安德魯·J.斯科特/文　崔佳艷/譯

Economic doomsayers have long warned that the aging populations of industrial and post-industrial countries represent a “demographic time bomb.” Societal aging is bad news for the economy， they say， because it means that fewer people work and contribute to economic growth， and more people collect pensions and demand health care.

經(jīng)濟悲觀論者早就提醒說，老齡化是工業(yè)化和后工業(yè)化國家的人口定時炸彈。他們稱社會老齡化于經(jīng)濟不利，因其意味著勞動人口減少以及養(yǎng)老金領取人數(shù)和醫(yī)療保健需求人數(shù)增加。

The United Nations estimates that between now and 2050， the share of the population aged 60 and older will increase in every country. Though life expectancy tends to be highest in advanced economies， it is growing fastest in emerging markets. The number of people aged 60 and over in developing countries is currently twice that of the developed world. And the UN expects a three-to-one ratio by 2030， and a four-to-one ratio by 2050.

據(jù)聯(lián)合國估計，從目前到2050年，所有國家的60歲及以上人口占比都會有所上升。雖然發(fā)達國家人口的預期壽命往往最長，但新興市場國家人口的預期壽命增長最快。目前，發(fā)展中國家60歲及以上人口數(shù)量是發(fā)達國家的兩倍，聯(lián)合國認為到2030年將增長為3倍，到2050年為4倍。

Within many countries， increased life expectancy and declining birth rates are pushing up the average age of the population. In Japan， the median age has risen from 26 in 1952 to 49 today. In China， it has risen from 24 to 39 over the same period， and is expected to reach 48 by 2050.

在許多國家，預期壽命延長和出生率不斷降低正推動著人口平均年齡不斷攀升。比如日本的中位數(shù)年齡已從1952年的26歲增長到如今的49歲。同期，中國的中位數(shù)年齡也從24歲增長到39歲，到2050年預計會增長到48歲。

The argument that aging will weaken these countries economies stems from what economists call the old-age dependency ratio （OADR）—the proportion of the population over 64， relative to the working-age population （those aged 15 to 64）. If one assumes that old people are unproductive consumers of government benefits， then a rising OADR implies slower economic growth and mounting pressure on public budgets.

老齡化會削弱國家經(jīng)濟這一論點源于經(jīng)濟學家口中的老年撫養(yǎng)比，即64歲以上人口與勞動年齡（15—64歲）人口之比。假設老年人不具備生產能力，只是政府福利的消費者，那么老年撫養(yǎng)比的增長意味著經(jīng)濟發(fā)展變緩以及公共預算壓力逐漸增加。

But what if this assumption is mistaken？ Governments are concerned about your age not because they want to know how many candles to buy for your birthday cake， but because it affects productivity and health-related spending. And if those are the factors that really matter， then the changing conditions of aging are far more rele-vant than the share of the population that has reached some arbitrary1 threshold2 of years on the planet.

但倘若這一假設是錯的，會是什么樣？政府關心你的年齡，原因不在于想了解要為你的生日蛋糕買多少根蠟燭，而是因為年齡會對生產力和醫(yī)療支出產生影響。如果這些因素確實重要，那么，比起地球上達到任意某個年齡值的人口占比，老齡化的變動狀況更有意義。

Measuring aging gracefully

老齡化的細致判定

The concept of “aging” is not as straightforward as it seems. Obviously， aging has a chronological component， expressed in the straightforward question： “How old are you？” But it can also be viewed in terms that are biological （“You look good for your age”）， subjective （“You are as old as you feel”）， and sociological （“You shouldnt be doing that at your age”）. Policymakers sole focus on chronological age3 is a 200-year-old artifact from the era when governments first started keeping reliable birth records.

“老齡化”概念看似直白，其實不然。它含有明顯的時間要素，體現(xiàn)在簡單的問句中，如“您多大了？”。但還可以從其他角度來看待這個概念，包括生理學（“您看著顯年輕”）、主觀意義（“您覺著自己多大年紀就多大年紀”）和社會學（“您這個年紀不應該這么做了”）。政府對出生記錄最早可靠的記載就只關注實際年齡，至今已有200年傳統(tǒng)。

If the various dimensions of aging could be embodied in a single immutable4 concept， focusing on a benchmark such as chronological age would not be a problem. Yet the biological， subjective， and sociological components of aging are not immutable. On the contrary， their relationships with one another have shifted over time.

如果不同層面的老齡化可以體現(xiàn)在單一恒定的概念中，那么只以實際年齡為基準是不存在什么問題的。然而，生物、主觀和社會意義上的老齡化并非一成不變的，彼此間的關系會隨時間的推移而改變。

The average age of the US population has steadily increased since 1950， but the average mortality rate has trended down. In other words， the average US citizen has become chronologically older but biologically younger. And the same trends can be found in other advanced economies， including the United Kingdom， Sweden， France， and Germany.

自1950年以來，美國人口平均年齡持續(xù)穩(wěn)定上升，平均死亡率卻呈下降趨勢。換言之，美國普通民眾的實際年齡變大，生理年齡卻更小了。英國、瑞典、法國和德國在內的其他發(fā)達國家也存在類似趨勢。

Given the decline in average mortality， one cannot say unambiguously5 that these societies have aged. Average mortality rates are driven by two factors， only one of which could properly be called “aging.” As countries industrialize， they undergo a “demographic transition” from higher to lower birth rates. This shift implies that older cohorts of the population will increase in size， and that average overall mortality will rise， because mortality rates are higher for older people.

考慮到平均死亡率的下降，無法明確地說上述國家已老齡化。推動平均死亡率上升的因素有二，準確地說老齡化只是其中一個因素。隨著國家工業(yè)化的發(fā)展，各國經(jīng)歷從高出生率到低出生率的“人口轉型”。這意味著老年人口規(guī)模將會變大，且總體平均死亡率將上升，因為老年人中死亡率更高。

But over the past few decades， this aging effect has been offset by a “l(fā)ongevity effect”. Owing to medical advances and other factors （for example， lower rates of smoking）， mortality rates at all ages have fallen. In actuarial6 terms， this means that people are younger for longer. Whereas the aging effect captures changes in the age distribution， the longevity effect addresses how we are aging. And in a country like the US， where the average age has increased while average mortality rates have fallen， it is clear that the longevity effect has more than offset the aging effect.

然而，在過去的幾十年內，老齡化效應已與“長壽效應”相抵消。醫(yī)療進步和吸煙率下降等因素降低了全年齡段的死亡率。用精算術語來說，這意味著人們年輕的時期延長了。老齡化效應反映了年齡分布的變化，而長壽效應解釋的是變老的過程。在美國這樣的國家，平均年齡的上升伴隨著平均死亡率的下降，顯然其長壽效應已遠遠抵消了老齡化效應。

The “New 65”

“新65歲”

The divergence7 between biological and chronological age points to a familiar problem in economics： the confusion between nominal and real variables. In the US， a 75-year-old today has the same mortality rate as a 65-year-old in 1952. Similarly， in Japan， 80 is the “new 65.” As an actuarial matter， then， todays 75-year-olds are not any older than the 65-year-olds of the 1950s.

生理年齡和實際年齡的差異指向了一個熟悉的經(jīng)濟學問題，即名義變量和實際變量的混淆。如今，美國75歲人口與1952年65歲人口的死亡率相同。同樣，日本的80歲是“新65歲”。因而從精算角度講，現(xiàn)在的75歲老人并不比上世紀50年代的65歲老人更老。

One can use changes in mortality rates to adjust for “age inflation” and determine an average real mortality age. In doing so， one finds essentially no increase in average “real” （mortality-adjusted） age in the UK， Sweden， or France， and barely any increase in the US.

人們可以根據(jù)死亡率的變化做出“年齡通脹”調整，確定平均實際死亡年齡。這樣一來，不難發(fā)現(xiàn)英國、瑞典和法國這些國家在根據(jù)死亡率調整后的平均“實際”年齡實質上沒有增長。美國也基本如此。

Mortality-adjusted indicators of aging provide a radically different perspective on what is happening to OADRs in advanced economies. When using chronological age， the OADRs in the US， the UK， France， and Sweden have all been increasing; but in mortality-adjusted terms， they have all actually declined.

根據(jù)死亡率調整后的老齡化指標為發(fā)達國家的“老年撫養(yǎng)比”情況提供了全然不同的角度。以實際年齡為依據(jù)時，美國、英國、法國和瑞典的老年撫養(yǎng)比都在不斷上升，但根據(jù)死亡率調整后，老年撫養(yǎng)比其實都下降了。

A policy challenge for the ages

老年人口政策上的一項挑戰(zhàn)

From this perspective， one can see the flawed assumptions underlying the conventional “demographic time bomb” narrative， which makes no distinction between aging and longevity effects. What is needed is a more nuanced8 approach that reflects the multidimensional aspects of aging. Although the average person now lives a longer， healthier life， that does not hold true for everyone. Behind the average health figures are noticeable differences based on income， education， genetics， lifestyle， and environment. And as more people advance in years， these dispar-ities will become increasingly obvious.

以此來看，“人口定時炸彈”這一傳統(tǒng)敘事下的假說存在漏洞，沒有區(qū)分老齡化效應和長壽效應。不同維度的老齡化需通過更細致的方式來體現(xiàn)。盡管普通民眾已過上更長壽、健康的生活，但并非人人如此。平均健康數(shù)據(jù)的背后是收入、教育、基因、生活方式和環(huán)境方面的顯著差異。隨著越來越多人步入老年，這些差異也會愈加明顯。

All countries still need programs to support those who are aging in a traditional sense; but there is also a growing need for more flexible policies to help older workers reap the benefits of longer， more productive lives. Increasing the official retirement age—one of the most common policy responses to the “aging society” problem—does not advance these other goals. And for those not benefiting from longer， healthier lives， it amounts to a cruel， retrograde intervention.

各國仍需出臺計劃供養(yǎng)傳統(tǒng)意義上的老齡化人口，但靈活運用政策幫扶大齡勞動者享受更長壽、充實生活的需求也在日益增長。提高法定退休年齡常用于應對老齡化社會問題，但無助于以上各項目標的達成。對于享受不到健康長壽生活的人來說，這無異于一種殘酷、適得其反的干預。

Governments need to develop pol-icies to help older， still-productive citizens find full-time employment or more flexible work arrangements. Unlike aging， longevity opens the door for policies that go well beyond end-of-life issues. Significantly longer lives， the twentieth-century historian Peter Laslett observed， invite us to draw up “a fresh map of life” itself.

政府需要制定政策幫助有余熱的老年人實現(xiàn)全職上崗或靈活就業(yè)。不同于老齡化，長壽為超越生命終結問題的政策開啟了大門。20世紀歷史學家彼得·拉斯利特認為，壽命的顯著延長要求我們?yōu)樯旧砻枥L一幅新地圖。

To maximize the advantages of longevity， we will need to rethink both education and traditional career paths， while ensuring that todays younger generations live as long and as healthily as possible.

我們需要重新思考未來的教育和傳統(tǒng)職業(yè)道路，從而最大限度利用長壽的優(yōu)勢，同時確保當今的年輕一代過上盡可能長壽健康的生活。

It is time to stop worrying about “aging societies” and start focusing on the type of demographic change that really matters. Governments should provide those in a position to reap the benefits of longer， healthier lives with opportunities to do so， while minimizing the number of people who are denied longevity. By investing in a longevity dividend， we can reduce the threat of an aging society.

當前，我們應停止對“老齡化社會”的擔憂，著眼于真正事關重大的人口變化形式。政府要為能享受到健康長壽生活的老人提供這樣的機會，同時盡量降低無法長壽的人口的數(shù)量。通過對長壽紅利方面的投資，可以減少老齡化社會帶來的威脅。

（譯者為“《英語世界》杯”翻譯大賽獲獎者）

1 arbitrary任意的；武斷的。? 2 threshold起點。

3 chronological age實際年齡（相對于身體、智力或情感方面的發(fā)展而言）。? 4 im-mutable永恒的；不可改變的。? 5 unambiguously不含糊地，明確地。

6 actuarial保險精算的。? 7 divergence偏離；背離。

8 nuanced有細微差別的。