By+Firmin+DeBrabander

Theres a well-known contradiction in the way many of us behave online， which is this： we know were being watched all the time， and pay lip service to the evils of surveillance by Google and the government.1 But the bounds of whats considered too personal， revealing or banal to be uploaded to an app or shared with a circle of social media “followers” seems to shrink by the day.

I moan about the lack of privacy， for example， and yet I willingly and routinely trade it for convenience. I am no longer forced to take my chances on a restaurant and guess which one is best； Yelp will tell me and then escort me to its front door.2 I no longer run the risk of unforeseen delays on public transport； Google Maps will inform me of the fastest route to my destination， and， in a pinch3， an Uber can get me there via any number of hidden by-roads. I no longer need to remember my friends birthdays； Facebook will nudge4 me， and invariably lure me to post an update to remind people I exist. To avail myself of5 these applications， all I have to do is make my location， habits and beliefs transparent to their parent companies whenever they choose to check in on me.

So whats going on？ “Visibility is a trap，” wrote the French philosopher Michel Foucault6 in Discipline and Punish： the Birth of the Prison （1975）. What he meant was that allowing oneself to be watched， and learning to watch others， is both seductive and dangerous. He drew upon Jeremy Benthams 18th-century plans for a “Panopticon”， a prison in which inmates are observed from a central tower manned by an invisible occupant，7 his watchful eye seeing but unseen. The idea was that the prisoners would internalize the presence of the spectral watchman， whether or not anyone was actually inside， and behave of their own accord.8

According to Foucault， the dynamics of the Panopticon bore an uncanny resemblance to how people self-monitor in society at large.9 In the presence of ever-watchful witnesses， he said， physical coercion10 is no longer necessary. People police themselves. They do not know what the observers are registering at any given moment， what they are looking for， exactly， or what the punishments are for disobedience. But the imagination keeps them pliant11. In these circumstances， Foucault claimed， the architecture of surveillances become perniciously subtle and seamless，12 so “l(fā)ight” as to be scarcely noticeable.

Individuals not only accept this form of discipline， but it soon becomes invisible to them， and they willingly perpetuate13 it.

Foucaults central claim is that such monitoring is worrisome， not just because of what corporations and states might do with our data， but because the act of watching is itself a devastating exercise of power. It has the capacity to influence behaviour and compel conformity and complicity，14 without our fully realising it.

But somethings not right here. The internet has no centre； we dont need hard evidence of a conspiracy15 between companies and governments to know that we are seen online. We seem to be surveilled from everywhere and nowhere， and yet the self-display continues. Have we been so thoroughly disciplined that the guards have taken away the watchtower， or is some other dynamic at work？

Social media provides a public space that often operates more like a private venue， where many people express themselves knowing that those watching will agree—or， particularly for internet trolls， in the belief that there they wont suffer the consequences of what they say online， as if protected by the mediation of technology. Having a smartphone and access to the internet does not automatically equip us with the tools necessary for effective and respectful collaboration， negotiation and speech.

Plato would be alarmed by the lack of shame online. He thought that shame was a crucial emotion， indispensable16 for doing philosophy and acting morally. Shame presupposes that we ought to know better but flout the rules regardless.17 This is precisely Platos point about moral knowledge： we already know the right way to live a just and fulfilling life， but are constantly diverted from that noble aim. For Plato， then， shame is a force that helps us resist the urge to conform when we know its wrong to do so. Shame helps us be true to ourselves and to heed18 the moral knowledge within. A man without shame， Plato says， is a slave to desire—for material goods， power， fame， respect. Such desire is tyrannical19 because， by its nature， it cannot be satisfied.

眾所周知，很多人在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上的表現(xiàn)都是矛盾的。一方面，我們知道自己時(shí)刻被監(jiān)視，口頭上認(rèn)同谷歌和政府的監(jiān)視行為有著種種弊端。另一方面，當(dāng)我們不斷把過(guò)于私人、暴露或平庸乏味的信息上傳到應(yīng)用軟件或分享給社交媒體上的“粉絲”時(shí)，我們對(duì)于隱私的界定似乎越來(lái)越開(kāi)放。

比如說(shuō)，我擔(dān)心失去隱私，卻自愿并習(xí)慣性地借此來(lái)?yè)Q取便利。選擇餐廳的時(shí)候，我可以不用碰運(yùn)氣；Yelp會(huì)告訴我哪家最好，并把我?guī)У讲蛷d門(mén)口。我再不用擔(dān)心公共交通突發(fā)的延誤；谷歌地圖會(huì)告訴我最快的路線，必要時(shí)可以優(yōu)步叫車(chē)送我到目的地，再偏僻的小路它都認(rèn)識(shí)。我無(wú)需再記住朋友們的生日；Facebook會(huì)給我發(fā)推送，一如既往地誘使我發(fā)一條狀態(tài)，告訴大家我還活著。為了利用這些應(yīng)用軟件，我需要做的只是把自己的位置、習(xí)慣乃至信仰對(duì)這些軟件的母公司透明公開(kāi)，以便其隨時(shí)調(diào)出我的信息。

這是一種怎樣的情形？“可見(jiàn)度是一個(gè)陷阱，”法國(guó)哲學(xué)家米歇爾·?？略凇兑?guī)訓(xùn)與懲罰：監(jiān)獄的誕生》（1975）中寫(xiě)道。他的意思是，讓自己處于監(jiān)視之中，并嘗試監(jiān)視他人，是極具誘惑力而又非常危險(xiǎn)的。他引用杰里米·邊沁在18世紀(jì)提出的“圓形監(jiān)獄”概念：在這種監(jiān)獄里，犯人被藏身于中央塔樓上的看守者監(jiān)視著，看守可以看見(jiàn)犯人，犯人卻看不見(jiàn)他。其用意就在于使犯人心存看守者無(wú)時(shí)不在的想法，這樣不管塔樓上有人沒(méi)人，犯人都會(huì)老老實(shí)實(shí)的。

?？抡J(rèn)為，圓形監(jiān)獄的動(dòng)態(tài)與整個(gè)社會(huì)內(nèi)人們的自我監(jiān)督有著驚人的相似。在他看來(lái)，因?yàn)闀r(shí)刻處于監(jiān)督之下，對(duì)身體的強(qiáng)制約束就沒(méi)必要了。人們會(huì)自己管好自己。即使不知道監(jiān)視者會(huì)在哪一刻記錄些什么，不知道他們究竟在尋找什么，也不知道違規(guī)的懲罰是什么，但是被監(jiān)視的想象就構(gòu)成了約束。?？抡J(rèn)為，這種監(jiān)視機(jī)制相當(dāng)無(wú)跡可尋，些微到令人難以察覺(jué)。

人們不僅接受了這種規(guī)訓(xùn)的形式，而且逐漸忽視了它的存在，自愿將其延續(xù)下去。

?？碌闹行恼擖c(diǎn)在于，這樣的監(jiān)視是讓人擔(dān)憂的。不只是因?yàn)楣竞驼畷?huì)利用我們的個(gè)人數(shù)據(jù)干點(diǎn)什么，而是因?yàn)楸O(jiān)視舉動(dòng)本身就是一種權(quán)力的濫用。它會(huì)在不知不覺(jué)中影響人們的行為，強(qiáng)制人們遵守并與之共謀。

但這里有點(diǎn)兒不對(duì)勁?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)并沒(méi)有一個(gè)明確的中心；即使沒(méi)有確鑿的證據(jù)，我們也很清楚公司和政府合謀在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上對(duì)我們進(jìn)行了監(jiān)視。我們似乎無(wú)時(shí)無(wú)刻不被監(jiān)視，但自我展示依然持續(xù)進(jìn)行著。是因?yàn)槲覀儽灰?guī)訓(xùn)得太過(guò)徹底，看守塔里已經(jīng)不再需要監(jiān)視者，還是有其他因素在作祟？

社交媒體提供的公共空間更像是一個(gè)私人場(chǎng)所，因?yàn)槿藗冊(cè)诎l(fā)表自己意見(jiàn)的時(shí)候，認(rèn)為監(jiān)控者會(huì)同意自己的觀點(diǎn)——尤其是那些網(wǎng)絡(luò)噴子，他們認(rèn)為自己無(wú)需承擔(dān)網(wǎng)絡(luò)發(fā)言的后果，因?yàn)榧夹g(shù)調(diào)節(jié)會(huì)保護(hù)他們。持有一部手機(jī)并且能夠上網(wǎng)，并不意味著我們就具備了高效互敬的合作、談判和演說(shuō)所需要的能力。

網(wǎng)絡(luò)上羞恥心的匱乏，大概會(huì)讓柏拉圖感到震驚。柏拉圖認(rèn)為，不管是研究哲學(xué)還是依道德行事，都離不開(kāi)羞恥心這一關(guān)鍵情感。羞恥心之所以會(huì)產(chǎn)生，是因?yàn)槲覀兠靼资吕?，卻要明知故犯。這正是柏拉圖的道德哲學(xué)觀點(diǎn)：我們并非不知道該如何過(guò)上正直和充實(shí)的人生，只是常常跑偏了而已。對(duì)柏拉圖來(lái)說(shuō)，羞恥心可以幫助我們遏制明知會(huì)犯錯(cuò)還要堅(jiān)持下去的沖動(dòng)，幫助我們誠(chéng)實(shí)地面對(duì)自己，聽(tīng)從內(nèi)心的道德召喚。柏拉圖說(shuō)，沒(méi)有羞恥心的人是欲望的奴隸，被物質(zhì)、權(quán)力、名聲和虛榮所驅(qū)使。而這種欲望是專(zhuān)橫的，因?yàn)閺谋举|(zhì)上說(shuō)，它是永遠(yuǎn)無(wú)法得到滿足的。

1. pay lip service to： 口頭上贊同，口惠而實(shí)不至；surveillance： 監(jiān)視。

2. Yelp： 美國(guó)著名商戶點(diǎn)評(píng)網(wǎng)站，囊括餐館、購(gòu)物中心、酒店等領(lǐng)域，供用戶打分、點(diǎn)評(píng)、交流體驗(yàn)；escort：護(hù)送。

3. in a pinch： 必要時(shí)，在緊要關(guān)頭。

4. nudge： 輕推。

5. avail oneself of sth.： 利用。

6. Michel Foucault： 米歇爾·?？拢?926—1984），法國(guó)哲學(xué)家、語(yǔ)言學(xué)家、文學(xué)評(píng)論家。

7. Jeremy Bentham： 杰里米·邊沁（1748—1832），英國(guó)哲學(xué)家、法學(xué)家和社會(huì)改革家；Panopticon： 圓形監(jiān)獄；inmate： 囚犯；man： v. 給……配備人員；occupant： 占據(jù)者。

8. internalize： 內(nèi)化；spectral： 幽靈的，幽靈似的；of ones own accord： 出于自愿，主動(dòng)地。

9. uncanny： 不可思議的，怪異的；at large： 普遍的。

10. coercion： 強(qiáng)制，脅迫。

11. pliant： 順從的。

12. perniciously： 有害地；seamless： 無(wú)縫的，渾然一體的。

13. perpetuate： 使持續(xù)，使長(zhǎng)存。

14. compel： 強(qiáng)迫，迫使；conformity： 遵從；complicity： 同謀，串通。

15. conspiracy： 陰謀，密謀。

16. indispensable： 必不可少的，必需的。

17. presuppose： 以……為前提；flout：藐視，無(wú)視。

18. heed： 注意，聽(tīng)從。

19. tyrannical： 殘暴的，專(zhuān)橫的。