Although the US policy focus on the Indo-Pacific region began under the Obama administration, it is the Trump administration that has clearly put forward the Indo-Pacific strategy. So far, the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacifi c strategy has gone through three phases, namely its proposition as a vision in 2017, its clarifi cation as a strategy in 2018, and its systematic implementation as a policy since 2019. In June 2019, the US Department of Defense issued the Indo-Pacifi c Strategy Report, identifying three priorities for maintaining American influence to achieve regional goals: readiness, partnership and promoting regional networking. The so-called readiness is meant to seek peace through strength, and ensure the realization of US strategic objectives by adopting effective deterrence; partnership refers to strengthening commitment to existing allies and partners, while expanding and deepening new partnerships with countries that respect sovereignty, fair trade and the rule of law; and promoting regional networking highlights enhancing and advancing the US alliance system and partnerships to form a networked security architecture to maintain a rule-based international order.

After three years of deliberation and planning, the US Indo-Pacific strategy has basically completed in terms strategic design, such as target orientation and path to realization, and progress has also been made in policy implementation in military/security, political/economic, and institutional domains. These practices underscore the importance the US has attached to military build-up in its Indo-Pacifi c strategy, which refl ects the priority given to security; while deepening relations with allies and partners, the US is trying to transform them, which highlights the importance given to both development and remodeling; and the US continues to promote the regional networking and institutionalize the “quadrilateral dialog”, which features “inheritance and innovation”.

The reason why the US proposed the Indo-Pacifi c strategy is ostensibly related to Trump administration’s tendency to “de-Obamaniz”, as well as to Japan’s vigorous promotion. But fundamentally speaking, it is the outcome of a continuing adjustment of America’s national security strategy. In the wake of the Cold War, the strategic objective for national security set by the US was to ensure its status as the “only superpower” of the world, and prevent the emergence of regional hegemonies that could threaten American interests. During this period, the US was expanding constantly in both Europe and Asia with the aftereffects of its Cold War victory. At the end of the 1990s, NATO’s eastward expansion established its advantage in Europe, after which the US began to tilt (rather than shift) its strategic focus toward Asia. Since the beginning of the new century, the Bush Jr. administration’s global anti-terrorism strategy, to a large extent, put the process on hold. In this period, the US was deeply mired in two wars. Particularly after the global financial crisis, the national strength of the United States was so overdrawn that the global expansion of its strategic layout was difficult to continue. In another word, the US had to adjust its global and regional strategies in the context of its declining hegemony. This adjustment is a kind of strategic one, which is manifested as “tactical contraction” to some extent, such as leading from behind, trying to withdraw from the Afghanistan war and the Iraqi war, reducing international intervention or even frequently withdrawing from international treaties and organizations. However, this has not changed the nature of America’s strategic expansion, as it can be said the US has adopted a strategic mode of “tactical contraction and strategic offense” instead.

Given the fact that the security situation in Europe eased and the importance of the Asia-Pacifi c rose in terms of geo-economic development and geo-political challenges, the Obama administration proposed the “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy, and shifted America’s diplomatic and strategic focus eastward, while the “Indo-Pacific” strategy pursued by the Trump administration is a continuation and consolidation of this strategic adjustment. Visibly, whether it is the “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy or the “Indo-Pacifi c” strategy, they are all concrete embodiments of the national security strategic adjustment of the United States against the background of its hegemony decline. This has determined the three characteristics of America’s Asia-Pacifi c or Indo-Pacifi c strategy. First, this is the strategy adopted by the US to cope with changes of the international power distribution pattern as well as the geopolitical and economic landscape, which is carried out in the context that the US power is relatively weakening. Therefore, either the Asia-Pacific strategy or the Indo-Pacific strategy has both active and positive elements. Second, the implementation of the Asia-Pacifi c or the Indo-Pacifi c strategy is not a smooth one, and it is uncertain whether or to what extent the desired goals will be achieved. Third, the strategy of the United States in the Asia-Pacific or even in the Indo-Pacifi c region has certain continuity and sustainability, which will not change with the change of its specifi c name.

The Indo-Pacifi c strategy of the United States is obviously intended at China. Whether it is at the security level, or the economic level, or even at the level of regional infl uence, China is the primary focus of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Apparently, the competition between China and the US has become more prominent and risky due to the Indo-Pacifi c strategy promoted by the United States. In the face of pressure and challenges brought by the Indo-Pacifi c strategy of the United States, China’s diplomacy needs a scientifi c thinking as strategic guidance, as well as detailed strategic deployment and tactical coordination, so as to achieve the unity of strategy and tactics. In terms of strategy, China should, under the guidance of Xi Jiping’s thought on diplomacy, take into account both international and domestic situations, balance development and security, stick to the bottom line thinking, be more mindful of potential dangers, improve the ability of planning and operation, and work to build a system of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.

In terms of tactics, China needs to achieve linkages at global, regional, China-US bilateral and domestic levels, and concentrate on dealing with the principal contradiction of strategic competition from the United States. Specifically, at the global level, China should promote a balanced development of relations with Russia, the EU and other major countries, and strengthen unity and cooperation with the developing countries under the idea of working together to build a community with a shared future for mankind, and by taking the building of the Belt and Road as a leverage, so as to broaden its international space, take the moral high ground, and maintain strategic initiative. At the regional level, China should, under the guidance of correct concept of justice and interests, deepen reciprocal cooperation with neighboring countries, consolidate and improve the China-ASEAN “10+1” and the ASEAN “10+3” mechanisms, properly handle maritime security issues, advocate open regionalism, uphold the security philosophy of dialog, inclusiveness and cooperation, and actively promote the building of regional security mechanisms. At the bilateral level, China needs to maintain a smooth high-level exchange mechanism with the United States, explore and expand new areas for cooperation, maintain and promote social and cultural exchanges between the two countries, and improve the mechanism of crisis prevention and management. At the domestic level, we must stick to the strategic focus and bottom line thinking, remain committed to doing our own job well, earnestly handle the relations between reform, development and stability, and continue to modernize China’s governance system and capacity. This is not only the fundamental guarantee for China to realize its national rejuvenation, but also the key to dealing with a variety of complex and serious challenges.

(Chen Jimin is the deputy director and professor at the Division of World’ Trends of Thought under the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Party School of Central Committee of CPC (National Academy of Governance) and Guest Researcher of CPDS; and Feng Zhennan is a graduate student at the Graduate School of the Party School of Central Committee of CPC (National Academy of Governance). This article was received on Oct. 20, 2020.)