的書中缺失的一個論點在于，Simon試圖在設計過程中盡可能減少直觀判斷的影響，從而推動設計作為一門科學的合法化，而這也構成了他的書《The Science s of the Artificial》的其中一章。他寫道：“在過去，我們所了解到的大部分設計和人工科學是智力參與薄弱、直觀的、非正式的和菜譜式的”。相反地，他把設計學定義為“從智力層面而言有難度但可解析、有點形式化、有點經(jīng)驗主義、又具有教育意義的設計過程?！币虼耍蓚鬟f性和可驗證性是設計思維得以實現(xiàn)合法性的前提。

我們知道，Simon在美國一所大學發(fā)表演講時，用工程師群體更容易接受的術語重新定義了設計科學的標準和要求。因此，他在書中用大量篇幅介紹了從設計科學如何形成可以有效解決問題的邏輯方式。Simon認為一個受尊重的設計學科的基礎是其邏輯的嚴謹性，然而這一點卻往往被那些將他的學術成果引用為新設計學科先例的人所忽視。幾乎沒有其他設計教育工作者像Simon一樣定義設計，尋求一種可以或者部分可以為電腦所替代的闡明設計過程要素的方式，他在《設計科學》一書中進一步闡釋了這一目標。如果今天讓他做類似的演講，那他很可能會在歌頌人工智能和專家系統(tǒng)的進步。他反對所謂“食譜法”，因為這一方法把設計從工科課程體系中分離了出來，他否定了將判斷或經(jīng)驗作為設計基礎的說法，因為這些并不能夠成為被工程師所能理解的語言。

而他所信奉的設計過程應該體現(xiàn)“運行中的計算機程序：優(yōu)化算法、搜索程序、為設計汽車專用程序、平衡生產(chǎn)線、選擇投資組合、定位倉庫、設計公路、疾病的診斷和治療，等等”。

Simon的設計理論是操作性。他對基于數(shù)學推導過程的決策策略比較感興趣。他更注重方法而非結果。他避免把判斷和經(jīng)驗作為設計決策的基礎，而是準確運用這些特質來描述那些未經(jīng)系統(tǒng)定義的設計目標，正如其他理論中同樣未經(jīng)系統(tǒng)定義的方法論。他定義了他的案例，將“城市、建筑物或是經(jīng)濟”等，都看做一個個復雜的系統(tǒng)，從而使他將他所提倡的的解決問題的特定方式定義為最合適的設計方式。Simon的設計項目只是一種假設而非實體，因此從其他角度來說可能有爭議。

二

我把Simon的工作視為設計研究的起點。在康普頓講座發(fā)表之后的幾年里，他的書被多次再版，許多研究人員開始關注Simon關于構建可以組成設計學科的嚴謹領域知識主體的呼吁?，F(xiàn)在鮮有圍繞設計學的討論，那些最關注學科性的人也沒有被Simon對判斷和經(jīng)驗的否定約束。但Simon文章中對設計活動看似廣泛的定義（“人人參與設計，并提出可以改良現(xiàn)狀的方法?！保┏蔀橥苿釉O計研究更側重于設計過程而不是發(fā)展一個批判性的實踐理論的動力。

如果“設計科學”這一術語能夠得到更廣泛的傳播的話，會將現(xiàn)今發(fā)生的許多設計研究和設計活動定義在設計之外。如果試圖通過科學論述來驗證設計實踐的方法，將簡單地創(chuàng)建一個基于邏輯嚴密性的層次結構，在我看來，將會成為論證設計作為一門學術學科合法性的反面佐證。

我更傾向于把設計活動看作設計研究方式這樣更為開放的概念，而非那種把單一領域知識作為調查研究的主要對象的先入為主的想法。我承認領域知識的價值，但當用過于嚴格的方式來要求或者定義它時，我們往往會忽略其他有價值的觀點。和Cross不同，我不擔心“科學或藝術領域的外來文化會使我們的研究陷入困境”，相反，我很贊同那些無論是在實踐層面還是理論層面有助于更好地理解設計的論述多樣性。

多年以來，“設計研究”而不是“設計科學”被用來代表不同的設計研究領域。它起源于Nigel Cross主編的同名雜志，該雜志由英國的設計研究學會投資成立?！对O計研究》致力于把設計發(fā)展成一門學科，并形成相關編輯政策以實現(xiàn)這一目的。

但“設計研究”也被用來代表更加多元化的事業(yè)項目。這也是我和來自《設計問題》的同事Richard Buchanan和Dennis Doordan采取的方法。我們更傾向于把設計研究視為一個開放的領域，不同的設計思想可以在這里相互碰撞。《設計問題》已經(jīng)很多年沒有發(fā)表過基于經(jīng)驗主義研究的文章了，但我們在改變立場以盡可能多地包容設計思想的多樣性。

三

到目前為止，關于設計究竟應該被視為一門科學、一門學科還是一種具有包容性的實踐的問題，已經(jīng)對學士和碩士個人的設計項目造成了一定的影響，但仍未成為整個設計界的核心問題。隨著博士課程在設計學科的出現(xiàn)，更深入地反映設計的本質以便更好地評估新的教育舉措顯得尤為重要。學士和碩士的課程主要是實踐導向的，即使這些課程也經(jīng)常包含研究的成分，但設計博士學位更有可能成為設計被社會理解的決定因素，因為它更側重設計研究。為了使一個研究群體得到別人的尊重，無論是研究人員和外行人，相關產(chǎn)業(yè)必須知道如何評估以及利用這些研究的產(chǎn)物。因此，開展一場關于設計活動本質的討論顯得極其重要，這樣可以讓教育工作者對什么類型的設計研究將被視為有價值的有更廣泛的理解，即使這些研究傾向是相互矛盾的。我這里講的不是追求統(tǒng)一單一方式或研究目標的學術領域，而是承認并重視那些涉及其他產(chǎn)業(yè)共享的多元化的研究方法和目標。

我認為，歷史、理論和批判主義應該在設計研究的不同領域發(fā)揮核心作用，并應該成為設計博士教育項目課程的一部分。在這三個科目里，理論還是最難描述的一個，因為它有很多不同的解釋方式。Simon認為理論應具備操作性，包括效用理論、統(tǒng)計決策理論、層次系統(tǒng)理論和理論邏輯。設計理論，正如他所定義的，補充了自然科學課程“在培訓專業(yè)工程師或任何以解決問題為目的的專業(yè)人士的過程中，起到選擇、合成和決定的作用”。Simon把理論加入設計科學課程的做法讓人把歷史和批判主義與之產(chǎn)生關聯(lián)的同時，不由得不質疑他未交待清楚的設計定義的依據(jù)。雖然Simon很謹慎地區(qū)分設計科學與自然科學，他已經(jīng)吸收了這些設計方法并嵌入到設計的技術框架。這種框架優(yōu)先把系統(tǒng)思維作為一種生成設計項目的方式，并以效率作為衡量設計設想有效性的一種方法。

Simon定義的設計實踐和理論屬于已故的哲學家Herbert Marcuse所說的“技術理性”，Marcuse說，“在單一維度的思想和行為模式里，想法、愿望和目標這些術語因其內容超出了現(xiàn)有的語言和行為描述而被排斥甚至刪除。給定系統(tǒng)的合理性和定量的拓展對他們重新進行了定義”，“顯然Simon拒絕把判斷和經(jīng)驗作為非量化和不可轉化的設計思想的來源與Marcuse的主張一致。

Marcuse進而認為，封閉的理性系統(tǒng)將人人居住的宇宙定義為受制于那些掌握權力的人。雖然在這一點上，我不希望采用Marcuse政治辯論的全部力量，但我確實想指出他的批判與歷史、理論和批判主義在博士課程中的地位的相關性。設計教育中常見的情況是，這些學科的課程是從屬于實踐訓練的邏輯的。他們提供某種形式的學術合法性并適度提高設計學生的意識，但他們不會質疑或者挑戰(zhàn)其他課程?？傊?，他們被納入一個理性的教學系統(tǒng)中。

歷史、理論和批判主義在設計教育中的從屬地位，是伴隨著大多數(shù)設計師在構想設計實踐方式的過程中遇到的困難出現(xiàn)的，而不是文化帶來的困難。然而，正如Richard Buchanan所說：

“假設是，將一個固定的或確定的設計主題交付給設計師，同時以同樣的方式將明確的自然主題交付給科學家。然而，設計是沒有給定的主題的。它是在發(fā)明和規(guī)劃的活動中或是那些設計師認為能夠有助于其描述工作特性的方法和過程中產(chǎn)生的?！?/p>

雖然Buchanan沒有像Marcuse那樣強調政治議程，但他對設計不定性的描述與Marcuse對如何創(chuàng)造及延續(xù)社會實踐的批判性反思的關注是一致的。盡管有人會認為，設計師的任務服從于文化結構尤其是工商企業(yè)活動，也有人會說，我們還不知道設計內容的界限。正如Marcuse所說：

“每一個既定的社會為了使得在體制框架中運作，都有預先判斷潛在項目合理性的趨勢。同時，每一個既定的社會都面臨著性質不同的歷史實踐的現(xiàn)實或可能性的質變，甚至可能會破壞現(xiàn)有的制度框架?！?/p>

如果我們承認設計的不確定性并接受Marcuse關于既定社會如何排除其他可能性的解釋，我們也需要認識到，設計理論最基本的是其社會功效理論而不是簡單的技術理論。Marcuse對技術理性的批判為把設計思想嵌入更大范圍的社會思想活動提供了基礎，而不是把設計想法從它的社會現(xiàn)狀中孤立起來或將設計發(fā)明的過程單獨理論化。如果我們將設計作為一種社會實踐，那就不得不考慮和評估它會在哪些情況下發(fā)生，而不能像Simon那樣將其視為一種自然而然的過程。

當我們承認我們與社會的關系是我們設計的關系的一部分，我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn)Marcuse關于把歷史、理論、批判作為所有設計教育不僅僅是博士培養(yǎng)的核心地位的想法是非常有說服力的。Marcuse為把歷史、理論和批評融入一個完整的設計反思項目提供了正當?shù)睦碛?，這同時也為實踐和教學提供了批判性的解釋。

作為對抗單一緯度的技術理性主義的手段，他提出了一種獨立于思想和實踐的主導系統(tǒng)以外的辯證邏輯。歷史使得辯證邏輯具體化。辯證邏輯“將其真理性解釋為，將其自身從掩蓋事實真相背后的欺騙性對象中脫離出來，即，如果它能夠將其自身世界理解為歷史的宇宙，則其中的已確立的事實即為人類歷史實踐之產(chǎn)物”。

存在于當前的環(huán)境之外歷史事件，也標志著人類經(jīng)驗的連續(xù)性。過去的斗爭也可以成為現(xiàn)在的斗爭。歷史經(jīng)驗可以為現(xiàn)狀提供其他選擇，并為固有邏輯之外評估現(xiàn)狀提供依據(jù)。二維思想對Marcuse而言就是被主流文化抵制的批判性思維。

既定的現(xiàn)實有一套特定的矛盾邏輯，它有利于保持既定的生活方式和那些復制并改良這種思維方式的行為模式。既定的現(xiàn)實有其自身的發(fā)展規(guī)律和真理；試圖努力去理解他們或者超越他們意味著與之不同的邏輯和真理。

Marcuse肯定地指出，這些不同的邏輯不具有可操作性，在面對主導體系的標準時可能會顯得蒼白無力。這一事實被一些科學家對軟硬科學的區(qū)分而證實，這些區(qū)別經(jīng)常在學術推廣和授予之類的政治活動中得以體現(xiàn)。這也是我們聯(lián)想到， Nigel Cross在他的《設計研究》社論中所說的那些設計研究的同事被所在單位拒絕續(xù)聘，因為他們的工作被認為是不夠嚴謹?shù)摹＿@也使得我們用邏輯的嚴密性來看待Simon所專注的事，并以此作為評價設計思想的主要標準。

這并不是說辯證思維就不嚴密。但是，相較于“硬”科學邏輯，歷史和理論更容易被看作是“軟”思想。與一個體系的主導價值觀相一致的思想，總是比那些體系以外的思想看起來更合理。然而，歷史可以為我們批判當下提供有說服力的例證。

William Morris的實踐，向我們展示了辯證邏輯的強大。Morris以工業(yè)革命之前的手工生產(chǎn)實踐為例，通過其勞動分工與機械化反駁了工業(yè)化的邏輯。他還試圖在他的各種企業(yè)的工作中使用這種做法。雖然他沒有成功改變工業(yè)體系也沒有使其他選擇長久制度化，他的思想依然是對許多被認為是工業(yè)化帶來的非人性面的批判。Morris的想法經(jīng)由諸如Herman Muthesius ，Walter Gropius， Ivan Illich 以及E.F. Schumacher等設計界的杰出思想家、教育工作者和從業(yè)者的沿襲一直流傳到現(xiàn)在。作為一個思想家，Morris對后來的設計師、教育工作者和理論家的影響是巨大的，因為他曾強烈表達對他那個時代技術理性的反對。他的論點仍有說服力，如同我們試圖理解當前的技術動蕩。當歷史、理論、批評處于設計課程的邊緣化時，社會條件對設計實踐的重要性就會衰退。一些教育家把領域知識僅稱作可操作的知識而不是擴展和細化設計師的自我意識的知識，能夠使他或她做出對價值觀和目標作出更明智的判斷。然而，僅僅把判斷和經(jīng)驗重新納入設計想象的領域是不夠的，這些素質必須被視為自身權利的主體來分析和培養(yǎng)。

歷史是我們共同的經(jīng)驗。我們知道的越多，我們就越能用它來質疑社會的普遍價值。對歷史一無所知就意味著放棄在體系之外尋求其他可能以及改變的權利。如果我們確實認識到設計的偶然性，那么我們應該通過承認社會系統(tǒng)的偶然性來強化這一概念。談論設計的不確定性與將它局限在既定情境的實踐中是相互矛盾的。如果設計師想要實現(xiàn)設計思維的全部潛力，那么這種思維必須擴展到考慮設計發(fā)生的情景本身是如何被設計的。

四

設計作為一種社會空間內發(fā)生的活動，它的偶然性受特定項目的價值和局限性影響。設計是充分復雜的，因其分析往往聚焦于特定實踐的必要性，而其焦點研究則受研究整體框架的影響。

設計理論需要承認可操作性活動的技術和他們的文化影響和接受度之間的相互作用。但是目前，設計理論家的群體是支離破碎的。一些人只在社會科學或技術框架內創(chuàng)建理論，而另一些人不管過程只考慮設計對文化的影響。也許在更廣泛的設計研究領域內，最有組織的學者群體是被稱作設計思維研究小組的一群人。這個小組自1991年以來一直定期舉行會議，主要由來自工程、建筑、工業(yè)設計、計算機科學和心理學的研究人員組成。他們已經(jīng)撰寫了一系列文章和著作發(fā)表。但他們并未嘗試把他們的工作與那些從不同角度看設計的理論家聯(lián)系起來。這種缺乏溝通要求更多地參與到關于設計的偶然性以及產(chǎn)生這種偶然性的社會情境中去。我們不需要一個設計實踐的整體模型，事實上我們也不應該尋求這樣的模型。如果理論家們更多地嘗試以不同的方式和關注點，至少承認彼此的活動甚至是把它們與自己的工作相聯(lián)系，設計研究將推進理論的前沿性。直到目前為止，這樣的嘗試還幾乎沒有，但是當我們討論博士教育問題時，這就顯得很必要，正如之前所說，為了解更清楚研究群體的概要，在此之內規(guī)劃不同的活動并揭示它們之間的關系。

歷史、理論和批評應該是這個群體的核心，不僅是為了促成新的活動，也是為了保持對研究過程的持續(xù)性質疑。一個成熟的領域需要一個持續(xù)的功能性言語來反饋關于其如何運作的評估。評論對一個多元化的研究群體來說必不可少。它的功能是批判、驗證和形成差異與爭論。評論承認研究事業(yè)本身的偶然性。對研究事業(yè)而言，不服從于將其發(fā)散性方法置于邊緣位置的、支配性的實踐理論，是很重要的。

Marcuse指出，“特定的歷史實踐可以用相應的歷史替代品來衡量”，這需要一種歷史、理論和批評培養(yǎng)出來的批判意識。把這些科目置于博士教育的核心位置就是承認他們在發(fā)展自覺意識與社會意識的設計實踐，以及創(chuàng)造一個具有相似性質的研究群體中的重要性。

原文

I

Since Herbert Simon first proposed a “science of design” in his Compton Lectures at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology thirty years ago, this goal has remained elusive. There have been continuous efforts, particularly among design educators, to rigorously ground design in a body of domain knowledge that they believe will insure its social acceptance as a serious endeavor. However, there has been no agreement as to what this knowledge consists of.

Among those who have actively pursued the task of creating a discipline of design is the British journal Design Studies, edited by Nigel Cross. In an editorial of 1996, Cross, responding to a report from the United States that several colleagues had not been granted tenure at their respective universities because those who judged their applications may have believed design research to be lacking in rigor or relevance, noted that We had assumed that there had been a growing acceptance of the academic legitimacy of design, and a growing acknowledgment of design as a discipline. It is very disappointing if design is still not accepted as a legitimate discipline of scholarship and research in some of the leading academic institutions.

Cross then went on to speak against innundating design with alien cultures from either science or art although he recognized the value of borrowing from these cultures where appropriate. His basic concern was with legitimacy. “We have to be able to demonstrate that standards of rigor and relevance in our intellectual culture at least match those of the others,”he wrote.

In seeking legitimacy based on standards that exist within other research cultures, although he did not mention any of these specifically, Cross echoed a concern of Simon’s that design be conceptualized in such a way as to be worthy of university study. In fact, Cross quoted extensively from Simon’s essay, “The Science of Design” in his editorial.

Despite frequent citations of Simon’s work as a precedent for a design science or discipline, what is frequently missed in Simon’s essay, which constitutes a chapter of his book The Science s of the Artificial, is that Simon seeks to legitimate design as a science by reducing the role of intuitive judgment in the design process as much as possible. “In the past,” he writes,“much if not most of what we knew about design and about the artificial sciences was intellectually soft, intuitive, informal, and cookbooky”. Instead, he defines a science of design as “a body of intellectuallytough, analytic, partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the design process.” Thus, design thinking has to be transferable and verifiable in order to be legitimate.

Let us remember that Simon presented his lectures at one of America’s leading technical universities and he defined his standards and criteria for a new science of design in terms that would be acceptable to a community of engineers. He therefore devoted considerable attention in his chapter on the science of design to forms of logic that would lead to efficient methods of problem solving. Simon’s bias towards a logical rigor that he believes is fundamental to a respectable design science is often overlooked by those who cite his work as a precedent for a new design discipline. Few design educators have sought, as Simon did, to articulate the elements of the design process in such a way that it or parts of it might be replicated by a computer, a goal that Simon advanced in “The Science of Design.” Were he giving a similar lecture today he would likely be celebrating advances in artificial intelligence and expert systems. He denigrates what he calls “cookbook methods” which he believes drove design from the engineering curriculum and he negates judgment or experience as the bases for design because these cannot be articulated in a language that makes sense to engineers.

Instead he espouses design processes that have been embodied in “running computer programs: optimizing algorithms, search procedures, and special-purpose programs for designing motors, balancing assembly lines, selecting investment portfolios, locating warehouses, designing highways, diagnosing and treating diseases, and so forth.”

Simon’s theory of design is an operational one. He is interested in strategies of decision-making that are based on mathematically-derived procedures. His focus is on method rather than outcome. While he eschews judgment or experience as the basis for design decision-making, he uses precisely these qualities to characterize the aims of design which are just as unsystematically defined in his theory as he might claim methodology to be in someone else’s. He defines his examples, whether “ cities, or buildings, or economies,” as complex systems, thus enabling him to privilege the particular methods of problemsolving he has been espousing as the appropriate ones for designing them. Simon’s design projects are simply given and not presented as entities that might be contested from other perspectives.

II

I present Simon’s work as one starting point that has led to the current state of design research. In the years since the Compton lectures were first published, and several further editions of Simon’s book have appeared, a number of researchers have heeded Simon’s call to establish a body of rigorous domain knowledge that would constitute a discipline of design. There has been little discussion about a science of design nor have those most concerned with issues of disciplinarity felt constrained by Simon’s rejection of judgment and experience. But Simon’s essay with its deceptively catholic definition of design activity ( “Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones.”) became the impetus for a direction in research activity that has focused more on the design process than on developing a critical theory of practice.

If the term ‘design science’ had achieved wider currency it would have excluded much of the design research and design activity that occur today. Attempting to validate the methods of design practice according to the discourse of science would simply create a hierarchy of activities based on logical rigor that would become, in my view, an unwelcome reference point for the legitimation of design as an academic subject.

I prefer a much more open conception of design activity as well as an approach to design research that is not preoccupied with justifying a separate sphere of domain knowledge as the primary subject of investigation. . I recognize the value of domain knowledge but when it is sought or defined in too strict a manner, one tends to exclude other valuable perspectives. Unlike Cross, I do not fear “swamping our research with different cultures imported either from science or art” but instead welcome the multiplicity of discourses that can contribute to a greater understanding of design, both in its practical as well as its theoretical sense.

For a number of years, the term ‘design studies,’ rather than ‘design science’ has been used to designate the diverse field of design research. It may have originated in the eponymous title of the journal currently edited by NigelCross, that developed from the founding of the Design Research Society in Great Britain. Design Studies has committed itself to developing design as a discipline and has shaped its editorial policy towards achieving that end.

But the term “design studies” has also been used to designate an enterprise that is constituted more pluralistically. This has been the approach that I and my fellow editors of Design Issues, Richard Buchanan and Dennis Doordan, have taken. We prefer to think of design studies as an open field where different ways of thinking about design can be brought into relation with each other. For many years Design Issues did not publish articles that were grounded in empirical research but we have changed our position in order to embrace as fully as possible the current diversity of design thought.

III

Until now, questions of whether or not design should be considered a science, a discipline, or a more openlyconceived practice have made some impact on individual design programs around the world at the Bachelor’s or Master’s level but they have not become central to the entire design community. With the advent of doctoral programs in design, it becomes important to reflect more deeply on the nature of design so as to better evaluate new educational initiatives, particularly at the doctoral level. Whereas programs at the Bachelor’s or Master’s level are primarily practiceoriented, even though they frequently contain research components, the design doctorate is more likely to set the parameters for the social understanding of design because of its emphasis on research. In order for a research community to be respected by others, both researchers and lay people, there must be some sense that the profession to which it is attached understands how to value and use the types of knowledge the research community produces. It is therefore extremely important to frame a debate on the nature of design activity that can eventually lead to a greater understanding among educators of what types of design research will be deemed valuable even if these research tendencies are at odds with each other. I am not speaking here of an academic field that must agree on a single method or goal of research but instead one that recognizes and values a plurality of research methods and goals that bear some shared relation to the larger profession to which they relate.

I want to argue here that history, theory, and criticism should play a central role within the diverse field of design research and should be part of the curriculum in every program of doctoral education in design. Of the three subjects, theory has remained the most difficult to characterize and the most open to different interpretations of what it is. Theory for Simon is a theory of operations that includes utility theory, statistical decision theory, theories of hierarchic systems, and theories of logic. Design theory, as he defines it, complements the natural science curriculum “in the total training of a professional engineer – or of any professional whose task is to solve problems, to choose, to synthesize, to decide.” The way that Simon has positioned theory in his curriculum for a science of design makes it impossible to bring this subject into relation with history or criticism without challenging the unspoken justification for his own definition of design. Although Simon is careful to distinguish design science from natural science, he has naturalized the methods of design and embedded them in a technical framework of designing. This framework privileges systems thinking as a means of generating design projects, and efficiency as a way of judging the efficacy of design thought.

Simon’s definitions of design practice and theory fall within what the late philosopher Herbert Marcuse has called “technological rationality.” This, Marcuse says is “a pattern of onedimensional thought and behavior in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to the terms of this universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative extension.” Clearly Simon’s rejection of judgment and experience as non-quantifiable and non-transferable sources of design thought fit Marcuse’s assertion.

Marcuse goes on to argue that closed systems of rationality define the universe in which everyone lives according to the terms of those in control. Although at this point I don’t wish to take on the full force of Marcuse’s political argument, I do want to note the relevance of his critique to the way we position history, theory, and criticism in a doctoralprogram. What frequently happens in design education is that courses in these subjects are subordinated to the logic of practical training. They provide some form of academic legitimation and modest consciousness-raising for design students but they are not expected to interrogate or challenge the rest of the curriculum. In short, they are incorporated within a system of pedagogical rationality.

The subordinate place of history, theory, and criticism in design education is concomitant with the difficulty most designers have in envisioning forms of practice other than those that are already given by the culture. And yet, as Richard Buchanan has argued The assumption is that design has a fixed or determinate subject matter that is given to the designer in the same way that the subject matter of nature is given to the scientist. However, the subject matter of design is not given. It is created through the activities of invention and planning, or through whatever other methodology or procedures a designer finds helpful in characterizing his own work.

Though Buchanan does not foreground a political agenda as Marcuse does, his characterization of design as indeterminate does coincide with Marcuse’s concern for critical reflection on the way we create and perpetuate social practices. Although some would argue that the task of the designer is given by the structure of the culture, notably the activity of business enterprises, others would say that we don’t yet know the limits of what might be designed. As Marcuse states Every established society....tends to prejudge the rationality of possible projects to keep them within its framework. At the same time, every established society is confronted with the actuality or possibility of a qualitatively different historical practice which might destroy the existing institutional framework.

If we acknowledge design’s indeterminacy and accept Marcuse’s explanation of how established society can close out alternative possibilities, we need to then recognize that design theory is at its most fundamental a theory of how design functions in society rather than simply a theory of techniques. Marcuse’s critique of technological rationalism provides a basis for embedding design thought within the larger activity of social thought rather than isolating design from its social situation and theorizing independently about its processes of invention. By holding design in our vision as a social practice, we are always obliged to consider and evaluate the situations in which it occurs rather than naturalizing them as Simon does.

When we acknowledge our relation to the social as part of our relation to design, we can find in Marcuse’s thought a cogent argument for making history, theory, and criticism central to all design education, not only to doctoral training. Marcuse provides the justification for joining history, theory, and criticism in an integral project of design reflection, which can offer a critical understanding of practice and of pedagogy as well.

As an antidote to the one-dimensionality of technological rationalism, he proposes a dialectical logic that arises from a space outside the dominant system of thought and practice. What gives dialectical logic embodiment is history. Dialectical logic“attains its truth if it has freed itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the factors behind the facts – that is, if it understands its world as a historical universe, in which the established facts are the work of the historical practice of man.”

Historical events exist outside current circumstances yet mark the continuity of human experience. Struggles from the past can also become struggles for the present. Historical experience can offer alternatives to current situations and provide the substance for evaluating the present from a position outside its logic. Two-dimensional thought for Marcuse is critical thought which is resisted by the dominant culture.

The given reality has its own logic of contradictions – it favors the modes of thought which sustain the established forms of life and the modes of behavior which reproduce and improve them. The given reality has its own logic and its own truth; the effort to comprehend them as such and to transcend them presupposes a different logic, a contradicting truth.

Marcuse rightly notes that these different logics are non-operational and may appear weak according to the criteria of the dominant system. This fact is exemplified by the distinctions that some scientists make between hard and soft science which frequently get played out in the politics of academic promotion and grant getting. It refers us also to the concern Nigel Cross expressed in his Design Studies editorial regarding design research colleagues who may have been denied tenure because their work was not seen to be sufficiently rigorous. It points us as well to Simon’s preoccupation with logical rigor as dominant criteria forevaluating design thought.

This is not to say that dialectical thought is unrigorous. But history, and theory too, can easily be seen as “soft”forms of thought compared to the “hard”logic of science. Thought which conforms to the dominant values of a system will always appear more legitimate than that which arises outside those values. And yet, history can provide us with examples that offer persuasive grounds for a critique of the present.

The practice of William Morris, shows us how powerful dialectical logic can be. Morris countered the logic of industrialization, exemplified by the division and mechanization of labor, with the preindustrial practice of craft production. He also sought to employ this practice in the work of his various enterprises. Although he did not succeed in changing the industrial system nor in institutionalizing an enduring alternative, his thought kept alive an oppositional critique of what many perceived to be the dehumanizing aspects of industrialization. Morris’s ideas have been kept alive until now through a distinguished lineage of design thinkers, educators, and practitioners ranging from Herman Muthesius and Walter Gropius to Ivan Illich and E.F. Schumacher. As a thinker Morris has had a tremendous influence on later designers, educators, and theorists because he so strongly articulated an opposition to the technical rationality of his day. His arguments are still persuasive as we struggle to make sense out of the current turbulence of technological innovation.When history, theory, and criticism are marginalized within the design curriculum, the social conditions of design practice recede in importance. What some educators want to call domain knowledge is only operational knowledge rather than knowledge that expands and refines the designer’s self-awareness, thus enabling him or her to make more informed judgments about values and goals. However, it is not enough to simply readmit judgment and experience to the realm of design imagination. These qualities must be treated as subjects in their own right which require analysis and cultivation.

History is our collective experience. The more we know of it, the more we can use it to question the prevailing values of society. To be without a knowledge of history is to give up a space outside the system where one can find alternatives and also empowerment for change. If indeed we are to recognize the contingency of design then we should reinforce that concept by acknowledging as well the contingency of social systems. It is paradoxical to speak about design’s indeterminacy and then frame it in a determined situation of practice. If designers are going to realize the full potential of design thinking, then this thinking must be extended to consider how the situations in which design occurs are themselves designed.

IV

Design as an activity occurs within a social space and its very contingency is guided by the values and limits that inform a particular project. Design is sufficiently complex for its analysis to focus of necessity on specific aspects of practice but focused research is always informed by the framework of the whole.

Design theory needs to acknowledge the interplay between the techniques of operational activity and their cultural impact and reception. At present, however, the community of design theorists is fragmented. Some theorize within a social science or technical framework exclusively while others exclude process and only consider design’s impact in and on culture. Perhaps the best organized community of scholars within the wider field of design studies is a group engaged in what some are calling Design Thinking Research. This group, which has been meeting regularly since 1991, consists primarily of researchers from engineering, architecture, industrial design, computer science, and psychology. They have generated a body of writing which has been published in journals and books. But they have not sought to bring their work into relation with other theorists who look at design from different perspectives. This lack of communication calls for more engagement with questions of design contingency and the social situations in which it gets played out. We do not need a tight holistic model of design practice, and in fact, we should not seek one. Design research would advance on the theory front if there were more attempts by theorists with different approaches and concerns to at least acknowledge each others activities and at best bring them in to relation with their own work. Until recently, there has been little impulse for this engagement but as we discuss issues of doctoral education, it becomes imperative, as I have already argued, to apprehend more clearly the contours of a research community, map the different activities within it, and reflecton the relationships between these activities.

History, theory, and criticism should be at the core of this community, not only to foster new activity but also to sustain a continuous interrogation of the research process. A mature field needs a sustained metadiscourse that feeds back assessments on how it is operating. Commentary is essential to a pluralistic research community. Its function is to critique, validate, and frame differences and debates. Commentary recognizes the contingency of the research enterprise itself. It is central to the enterprise and not subordinate to a hegemonic theory of practice that relegates its discursive methods to a marginal position.

Marcuse notes that “a specific historical practice is measured against its own historical alternatives.” This requires a critical awareness that history, theory, and criticism can foster. To position these subjects at the center of doctoral education is to recognize their importance to the development of a self-consciousness and social aware design practice as well as to the creation of a research community with similar qualities.

（責任編輯 童永生）

Victor Margolin， Professor Emeritus of Design History at the University of Illinois, Chicago.