多彥彥，夏維力

產(chǎn)能有限的供應(yīng)商主導(dǎo)的雙渠道分銷策略研究

多彥彥，夏維力

（西北工業(yè)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院，陜西 西安 710129）

在供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)能有限的背景下，研究供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)分配策略和雙渠道分銷的問題。根據(jù)期望利潤最大化建立供應(yīng)商渠道分配模型，依據(jù)納什均衡確定供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)定價(jià)、最優(yōu)產(chǎn)能和最優(yōu)分銷策略。結(jié)果表明，在雙渠道策略的情況下，供應(yīng)商應(yīng)該優(yōu)先滿足銷售企業(yè)的銷售量。若供應(yīng)鏈的銷售量恰好得到滿足，供應(yīng)商應(yīng)該按最優(yōu)產(chǎn)能生產(chǎn)。供應(yīng)商的渠道選擇與供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)能、供應(yīng)鏈各節(jié)點(diǎn)的盈利能力和生產(chǎn)成本有關(guān)。

產(chǎn)能有限；分配策略；雙渠道；納什均衡

0 引言

在市場經(jīng)濟(jì)下，一個(gè)供應(yīng)商為多個(gè)銷售企業(yè)供貨的現(xiàn)象普遍存在，然而，在供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)能有限的情況下，供應(yīng)鏈的供應(yīng)可能會(huì)受到限制。許多供應(yīng)鏈有兩個(gè)特點(diǎn)：供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)能有限，多個(gè)零售商向市場銷售產(chǎn)品。有限的能力意味著供應(yīng)商可能會(huì)按照某些策略分配產(chǎn)能以使自身利潤最大化，在汽車、電腦、航空等行業(yè)中都存在產(chǎn)品分配的問題。在供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)能有限的情況下，本文重點(diǎn)研究供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)定價(jià)、最優(yōu)產(chǎn)能和最優(yōu)分銷策略，為提高供應(yīng)鏈利潤提供理論借鑒。

本文參考的文獻(xiàn)涉及三個(gè)方面：供應(yīng)商渠道分銷、供應(yīng)鏈競爭、供應(yīng)商有限產(chǎn)能。供應(yīng)商面臨著直銷或者通過零售商間接銷售的選擇，他們的選擇會(huì)產(chǎn)生三種可能的銷售渠道結(jié)構(gòu)，即零售商渠道、直銷渠道、雙渠道。Venkatesh等人針對(duì)專有組件供應(yīng)商的最佳策略進(jìn)行了研究，三種銷售方式都具有獨(dú)特的優(yōu)化策略[1]。Alberto等人為供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)提出了一個(gè)優(yōu)化模型[2]。Pun的研究表明，在企業(yè)的盈利能力比供應(yīng)商更強(qiáng)的情況下，供應(yīng)商采取雙渠道的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)比較好[3]。雙渠道策略也可以使零售商處于均衡狀態(tài)[4]。然而上述研究假定供應(yīng)商的產(chǎn)能無限，在實(shí)際生活中，供應(yīng)商的產(chǎn)能可能是有限的，這也許會(huì)降低雙渠道策略的合理性，本文考慮供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)能有限下的最優(yōu)定價(jià)、最優(yōu)產(chǎn)能和最優(yōu)分銷策略。

供應(yīng)商和銷售企業(yè)的競爭方式多種多樣，例如價(jià)格、數(shù)量、服務(wù)水平和購物體驗(yàn)等[5]。具體來說，供應(yīng)商通過直銷的低價(jià)策略與銷售企業(yè)競爭下游市場，進(jìn)而增加自身利潤[6]。銷售企業(yè)則通過調(diào)整定貨量的方式迫使供應(yīng)商降低批發(fā)價(jià)格[7]。在上述研究中，企業(yè)是為需求競爭而不是為供應(yīng)競爭，如果供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)能有限，供應(yīng)商和銷售企業(yè)不僅會(huì)為需求競爭，也會(huì)為供應(yīng)競爭，為了更好的探索供應(yīng)商有限產(chǎn)能的影響，本文將將供應(yīng)商和銷售企業(yè)在下游市場上的競爭作為基于銷售數(shù)量的競爭。

為了更好的了解供應(yīng)鏈下游關(guān)于銷售量的競爭，本文參考了Ha（供應(yīng)鏈領(lǐng)域研究專家）等人的研究成果。Ha調(diào)查了兩個(gè)競爭供應(yīng)鏈中的信息共享問題，每個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈由一個(gè)供應(yīng)商和一個(gè)零售商組成，信息共享對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)怯欣?，信息共享能力是供?yīng)鏈競爭優(yōu)勢的來源[8][9]；信息共享的發(fā)生取決于零售商是否在數(shù)量或價(jià)格上競爭，以及制造商是否能夠有效降低成本[10]。Ha研究了兩個(gè)競爭供應(yīng)商通過一個(gè)零售商銷售可替代產(chǎn)品的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)，供應(yīng)商可以和零售商簽署信息共享契約，促使零售商分享需求信息[11]。Hu研究了一個(gè)供應(yīng)商為多個(gè)零售商供貨的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)，供應(yīng)商可以利用批發(fā)價(jià)格影響零售商的訂貨量[12]；當(dāng)兩家零售商在完全信息下進(jìn)行古諾競爭時(shí)，某些零售商可能會(huì)策略地夸大訂單量，影響供應(yīng)商決策[13]。當(dāng)零售商的訂單超過供應(yīng)商的產(chǎn)能時(shí)，供應(yīng)商必須采用某種分配機(jī)制來平衡供需，尤其在汽車行業(yè)，需要采用不同的策略來應(yīng)對(duì)需求不確定性[14]。上述研究的重點(diǎn)是供應(yīng)商如何在企業(yè)之間分配有限的產(chǎn)能，但供應(yīng)商不直接向市場銷售產(chǎn)品，不參與需求競爭，在本文的模型中，供應(yīng)商參與銷售企業(yè)的競爭，二者是競爭與合作的關(guān)系：即為需求和供應(yīng)競爭，又是供應(yīng)鏈合作伙伴。另外，雙渠道策略也能夠有效的幫助供應(yīng)商獲取需求信息，對(duì)供應(yīng)商來說，可以在一定程度上緩解牛鞭效應(yīng)。

供應(yīng)商的有限產(chǎn)能限制了供應(yīng)鏈滿足市場需求的能力，也限制了銷售企業(yè)的可用庫存，供應(yīng)商可以有效地利用有限產(chǎn)能并使自身利潤最大化。Robert研究了產(chǎn)能有限的供應(yīng)商的分配策略問題，并給出了最優(yōu)解的必要條件[15]。Robert進(jìn)一步研究了稀缺資源的分配問題，按照利潤最大化和公平的分配原則，確定了稀缺資源的順序分配問題[16]。Yu提出了預(yù)售的觀點(diǎn)，結(jié)果表明，供應(yīng)商的預(yù)售分配數(shù)量和區(qū)別定價(jià)策略隨現(xiàn)有產(chǎn)能變化[17]。高品質(zhì)的供應(yīng)商可以通過在預(yù)售期比低品質(zhì)的供應(yīng)商分配更少的產(chǎn)能來區(qū)分自己[18]。這些研究的重點(diǎn)是時(shí)間限制了供應(yīng)商的產(chǎn)能，本文研究供應(yīng)商生產(chǎn)能力的有限對(duì)分銷策略的影響。

基于上述情況，研究產(chǎn)能有限的供應(yīng)商為下游企業(yè)供貨的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)，供應(yīng)商可以只發(fā)揮供應(yīng)商的作用，把企業(yè)當(dāng)成向市場銷售產(chǎn)品的中介，也可以直接向市場銷售產(chǎn)品，更可以采用雙渠道策略。在供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)能有限的情況下，本文通過分析供應(yīng)商的利潤，探討供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)定價(jià)、最優(yōu)產(chǎn)能和最優(yōu)分配策略。

1 問題描述與模型假設(shè)

圖1 供應(yīng)商雙渠道分銷模式

Figure 1 Dual channel distribution model of the supplier

表1 模型參數(shù)及意義

2 產(chǎn)能有限的模型分析

2.1 雙渠道銷售策略分析

企業(yè)和供應(yīng)商的利潤如下

供應(yīng)商采取雙渠道銷售的策略如表2所示。

表2 雙渠道分配策略

圖2 供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)產(chǎn)能策略

Figure 2 Supplier’s optimal capacity strategy

2.2 供應(yīng)商渠道選擇分析

供應(yīng)商采取零售商渠道的利潤為：

首先，通過比較區(qū)域II、區(qū)域III、區(qū)域IV的雙渠道利潤，區(qū)域Ⅲ的雙渠道策略最優(yōu)；其次，通過比較區(qū)域III的雙渠道和直銷渠道的利潤，得到區(qū)域III的雙渠道策略優(yōu)于直銷策略；最后，通過比較區(qū)域III的雙渠道和零售商渠道的利潤，得出結(jié)論如下：（證明過程略）

首先，比較區(qū)域III和區(qū)域V的雙渠道利潤，其次，通過比較雙渠道和直銷渠道、零售商渠道的利潤，得出結(jié)論如下：（證明過程略）

圖3 供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)渠道決策

Figure 3 Supplier’s optimal channel decision

3 擴(kuò)展模型分析

現(xiàn)實(shí)問題中，一個(gè)供應(yīng)商往往對(duì)應(yīng)多個(gè)銷售企業(yè)，本節(jié)對(duì)模型進(jìn)行擴(kuò)展，研究一個(gè)供應(yīng)商對(duì)應(yīng)多個(gè)銷售企業(yè)的情況，企業(yè)與企業(yè)之間是競爭關(guān)系，企業(yè)與供應(yīng)商之間既是競爭關(guān)系又是合作關(guān)系。

企業(yè)和供應(yīng)商的利潤如下

企業(yè)競爭下，供應(yīng)商采取雙渠道銷售的策略如表3所示。

表3 雙渠道分配策略

4 算例分析

由上述分析可知，供應(yīng)商采用雙渠道時(shí)，應(yīng)該優(yōu)先滿足銷售企業(yè)的銷售量，供應(yīng)商的渠道選擇與供應(yīng)鏈的盈利能力和供應(yīng)商的產(chǎn)能以及生產(chǎn)成本有關(guān)。以一個(gè)供應(yīng)商為一個(gè)銷售企業(yè)供貨的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)為例，賦予模型參數(shù)數(shù)值，供應(yīng)商渠道選擇結(jié)果如下表4所示。

表4 算例分析

當(dāng)供應(yīng)商和銷售企業(yè)的盈利能力相當(dāng)時(shí)，供應(yīng)商選擇雙渠道比較好，除非，供應(yīng)商的產(chǎn)能極小，直銷渠道優(yōu)于雙渠道。當(dāng)銷售企業(yè)的盈利能力遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于供應(yīng)商的盈利能力時(shí)，選擇零售商渠道比較好。此算例分析進(jìn)一步驗(yàn)證了本文結(jié)論的正確性。

5 結(jié)論

供應(yīng)商的渠道選擇是困擾供應(yīng)商的重要問題，本文在有限產(chǎn)能的背景下來研究這一問題。重點(diǎn)探討了供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)產(chǎn)能和最優(yōu)分配策略。得出的結(jié)論如下：

（1）供應(yīng)商在采取雙渠道策略時(shí)，應(yīng)該優(yōu)先滿足銷售企業(yè)的銷售量。

（2）當(dāng)供應(yīng)商和銷售企業(yè)的盈利能力相當(dāng)時(shí)，供應(yīng)商選擇雙渠道策略比較好，除非，供應(yīng)商的產(chǎn)能極小，直銷渠道優(yōu)于雙渠道；當(dāng)銷售企業(yè)的盈利能力遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于供應(yīng)商的盈利能力時(shí)，選擇零售商渠道比較好。這個(gè)結(jié)論也對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中的銷售渠道作出了解釋，例如小米手機(jī)“饑餓營銷”的直銷渠道策略；大多數(shù)手機(jī)如華為等電子產(chǎn)品“設(shè)立網(wǎng)上旗艦店和零售店”的雙渠道策略；汽車等大型重產(chǎn)品的零售商渠道策略，汽車等大型重產(chǎn)品直銷的盈利能力遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)小于零售店銷售的盈利能力。

根據(jù)實(shí)際情況，當(dāng)消費(fèi)者發(fā)現(xiàn)同樣的產(chǎn)品具有不同的銷售價(jià)格時(shí)，更傾向于直銷的低價(jià)產(chǎn)品，這也被很多研究者證實(shí)。在信息不對(duì)稱的情況下，銷售企業(yè)總是處于不利地位。故本文可以在以下兩個(gè)方面擴(kuò)展研究，一是考慮供應(yīng)鏈各方以及消費(fèi)者偏好對(duì)結(jié)果的影響，例如把社會(huì)心理學(xué)中的公平偏好考慮在內(nèi)，二是進(jìn)一步研究零售商的競爭行為。

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Research on dual-channel distribution strategy with limited production capacity

DUO Yanyan, XIA Weili

（School of Management，Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710129, China）

In the first part of this paper, some background is provided regarding the problem, and the results of existing research are reviewed. In a market economy, suppliers make widespread contributions to multiple sales companies. However, supply may be limited if the supplier has limited capacity. When suppliers cannot meet the volume of orders they receive, they will allocate capacity strategically to maximize profits. This strategic behavior can increase the profitability of suppliers of such products as computers and automobiles, but may cause problems with product configuration in industries such as aviation. The research reviewed covers three aspects: supply channel distribution, supply chain competition, and limited supply capacity.

In the second part of this paper, the research problem is explained in detail. Suppliers can sell products directly to the market, indirectly through sales companies, or implement both approaches simultaneously. Three sales channel structures are possible, depending on the distribution method, namely: retail channels, direct sales channels, and dual-channel structure. The order completion process begins with the supplier determining the wholesale price and the number of products to be assigned to the sales enterprise. Next, the sales enterprise determines the order quantity by predicting market demand. Finally, both parties sell products to the market at the same time. In the case of limited supplier capacity, suppliers’ optimal pricing, optimal production capacity, and optimal distribution strategy are given emphasis, and theoretical references are provided for improving supply chain profit.

In the third part of this paper, a model was developed and the supplier's optimal strategy analyzed. To study the supply chain structure of a supplier with limited capacity who sells products to the market through a sales enterprise, the most relevant research method is game theory. The model establishment and analysis process is as follows: First, under the assumption that the market liquidation price is a linear function of sales volume, a literature search was conducted and logical reasoning was applied to establish the supplier dual channel distribution model, according to the principle of expected profit maximization. Second, the Nash equilibrium is used to find the best wholesale price, based on the optimal production capacity and supply quantity assigned by the supplier. Then, using comparative analysis and the multi-angle compound analysis method, the profit of each supply channel is compared to determine the optimal production capacity and distribution strategy of the supplier. Finally, the research model was extended to cover additional problem scenarios. One supplier often distributes to multiple sales companies, and further studies of this situation may help to draw a more comprehensive conclusion. The results show that: (1) in the case of a large supply capacity, it is more effective for suppliers to use retail channels. However, if the supplier only supplies one sales enterprise and the difference in net profit between the supplier and the enterprise is minimal, the dual channel method would rein superior; (2) In the case of moderate supply capacity, if the profitability of the supplier and that of the sales enterprise are relatively close, adopt a dual-channel strategy; otherwise, if the profitability of the sales enterprise is far greater than that of the given retailer, adopt a retail channel strategy. If the dual-channel method is applied, a greater volume of the supply should be allocated to the sales enterprise; (3) In the case of a small supply capacity, if the difference in profits between the supplier and sales enterprise is minimal, a direct sales channel should be used. As the supply capacity increases, a transition can be made to the dual-channel structure. However, if the supplier would be less profitable than the sales enterprise, a retail channel would be more appropriate; (4) The smaller the profit difference between suppliers and sales enterprises, the more suitable it is to adopt a dual-channel sales approach.

In summary, channel selection is an important problem that plagues suppliers. This paper studies this issue in the context of limited production capacity in the supply chain, focusing on the optimal pricing, optimal production capacity, and optimal allocation strategy of suppliers. When the profitability of suppliers and sales companies is comparable, it is more effective for suppliers to apply a dual-channel strategy, unless the supply capacity is rather scarce, in which case a direct sales channel is a better choice. Alternatively, when the sales enterprise’s net profit greatly exceeds that of the supplier, the best option is to use a retail channel. Furthermore, when adopting a dual-channel strategy, suppliers should allocate a greater volume of the supply to sales companies.

Limited capacity; Allocation strategy; Dual channel; Nash equilibrium

2017-7-20

2018-1-16

Funded Project: Supported by the Humanities and Social Science Foundation of the Ministry of Education (16YJA630068, 18YJA630043), the Aeronautical Science Foundation of China (2016ZG53071), the Natural Social Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province (2018S28) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (G2017KY0101)

F224

A

1004-6062(2020)02-0139-006

10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2020.02.015

2017-07-20

2018-01-16

教育部人文與社會(huì)科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目（16YJA630068、18YJA630043）；航空科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目（2016ZG53071）；陜西省社會(huì)科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目（2018S28）；中央高?；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)資助項(xiàng)目（G2017KY0101）

多彥彥（1992—），女，河南濮陽人；西北工業(yè)大學(xué)碩士研究生；主要研究方向：供應(yīng)鏈管理。

中文編輯：杜 ??；英文編輯：Boping Yan